05000244/FIN-2013004-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Guidance for Workers to Implement a Modification to the Main Generator Digital Protection Relays |
| Description | A self-revealing Green finding was identified for inadequate guidance as required by Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC (CENG) procedure CNG-PR-1.01-1005, Control of Constellation Nuclear Generation Technical Procedure Format and Content, Revision 00500, for workers to implement a modification to the main generator protection digital relays. During the 2012 refueling outage (RFO), the protection relays outputs were incorrectly configured to trip due to inadequate guidance given to the workers. This resulted in a main generator trip signal that led to a main turbine trip and a subsequent reactor trip during positive reactive capability testing on July 24, 2013. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, Ginna procedures PRI- 06-02-KVRELAY and PRI-26-02-GEN which were used to perform the maintenance and modification on the generator protective relays during the 2012 RFO, were not sufficient to ensure the relays were set correctly prior to the system being placed in service. This resulted in a plant trip when the set points for the incorrectly set generator trip relays were achieved during generator voltage testing. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued June 19, 2012. This attachment directed the inspectors to evaluate the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined this finding did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition (e.g. loss of condenser, loss of feedwater). Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control, because CENG personnel did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant and human performance. Specifically, CENG personnel did not follow defined processes, such as the scope change process, to address the impact of changes to the work scope when implementing procedure changes to a modification to configure main generator digital protection relays. |
| Site: | Ginna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000244/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook D Dodson D Schroeder J Laughlin N Perry T Moslak |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Ginna - IR 05000244/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Ginna) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Ginna)
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