Letter Sequence Request |
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CAC:MG0181, Provide RISK-INFORMED Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4B (Approved, Closed) |
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MONTHYEARML17086A4512017-02-21021 February 2017 02-21-17 NRC Final Revision of Appendix X to NEI 05-04, 07-12, 12-16, Close-Out of Facts and Observations (F&Os) Project stage: Request ML17243A0112017-08-30030 August 2017 Measurement Uncertainty Recapture License Amendment Request - Supplement 4 Response to Request for Additional Information Project stage: Supplement ML17243A0142017-08-30030 August 2017 Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors Project stage: Request ML17249A0722017-09-0505 September 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Slides for Sept 6, 2017, Public Meeting to Discuss NEIs Model 10 CFR 50.69 License Amendment Request Project stage: Meeting ML17272B0162017-10-10010 October 2017 Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Adoption of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 50.69 (CAC Nos. MG0181-82; EPID L-2017-LLA-0281) Project stage: Acceptance Review ML17297B5212017-10-24024 October 2017 Supplement to Application to Adopt 10CFR50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors Project stage: Supplement ML17300A2762017-10-27027 October 2017 Acceptance Review - Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 - License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 (CAC Nos. MG0181 and MG0182; EPID L-2017-LLA-0281) Project stage: Acceptance Review ML18005A0772018-01-0909 January 2018 Regulatory Audit Plan Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 (CAC Nos. MG0181 and MG0182; EPID L-2017-LLA-0281) Project stage: Other ML18096B5062018-04-0606 April 2018 Request for Additional Information Exelon Generation Company, LLC Requested Amendment to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 for Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components Project stage: RAI ML18072A3722018-04-10010 April 2018 Regulatory Audit Summary Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 50.69 Project stage: Other ML18128A0092018-05-0707 May 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Plants Project stage: Response to RAI ML18157A2602018-06-0606 June 2018 Supplemental Information to Support Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Plants Project stage: Supplement ML18178A4772018-06-27027 June 2018 Request for Additional Information 2nd Round - Adopt 50.69 License Amendment Project stage: RAI ML18192A1192018-07-10010 July 2018 Request for Additional Information 2nd Round (Final) - Adopt 50.69 License Amendment Project stage: RAI ML18200A2742018-07-17017 July 2018 Request for Additional Information 2nd Round (Final) - Adopt 50.69 License Amendment Project stage: RAI 05000277/LER-2018-002, Unit 3, Emergency Diesel Generator Air Inlet Check Valve Failure Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications2018-08-10010 August 2018 Unit 3, Emergency Diesel Generator Air Inlet Check Valve Failure Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Project stage: Request ML18222A3872018-08-10010 August 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information and Supplemental Information - Application to Adopt 1 O CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components . Project stage: Supplement ML18234A1872018-08-22022 August 2018 Supplemental Information - Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Plants Project stage: Supplement ML18263A2322018-10-25025 October 2018 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 321 and 324 to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 (CAC Nos. MG0181 and MG0181; EPID L-2017-LLA-0281) Project stage: Approval ML18302A2572018-11-0101 November 2018 Correction to Amendment Nos. 321 and 324 to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structure, Systems and Components (CAC Nos. MG0181 and MGO182; EPID L-2017-LLA-0281) Project stage: Other 2018-11-01
[Table View] |
LER-2018-002, Unit 3, Emergency Diesel Generator Air Inlet Check Valve Failure Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
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| 2772018002R00 - NRC Website |
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text
Exelon Generation CCN: 18-76 August 10, 2018 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A TIN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 10CFR 50.73 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Unit 2 and Unit 3 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-44 and DPR-56 NRC Docket No. 50-277 and 50-278
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER) 2-18-002 Enclosed is a Licensee Event Report concerning a violation of Technical Specifications caused by a failure of an Emergency Diesel Generator. In accordance with NEI 99-04, the regulatory commitment contained in this correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations.
The specific methods that have been planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact Jim Kovalchick at 717-456-3351.
Sincerely,
---...,_,, ~
~A.
Henry Director Site Operations Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station DAH/dnd/IR 4146926 Enclosure cc:
US NRC, Administrator, Region I US NRC, Senior Resident Inspector R. R. Janati, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania S. Gray, State of Maryland B. Watkins, PSE&G, Financial Controls and Co-Owner Affairs
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)
Estinated burden per response to comply wit11 th~ mandatory collection request: BO hours.
c,,'-f>'RR£cu<.,>
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Reported lessoos learned are incorporated '1to the licensing process and led back m industry. Send comments regarding burden estinete to the Information Services Branch
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(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
(T-2 F43). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm~ s ion, Washngton, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mai I!!
n ta lnlocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and
- ! ~
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget.
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Washngton. DC 20503. II a means used ta inl>ose an nlonnatioo colection does not
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httg:llwww.nrc.gov/reading-rmldoc-collections/nuregs/staft/sr1022/r30 display a currently valid OMB coolrol nurroer, the NRC may not oanducl or sponsor, and a persoo ~not required to respond to, the nfonnatoo coUection
- 3. Page Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 05000277 1
OF 4
- 4. Title Emergency Diesel Generator Air Inlet Check Valve Failure Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
- 5. Event Date
- 6. LEA Number
- 7. Report Date
- 8. Other Facilities Involved I
Sequential I Rev Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Number No.
Month Day Year Peach Bottom Atomic Power Sta. Unit 3 05000278 Facility Name Docket Number 06 13 2018 2018 - 002 0
08 10 2018 05000
- 9. Operating Mode
- 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 0 20.2201{b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2201(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 1 D 20.2203(a)(1 i D
D so.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71 (a)(S)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1>
100%
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 13.n(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[8] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 13.77(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D Other (Specify in Abstract below or in SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002 E-3 EOG. The air inlet check valves for the three remaining EOGs were inspected with no concerns identified. All three EOGs remained operable while E-3 was being repaired.
REV NO.
0 Repairs were completed, post-mqintenance testing performed and the E-3 EOG was declared operable at 7: 1 O pm on 6/23/18. As a result of this event, the E-3 EOG was inoperable for repairs for approximately 9 days, 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />. The previous surveillance test was performed on 5/20/18, 24 days prior to the failed surveillance on 6/13/18. Analysis determined the E-3 EOG would have performed its design function at the time of the May surveillance test, but potentially not afterward. As a result, the E-3 EOG is considered to have been inoperable for a total of approximately 34 days. This exceeds the TS 3.8.1 allowed outage time of 14 days. As a result, this event is being reported in accordance with 1 OCFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), for any operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this event. The plant's safety analysis assumes one EOG is unavailable. If a design basis event had occurred during the time the E-3 EOG was inoperable, the units could have been safely shutdown with the three remaining EOGs.
Cause of the Event
The cause was determined to be less than adequate repairs to the air inlet check valve during maintenance performed in April of 2017. Several causal factors existed, including shaft bushing wear and inadequate shaft to disk fit, which resulted in higher vibration of the shaft and disk. With the higher vibration, tolerances for the interference fit of the pin to the disk shaft were not adequate to prevent the pin from becoming dislodged.
Corrective Actions
The valve disk, shaft and bushings were replaced and repairs to the EOG were performed as described above. Additional causal factors and corrective actions are documented in the corrective action program.
Previous Similar Occurrences No previous similar occurrences have been identified.
NAC FORM 366A (04-2018)
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| 05000278/LER-2018-001, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Pressure Switch Failure Results in Condition Prohibited by TS | Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Pressure Switch Failure Results in Condition Prohibited by TS | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | | 05000277/LER-2018-001, Fire Safe Shutdown Requirements Not Met for Spurious Operation of Valves at a High-Low Pressure Interface | Fire Safe Shutdown Requirements Not Met for Spurious Operation of Valves at a High-Low Pressure Interface | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000277/LER-2018-002-01, Emergency Diesel Generator Air Inlet Check Valve Failure Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | Emergency Diesel Generator Air Inlet Check Valve Failure Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | | 05000278/LER-2018-002-01, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Resulting in Technical Specification Required Shutdown | Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Resulting in Technical Specification Required Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000278/LER-2018-002, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Resulting in Technical Specification Required Shutdown | Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Resulting in Technical Specification Required Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000277/LER-2018-002, Unit 3, Emergency Diesel Generator Air Inlet Check Valve Failure Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | Unit 3, Emergency Diesel Generator Air Inlet Check Valve Failure Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000278/LER-2018-003, Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Two Condensate Pumps | Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Two Condensate Pumps | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000278/LER-2018-004, Failure of a Main Steam Isolation Valve to Fully Close | Failure of a Main Steam Isolation Valve to Fully Close | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
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