05000275/LER-2011-001, Regarding Mode Transition with Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable

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Regarding Mode Transition with Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable
ML110060174
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 01/05/2011
From: Becker J
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
DCL-11-004 LER 11-001-00
Download: ML110060174 (5)


LER-2011-001, Regarding Mode Transition with Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8)
2752011001R00 - NRC Website

text

III Pacific Gas and

~ ~ Electric Company James R. Becker Diablo Canyon Power Plant Site Vice President Mail Code 104/5/601 p. O. Box 56 January 05, 2011 PG&E Letter DCL-11-004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.3462 Internal: 691.3462 Fax: 805.545.6445 10CFR 50.73 License Event Report 1-2011-001-00: Mode Transition With Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Pacific Gas and Electric Company is submitting the enclosed licensee event report regarding an improper mode transition with an inoperable turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and a failure to meet Technical Specification 3.0.4.

In addition, this event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B).

There are no new or revised regulatory commitments in this report.

\\

This event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

James R. Becker dnpo/2246/50368618 Enclosure cc/enc:

Elmo E. Collins, NRC Region IV Michael S. Peck, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Alan B. Wang, NRR Project Manager INPO Diablo Distribution

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 05000 275 1 OF 4
4. TITLE Mode Transition With Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable
5. EVENT DATE MONTH DAY YEAR 11 06 2010
9. OPERATING MODE 3
10. POWER LEVEL 000
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 2011 -

1 -

0 01 05 2011 05000

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

D 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) o 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4)

[(] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) o 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii) f0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8)

D 73.71(a)(5)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

[(] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Sp~cify in Abstract below or In

B. Event Description

6. LER NUMBER I

SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER 001 REV NO.

00

3. PAGE 3

OF 4

On October 27, 2010, during the lR16 refueling outage, Maintenance completed replacement of the governor and servo on the TD AFW PP 1-1. At 0512 PST on November 6, 2010, Unit 1 entered Mode 3.

On November 6,2010, at 2222 PST, DCPP commenced Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) P-AFW-11, "Routine Surveillance Test of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump I-I." This procedure was also used with a maintenance procedure to set the speed of the governor, with support from Maintenance personnel, and also served as post-maintenance testing (PMT) for TD AFW PP 1-1. When steam was admitted to TD AFW PP 1-1 to raise the speed, test personnel observed speeds in excess of 4,300 rpm, at which point the governor had still not assumed control.

Maintenance personnel made internal adjustments to the governor in order to achieve a pump speed below 4,260 rpm (the maximum allowable recirculation speed stated in the surveillance procedure). After the adjustments, the pump reached a recirculation speed of 4,210 rpm. The test was completed satisfactorily and the TD AFW PP 1-1 was secured on November 7, 2010, at 0026 PST.

C. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected

No additional safety systems were adversely affected by this event.

D. Method of Discovery

The condition was discovered on January 3,2011 when it was recognized that TD AFW PP 1-1 had excessive pump speed prior to governor adjustment.

E. Status of Inoperable Structures, Systems, or Components that Contributed to the Event When the pump recirculation speed exceeded 4,300 rpm without governor intervention, TD AFW PP 1-1 was considered inoperable because it operated at a speed outside the band specified in the test procedure and in DCPP's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Motor-driven AFW pumps 1-2 and 1-3 remained operable during this event.

F. Operator Actions

Operations utilized Maintenance support to adjust pump speed within an acceptable range.

G. Safety System Responses Not applicable for this event.

III. Cause of the Problem To be provided in the supplemental report.

IV. Assessment of Safety Consequences

To be provided in the supplemental report.

V. Corrective Actions

A. Immediate Corrective Actions

2. DOCKET YEAR 05000 275 2011
6. LER NUMBER I

SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER REV NO.

001

- 00 Operations utilized Maintenance support to adjust pump speed within an acceptable range.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence (CAPR)

To be provided in the supplemental report.

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed Components / Extent of Condition

B. Previous Similar Events

C. Industry Reports To be provided in the supplemental report. 3. PAGE 4

OF 4