05000272/LER-2003-003
| Salem Generating Station Unit 1 | |
| Event date: | 10-15-2003 |
|---|---|
| Report date: | 12-05-2003 |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown |
| 2722003003R00 - NRC Website | |
FACILITY NAME (1)
- -
DOCKET
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse — Pressurized Water Reactor Feedwater Steam Generatorlevel Control {JBIFCV}
- (BF)
- Energy Industry Identification System {ELLS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as (SS/CCC)
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE
Event Date: October 15, 2003 � -
- Discovery Date: October 15, 2003
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE
The plant was in MODE 1 (POWER OPERATION) at the time of the event. No other structures, systems or components were inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to the event. -
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE
On October 15, 2003, at approximately 0316, the Salem Unit 1 nuclear control operator (NCO) (licensed operator) noticed that the 14BF19 (main feedwater regulating valve) {JBIFCV} was not moving with changing demand (both in automatic and manual). The valve appeared to be approximately 71% open:
Initial local visual inspection of the valve showed no signs of binding. Based on the results of the initial visual inspection of the valve and prior experience, our initial assessment was that the problem with the valve was the actuator and not the feedwater isolation function, thus the valve was still operable.
Further investigation confirmed the valve to be immovable. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 1505 because the feedwater Isolation functioned was affected and the valve would not have closed if demanded by either train of solid state protection (i.e., the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.3.2.1 could not be met).
Technical Specification 3.0.3 requires that within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply.
A power reduction was initiated at 16:03 in accordance with procedures and to comply with the requirement of Technical Specifications 3.0.3.
FACIUTY NAME (1)
DOCKET
Salem Generating Station Unit 05000272 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (continued) The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 and all systems responded as expected.
This event is reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2)(i)(A), completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE
The valve was opened and inspected. Foreign material was found lodged between the valve plug and the inside diameter of the cage. This resulted in the valve not being able to move.
Although the object was severely deformed, an analysis of the foreign material was performed and the results of the analysis indicated that the object was a stud that was not from a system component. The stud prevented the plug from freely moving inside the cage.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of reportable events for Salem and Hope Creek in the last two years did not identify any similar several events where foreign material intrusion resulted in a plant shutdown.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no safety consequences associated with this event.
At Salem there are two valves in each main feed line that serve to isolate main feedwater flow following a steamline break; (1) the main feedwater regulator valve (BF19), which receives dual, separate train trip signals from the Plant Protection System on any safety injection signal and closes within 10 seconds (including instrument delays), and (2) the feedwater isolation valve (BF13) that also receives dual, separate train trip signals from the reactor protection system following a safety injection signal. The BF13 valves are motor operated and close within 32 seconds (including instrument delays). Additionally, the main feed water pumps receive dual, separate train trips from the protection system following a steam line break.
Failure of the main feedwater regulator valve a (BF19) to close results in an additional 22 seconds during which feedwater from the Condensate Feed System may be added to the faulted steam generator. This failure of a BF19 to close has been analyzed with acceptable results and it is fully described in Chapter 15.4 of the Salem Final Safety Analysis Report.
This event constitutes a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02 Salem Generating Station Unit I 05000272
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The plant was shutdown and the valve was opened and inspected. The foreign material was removed and the valve was returned to an operable status. No damaged was done to the valve by the stud.
An extent of condition evaluation was performed. For the affected loop, the evaluation included performance o1 diagnostic air test and baroscope (eight feet on either side of the 14BF19 valve). Similarly, a diagnostic air test valve stroke test, and monitoring of the metal impact monitoring system were performed for the other three feedwater loops. Based on the results of these evaluations and the conclusion that the source of the material was not from a system component, the evaluation concluded that it was unlikely that foreign material would still exist in the feedwater loops.
As a result of the inspection a level one condition report was initiated to evaluate the root cause of this and other issues with the foreign material control program. The level one root cause is in progress and corrective' actions will be taken as necessary to enhance the foreign material control program.
COMMITMENTS
The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.