05000263/FIN-2012002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | FAILURE TO MONITOR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM UNDER 50.65(a)(1) DUE TO INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE RULE EVALUATIONS |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to establish an a(1) action plan and associated goals when the residual heat removal (RHR) system a(2) preventative maintenance demonstration became invalid. Specifically, in June 2011, the No. 13 RHR pump exceeded its performance criteria when it experienced a second maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF). The licensee failed to appropriately evaluate these failures in their Maintenance Rule Program and, as a result, the site failed to monitor the equipment under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) as required. Corrective actions taken by the licensee to address this issue included performing a root cause evaluation of the sites Maintenance Rule programmatic deficiencies, and creating an a(1) action plan for the RHR system. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CAP 01325200. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to monitor the RHR system in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) due to inadequately evaluating three MPFFs under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was a performance deficiency, because it was the result of the failure to meet a requirement or a standard; the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct; and should have been prevented. The inspectors screened the performance deficiency per IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, and determined that the issue was more than minor because it impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, to this finding. The inspectors evaluated the issue under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and utilized Column 2 of the Table 4a worksheet to screen the finding. The inspectors answered No to all five questions, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, having work practices components, and involving aspects associated with the licensee ensuring supervisory and management oversight of work activities, such that nuclear safety is supported |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2012002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer M Phalen S Thomas P Voss S Bell M Ziolkowski |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2012002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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