05000263/FIN-2011005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Completion of CAPRs Associated with 2RS to 2R Feeder Cable Testing |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was self-revealed following a reactor scram, which was the direct result of an electric plant realignment caused by a faulted feeder cable and lockout of the stations 2R transformer. Specifically, annual testing to monitor the performance of the 2R feeder cables, which was put in place as a corrective action to prevent recurrence to address issues identified subsequent to a similar event in 2008, had not been performed since the cables were placed back in service following that event. To address the identified material deficiencies, the licensee replaced and tested the electrical cables between 2RS and 2R in their entirety, employing a new route designed to avoid cable submergence. Additional corrective actions were put in place to strengthen the licensees planned maintenance deferral process and their cable condition monitoring program. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to perform annual testing of the 2R transformer feeder cables, as required by the stations planned maintenance program, was a performance deficiency because it was the result of the failure to meet a requirement or a standard, the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined that the issue was more than minor because it impacted the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to this finding. The inspectors utilized Column 1 of the Table 4a worksheet to screen the finding. Because the finding contributed to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigating equipment or functions would not be available, the Region III Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a Phase 3 analysis, and screened the finding to be of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, having decision-making components, and involving aspects associated with the licensees making safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process to ensure safety is maintained |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2011005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Munir C Zoia K Riemer M Phalen K Stoedter S Thomas R Walton P Voss J Beavers S Bell |
| CCA | H.10, Bases for Decisions |
| INPO aspect | CO.2 |
| Finding closed by | |
| IR 05000263/2011005 (1 February 2012) | |
| ' | |
Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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