05000244/LER-1990-001, :on 900225,determined That Security Tours Did Not Necessarily Result in Entry to Areas Once Per Hour,As Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Improper Interpretation of Security Touring Policy

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:on 900225,determined That Security Tours Did Not Necessarily Result in Entry to Areas Once Per Hour,As Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Improper Interpretation of Security Touring Policy
ML17261B034
Person / Time
Site: Ginna 
Issue date: 03/27/1990
From: Cavanaugh M, Mecredy R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-001, LER-90-1, NUDOCS 9004130177
Download: ML17261B034 (9)
v • d • e


LER-1990-001, on 900225,determined That Security Tours Did Not Necessarily Result in Entry to Areas Once Per Hour,As Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Improper Interpretation of Security Touring Policy
Event date:
Report date:
2441990001R00 - NRC Website
v • d • e

text

ACCELERATEH3 DARIBUTION DEMONSHRTION SYSIZM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 9004130177 DOC. DATE: 90/03/27 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G

AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION CAVANAUGH,M.E.

Rochester Gas

& Electric Corp.

MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas

& Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000244 D

/

05000244 NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

SUBJECT:

LER 90-001-00:on 900225,fire watch did not perform tour at least once per h due to personnel error.

W/9 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL i SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

RECIPIENT ZD CODE/NAME PD1-3 LA JOHNSON,A INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 NRR/DST/SELB SD LBSD1 G FIL 02 RGN1 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EG &G STUART g V A LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

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f NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENIS:

PLEA% HELP US TO REDUCE WASIZ1 CONTACTTHE DOCUMENTCONSOL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAMEFROM DISTIUBUTION LISIS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEEDl D

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 35 ENCL 35

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

~ 89 EAST AVENVE, ROCHESTEF, N Y 148<&.i')0 March 26, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LER 90-001, Technical Specification Fire Watch Patrol Established, But Did Not Perform Tour At Least Once Per Hour Due to Personnel Error.

R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.

50-244 In 'accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B),

which requires reporting of, "Any Operation Or Condition Prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications",

the attached Licensee Event Report LER 90-001 is hereby submitted.

This LER is being submitted because the hourly Fire Watch Patrol did not meet the Ginna Technical Specification 3.14 requirements for patrolling three (3) Technical Specification systems.

This event in no way affected the public health and safety.

Ver truly yours, xc:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Rd.

King of Prussia, PA 19406 Robert C.

Me edy Division Manager Nuclear Production Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

+0041301'f7 9OV3~7 PDR AClUCK C~ 000244 PDC P~o t<<~

HAC fera $00 ISIS I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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HAMIMark E. Cavanaugh Fire Protection Engineer LICCHSEl CONTACT SOII 'THIS L IllIIII'KLCSHOHEHVMICII AIICA COOK 7

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2 COMSLETC OHC LINC SOII EACH COMSOHINT SAILVIIEOISCIIISCO IN Terri IICSOXT llll CAVS K SYSTIM COMSO HIHT MAHVSAC TVIIEII ee~r~41.'0 Cigar CAVSI SYSTIAI COMfOHCHT MAHUSAC TVIICII TO HfIIOS r@<.re:N@%vggg SVSSLEMENTAL IIESOAT CXSCCTIO 114 CXSCCTCO LUSMISSION OATC Illl MONTH CAY YEAII YCC IIIrrr. aerefreer C/IfCCTCO SVCMISJIOH OATCI HO AKCTXACTIIIrrrIIN leOO aaoaa, I ~., IAereravars IIIreerr vrrfrrafrre rrJrorlrao Aaell 11 ~ I On February 25, 1990, at approximately 1345 EST with the Reacto power at approximately 98%/

the Operations Shift Superviso called the Security Shift Supervisor to discuss the areas bein toured by Security personnel to fulfillthe technical specifica-tions for Fire Watch tours.

It was determined that Securit tours did not necessarily result in entry to these areas once pe hour.

Immediate action was to establish an hourly tour using the auxiliary operators until the Fire Protection Section could acquire the personnel to perform the task.

The

cause

of the event was determined to be the improper inter-pretation of Security touring policy which resulted in the failure of Security to tour the required areas once per hour.

Corrective action has been taken by Fire Protection to conduct required Fire Watch tours as required.

Follow-up action is to restore the inoperable systems/components to operable status.

HAC Sera

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NI I L LANT TIO S The plant was at approximately 984 steady state full power with no major activities in progress.

II.

DESCRIPTION

OF EVENT C

A.

DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

February 25,

1990, 1345 EST:

Discovery date and time.

February 25,

1990, 1400 EST:

Auxiliary Operators initiated touring the areas once per hour 'n compliance with Technical Specifications.

February 25, 1990,.1720 EST:

Fire Watch personnel relieved Auxiliary,Operator from hourly tours.

B.

EVENT

'n February 25, 1990 at approximately 1345 EST with the Reactor at approximately 984 full power, the Operations Shift Supervisor called the Security Shift Supervisor to discuss the areas being toured by Security to fulfill the requirements of Technical Specification 3.14 for Fire Watch hourly tours.

During the course of conversation with the Operations Shift Supervisor, it was determined that Security tours do not necessarily result in entry to the areas of concern once per hour.

An investigation of Security computer records indicated that.

greater than one hour had elapsed between some entries to these areas.

On February 25, 1990 at approximately 1400

EST, the Operations Shift Supervisor assigned the auxiliary operators to perform the hourly Fire Watch tour until the Fire Protection Section could come in and relieve them.

At approximately 1720

EST, the Fire Watch from Fire Protection was on site and relieved the Fire Watch hourly tour from the auxiliary operators.

4 AC S 0 AM 999 k IEI)I

NRC Form 344A I943I FACILITYNAME I5I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION OOCRET NUMSER ITI U,S, NUCLEAR AEQULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OM8 NO 3I 80&I04 EXPIRES. SISI/88 LER NUMSER (SI 54004NTIAL rrvM 5II y,. 15YNIOrr Le ~ NUM eo

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D.

E.

INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:,

Inoperable fire barrier penetration I-79-P Inoperable fire damper I-411-21-P Inoperable fire detection system Z-25 OTHER SYSTEMS OF SECONDARY FUNCTION AFFECTED:

None

METHOD OF DISCOVERY

This event was. discovered as a result of,,a conversation between the Operations Shift Supervisor'and the Security Shift Supervisor discussing the areas being toured by Security to fulfill the requirements for hourly Fire Watch Patrol.

OPERATOR ACTION

The Operations Shift Supervisor discovered the problem and performed the following:

Initiated an A-25.1 Gi a Station Event Re ort Assigned auxiliary operators to perform the hourly tours until Fire Watch could be called in Notified Duty Engineer Notified Shift Technical Advisor (STA)

Notified Plant Superintendent Notified Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector G.

SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES NONE

III. CAUSE OF EVENT

A.

IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

Technical Specification fire barrier and fire detection systems were not Fire Watch toured hourly as required by Technical Specifications.

NRC FORM 344A 8343 l

HRC F<<m 999A 1945 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION U,E. HUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMITEIOH AFFROVED OME HO 5150&10<

E XF IR E $

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B.

INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

The inoperable fire detection system could not be repaired and tested before the end of the working day.

C.

ROOT CAUSE:

The root cause was determined to be improper interpret-ation of Security touring policy which resulted in Security not going into the areas of inoperable fire barriers and detection system once per hour.

IV,

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

An hourly Fire Watch tour of three (3)

Technical Specification areas with inoperable fire components was not conducted so Technical Specifications 3.14.1 and 3.16.6 was not met.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report

System, item (a) (2) (i) (B), which requires reporting of, "Any Operation Or Condition Prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications".

An assessment was performed considering the safety of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no operation or safety consequences or implications attributed to the inoperable fire detection system or inoperable fire barriers because:

Inoperable Fire Detection System Z-25 Fire detection system for the standby auxiliary feed water pump building was a maximum permissible fire load of 240,000 BTU/Sq.Ft.

Existing fire loading is 1,809 BTU's/Sq.Ft.

with an available heat release of 350 degrees F.

This is considered a

low fire load

(<80,000 BTU/Sq.Ft.).

The wall separating the standby auxiliary feed water pump building from the adjacent auxiliary building is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated wall with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire seals.

+ R C F 0 R M 099 A l9 051

NIIC Perm SSEA IOTAS'ICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LERI TEXT CONTINUATION V S. NVCEEAII IIEOVEATOIIYCOMMISSION APPIIOYEO OME rIO SISOMIOP EEPIAES EISIrES 4

PACIEITY NAME III OOCKET NUMSEII ITI lEII NIIMEEIIIEI scgvEHTrAC

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0 1 005007 Inoperable Fire Damper I-411-21-P Fire damper I-411-21P separates Fire Zone ABO-3W (Auxiliary Building Operating Level West) and Fire Zone IBS-2 (Intermediate Building Operating Level South).

Fire Zone ABO-3W comprises 2500 square feet.

The maximum design basis fire loading for this zone is 240,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft.

The existing fire loading is 8,721 BTU's/Sq.Ft.

with an available heat release of 1120 degrees F.

The fire resistance for the actual fuel loading condition would be 0.11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> for complete fire fuel reduction.

Fire zone IBS-2 comprises 2385 square. feet.

The maximum design basis fire loading for the zone is 160,000 BTU/Sq.Ft.

Existing fire loading for this zone is 20,470 BTU's/Sq.Ft. with an" available heat release of 1415 degrees F.

The fire resistance for the actual fire loading conditions would be 0.26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> for complete, fire fuel reduction.

These two fire zones/areas (ABO-3W and IBS-2) are monitored by their respective fire detection systems.

In addition, fire extinguisher and hose stations are available for each fire zone/area.

Inoperable Fire Seal I-79-P Fire Seal Penetration I-79-P separates Fire Zone IBN-1 (Intermediate Building Elevation 253'6" (North))

and Fire Zone SB-1 (Service Building Basement Level Elevation 235'-6").

Fire Zone IBN-1 comprises 3570 square feet.

The maximum design basis fire loading for this zone is 160,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft.

Existing fire loading for this zone is 74,198 BTU's/Sq.Ft. with an"available heat release of 1670 degrees F.

The fire resistance for the actual fire loading condit'ions would be

.93 hours0.00108 days <br />0.0258 hours <br />1.537698e-4 weeks <br />3.53865e-5 months <br /> for complete fire fuel reduction.

NAC POIIM SPEA IS4J I

NRC fMm 555A 1545 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER1 TEXT CONTINUATION V.S. NUC55AR REQUCATORY COMMISSION ASSROYEO OMS NO )150&10<

EXSIRE5 5/SI/55 SACIiITY NAME III OOCK 5 T NUM55 R Ill LER NVMCER 151 SSQUSNTIAI, H

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0 6 oF0 Fire Zone SB-1 comprises 16, 275 Sq. Ft.

The maximum design basis fire loading for the zone is 160,000 BTU's/Sq.Ft.

existing fire loading for this zone is 7919 BTU's/Sq.Ft.

with an available heat release of 1080 degrees F.

The fire resistance for the actual fire loading condition would be.10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> for complete fire fuel reduction These two fire zone/areas (IBN-1 and SB-1) are monitored by a fire detection system and fire suppression system respectively.

In addition, fire extinguishers and hose stations are available for each fire zone/area.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.

V.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

ACTIONS TAKEN TO RETURN INOPERABLE COMPONENTS TO OPERABLE STATUS:

Actions taken to return inoperable fire detection system to operable status:

.The fire detection system was repaired under SC-3.16.2.8 and tested in accordance with PT-13.11.4 and declared operable on February 26, 1990 at 0925 EST.

Action taken to return inoperable fire barrier I-79-P to operable status:

A fire watch was established until the cracked mortar was packed with kaowool using procedure M-S6.1, "Placement of Temporary Ceramic Fiber Penetration Fire Seals.

A maintenance work request was assigned to per-manently seal the penetration.

Action taken to bring the fire damper I-411-21-P to operable status:

NAC SORM SSSA (5451

NRC Term 444A

/44S I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION V.S, HVCLTAR RSOVLATOIIYCOMM/4410/I ARRROVTO OM4 NO SISOWI04 4XRIR4$ 4/SI/4S RACILITY//AMT 111 OOCKST HVM444 ITI VSAR LSR HVM4IR 141 SCQVS//T/AL RVM R

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07007 Fire watch is in place until the replacement fire damper arrives and is installed and tested in e

ers B.

ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

As the root

cause

was determined to be improper interpretation of Security touring policy resulting in inadequate hourly fire patrols by Security.

Ginna Station will provide dedicated fire watch coverage as required.

VI.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A.

FAILED COMPONENTS:

B ~

None PREVIOUS LER'S ON SIMILAR EVENT:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results:

No documentation of similar LER events with the same root

cause

at Ginna Station could be identified.

C.

SPECIAL COMMENTS:

None RRC AORM S44A

/4 4S I

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