LER-2011-001, Regarding Mode Transition with Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) |
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| 2752011001R00 - NRC Website |
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text
III Pacific Gas and
~ ~ Electric Company James R. Becker Diablo Canyon Power Plant Site Vice President Mail Code 104/5/601 p. O. Box 56 January 05, 2011 PG&E Letter DCL-11-004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.3462 Internal: 691.3462 Fax: 805.545.6445 10CFR 50.73 License Event Report 1-2011-001-00: Mode Transition With Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable
Dear Commissioners and Staff:
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Pacific Gas and Electric Company is submitting the enclosed licensee event report regarding an improper mode transition with an inoperable turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and a failure to meet Technical Specification 3.0.4.
In addition, this event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B).
There are no new or revised regulatory commitments in this report.
\\
This event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.
James R. Becker dnpo/2246/50368618 Enclosure cc/enc:
Elmo E. Collins, NRC Region IV Michael S. Peck, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Alan B. Wang, NRR Project Manager INPO Diablo Distribution
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 05000 275 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Mode Transition With Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable
- 5. EVENT DATE MONTH DAY YEAR 11 06 2010
- 9. OPERATING MODE 3
- 10. POWER LEVEL 000
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 2011 -
1 -
0 01 05 2011 05000
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) o 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4)
[(] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) o 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii) f0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8)
D 73.71(a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[(] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Sp~cify in Abstract below or In
B. Event Description
- 6. LER NUMBER I
SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER 001 REV NO.
00
- 3. PAGE 3
OF 4
On October 27, 2010, during the lR16 refueling outage, Maintenance completed replacement of the governor and servo on the TD AFW PP 1-1. At 0512 PST on November 6, 2010, Unit 1 entered Mode 3.
On November 6,2010, at 2222 PST, DCPP commenced Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) P-AFW-11, "Routine Surveillance Test of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump I-I." This procedure was also used with a maintenance procedure to set the speed of the governor, with support from Maintenance personnel, and also served as post-maintenance testing (PMT) for TD AFW PP 1-1. When steam was admitted to TD AFW PP 1-1 to raise the speed, test personnel observed speeds in excess of 4,300 rpm, at which point the governor had still not assumed control.
Maintenance personnel made internal adjustments to the governor in order to achieve a pump speed below 4,260 rpm (the maximum allowable recirculation speed stated in the surveillance procedure). After the adjustments, the pump reached a recirculation speed of 4,210 rpm. The test was completed satisfactorily and the TD AFW PP 1-1 was secured on November 7, 2010, at 0026 PST.
C. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected
No additional safety systems were adversely affected by this event.
D. Method of Discovery
The condition was discovered on January 3,2011 when it was recognized that TD AFW PP 1-1 had excessive pump speed prior to governor adjustment.
E. Status of Inoperable Structures, Systems, or Components that Contributed to the Event When the pump recirculation speed exceeded 4,300 rpm without governor intervention, TD AFW PP 1-1 was considered inoperable because it operated at a speed outside the band specified in the test procedure and in DCPP's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Motor-driven AFW pumps 1-2 and 1-3 remained operable during this event.
F. Operator Actions
Operations utilized Maintenance support to adjust pump speed within an acceptable range.
G. Safety System Responses Not applicable for this event.
III. Cause of the Problem To be provided in the supplemental report.
IV. Assessment of Safety Consequences
To be provided in the supplemental report.
V. Corrective Actions
A. Immediate Corrective Actions
- 2. DOCKET YEAR 05000 275 2011
- 6. LER NUMBER I
SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER REV NO.
001
- - 00 Operations utilized Maintenance support to adjust pump speed within an acceptable range.
B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence (CAPR)
To be provided in the supplemental report.
VI. Additional Information
A. Failed Components / Extent of Condition
B. Previous Similar Events
C. Industry Reports To be provided in the supplemental report. 3. PAGE 4
OF 4
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| 05000323/LER-2011-001, For Diablo Canyon Regarding Unit 2 Reactor Trip from Loss of Main Feedwater Pump 2-1 | For Diablo Canyon Regarding Unit 2 Reactor Trip from Loss of Main Feedwater Pump 2-1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000275/LER-2011-001, Regarding Mode Transition with Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable | Regarding Mode Transition with Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000275/LER-2011-002, For Diablo Canyon, Unit 1, Regarding Single Failure Vulnerability of Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System | For Diablo Canyon, Unit 1, Regarding Single Failure Vulnerability of Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000275/LER-2011-003, Regarding Deviation from License Condition for Physical Protection Due to Tsunami Events | Regarding Deviation from License Condition for Physical Protection Due to Tsunami Events | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000275/LER-2011-004-01, 1 for Diablo, Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Actuated Upon 230 Kv Isolation Due to Maintenance Activities on Relay Panel | 1 for Diablo, Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Actuated Upon 230 Kv Isolation Due to Maintenance Activities on Relay Panel | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000275/LER-2011-004, For Diablo Canyon Power Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generators Actuated Upon 230-kV Isolation Due to Maintenance Activities on Relay Panel | For Diablo Canyon Power Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generators Actuated Upon 230-kV Isolation Due to Maintenance Activities on Relay Panel | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000275/LER-2011-005-01, 1 for Diablo Canyon Unit 1, Emergency Diesel Generator Actuations Upon Loss of 230 Kv Startup Due to Electrical Maintenance Testing Activities | 1 for Diablo Canyon Unit 1, Emergency Diesel Generator Actuations Upon Loss of 230 Kv Startup Due to Electrical Maintenance Testing Activities | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000275/LER-2011-005, For Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 1 - Emergency Diesel Generator Actuations Upon Loss of 230 Kv Startup Due to Electric Maintenance Testing Activities | For Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 1 - Emergency Diesel Generator Actuations Upon Loss of 230 Kv Startup Due to Electric Maintenance Testing Activities | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000275/LER-2011-006-01, Loss of Control Room Envelope Due to the Work Control Shift Foreman Incorrectly Authorizing Removal of a Blank Flange | Loss of Control Room Envelope Due to the Work Control Shift Foreman Incorrectly Authorizing Removal of a Blank Flange | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000275/LER-2011-006, For Diablo Canyon, Unit 1, Regarding Loss of Control Room Envelope Due to the Work Control Shift Foreman Incorrectly Authorizing Removal of a Blank Flange | For Diablo Canyon, Unit 1, Regarding Loss of Control Room Envelope Due to the Work Control Shift Foreman Incorrectly Authorizing Removal of a Blank Flange | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000275/LER-2011-007-02, Inadequate Control Room Envelope Testing Due to Inadequately-Documented In-leakage Test Data | Inadequate Control Room Envelope Testing Due to Inadequately-Documented In-leakage Test Data | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000275/LER-2011-007-01, Regarding Inadequate Control Room Envelope Testing Due to Inadequately - Documented In-leakage Test Data | Regarding Inadequate Control Room Envelope Testing Due to Inadequately - Documented In-leakage Test Data | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000275/LER-2011-007, For Diablo Canyon, Unit 1, Inadequate Control Room Envelope Testing Due to Inadequately-Documented In-Leakage Test Data | For Diablo Canyon, Unit 1, Inadequate Control Room Envelope Testing Due to Inadequately-Documented In-Leakage Test Data | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000275/LER-2011-008-01, Control Room Ventilation System Design Vulnerability | Control Room Ventilation System Design Vulnerability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) | | 05000275/LER-2011-008, Regarding Control Room Ventilation System Design Vulnerability | Regarding Control Room Ventilation System Design Vulnerability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) |
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