05000278/LER-2003-001, Loss of Capability of the 10CFR.50 Appendix R Alternate Control Station

Loss of Capability of the 10CFR.50 Appendix R Alternate Control Station

ML031900043
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	07/01/2003
From:	Stone J Exelon Nuclear
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 03-001-00
Download: ML031900043 (7)

LER-2003-001, Loss of Capability of the 10CFR.50 Appendix R Alternate Control Station

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
2782003001R00 - NRC Website

text

Exeon.m Exelon Nuclear Telephone 717.456.7014 Nuclear Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station www.exeloncorp.com 1848 Lay Road Delta, PA 17314-9032 1 OCFR 50.73 July 1, 2003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 Facility Operating License No. DPR-56 NRC Docket No. 50-278

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) 3-03-01 This LER reports a condition concerning the unavailability of the Unit 3 alternate control station in the event of certain 1 OCFR 50 Appendix R fires. This condition was discovered on 5/13/03 during the performance of a routine surveillance test. In accordance with NEI 99-04, the regulatory commitment contained in this correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations. The specific methods that are planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER. If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely, hn A. Stone ant Manager each Bottom Atomic Power Station JAS/djf/CR158665 Attachment cc:

PSE&G, Financial Controls and Co-owner Affairs R. R. Janati, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania INPO Records Center H. J. Miller, US NRC, Administrator, Region I R. I. McLean, State of Maryland A. C. McMurtray, US NRC, Senior Resident Inspector CCN 03-14056

bcc:

J. L. Skolds - Cantera I C. G. Pardee - KSA 3-N Jeff Benjamin - Cantera 1 J. A. Stone - PB, A4-1S E. J. Eilola - PB, A4-1S G. L. Stathes, PB, SMB 3-7 P. J. Davison - PB, A3-1S J. P. Grimes - KSA 2-N G. L. Johnston - KSA 3-N R. A. Kankus - KSB 3-S A. J. Sherwood - PB, TC S. C. Beck - PB, A4-5S M. P. Gallagher - KSA 3-E D. P. Helker - KSA 3-E K. Langdon - PB, SMB4-6 Commitment Coordinator - KSA 3-E Site Commitment Coordinator - A4-5S Correspondence Control Desk - KSA 1-N-1 DAC - KSA 1-N-1

e SUMMARY OF EXELON NUCLEAR COMMITMENTS The following table identifies commitments made in this document by Exelon Nuclear.

(Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Exelon Nuclear. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.)

Commitment

Committed Date or "Outage" In accordance with NEI 99-04, the In accordance with the Corrective Action regulatory commitment contained in this Program correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations. The specific methods that are planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER.

KkC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 630-2001 (1-2001)

COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatoryiinformation collectionrequest 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated Into the licensing process and fedbark

.to industy. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch l

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U.S. NuclearRegulatoryCommission, Washington, AdC265-,0 or by Iternet LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) olwclffiocc cvclt l acrvz I oco~emailto bisi nrc.gov andtotheDeskOfficer,Offlce of lnformationandR ulat

Affairs, NEOB-102a2 (3150-0164), Oflice ofManagement and Budgt Wahngtn C2

.i a (See reverse for required number of means used to impose Information collection does not disO a cu alid MB control digitslcharacters for each block) number, the NRC not conduct or sponsor, anda person Is not required t respond t. the FACILITY NAME (1) 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 1 PAGE(23 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 l

05000 278 1 OF 4

TITLE 14)

Loss of Capabilit of the Unit 3 IOCFR 50 Append R Alternate Control Station EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NWUBER MO DAY YEAR YEAR NEUMERlA I N MO DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 5

5 03 03 0 01 00 07 1

03 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMrrTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR hCheck an that apple) I'l)

MODE (9) 1

_ 20.2201()

_ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

_ 50.73(a)(2)(1x)(A)

POWER

_ 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iiO 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 100 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(lv)(A)

_ 73.71 (a)(4) f

__20.220a)(2_

50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

_ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

_ 73.71 (a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

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_50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

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~~UiCE NSE E CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Ellen Anderson - Regulatory Assurance Manager

(.717 456-3588 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DSREDIN TrIlS REPORT (13)

CAUSE

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CAUSE

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTEDN(14) CEOXT F

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DATE (15)

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ABSTrrACT ILimrit to 140M0 soaces. i e.. anoroximratelv 15 sirnalesncaed Svoweeten Hnes)I 116)

On 5/14/03, at 0410 hours0.00475 days <br />0.114 hours <br />6.779101e-4 weeks <br />1.56005e-4 months <br />, an operability evaluation performed by a shift supervisor determined that the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection AHPCI)

Alternate Control Station (ACS) for Fire Safe Shutdown was inoperable. This inoperability was due to the fact that multiple instruments were de-energized as a result of a failed wire on a power supply. This resulted in Operations personnel not having the capability to implement actions required for plant safe shutdown from the ACS if a ONCFR 50 Appendix R fire were to occur. The HPCI ACS is required if a significant fire were to occur in the Cable Spreading Room, Main Control Room or the Main Control Room Fan Room. Repairs to the broken wire were promptly made and the ACS was restored to an operable status on 5/14/03 by 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br />. There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this event. Investigation determined that the broken wire occurred during previous maintenance activities on 5/5/03.

Further review of the post maintenance testing performed on 5/6/03 revealed that the I&C technicians involved with the work did not perform sufficient post maintenance testing as required. The involved I&C technicians have been counseled and expectations for strict compliance with the work order requirements have been reinforced. There were no previous similar events identified.

NRC FORM 366(1-2001) sf more space Is Xquired, use dftional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Formn 366A) (17)

Analysis of the Event

There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this event. Once identified, repairs were promptly completed and the U/3 HPCI ACS was returned to an operable status.

The purpose of the Unit 3 HPCI ACS is to provide the capability to bring the unit to a safe shutdown condition for significant fires that could occur in the Cable Spreading Room, Main Control Room or the Main Control Room Fan Room. Fires in these areas have the potential to prevent plant safe shutdown from the Main Control Room. The affected ACS is one of four ACS's for Unit 3 and allows for operation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs).

It also provides diagnostic instrumentation for HPCI, RHR, HPSW and Emergency Service Water (ESW) systems as well as reactor process monitoring instrumentation. The other three ACS's (which were unaffected by this event) allow operation of Emergency Switchgear, Diesel Generators, and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) relief valves.

The power supply affected provides power to instrumentation associated with the HPCI ACS. The instrumentation is used to monitor the status of various reactor, primary containment (including suppression pool), HPCI, RHR, and ESW parameters.

The HPCI turbine emergency speed control system was also affected resulting in not being able to use the HPCI system for level control. The emergency procedures recognize that the Reactor Cooling Isolation Control (RCIC) system may be able to be used for certain fire scenarios in lieu of HPCI. Operation of other required safe shut down equipment for Unit 3 was unaffected by this event.

Also, Unit 2 Appendix R safe shutdown capability was unaffected by this event.

The duration of the unavailability of the affected equipment on the HPCI ACS was approximately 9 days. It was determined that this duration was not risk significant. PBAPS Technical Specifications allow HPCI to be out of service for up to 14 days prior to initiating plant actions. There was no affect on the ability for HPCI to perform its intended safety function for non-fire related design basis events. Control room instrumentation and the ability to monitor and operate plant equipment from the Main Control Room was unaffected by this event.

During the duration of this event, the ability to detect fires in the Main Control Room, Cable Spreading Room or Main Control Room Fan Room was maintained.

Manual fire suppression capability was available during this time.

Cause of the Event

The cause of the event was due to a broken wire on the instrumentation power supply in the HPCI ACS. Investigation determined that the broken wire occurred during previous maintenance activities on 5/5/03.

On 5/5/03, a routine calibration of the inverter associated with the power supply was being performed. The inverter had been removed to perform the calibration. To facilitate removal of the inverter, the I&C technician (utility, non-licensed personnel) moved the power supply about 1 inch to allow access to the inverter which was just below the power supply in the HPCI ACS. It was determined that when the power supply was moved, stress was placed on the positive wire feeding the power supply from the inverter. This stress caused the wire to break. Due to the tight location within the panel, the I&C technician did not notice that the wire had broken.

(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)Further review of the post maintenance testing performed on 5/6/03 revealed that the I&C technicians involved with the work did not perform sufficient post maintenance testing as required. The post maintenance testing for the job required, in part, that a loop check to the power supply be performed. Contrary to this requirement, the loop check was not performed.

Corrective Actions

The involved I&C technicians have been counseled and expectations for strict compliance with the work order requirements have been reinforced.

Additionally, this event has been shared with the maintenance organization to highlight the importance of strict compliance to the post maintenance requirements of the work order.

Previous Similar Occurrences There were no previous events identified involving the loss of fire safe shutdown capability due to post maintenance human performance issues.