05000263/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Emergency Diesel Generator Quarterly Surveillance Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensee failed to follow the quarterly emergency diesel generator (EDG) surveillance procedure during testing of the EDG air start system. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow a procedural step that involved in-service testing of a check valve in the EDG air start system that, if degraded, could allow air to bleed out of the starting air tanks which are required for diesel generator operability. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP), and corrective actions for this issue included suspension of the test, performance of a Human Performance Investigation Team review, and disqualification of the individual performing the test. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, having work practices components, and involving aspects associated with using human error prevention techniques during performance of work activities. H.4(a) The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to follow their EDG surveillance procedure was a performance deficiency, because it was the result of the failure to meet a requirement; the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct; and should have been prevented. The inspectors screened the performance deficiency per Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, and determined that the issue was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstones objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). As a result, this finding was evaluated under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to this finding. The inspectors utilized Column 2 of the Table 4a worksheet to screen the finding. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the inspectors answered No to all five questions. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2011004 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Shah K Riemer M Phalen K Stoedter S Thomas P Voss M Learn A Scarbeary J Corujo-Sandin P Cardona-Morales S Bell |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2011004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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