A finding of very low safety significance and an associated
NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed when the licensee failed to follow step 5.4.4.b of Technical Specification surveillance procedure RT85DA,
Control Room Emergency Ventilation Filtration Testing A Train. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly connect maintenance and test equipment (
M&TE) across flow transmitter test taps which caused V26A, the air filter unit (AFU) VF26A fan, to stop 17 seconds after operators started the fan from the control room. The licensee entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program (
CAP) as condition report (CR)
CRPLP201705234. Corrective actions included coaching the vendor on ensuring
M&TE is properly connected to plant equipment and ensuring suitable field oversight of the vendor during re-performance of the surveillance.The issue was determined to be more than minor in accordance with
IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because it was associated with the
Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with
IMC 0609, Appendix A, The
Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3, because the inspectors answered "No" to all screening questions. The finding had across-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, in the Field Presence aspect, for the failure to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel (H.2).
