05000219/LER-2003-004, Actuation of Reactor Protection System Due to Instrument Malfunction
| ML032810194 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 09/29/2003 |
| From: | Harkness E AmerGen Energy Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2130-03-20247 LER 03-004-00 | |
| Download: ML032810194 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B), Common Cause Inoperability |
| 2192003004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
AmerGen SM AmerGen Energy Company, LLC An Exelon/British Energy Company Oyster Creek US Route 9 South P.O. Box 388 Forked River, NJ 08731-0388 10 CFR 50.73 September 29, 2003 2130-03-20247 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Oyster Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 NRC Docket No. 50-219
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2003-004-00:
Actuation of Reactor Protection System due to Instrument Malfunction Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 2003-004, Revision 0. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
If any further information or assistance is needed, please contact Mr. William Stewart, of my staff, at 609.971.4775.
Very truly yours, Ernest J Harkness P.E., Vice President Oyster Creek Generating Station EJH/RAM Enclosure cc:
Regional Administrator, USNRC Region I USNRC Senior Project Manager, Oyster Creek USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek File No. 03082
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES6-30-2001 (1-2001)
COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the liensiCO process and fed back to h'ndustiy. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the !=d Recoadeneaanaemerrt Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. DC 20550001, or by Internet LICEN EE E ENT R PORT(LEe-mail to bjsil nrc.gozv.
and to the Desk Officer, OfficeofrInformnation and Regulato Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Buget~ WeashngnD203I a (See reverse for reuired number of means used to impose Information collection does not display a currenty valid OMB control digitscdiaracters Cr each block) number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the Information collection.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Oyster Creek, Unit 1 05000 219 J
1 OF 3
TITLE (4)
Actuation of Reactor Protection System Due to Instrument Malfunction EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILTIES INVOLVED (8)
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER ISEQUENTIALI REV I _ _ _ _
MO DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER RE MO DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 22 2003 2003 -004
- - 00 09 29 2003 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT I1 SU 'MrITED PURSUANT TO iiIE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 C R: (Check all that apoly) (11)
MODE (9)
N
_ 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)()((11) 50.73(a)(2)(lI)(B)
I 50.73(a)(2)px)(A)
POWER
_ 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(4)
_ 50.73(a)(2)(110 I 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 100
_ 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c)(1)f)(A)
X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 202=3(a)(2))
_ 50.36(c)(1)01)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 7.7 1
(
a)5
_ 22=03(a)(2)0i) 50.36(c)(2) 0.73(a)(2)(v)(B) bo oI 202203(a)(2)(11in 50.46(a)(3)(1i) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
NICFon 366A 20.2203(a)(2)flv) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
_ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
_20.2203(a)(2)(v)
_50.73(a (2111)(13)
__50.73(a)(2)CviI) 20.2203(a)(2)(vI)
_50.73(a)(2f(1)(C)
__50.73(a)(2)(v~ill(A) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
_ 50.73(a)(2)(IR(A)
I 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
William Stewart 1
609.971.4775 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THis REPORT (13) i~~~;iiii I U~~~~~~~ANU-IREPORTABLE IIJMANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FA CTURER TO EPIX B
SN 0
LS M040 Y
D1 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MOCTH DAY YEAR 1SUBMISSION lYES (Ifys corn les teEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).
I X INO DATE ()IS I)I I
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces. I.e.. apDroxlmately 15 sinale-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On August 22, 2003, a Turbine Trip was caused by a spurious actuation of Moisture Separator Hi-Hi Level switch, LS-4-691. This resulted in a Reactor Scram from 100% power. The reactor shut down as designed. Plant cooldown to cold shutdown was required due to the trip of all five recirculation pumps.
The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The plant responded as designed for this type of event. Technical Specification limits were maintained. There was no radioactive release. All safety systems were fully operable. Off-site power was available. Operator performance was satisfactory.
All four level switches were replaced and a root cause is in progress.
NRC FORM 366 (1-2001)
(ff more space Is required use additonal copies of NRC Fonn 3A) (17)
DATE OF DISCOVERY This event occurred on August 22,2003.
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Note: System Identification codes from IEEE 805-1984 are indicated with Si. Component Function Identifiers from ANSI/IEEE 803A-1 983 are indicated by CFI.
A spurious actuation of a Moisture Separator (SI - SN), HI-HI Level switch (CFI - LS) tripped the main turbine (CFI - TRB) and scrammed the reactor (CFI - RCT). Actuation of the Reactor Protection System is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO DISCOVERY The plant was operating at approximately 100% power at normal reactor pressure, level, and temperature. All safety-related equipment was operable. Plant conditions prior to the Turbine Trip I Scram were stable.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On August 22,2003, at 0259 hours0.003 days <br />0.0719 hours <br />4.282407e-4 weeks <br />9.85495e-5 months <br />, annunciators (CFI - ANN) in the Main Control Room indicated a Moisture Separator HI-HI Level alarm. About ten seconds later the main turbine tripped as designed. The reactor then scrammed as designed, due to the anticipatory scram on the turbine stop valve closure.
The turbine trip caused a pressure increase which caused two of five Electromatic Relief Valves (CFI - RV) to open momentarily, three of five Reactor Recirculation Pumps (Si - AD, CFI - P) to trip, and both Isolation Condensers (Si - BL) to actuate. The reactor scram shut down the reactor as designed. Operators manually tripped the two operating Reactor Recirculation pumps, as required by procedure, and stabilized plant conditions.
Although no Technical Specification required the plant to be placed in the Cold Shutdown condition, the trip of all reactor recirculation pumps required cooldown to cold shutdown to recover the plant. Plant cooldown was begun at 0349 hours0.00404 days <br />0.0969 hours <br />5.770503e-4 weeks <br />1.327945e-4 months <br />. Shutdown Cooling (SI - BO) was placed in service at 1050 hours0.0122 days <br />0.292 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />3.99525e-4 months <br /> and the cold shutdown condition was reached at 1205 hours0.0139 days <br />0.335 hours <br />0.00199 weeks <br />4.585025e-4 months <br />.
NRC FORM 368A (1-2001)(1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET(2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE(3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR I
NUMBER I NUMBER Oyster Creek, Unit 1 05000 219 2003 004 00 3
OF 3
NARRATIE (ff more space Is requlred, use addlioacopies of NRC Fom 3664) (17)
APPARENT CAUSE Actuation of the Reactor Protection System was caused by closure of the turbine stop valves when the turbine tripped. The turbine trip was caused by spurious actuation of Moisture Separator Hi-Hi Level switch, LS-4-691.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The plant is designed for this type of transient and responded as designed. Technical specification limits were maintained. There was no radioactive release, nor any effect on the health and safety of the public. Operator performance was satisfactory.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Replaced all four moisture separator Hi-Hi Level Switches.
A root cause of the switch actuation is in progress to determine if additional corrective actions are warranted.
SIMILAR EVENTS
LER 1994-003, Turbine Trip / Reactor Scram on High RPV Water Level