05000266/FIN-2014007-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Maintain External Flooding Procedure to Address All Possible CLB Floods |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated non-citied violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, in that from January 19, 1996 until November 25, 2013, the licensee failed to ensure that activities affecting quality were prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances to address external flooding as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Specifically, PC 80 Part 7, Lake Water Level Determination directed advanced installation of concrete barriers to protect against deep wave action from the lake, which introduced significant unrecognized blockages in the natural drainage path credited in the FSAR to protect against the probable maximum precipitation and Turbine Building internal flooding events. Corrective actions for this issue included changing the procedure and FSAR to include actions to provide an additional flood relief path through the CWPH building and reliance on internal flood relief dampers for the affected flooding events. The performance deficiency was screened against the Reactor Oversight Process per the guidance of lMC 0612, Appendix B, and determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Protection Against External Factors (Flood Hazard) and Procedure Quality, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the licensees failure to procedurally control external flooding design features to ensure they would not adversely affect the strategy for other flooding events, could negatively impact mitigating systems ability to respond during external and internal flooding events. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Tables 2 and 3, and Appendix A, and determined a detailed risk evaluation was required. Following a detailed risk evaluation, Region III SRAs determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, because the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. |
Site: | Point Beach ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000266/2014007 Section 4OA4 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 95002 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Bartlett J Beavers J Cameron J Jandovitz K Miller P Voss R Elliott |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
CCA | P.3, Resolution |
INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2014007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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