05000275/FIN-2017002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Expansion Scope of Risk - Informed Welds |
| Description | Green . The inspectors identified a non -cited violation of the licensees risk -informed inservice inspection program (which is their alternative to portions of the ASME Code,Section XI inservice inspection program approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)) for the failure to properly expand the scope of additional welds to inspect. Specifically, a rejectable flaw on a pipe weld in the pressurizer spray line was identified during refueling outage 1R19 while performing an ultrasonic examination. The licensee expanded the inspection scope by four additional welds, but failed to select those assigned with the same degradation. For immediate corrective actions, the licensee identified and intended to inspect four additional welds assigned to the same degradation mechanism as required by the risk -informed inservice inspection program. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Notification 50920222. The licensees failure to properly expand the weld examination scope as required by the risk -informed inservice inspection program was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to select additional welds that were susceptible to the same degradation mechanism as weld WIB -378 placed the plant at an increased risk due to the potential of having an active degradation mechanism that could affect additional components. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP ) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, the inspector s determined the finding screened as having very low significance (Green) because: (1) it was not a design deficiency; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not result in the loss of a high safety -significant non -technical specification train. This finding had a cross -cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with 3 change management because leaders failed to use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing the change to a risk -informed inservice inspection program. The implementing procedure failed to include the reference to degradation mechanism allowing for a misinterpretation of weld expansion requirements once a flaw was identified in a weld WIB -378 [H.3]. |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2017002 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Newport J Reynoso J Choate I Anchondo T Farina C Osterholtz C Steely L Carson J O'Donnell G George S Makor C Stott M Haire |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.55a |
| CCA | H.3, Change Management |
| INPO aspect | LA.5 |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2017002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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