05000255/FIN-2017001-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | The licensee Identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, which requires, in part, that where cables or equipment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shut down conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided. Contrary to the above, as of October 1, 2010, the licensee failed to ensure that one of the redundant trains was free of fire damage in areas where cables or equipment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment. Specifically, the licensee failed to analyze a fire scenario in the 1C switch gear room, screen- house room, and component cooling water pump room that could potentially damage the control cable before the load cable, and therefor e result in the loss of safety -related 2400 volt alternating current (VAC) bus 1C and/or 1D, with subsequent loss of equipment credited for Appendix R compliance to support safe shutdown in the event of such a fire. The licensees failure to analyze an Appendix R fire scenario for the three fire areas described above w as a performance deficiency . 21 The performance deficiency was more- than- minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not impact the licensees ability to reach hot shutdown because operator manual actions would have allowed operators to shut down the plant following a fire. The licensee identified this issue during the transition to NFPA 805, entered the issue into their CAP as CR PLP 2010 04255, and implemented compensatory measures, including fire watches. The violation was not willful and routine licensee efforts, such as normal surveillance or quality assurance activities, were not likely to have previously identified the violation due to the specific sequence of fire cable damage required for such an Appendix R fire scenario. As a result, the inspectors concluded that the violation met all four criteria for exercising enforcement discretion established by Section 9.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues; therefore, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion to not cite this violation |
Site: | Palisades |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000255/2017001 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Nguyen A Shaikh B Bartlett D Sargis E Duncan J Boettcher J Mancuso T Taylor |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix R |
INPO aspect | |
' | |
Finding - Palisades - IR 05000255/2017001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Palisades) @ 2017Q1
Self-Identified List (Palisades)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||