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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5407218 May 2019 14:00:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2This is a non-emergency notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation (eight hour notification) due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation. Unit 3 manual reactor trip following grid disturbance. Following the grid disturbance, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to lowering steam generator water levels. All control rods fully inserted. AFW started as expected. All other systems responded as expected. Current reactor temperature is 547 degrees F. Current reactor pressure is 2235 psig. Decay heat is being removed through the Atmospheric Steam Dumps (no known primary to secondary Reactor Coolant System leakage exists). The unit is in a normal post-trip electrical lineup. There was no affect on Unit 4. The cause of the grid disturbance is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 540463 May 2019 16:43:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5296010 September 2017 22:20:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 09/10/17 at 1855 (EDT), (Turkey Point) Unit 4 reactor was manually tripped from 88% RTP (Rated Thermal Power) due to a failure of 4C Steam Generator main feed regulating valve causing lowering S/G (Steam Generator) level. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feed Water initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOP's (Emergency Operating Procedures) have been exited and General Operating procedures (GOP'S) were entered. Unit 4 is stable in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP (Normal Operating Temperature/Normal Operating Pressure). The licensee is investigating the failure of the feed regulating valve. Offsite power is available. Decay heat is being removed via main feedwater with steam discharged to atmosphere using the ADVs (Atmospheric Dump Valves). There is no known primary-secondary steam generator tube leakage. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 529528 September 2017 00:06:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 2300 today, the National Weather Service issued a hurricane warning for the area including Turkey Point Nuclear Units 3 & 4. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at 2314 (EDT). In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. No safety systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable but grid risk is high. Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0458 EDT ON 09/11/17 FROM TIM JONES TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

At 0400 (EDT) on 09/11/17, conditions at Turkey Point Nuclear have met established exit criteria to downgrade the Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE). The previously reported EAL (Emergency Action Level) has been exited. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R2DO (Michel) and R2OC (Miller), IRDMOC (Gott), NRREO (Miller), DHS, DOE, FEMA, HHS, USDA, EPA, FDA, DHS NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).

ENS 527969 June 2017 10:17:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of several safety systems. On April 10, 2017 at 1347 hours (EDT) with Unit 3 in Mode 6 during performance of the Train B Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test, safety system actuations occurred prior to the expected point in the test procedure when a loss of continuity resulted while the seismic clips were being removed from a fuse. The actuations were supposed to occur at a subsequent step when the fuse was to be pulled to actuate the Hi Containment Pressure signal. As a result, the following equipment actuated: 3B, 4A and 4B High Head SI pumps; 3B Containment Spray pump; Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolations; 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators; Emergency Containment Coolers. Because an actual high containment pressure signal did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation is considered invalid. All equipment responded as expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 527916 June 2017 15:48:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis notification is in accordance with Turkey Point Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 to report the inoperability of both Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps (SSGFPs) for greater than 24 hours. On 6/6/17 at 1751 hours (EDT) both SSGFPs will be inoperable for greater than 24 hours in support of planned valve repairs that require isolation of the common suction and discharge piping. TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 requires a report within four hours if both SSGFPs have been inoperable for 24 hours providing the cause of the inoperability and restoration plans. The valve repairs are currently planned for completion on or about 2300 hours on 6/9/17 which will restore the 'A' pump to service and allow TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 to be exited. The diesel-driven 'B' pump will remain out of service for radiator repair which is currently planned for completion on or about 0800 hours on 6/14/17. The function of the Standby Steam Generator Feedwater System is as a backup to the Auxiliary Feedwater System and is not credited in the safety analysis. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Both pumps were taken out of service at 1751 EDT on 6/5/17.
ENS 5262318 March 2017 15:07:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 3/18/17 at 1107 (EDT), the Unit 3 reactor tripped as a result of the loss of the 3A 4kV bus. All three reactor coolant pumps (RCP) tripped and the 3B RCP was restarted for forced recirculation. The reactor is stable in Mode 3. The 3A 4kV bus remains deenergized until troubleshooting and repairs are complete. In addition, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action C requires a four hour report for the concurrent inoperability of the Unit 4 startup transformer to Unit 3 via the 3A 4kV bus and the Unit 3 3A diesel generator. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/18/2017 AT 1854 EDT FROM JAMES SPICHER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Update to previous report (EN 52623) to include additional reporting criteria. On 3/18/17 at 1107 (EDT) the Unit 3 reactor tripped as a result of the loss of the 3A 4kV bus. The 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started on the loss of power signal but did not load, as designed, due to the bus fault. The 3A EDG was manually stopped at 1332. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System also initiated as expected. AFW was stopped at 1135. The actuations of the 3A EDG and AFW are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). A loss of safety function affecting Units 3 and 4 occurred due to the loss of the 3A high head safety injection (HHSI) pump because it could not be powered from the faulted 3A 4kV bus with both Unit 4 HHSI pumps earlier (0624) removed from service due to planned maintenance. This caused three of the four HHSI pumps to be inoperable. The four HHSI pumps are shared by both Units 3 and 4. The safety function is achieved by two of the four HHSI pumps. Both Unit 4 HHSI pumps were restored to operable status at 1336. The loss of safety function is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Unit 3 reactor is stable in Mode 3. The 3A 4kV bus remains deenergized until troubleshooting and repairs are complete. Unit 4 remains operating at 100% power. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt) and NRR EO (Miller).

ENS 5262118 March 2017 12:09:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Alert declared at 1119 EDT 3/18/17 based on EAL H.A.2 - Fire or Explosion affecting plant safety systems. Fire alarms in the Unit 3 4kV switchgear rooms resulting in a loss of the 3A 4kV bus and trip of all three Reactor Coolant Pumps. The reactor tripped and was stabilized in Mode 3. No actual fire was observed. The 3A 4kV is deenergized. The 3B Reactor Coolant Pump was restarted for forced circulation. All other safety systems functioned as required. A refueling outage was scheduled to begin on 3/20/17. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed using feedwater and steam generator atmospheric steam dumps. One person was injured with a minor burn and possible sprained ankle and was taken to a local hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA (e-mail), NWC (e-mail), NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1426 EDT ON 3/18/2017 FROM DAN HAGARDY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Unit 3 was determined by the Emergency Coordinator to be in a safe and stable condition, the Emergency Plan personnel at the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility were no longer required for support, the Operations Support Center was staffed for recovery efforts, and plant personnel were sufficient and capable for continuing mitigation efforts. Investigation of the fault on the 3A 4kV bus is ongoing. Based on the above conditions, the Alert was exited at 1420 hours (on 3/18/2017). The injured electrician was taken to an offsite hospital to treat minor burns and possible sprained ankle. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt), NRR EO (Miller and King), IRD MOC (Stapleton), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA (e-mail), NWC (e-mail), NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).

ENS 521628 August 2016 20:31:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1045 EDT, on August 8, 2016, it was determined that a non-licensee contract supervisor had failed to provide a urinalysis specimen for a random test and the medical explanation was not sufficient. It was ruled a refusal by the Medical Review Officer. The individual's access has been permanently denied. This is reportable under 10 CFR26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5213630 July 2016 03:52:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Power had been reduced for planned maintenance on the 3B feedwater heater. During isolation of the feedwater heaters, a repeated water hammer was experienced. A normal shutdown of Unit 3 was performed. Unit 4 was not affected by the water hammer. The decay heat is being removed via the condenser and all offsite and onsite electrical power is available. The investigation of the cause is underway. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2141 EDT ON 07/30/16 FROM ERIC JUERGENS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: At 0352 EDT on July 30, 2016, EN #52136 provided notification of a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation during a normal shutdown of Unit 3 in response to a secondary system equipment issue. Upon further investigation, the unit shutdown and manual RPS actuation were in accordance with general plant operating procedures. The manual RPS actuation was in accordance with the general operating procedure and not required to mitigate the consequences of the secondary system equipment issue. As such, the notification made by EN #52136 for a valid actuation of a specified system is hereby retracted. The NRC Resident lnspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).

ENS 5155119 November 2015 00:56:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopUnit 3 experienced Loss of Offsite Power due to lockout on Unit 3 Startup transformer. The 3B EDG auto started and loaded on the 3B 4KV Bus. The 3A Sequencer was out of service and prevented the 3A EDG from auto starting and supplying 3A 4KV busses. With only 3B 4KV bus powered from an EDG and no offsite power to Unit 3, Unit 3 entered an Unusual Event. Core cooling was restored with 3B RHR pump at 2343 EST. At 2350 EST, 3A 4KV Bus was manually loaded onto 3A EDG and conditions for Unusual Event were terminated. Additionally this is a non-emergency eight hour notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), for a valid automatic actuation of the 3B Emergency Diesel Generator. While core cooling was lost, the core experienced a 3 degree heat up. Spent fuel pit cooling has also been restored. The cause of the transformer lockout is under investigation. Unit 4 was unaffected and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified state and local authorities about this event. The licensee has also notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5154718 November 2015 09:53:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency eight hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), for an automatic actuation of the 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). On 11/18/15 at approximately 0326 (EST) a loss of power was experienced on the 3A 4KV Bus. The redundant 3B 4KV bus did not experience a loss of power. All systems operated as expected following the loss of power with the 3A EDG automatically sequencing onto the 3A 4KV bus and the load sequencer loading as designed. At the time of the actuation, Unit 3 was in a refueling outage in MODE 5. Investigation into the cause of the loss of power is in progress. There was no impact on Unit 4 operation during this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2100 EST ON 01/19/16 FROM JIM SPEICHER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting the original notification of a valid actuation and has re-categorized this as a 60-day optional report based on the following: This 60-day telephone notification is being made under the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the 3A EDG. The 3A EDG start resulted from an unexpected actuation of the 3A load sequencer during setup activities for the 3A Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test (ESIT) loss of offsite power (LOOP) sequence. On November 18, 2015, at approximately 0330 EST with Unit 3 in Mode 5 during a refueling outage, an unexpected LOOP occurred on the 3A 4160 V bus. At the time, an Instrument and Control (I&C) specialist was working in sequencer cabinet 3C23A verifying proper placement of flags in preparation for the installation of a local test switch that would be used to initiate the 3A ESIT LOOP signal. The 3A EDG started and functioned as designed. Initial troubleshooting determined that there were no actual plant conditions or parameters (e.g., undervoltage, degraded voltage, manual initiation) involved in the actuation. The root cause investigation revealed that individuals working in the room near the open cabinet did not have their mobile phones in airplane mode as required and two computer tablets being used adjacent to the sequencer cabinet were not in airplane mode as required prior to entering the 3A sequencer room. The cause of the actuation was determined to be an unintended human interaction in the form of electromagnetic or radio frequency interference at the proximity of the 3C23A cabinet. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 515186 November 2015 14:08:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 4-hour Non-Emergency notification to the NRC is being made based on notifications to other government agencies per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). On November 6, 2015, at approximately 1138 EST, notification of a deceased American Crocodile discovered in the Owner Controlled Area was made to state and federal agencies. The crocodile's death was not caused by facility operations. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission were notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 515155 November 2015 00:49:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency, information only notification to the NRCOC. Plant conditions are as follows: Unit 3 is de-fueled and Unit 4 is in Mode 1 (At 100 percent power). The Unit 3 Startup transformer is INOPERABLE due to preplanned maintenance. The 3B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) became INOPERABLE due to loss of all 480V vital AC load centers on Unit 3. With Unit 4 in Mode 1, Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1.c requires a 4-hour report to the NRC due to inoperability of 1 of 3 required EDGs onsite, concurrent with inoperability of a required Startup transformer. This report is for informational purposes only and is not required by 10CFR50.72/73. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling at Unit 3 remains available via 3B SFP Cooling Pump which is powered from Unit 4. The loss of the Unit 3 480V AC load centers is still under investigation. TS 3.8.1.1.c requires Unit 4 to exit the TS action statement in 2 hours or shutdown. To exit this TS, no two battery chargers may be powered from the same motor control center. The 480V vital AC load centers for Unit 3 must be restored since Unit 4 requires at least one train from Unit 3 480V AC load centers. The licensee is in the process of performing those actions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5114711 June 2015 12:10:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). On 6/11/15, at 0822 (EDT), Miami-Dade Fire Department notified the site of an alarming single Emergency Plan siren. Investigation is ongoing for alarming siren. At no time was there an emergency requiring the siren activation. FPL (Florida Power and Light) has not issued a news release. This notification is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The Senior NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ALEX CHOMAT TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1552 EDT ON 6/11/15 * * *

The investigation of the reported alarming EP siren did not confirm that it had been activated or had malfunctioned. The notification received from the Miami-Dade Fire Department apparently resulted from an erroneous call from a member of the public. This event notification is retracted based on the fact that no EP siren activation occurred necessitating notifications. The Senior NRC Resident (Inspector) has been updated. Notified R2DO (Guthrie)

ENS 5106512 May 2015 05:48:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is an non-emergency notification to the NRC (Headquarters) Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation (eight hour notification) due to auxiliary feedwater (AFW) initiation. On 5/12/15 at 0430 EDT, Unit 4 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Generator Differential Trip. Investigation is underway to determine the cause. Auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated as expected. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. Unit 4 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. All control rods fully inserted. Normal offsite power is available with decay heat is being removed by the atmospheric steam dumps. There is no known primary to secondary reactor coolant system leakage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5092125 March 2015 17:01:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to 'other government agencies.' On March 25, 2015 at approximately 1525 EDT, Florida Power & Light Company notified the State of Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission of an observed increase in the mortality of sheepshead minnows in the cooling canal system; an industrial wastewater facility. No other animal or fish species were affected. The impact is estimated to be a very small fraction of the total minnow population. The condition has had no adverse impact on station operations. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Sheepshead minnows are not an Endangered Species.
ENS 5080711 February 2015 01:03:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At 1750 (EST) hours on 2/10/15, Unit 4 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to missing tubing supports identified for two separate high point vent lines. This condition is unanalyzed and potentially rendered the cold leg High Head Safety Injection flow path inoperable. Upon discovery, the vent line root isolation valves were closed and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 1805. Investigation has been initiated to determine cause. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1250 EDT ON 03/31/15 FROM ERIC JUERGENS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: On 2/11/2015 at 0103 EST, Event Notification 50807 reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center (NRCOC) the potential inoperability of the Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) piping due to missing tubing supports on two separate high point vent lines. Subsequent analysis has determined that the Unit 4 HHSI cold leg injection flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS) remained operable with the missing vent line tubing supports and its safety related function was not affected. The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flow path to the RCS had been operable with the missing vent line tubing supports, Technical Specification (TS) requirements were met, and entry into TS 3.0.3 was not required. The HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4. Therefore, the immediate notification to the NRCOC on 2/11/2015 at 0103 EST in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is hereby retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Walker).

ENS 507895 February 2015 18:34:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 1130 EST on 2/5/15, the site discovered degradation of the technical support center ventilation air handling unit. Compensatory measures were established during the period that the ventilation system was non-functional. The TSC ventilation system was subsequently restored to functional status. The TSC ventilation system was restored at approximately 1834 EST on 2/5/15. The issue was a failure of the automatic TSC air recirculation function due to a tripped circuit breaker. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 507142 January 2015 16:45:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0925 (EST) on 1/2/2015, Engineering personnel identified a gas void in each of two Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) discharge lines which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg HHSI flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. The voids were vented and Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was exited at 1032. The testing for gas voids conducted on 1/2/2015 was a follow-up to a gas void found in one Unit 4 HHSI line on 12/26/2014. On 12/26/14, TS 3.0.3 was entered at 1020 and exited at 1048 after the gas void was vented. After further review, the 12/26/2014 event was also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Engineering evaluation will be performed for both events to determine the specific impact of the gas voids on HHSI system function. Cause evaluation is being conducted to determine the source of the gas and any needed corrective actions. Unit 3 was verified to not have this voiding issue. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SEAN BLOOM TO VINCE KLCO AT 1120 EDT ON 3/11/15 * * *

On 1/2/2015 at 1645 (EST), Event Notification 50714 reported to the NRCOC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center) gas voids detected on 12/26/2014 and 1/2/2015 in Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) piping which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria. Subsequent analysis has determined that if a HHSI pump started with the measured gas voids present, the resulting system conditions would not have impacted the integrity of the Unit 4 HHSI discharge flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS) and therefore its safety related function would not be impaired. The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flow path to the RCS had been operable with the voids present, Technical Specification (TS) requirements were met, and entry into TS 3.0.3 was not required. The HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4. Therefore, the immediate notification to the NRCOC on 1/2/2015 at 1645 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is hereby retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer).

ENS 5066811 December 2014 07:45:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Turkey Point will be conducting routine preventative maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The expected start of the preventative maintenance is 12/11/14, 0800 EST. Planned completion is 12/11/14, 1800 EST. This maintenance renders the TSC non-functional. The planned TSC alternative will be the Control Room. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JIM RUSSELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1625 EST ON 12/11/14 * * *

The TSC was declared operable at 1445 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

ENS 5064530 November 2014 17:26:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is an non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC (NRC Operations Center) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to preplanned manual actuation of Reactor Protection System and auto-initiation of AFW due to beginning of cycle operating conditions, IAW 4-GOP-103 (General Operating Procedure). On 11/30/14 at 1354 EST, Unit 4 reactor power was reduced to approximately 23% and manually tripped as a pre-planned evolution to facilitate repairs to an unidentified steam leak on Unit 4 High Pressure Turbine. All systems and components operated as designed. Unit 4 is currently stable in Mode 3, AFW has been secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 5062418 November 2014 19:25:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn November 17, 2014, Miami Dade County notified the site of an alarming single Emergency Plan siren. Following this notification from the County, a courtesy ENS Notification was made to the NRC Operations Center and the State of Florida State Warning Point. The siren has been repaired and returned to service. At no time was there an emergency requiring the siren activation. FPL (Florida Power and Light) did not issue a news release. This notification is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to 'other government agencies.' The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.
ENS 5054918 October 2014 15:20:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report (two separate) invalid actuations of the Unit 4 Safety Injection (SI) System in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On October 1, 2014 at approximately 1656 (EDT), Sl was actuated on low pressurizer pressure when the Sl signal block was inadvertently removed during pressure transmitter calibrations. The actuation was invalid because it was not in response to an actual plant condition requiring the need for Sl. Containment and containment ventilation isolation were initiated, and the following equipment automatically started: 4B residual heat removal pump; 3A, 3B and 4B high head safety injection (HHSI) pumps; 3A, 3B and 4B diesel generators (DG). This was a partial Sl actuation because of equipment removed from service or already in service due to unit outage conditions. Actuated equipment started and functioned successfully. Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection did not occur. The DGs started but did not load. On October 7, 2014 at approximately 1607 (EDT while unit was in a defueled status), Sl was actuated on low pressurizer pressure during restoration of power to the Train A instrumentation rack. The Sl actuation occurred when a fuse was inserted reenergizing the logic circuit because an incorrect test switch was manipulated during a prior procedure step. Properly positioning the correct test switch would have blocked the low pressurizer pressure signal. The actuation was invalid because it was not in response to an actual plant condition requiring the need for Sl. Containment isolation, containment ventilation isolation, control room isolation, feedwater isolation, and turbine trip were initiated, and the following equipment automatically started: 3A, 3B and 4A HHSI pumps; 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B DGs: 4A intake cooling water pump with isolation of turbine plant cooling water heat exchangers. This was a partial Sl actuation because of equipment removed from service or already in service due to unit outage conditions. Actuated equipment started and functioned successfully. ECCS injection did not occur. The DGs started but did not load. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. ..
ENS 5044010 September 2014 10:24:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) which requires a report when any event or condition at time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. On 9/9/14, FPL discovered the automatic feature associated with the swing 4A emergency containment cooling (ECC) unit was inoperable due to a design change inadequacy. During breaker replacement activities performed on 9/3/14, a one hour shutdown action statement pursuant to TS 3.6.2.2.b was exceeded due to two ECC's being unable to automatically start on an SI (Safety Injection) signal. (This was not known until the 4A was declared inoperable on 9/9/14 at 1936 EDT). The 4A ECC was declared inoperable at 1936 EDT on 9/9/14, and in accordance with TS 3.6.2.2.a, must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from the time of discovery. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5035411 August 2014 14:20:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is an non-emergency notification to the NRCOC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation (eight hour notification) due to auxiliary feedwater (AFW) initiation , safety injection (SI) initiation, and emergency diesel generator (EDG) auto start. On 8/11/14 at 1028 EDT, Unit 3 experienced a manual reactor trip due to a loss of instrument air. Auxiliary feed water automatically initiated as expected. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. Instrument air has been restored. At 1305 a safety injection signal (SI) occurred due to main steamline high differential pressure during a plant cooldown to 470 degrees Fahrenheit. High head safety injection (HHSI) pump, residual heat removal (RHR) pumps, and emergency diesel generators (EDGs) auto started as expected due to the safety injection signal. Based on plant conditions, the HHSI and RHR pumps did not inject into the reactor coolant system. The plant was stabilized after the reactor trip, however, the loss of instrument air resulted in a loss of letdown and PZR level continued to slowly increase to approximately 91%. All rods fully inserted and normal offsite power was maintained. Operators initiated a plant cooldown to stabilize and lower PZR level using the S/G atmospheric steam dumps. Unequal opening of the S/G atmospheric steam dumps caused the SI to occur due to main steamline high differential pressure. No RCS injection occurred and all SI equipment operated as expected and has been subsequently secured. Unit 3 is stable in mode 3 at 490 degrees Fahrenheit and RCS pressure is 1940 psig. There was no effect on Unit 4 which continues to operate at 100% power. The loss of instrument air is being investigated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5030624 July 2014 19:43:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 4-hour Non-Emergency notification to the NRC is being made based on a notification to another government agency per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). On July 24, 2014 at 16:04 (EDT), the control room was notified of a deceased American Crocodile inside the intake well. Based on visual evidence of no physical injury or trauma, the crocodile's death was not caused by plant operations. The Federal Fish and Wildlife Service and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) were notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5028720 July 2014 20:02:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1454 EDT on 20 July 2014, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F due to a natural event. This report is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. At 1800 EDT the NRC verbally approved a natural event Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) which allows the ultimate heat sink temperature to exceed 100 degrees F up to 103 degrees F. Unit power levels have been maintained at Unit 3 100% and Unit 4 95%. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS TRENT TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2058 EDT ON 7/26/2014 * * *

At 2046 on 7/20/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 exited the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink, when the ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature decreased below the TS limit of 100 degrees F. At 1604 on 7/26/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for TS 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. Turkey Point is currently complying with NOED No. 14-2-001, which allows a temporary maximum UHS temperature of 103 degrees F. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. At 2058 on 7/26/14 the UHS average temperature was 100.3 degrees F and the peak temperature was 100.5 degrees F. Unit 4 is currently operating at 75% power in anticipation of elevated intake temperature in the next several days. Notified R2DO (Musser)

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOSE VASQUEZ TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1913 EDT ON 7/27/2014 * * *

At 2102 on 7/26/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 exited the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink, when the ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature decreased below the TS limit of 100 degrees F. At 1602 on 7/27/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for TS 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. Turkey Point is currently complying with NOED No. 14-2-001, which allows a temporary maximum UHS temperature of 103 degrees F. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. At 1913 on 7/27/14 the UHS average temperature was 101.1 degrees F and the peak temperature was 101.3 degrees F. Units 3 and 4 are currently operating at 75% power in anticipation of elevated intake temperature in the next several days. Notified R2DO (Musser)

  • * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY CHRISTOPHER TRENT TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2103 EDT ON 07/28/2014 * * *

At 2212 on 7/27/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 exited the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink, which was entered at 1602 on 7/27/14, when the ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature decreased below the TS limit of 100 degrees F. At 1445 on 7/28/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for TS 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. Turkey Point is currently complying with NOED No. 14-2-001, which allows a temporary maximum UHS temperature of 103 degrees F. At 1946 on 7/28/14, UHS temperature decreased below the TS limit of 100 degrees F and Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 exited the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. 'The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Peak UHS temperature reached on 7/28/2014 was 101.1 degrees F. Units 3 and 4 are currently operating at 75 percent power in anticipation of continued elevated intake temperatures. Notified R2DO (Musser)

  • * * UPDATE FROM ADRIAN GONZALEZ TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2113 EDT ON 8/7/14 * * *

At 1455 on 08/07/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for TS 3/4.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. Turkey Point is currently complying with NOED No. 14-2-001, which allows a temporary maximum UHS temperature of 103 degrees F. The NRC Resident lnspector was notified. UHS temperature was at 100.4 F at the time of the notification. Notified R2DO (Nease).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ADRIAN GONZALEZ TO S. SANDIN AT 1900 EDT ON 8/8/14 * * *

At 1445 EDT on 08/08/14 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered Action for TS 3/4.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. On 8/08/14 at 1556 EDT Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 received Amendment No. 261 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 and Amendment No. 256 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 and exited the Action for TS 3/4.7 .4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. UHS temperature was at 101.24 F at the time of the notification. Notified R2DO (Nease).

ENS 5021720 June 2014 08:12:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Notification for planned, routine, preventative maintenance on Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The expected start of preventative maintenance is 06/20/14 at 0815 EDT. Planned completion is 06/20/14 at 1500 (EDT). Maintenance renders the TSC nonfunctional. The planned TSC alternative will be the Control Room. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE TO TIM JONES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1559 EDT ON 6/20/14 * * *

Maintenance is complete and the TSC HVAC was restored to service at 1455 EDT on 6/20/14. The TSC is now functional. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Haag).

ENS 5014025 May 2014 07:37:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is an non-emergency event notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) (four hour notification). On 05/25/2014 at 0536 EDT, as part of a planned maintenance outage to repair a leaking check valve inside the containment building, Unit 4 power level had been lowered to 19% reactor power for the planned opening of the reactor trip breakers. Unit 4 experienced a loss of condenser vacuum. An automatic turbine trip signal was generated which initiated a reactor trip signal. The reactor tripped as required on the automatic trip signal. Unit 4 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. The loss of vacuum is under investigation at this time. All other plant systems are working as designed. The reactor trip was uncomplicated with no other safety system actuations. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to atmosphere. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The grid is stable and Unit 4 is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 3 was not affected and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5005423 April 2014 17:18:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency eight hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), for a valid manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System. While performing rod control system testing with the reactor subcritical in MODE 3, a rod control demand position indicator failed when one bank of rods were withdrawn. The group step counter demand exceeded the Technical Specification allowable value. On 4/23/2014 at approximately 1302 (EDT), the Unit 3 reactor trip breakers were manually opened to comply with Technical Specification 3.1.3.3 action. The rods being tested were fully inserted when the reactor trip breakers were opened. All other rods remained fully inserted. Unit 3 remains in MODE 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4993320 March 2014 00:29:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). During an inspection, a small amount of boric acid residue was noted in the vicinity of the Pressurizer heater components. Subsequent examination revealed a small flaw in Pressurizer Backup heater Bank B element 11. This component is part of the primary system boundary. Repair options are being evaluated. Currently, Unit 3 is in Mode 5 in preparation for refueling. The repair will be performed prior to restart. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4992717 March 2014 17:09:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At approximately 1018 EDT on March 17, 2014, during a check of facility equipment, the Technical Support Center (TSC) was found to be degraded due to the loss of the air conditioning (AC) system. Due to the loss of AC, TSC habitability is impacted. The emergency assessment function can be performed in the control room as addressed in emergency response procedures. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This condition is common to both units. Unrelated to this condition, Unit 3 is currently in the process of shutting down in preparation for a refueling outage. Unit 4 will remain Mode 1, 100% Power. The TSC AC system repairs are in progress. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 0359 EDT ON 3/18/14 FROM PELL TO SNYDER * * * 

The TSC AC system has been repaired and restored to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

ENS 4986127 February 2014 18:56:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At approximately 1222 EST on February 27, 2014, the site discovered degradation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation air handling unit. Maintenance is in progress. The functionality of the TSC ventilation system is in question. The emergency assessment function could have been performed in the Control Room as addressed in emergency response procedures. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). A TSC ventilation fan was vibrating because of a thrown fan blade. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

 *  *  *  UPDATE AT 1105 EST ON 3/6/2014 FROM CHRIS TRENT TO JEFF ROTTON  *  *  * 

Turkey Point Nuclear Station declared the TSC functional but degraded due to its normal power supply breaker tripping unexpectedly. The TSC is capable of going on emergency recirculation on its alternate power supply. The TSC is currently in its normal standby alignment with its power being supplied from its alternate source breaker. Compensatory measures are in place IAW 0-ADM-117, Equipment Important to Emergency Response, and will remain in place until the cause of the normal power supply breaker tripping is identified and corrected. Emergency Preparedness department will be making a notification to ERO members to report to the TSC as their primary notification again. Notified R2DO (Rose).

ENS 4965218 December 2013 13:01:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

NRC Operations Center notification for planned routine preventative maintenance on the Technical Support Center HVAC. Expected start of the preventative maintenance is 12/18/13 at 1300 EST. Planned completion is 12/19/13 at 0100 EST. This maintenance renders the TSC non-functional. The planned TSC alternate location will be the Control Room. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/19/13 AT 1621 EST FROM NICHOLAS DESANTIS TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1405 EDT, maintenance was completed, and the TSC was declared functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Freeman).

ENS 4964617 December 2013 17:25:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 1050 EST on December 17, 2013, during a check of facility equipment, the Technical Support Center (TSC) was found to be degraded due to the loss of the air filtration system. The air filtration system was restored and the TSC made fully functional at approximately 1300 the same day. The emergency assessment function could have been performed in the control room as addressed in emergency response procedures. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 490966 June 2013 16:24:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 0800 hours on June 6, 2013, it was determined that a non-licensee contract supervisor had been arrested off-site for possession of a controlled substance. Access has been terminated and additional information documented in the Personnel Access Data System (PADS). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4902110 May 2013 12:42:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification). On 5/10/13 (at 1108 EDT) Unit 3 was stabilizing at 25% (power) during a controlled shutdown from an initial power level of 38% (power). Prior to the planned insertion of the trip at 25% (power), a malfunction of the turbine valves (not yet understood) caused a loss of load and a manual reactor trip was performed at 1108 (EDT). Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and stable. Source Range Nuclear Instrument N-3-32 malfunctioned (loss of detector voltage). All other plant systems are working as designed. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at normal operating temperature and pressure. All control rods fully inserted. All other Nuclear Instrumentation is operable. Decay heat removal is via main feedwater and atmospheric steam dumps however, the condenser steam dumps are available but not preferred for Tave control. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. Unit 3 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The cause of the turbine valves malfunction is not known at this time. There is no impact on Unit 4. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 490179 May 2013 16:10:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of the Unit 3 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On March 11,2013 at approximately 0043 (EDT), while starting the 3B Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP) for a one minute run, both trains of AFW started. Operators then manually closed the AFW flow control valves. AFW Trains 2 and 1 were restored to operable standby status at approximately 0112 (EDT) and 0117 (EDT), respectively. AFW actuation occurred because of a misunderstood procedure step and unnecessarily placed jumpers in AFW actuation logic in preparation for start of the 3B SGFP, which resulted in the invalid signal. At the time, the level in the steam generators was being maintained by the 3A Standby Steam Generator Feed Pump (SBSGFP). Because no actual loss of normal feedwater condition existed (with the 3A SBSGFP in service) which required AFW to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for actuation, this event is an invalid actuation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4894819 April 2013 18:08:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

An Unusual Event was declared on Unit 4 at 1730 EDT due to a loss of offsite power for greater than 15 minutes. Emergency buses are being powered from the Emergency Diesel Generators. All rods inserted. The plant is stabilizing on natural circulation in Mode 3. Emergency buses failed to auto-transfer to the startup transformer. AFW initiated and is supplying water to the steam generators. There was no impact on Unit #3. The failure of the auto-transfer of the startup transformer is under investigation. Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NuclearSSA via email. The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT PELL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1911 EDT * * *

At 1854 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 continues to be in an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. The emergency buses were energized from the start up transformer at 1824 EDT. Two reactor coolant pumps have been started and are running. The plant is stabilizing in Mode 3. In addition, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) notifications are being made for the Reactor Protection Actuation for loss of power and the Emergency Safety Function actuations of the Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliary Feedwater. The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias), NRR (Skeen), and IRD (Grant).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT PELL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1943 EDT * * *

All emergency buses are powered from offsite power. Unit 4 is stable in Mode 3. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1915 EDT on 4/19/13. The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias), NRR (Skeen), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NuclearSSA via email

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEITH MAESTAS TO BILL HUFFMAN ON 4/23/13 AT 1959 EDT * * *

In addition to the 10 CFR 50.72 sections initially identified, this event is also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Turkey Point was performing a 3rd Harmonic Relay Power Ascension Test after an Extended Power Upgrade outage. Unit 4 was approximately 173 MW electric with the auxiliary transformer supplying the site safety related 4.16KV busses. The test required maneuvering the Unit 4 main generator voltage downward to place the generator in the lead. As the Unit 4 main generator voltage was lowered, the Load Center degraded voltage relays initiated sequencer operation, 4.16KV bus stripping, starting the EDGs, and loading the 4.16KV buses onto EDGs. Offsite power was available at all times. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Sykes) notified.

ENS 4885226 March 2013 19:06:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. On 3/26/13 at 0620 EDT, during a routine surveillance of the Technical Support Center (TSC), the TSC emergency ventilation system control switch was discovered in the off position (vs. auto). The Operations department was notified and the TSC emergency system ventilation was returned to normal alignment (auto) at 0644 EDT. The switch normally operates in the 'auto' position, so that TSC emergency ventilation system can be automatically initiated from a control room isolation signal. In accordance with station operating procedures, upon initial responder activation to the TSC, the TSC ventilation system is also manually placed in service. The TSC emergency ventilation system was capable of manual initiation and was not out of service for repair or maintenance. An investigation is underway to understand the circumstances associated with the control switch misalignment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4882113 March 2013 19:01:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC (NRC Operations Center) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuations of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW). On 3/13/2013 at 1120 EDT, Unit 3 experienced an automatic initiation of AFW due to a trip of the 3B Steam Generator Feedwater Pump while shutdown with Rod Banks withdrawn in preparation for startup. Subsequently, at 1131 EDT, Rx Trip Breakers were opened due to a lowering Reactor Coolant System average temperature resulting from AFW operation. Unit 3 remains stable in Mode 3. The initiation of AFW is currently under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4881712 March 2013 17:31:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopUnit 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip from approximately 3% power. The turbine was off-line and undergoing testing following a control valve position indication repair. A turbine inlet pressure channel perturbation momentarily actuated the 'Reactor Trip by Turbine Trip' protection, causing the Unit 3 reactor to trip. Unit 3 is currently stable in Mode 3. No other complications were noted following the reactor trip. The cause of the turbine inlet pressure channel perturbation is currently under investigations. All control rods fully inserted. Normal feedwater is supplying the steam generators and decay heat removal is to atmosphere via the atmospheric steam dumps. There is no primary to secondary leakage. Unit 3 is in a normal shutdown offsite electrical power alignment. There is no impact on Unit 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4876418 February 2013 03:19:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is an non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation (eight hour notification). On 2/18/2013 at 0055 Unit 3 commenced a unit shutdown due to high # 1 seal leak-off on the 3A Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). At 0129 3A RCP #1 seal leak-off exceeded operating limits. Unit 3 reactor was manually tripped. Auxiliary feedwater actuated as designed based on steam generator levels as a result of the trip. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. No complications were noted as a result of the reactor trip. Steam generator levels are being returned to normal level following the reactor trip. All other plant systems functioned as designed during and after the reactor trip. 3A RCP high #1 seal leak-off is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat was removed by AFW to the steam generators out the atmospheric reliefs. There was no primary to secondary leakage. Electrical buses are being supplied via offsite power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4874412 February 2013 00:45:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation (eight hour notification). On 2/11/2013 at 2236 EST Unit 3 experienced a loss of condenser vacuum. An automatic Turbine Trip signal was generated which initiated a Reactor Trip signal. The reactor tripped as required on the automatic trip signal. Auxiliary feedwater water actuated automatically based on low steam generator levels following the trip. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. Steam generator levels have been returned to normal levels . The loss of vacuum is under investigation at this time. All other plant systems are working as designed. The reactor trip was uncomplicated. All control rods fully inserted. The plant is stable at normal temperature and pressure. AFW has been secured and main feedwater is being used for Steam Generator water level control. The main condenser is unavailable and decay heat removal is to atmosphere via the atmospheric steam dumps. There are no indications of primary to secondary leakage. Unit 3 is in a normal offsite power electrical alignment. There is no impact on Unit 4. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4858613 December 2012 08:58:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Planned maintenance activities are being performed today (December 13, 2012) to Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. This work activity is planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within about 8 hours including establishing and removing the clearances, and performing post maintenance testing. If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the TSC, plans are to utilize the TSC during the time this work activity is being performed, as long as habitability conditions allow. The Emergency Response Organization duty team members will be relocated to alternate locations if required by habitability conditions in accordance with emergency implementing procedures. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOSEPH MCKED TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2000 EST ON 12/13/12 * * *

The licensee reported that the planned maintenance activities have been completed to the Technical Support Center's HVAC.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Blamey) notified.

ENS 4854730 November 2012 04:54:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) notification to the NRC of an event related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made. On 11/30/12 at 0310 EST, (licensee was) notified by the site Hazardous Materials Coordinator that a diesel fuel spill occurred in the owner controlled area (OCA) that exceeded the reporting quantity (RQ) to the state and local agencies. The quantity spilled was 40 gallons, with a minor portion entering the cooling canal system. On 11/30/12 at 0325 EST, (licensee) initiated contact with the following government agencies: 1) National Response Center (Report # 1031907), 2) Florida State Watch Office (Report # 2012-7936), and 3) South Florida Regional Planning Council (voice mail message left with contact number). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4852620 November 2012 15:51:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed contract acting supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a random fitness for duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4851717 November 2012 22:16:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopIn anticipation of core offload, the control room emergency ventilation system was placed in recirculation mode. As a result of a deficient procedure, an automatic initiation feature to the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was inhibited from 11/16/12 at 2325 (EST) to 11/17/12 at 1419 (EST). The Turkey Point TSC habitability design basis assumes that upon discovery of an accident condition, an initiation signal will automatically place both control room and TSC ventilation systems in recirculation. Contrary to the design basis, it was discovered on 11/17/12 at 2000 (EST) that when the TSC ventilation system was placed in the 'inhibited mode,' the automatic initiation feature to the TSC ventilation system recirculation mode was defeated. The TSC ventilation system otherwise remained functional and available. Upon discovery of this condition, the TSC inhibit switch was returned to enable which would allow the TSC to automatically go on recirculation from an automatic start signal. No accident conditions occurred that warranted a need to activate any emergency operations facilities. This notice is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 482898 September 2012 13:12:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopFPL (Florida Power & Light) previously reported (EN 47819) that a portion of the Turkey Point Technical Support Center (TSC) Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (HVAC) was deenergized for maintenance during two extended periods. FPL concluded that due to the condition, the TSC may not have been fully functional under every postulated design basis accident scenario. As a result of further investigation, FPL has been unable to validate the historical TSC design basis assumptions for habitability for an indeterminate period in the past. Among the issues identified include (a) seized HVAC isolation damper, (b) unsecured HVAC balancing damper, and (c) voids in the concrete shield wall. Additionally, while the original design basis did not provide for any unfiltered air inleakage, the HVAC system was constructed and maintained to ensure only that a positive pressure could be achieved. FPL has addressed the TSC issues. A new dose analysis and recent tracer gas test have established TSC compliance with the current licensing basis. Therefore, the TSC is fully functional at this time. This report is made for historical conditions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.