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Xcel Energya January 26, 2012 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2807 W County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362 L-MT-I 2-007 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control. Desk Washington, DC 205.55-001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket 50-263 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 LER 201 1-01 0 "Rod Worth Minimizer Bvpassed During Startup" A Licensee Event Report (LER) for this occurrence is attached.
Summaw of Commitments This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
~ o n t i c e 6 Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company-Minnesota Enclosure cc:
Regional Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC Resident Inspector, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ee reverse for re uired number of
('digits/characters?or each block) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(I)
[I] 20.2203(a)(4)
C] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
C] 50,73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I] 50,36(c)(l)(i)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50,36(c)(l)(ii)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(~)(2) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) [I] 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
On November 27, 201 1, while performing the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) Operability Test as part of startup activities, it was discovered that the RWM control switch was in Bypass. With the control switch in the Bypass position, the RWM was inoperable and did not enforce the pre-determined control rod withdrawal sequence.
The RWM control switch was restored to the Operate position and the RWM was verified to be operable.
The apparent cause was determined to be the crew failed to precisely identify the sequence of surveillances/procedures required to be completed, prior to the mode change. The pre-job brief was inadequate in that the specific sequence and details were not discussed and the licensed operators on duty failed to identify that the RWM configuration did not support the mode change. Additionally, control room indications available to the operators were not properly utilized to prevent the out of sequence control rod NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
onticello Nuclear Generating Plant Prior to the event, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant was in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown). Reactor temperature was 104 F and pressure 0 PSIG.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 2. DOCKET 05000-263 Upon recognizing error, the crew stopped, assessed the conditions, and placed the plant in a safe condition.
- 3. PAGE 3 OF 3
- 6. LER NUMBER Non-immediate actions:
YEAR
- 1. The Site Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer provided oversight of the investigation and corrective actions, including the reinstatement of license holder duties.
- 2. Revise Procedure 0212 Rod Worth Minimizer Operability Test to include additional detail to eliminate error traps such as knowledge-based steps.
- 3. C.1 Startup procedure has been improved to enhance the mode change process.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
2011 010 00 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER LER 2010-006 "Mode change Made with PClVs Inoperable". The Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) main steam line drain valves were de-energized in the Open position to establish a reactor vent path during a short outage. Document barriers for PCIV status were missed, and the duty Operations crew failed to recognize that these valves needed to be restored prior to transitioning to Mode 2.
REV NO
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Energy industry identification system (EIIS) codes are identified in the text within brackets [xx].
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| 05000263/LER-2011-001, For Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Reactor Vessel Overfill in Appendix R Scenario | For Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Reactor Vessel Overfill in Appendix R Scenario | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000263/LER-2011-002, Regarding ESF Actuation Due to Failed Power Supply | Regarding ESF Actuation Due to Failed Power Supply | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000263/LER-2011-003, Regarding Secondary Containment Damper Icing | Regarding Secondary Containment Damper Icing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000263/LER-2011-004, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperability Due to Ventilation Alignment Issue | Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperability Due to Ventilation Alignment Issue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000263/LER-2011-005, Regarding Power Range Monitor Channels Out of Alignment | Regarding Power Range Monitor Channels Out of Alignment | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000263/LER-2011-006, Regarding Lntake Structure Fire Suppression System Blockage | Regarding Lntake Structure Fire Suppression System Blockage | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000263/LER-2011-007, Regarding Both Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to Inadequate Surveillance | Regarding Both Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to Inadequate Surveillance | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000263/LER-2011-008, Regarding Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Normal Offsite Power | Regarding Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Normal Offsite Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000263/LER-2011-009, Regarding Automatic Reactor Scram While Performing Turbine-Generator Testing | Regarding Automatic Reactor Scram While Performing Turbine-Generator Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000263/LER-2011-010, Regarding Rod Worth Minimizer Bypassed During Startup | Regarding Rod Worth Minimizer Bypassed During Startup | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000263/LER-2011-011, Regarding Failure to Lock Mode Switch in Refuel Position During Control Rod Exercise | Regarding Failure to Lock Mode Switch in Refuel Position During Control Rod Exercise | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown |
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