05000244/LER-1917-001, R. E. Ginna Re During Surveillance Testing, Lift Pressure Setpoints on Three Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Technical Specifications Limits Due to Stiction
| ML17174A675 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/2017 |
| From: | Swift P Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 17-001-00 | |
| Download: ML17174A675 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 2441917001R00 - NRC Website | |
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Exelon Generation June 16, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
SUBJECT:
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 Docket No. 50-244 Paul Swift Plant Manager R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 1503 Lake Rd.
Ontario, NY 14519 315-791-5205 Office www.exeloncorp.com paul.swift@exeloncorp.com LER 2017-001, During Surveillance Testing, Lift Pressure Setpoints on Three Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Technical Specifications Limits Due to Stiction.
The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2017-001 is submitted under the provisions of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines. There are no new commitments contained in this submittal. This submittal is for revision O of the LER.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Kyle Garnish at 315-791-5321.
Sincerely, l
'"\\:? 0 ut'LV Paul Swift, Ginna Plant Manager PS/ejf
Attachment:
LER 2017-001 cc:
NRC Regional Administrator, Region I NRC Project Manager, Ginna NRC Resident Inspector, Ginna
Attachment LER 2017-001
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0313112020 (04-2017) http://www.nrc.gov/read i ng-rm/doc-collections/n u regs/staff/sr1 022/r3/)
- the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000 244 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE During Surveillance Testing, Lift Pressure Setpoints on Three Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Technical Specifications Limits Due to Stiction.
, 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I
SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 23 2017 2017 -
001 -
00 06 15 2017 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D '20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D so.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 13.11(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D so.3s(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 13.11(a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D so.4s(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1) 088 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[{] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 13.77(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in F. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
No safety systems were actuated.
Ill. CAUSE OF EVENT:
The apparent cause of the MSSVs' as-found lift pressures being outside +1 % I -3% of setpoint is stiction in the disc area due to micro-fouling. Note that all the Ginna MSSVs were upgraded in 2009/2012 to lnconel 618 flexi-discs and 316SS nozzles, so corrosion of these sub-components (a contributor to some MSSV failures) is insignificant.
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT:
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires a report of, "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications."
The operability of the MSSVs ensures that the secondary system pressure will be limited to within 110% of its design pressure of 1140 psig during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The as-found condition of the MSSVs was compared to the current overpressure analysis prepared in support of extended power uprate, and it was concluded that the analysis remained bounding. As such, the applicable acceptance criteria for design basis events would have been met, and the MSSVs remained capable of performing their intended safety function.
The as-found settings of all three MSSVs remained within analytical bounds; therefore, this event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.
V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:
All three MSSVs (3508, 3509, and 3512) found outside the acceptance criteria of +1 % / -3% of their required setpoints were adjusted to within +/- 1 % of setpoint.
- 8. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
- Evaluate whether the as-found Technical Specification limit (+1 % I -3%) can be increased to (+3% I -3%). This will alleviate the programmatic issue of insufficient margin between the Technical Specification acceptance criteria and the acceptable as-left acceptance criteria. This action will also accommodate possible set pressure drift related to stiction.
- Evaluate increasing the test frequency from 5 years to 3 years. More frequent testing will prevent the formation of micro-fouling and reduce the likelihood of stiction.
VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A. FAILED COMPONENTS:
No other structures, systems, or components failed as result of this event.
B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
A Ginna LER event historical search was conducted which yielded the following results:
- LER 2006-007, Rev. 1, Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Exceedance C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EllS) COMPONENT FUNCTION IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM REFERRED TO IN THIS LER:
3508 3509 3512 COMPONENT Valve, Relief Valve; Relief Valve, Relief IEEE 803 FUNCTION NUMBER RV RV RV IEEE 805 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION SB SB SB Note that all three relief valves were made by the same m,anufacturer and are the same model number. Page 4
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