Semantic search
| Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56813 | 25 October 2023 01:12:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2159 on 10/24/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was automatically tripped due to an actuation signal into the Unit 3 reactor protection system protection rack during maintenance. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Decay heat is being removed via auxiliary feed water system and the steam dump system. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the automatic reactor trip will be investigated by the licensee. |
| ENS 56755 | 22 September 2023 22:09:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1819 EDT on 9/22/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a main generator lockout. The probable cause of the main generator lockout was from a lightning strike. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the steam dump system. Unit 4 is not affected. Auxiliary feed water was actuated as expected as a result of the reactor trip. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56658 | 4 August 2023 15:30:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1320 (EDT) on 08/04/2023, with the Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering level in the 3C steam generator. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Decay heat is being removed via the auxiliary feed water system and the atmospheric steam dumps. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of lowering level in the 3C steam generator was unknown at the time of the notification and will be investigated by the licensee. |
| ENS 56474 | 18 April 2023 03:56:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1112 EDT on 4/15/23, it was determined that the (reactor coolant system) RCS pressure boundary does not meet ASME Section XI, Table IWB-341 0-1, `Acceptable Standards,' due to through wall leak of the flux mapper seal table guide tube H-6. Corrective actions have been scheduled. `This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). A follow-up review of the condition revealed that 10 CFR 50.72 notification was applicable within 8 hours of the time of discovery on 04/15/23. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56264 | 8 December 2022 14:39:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1402 EST Turkey Point Unit 3, while operating at 100 percent, declared an Unusual Event due to unidentified leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute for more than 15 minutes. The abnormal procedure for Reactor Coolant System leakage was entered. The plant remains at 100 percent power. The cause of the leakage is under investigation. At 1446 EST it was verified that the leak had been isolated. The plant remains at 100 percent power. Unit 4 was unaffected. State and local authorities were notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Dest (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
Turkey Point Unit 3 has isolated the leak. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1558 EST. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller), NRR EO (Miller), and IR MOC (Crouch). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Dest (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
Turkey Point Nuclear Unit 3 is retracting this notification based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification, Following the event for unidentified RCS leakage on 12/8/22 at 1403 EST, additional information demonstrated that an RCS leak did not exist. A review of indications showed that the in-service seal water return filter D/P (Differential Pressure) rose from 1 psid to 6 psid with a corresponding rise in VCT (Volume Control Tank) level as would be seen with an increase in excess letdown flowrate. Additionally, the on-contact radiation dose rate from the excess letdown piping in the U3 Pipe and Valve Room was measured by RP (Radiation Personnel) to be significantly higher than normal with no other sources of elevated radiation levels noted. Following the closure of CV-3-387, RCS To Excess Letdown HX (Heat Exchanger) Control Valve, a nominal input/output flow balance was able to be restored. Containment parameters including pressure, temperature, sump level and radiation level did not change during the event. Due to the shared nature of piping between excess letdown and seal water return, a challenge to system integrity would not allow RCP (Reactor Coolant Pump) controlled bleed-off to remain in service with a normal flow balance which it has at all times subsequent to the event. Turkey Point Nuclear reported initially based on the available information at the time and to ensure timeliness with emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller). |
| ENS 55831 | 8 April 2022 01:10:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1900 EDT on 04/07/22, while Unit 4 was in Mode 4 following a refueling outage, it was discovered that both trains of residual heat removal (RHR) were simultaneously inoperable due to gas voiding. At 2032 EDT corrective actions were completed and both trains of RHR were declared operable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 4/8/2022 at 0110 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 notified the (NRC Operations Center (NRCOC)) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) that both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) were simultaneously inoperable due to the presence of gas voids that were identified during scheduled system gas accumulation testing. Subsequent evaluation by (Florida Power & Light (FPL)) Engineering has concluded that both trains of RHR remained operable and capable of performing their specified safety function. This NRCOC notification is a retraction of EN# 55831. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Miller) |
| ENS 55785 | 12 March 2022 06:56:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0050 EST on 3/12/22, while shutting down for entry into a scheduled refueling outage, the station discovered that a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (4A MSIV) did not fully close on demand. All other equipment operated as expected. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 3/12/2022 at 0656 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 notified the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) that a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) did not fully close when manually demanded from the control room during shutdown of Unit 4 for a refueling outage. Following disassembly and inspection of the MSIV, Florida Power & Light Engineering identified the cause of the deficiency and determined that the valve would have fully seated under its design accident conditions. This notification is a retraction of EN# 55785. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller). |
| ENS 55768 | 5 March 2022 15:12:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email: A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55757 | 25 February 2022 14:53:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: A non-licensee contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55574 | 12 November 2021 20:47:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1605 EST on 11/12/21, it was determined that the RCS Pressure Boundary does not meet ASME Section XI, Table IWB-341 0-1, 'Acceptable Standards' due to a through wall leak of the Core Exit Thermocouple Nozzle Assembly. Measures have been taken to establish Mode 5 for corrective actions. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/12/2021 EN 55574 reported possible evidence of pressure boundary through-wall leakage observed on a Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) tube. On 3/10/2022, based on laboratory analysis of the affected CET tube section, FPL Engineering determined that there was no pressure boundary through-wall leakage associated with this event. Analysis identified that the leakage likely originated from an adjacent threaded compression fitting on a tubing joint. This condition complies with ASME Section XI requirements and is therefore not reportable. This follow-up NRCOC notification is a retraction of EN 55574. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller). |
| ENS 55513 | 9 October 2021 07:27:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0300 EDT, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System occurred when steam generator water level rose to 80 percent causing a Feedwater Isolation signal, which tripped the last remaining Steam Generator Feed Pump during plant cooldown. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed when the feedwater isolation signal was received. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the high steam generator level is under investigation. |
| ENS 55153 | 24 March 2021 22:06:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | An Unusual Event was declared at Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Generating Station at 2129 EDT on 03/24/2021 due to a Fire Alarm in Containment. The licensee was not able to validate the alarm within 15 minutes. Following containment entry there was not smoke or fire present. At 2214 EDT, Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Generating Station terminated the Unusual Event. The cause of the spurious fire alarm is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), R2DO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email). |
| ENS 55117 | 1 March 2021 14:07:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On 3/1/21 at 1112 EST, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP), the reactor automatically tripped. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide Steam Generator (S/G) water level control. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods are inserted, decay heat is being removed via S/G through normal secondary systems. The plant is in a normal electrical line-up. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is (unknown at this time and is) being investigated. There was no effect on Unit 4. |
| ENS 55109 | 20 February 2021 22:00:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1830 (EST) on 02/20/21, Turkey Point Nuclear Station Security identified three distressed individuals, potentially drowning, in the bay just offshore of the Owner Controlled Area. The licensee contacted the U.S. Coast Guard and local sheriffs department for assistance. At 1852 all 3 individuals were reported as safe and onshore. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55036 | 14 December 2020 20:21:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1240 EST on 12/14/20, it was determined that all Unit 4 Charging Pumps and Boration Flowpaths were simultaneously inoperable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
On 1/21/21 a past operability review was completed that assessed the event reported on 12/14/20. The evaluation concluded that the condition did not render any Unit 4 Charging Pump or all boration flowpaths inoperable, and that the 8-hour notification submitted on 12/14/20 was not required. This notification is a retraction of EN #55036. The NRC Site Resident has been notified of the EN #55036 retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller). |
| ENS 54847 | 21 August 2020 03:12:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | On 08/20/20 at 2354 (EDT), with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 34% RTP (Rated Thermal Power), the reactor was manually tripped. This was due to Steam Generator Water Level control issues that resulted in the only Steam Generator (S/G) Feed Pump tripping on low suction pressure. Unit 3 reactor was tripped manually upon the loss of the last running feed pump. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOPs have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) The NRC Resident Inspector bas been notified. Decay heat removal is by the steam dumps to atmosphere. Unit 4 is not affected. The cause of the low suction feed pressure to the steam generator feed pump is under investigation. | |
| ENS 54844 | 19 August 2020 15:57:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | On 08/19/20 at 1325 EDT, during Unit 3 startup at approximately 0 percent rated thermal power, the reactor automatically tripped. The trip was automatically initiated from the Source Range Nuclear Power Instrumentation. All other systems operated normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by Steam Dumps. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the Source Range Nuclear Power Instrumentation trip is under investigation. | |
| ENS 54839 | 18 August 2020 00:08:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | On 08/17/20 at 2113 EDT, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 92% (Rated Thermal Power) RTP, the reactor was manually tripped. This was due to a turbine runback caused by CV-3-2011, Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Control Valve, failing open, followed by rising Steam Generator (S/G) levels. Unit 3 reactor was tripped manually when the 3C S/G Level reached 78% narrow range. Unit 3 Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed manually in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) network due to 38 MSR Main Steam Stop valve position indication lost. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOPs have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods are inserted, decay heat is being removed via S/G through normal secondary systems. The plant is in normal electrical line up. Lightning strike is believed to be the initial cause of the runback. | |
| ENS 54762 | 5 July 2020 23:05:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Reactor trip caused by turbine trip due to voltage regulator issues. Plant is stable. Exited the Emergency Operating Procedure Network. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically actuated and was subsequently restored to standby. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 54423 | 5 December 2019 13:30:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | This 4-hour non-emergency notification to the NRC is being made on a notification to another government agency per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). On 12/5/2019, at 0719 EST, a deceased manatee was identified in the Owner Controlled Area. The Federal Fish and Wildlife Service and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) were notified on 12/5/2019, at 1220 EST. Miami-Dade County was notified on 12/5/2019, at 1245 EST. A courtesy call to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection was made on 12/5/2019, at 1300 EST. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54072 | 18 May 2019 14:00:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | This is a non-emergency notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation (eight hour notification) due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation. Unit 3 manual reactor trip following grid disturbance. Following the grid disturbance, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to lowering steam generator water levels. All control rods fully inserted. AFW started as expected. All other systems responded as expected. Current reactor temperature is 547 degrees F. Current reactor pressure is 2235 psig. Decay heat is being removed through the Atmospheric Steam Dumps (no known primary to secondary Reactor Coolant System leakage exists). The unit is in a normal post-trip electrical lineup. There was no affect on Unit 4. The cause of the grid disturbance is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 54046 | 3 May 2019 16:43:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident has been notified. | |
| ENS 52960 | 10 September 2017 22:20:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On 09/10/17 at 1855 (EDT), (Turkey Point) Unit 4 reactor was manually tripped from 88% RTP (Rated Thermal Power) due to a failure of 4C Steam Generator main feed regulating valve causing lowering S/G (Steam Generator) level. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feed Water initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOP's (Emergency Operating Procedures) have been exited and General Operating procedures (GOP'S) were entered. Unit 4 is stable in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP (Normal Operating Temperature/Normal Operating Pressure). The licensee is investigating the failure of the feed regulating valve. Offsite power is available. Decay heat is being removed via main feedwater with steam discharged to atmosphere using the ADVs (Atmospheric Dump Valves). There is no known primary-secondary steam generator tube leakage. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52952 | 8 September 2017 00:06:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 2300 today, the National Weather Service issued a hurricane warning for the area including Turkey Point Nuclear Units 3 & 4. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at 2314 (EDT). In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. No safety systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable but grid risk is high. Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).
At 0400 (EDT) on 09/11/17, conditions at Turkey Point Nuclear have met established exit criteria to downgrade the Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE). The previously reported EAL (Emergency Action Level) has been exited. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R2DO (Michel) and R2OC (Miller), IRDMOC (Gott), NRREO (Miller), DHS, DOE, FEMA, HHS, USDA, EPA, FDA, DHS NICC, and NSSA (e-mail). |
| ENS 52796 | 9 June 2017 10:17:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of several safety systems. On April 10, 2017 at 1347 hours (EDT) with Unit 3 in Mode 6 during performance of the Train B Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test, safety system actuations occurred prior to the expected point in the test procedure when a loss of continuity resulted while the seismic clips were being removed from a fuse. The actuations were supposed to occur at a subsequent step when the fuse was to be pulled to actuate the Hi Containment Pressure signal. As a result, the following equipment actuated: 3B, 4A and 4B High Head SI pumps; 3B Containment Spray pump; Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolations; 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators; Emergency Containment Coolers. Because an actual high containment pressure signal did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation is considered invalid. All equipment responded as expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 52791 | 6 June 2017 15:48:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This notification is in accordance with Turkey Point Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 to report the inoperability of both Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps (SSGFPs) for greater than 24 hours. On 6/6/17 at 1751 hours (EDT) both SSGFPs will be inoperable for greater than 24 hours in support of planned valve repairs that require isolation of the common suction and discharge piping. TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 requires a report within four hours if both SSGFPs have been inoperable for 24 hours providing the cause of the inoperability and restoration plans. The valve repairs are currently planned for completion on or about 2300 hours on 6/9/17 which will restore the 'A' pump to service and allow TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 to be exited. The diesel-driven 'B' pump will remain out of service for radiator repair which is currently planned for completion on or about 0800 hours on 6/14/17. The function of the Standby Steam Generator Feedwater System is as a backup to the Auxiliary Feedwater System and is not credited in the safety analysis. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Both pumps were taken out of service at 1751 EDT on 6/5/17. |
| ENS 52623 | 18 March 2017 15:07:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On 3/18/17 at 1107 (EDT), the Unit 3 reactor tripped as a result of the loss of the 3A 4kV bus. All three reactor coolant pumps (RCP) tripped and the 3B RCP was restarted for forced recirculation. The reactor is stable in Mode 3. The 3A 4kV bus remains deenergized until troubleshooting and repairs are complete. In addition, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action C requires a four hour report for the concurrent inoperability of the Unit 4 startup transformer to Unit 3 via the 3A 4kV bus and the Unit 3 3A diesel generator. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified.
Update to previous report (EN 52623) to include additional reporting criteria. On 3/18/17 at 1107 (EDT) the Unit 3 reactor tripped as a result of the loss of the 3A 4kV bus. The 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started on the loss of power signal but did not load, as designed, due to the bus fault. The 3A EDG was manually stopped at 1332. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System also initiated as expected. AFW was stopped at 1135. The actuations of the 3A EDG and AFW are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). A loss of safety function affecting Units 3 and 4 occurred due to the loss of the 3A high head safety injection (HHSI) pump because it could not be powered from the faulted 3A 4kV bus with both Unit 4 HHSI pumps earlier (0624) removed from service due to planned maintenance. This caused three of the four HHSI pumps to be inoperable. The four HHSI pumps are shared by both Units 3 and 4. The safety function is achieved by two of the four HHSI pumps. Both Unit 4 HHSI pumps were restored to operable status at 1336. The loss of safety function is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Unit 3 reactor is stable in Mode 3. The 3A 4kV bus remains deenergized until troubleshooting and repairs are complete. Unit 4 remains operating at 100% power. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt) and NRR EO (Miller). |
| ENS 52621 | 18 March 2017 12:09:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | Alert declared at 1119 EDT 3/18/17 based on EAL H.A.2 - Fire or Explosion affecting plant safety systems. Fire alarms in the Unit 3 4kV switchgear rooms resulting in a loss of the 3A 4kV bus and trip of all three Reactor Coolant Pumps. The reactor tripped and was stabilized in Mode 3. No actual fire was observed. The 3A 4kV is deenergized. The 3B Reactor Coolant Pump was restarted for forced circulation. All other safety systems functioned as required. A refueling outage was scheduled to begin on 3/20/17. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed using feedwater and steam generator atmospheric steam dumps. One person was injured with a minor burn and possible sprained ankle and was taken to a local hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA (e-mail), NWC (e-mail), NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).
Unit 3 was determined by the Emergency Coordinator to be in a safe and stable condition, the Emergency Plan personnel at the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility were no longer required for support, the Operations Support Center was staffed for recovery efforts, and plant personnel were sufficient and capable for continuing mitigation efforts. Investigation of the fault on the 3A 4kV bus is ongoing. Based on the above conditions, the Alert was exited at 1420 hours (on 3/18/2017). The injured electrician was taken to an offsite hospital to treat minor burns and possible sprained ankle. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt), NRR EO (Miller and King), IRD MOC (Stapleton), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA (e-mail), NWC (e-mail), NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail). |
| ENS 52162 | 8 August 2016 20:31:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1045 EDT, on August 8, 2016, it was determined that a non-licensee contract supervisor had failed to provide a urinalysis specimen for a random test and the medical explanation was not sufficient. It was ruled a refusal by the Medical Review Officer. The individual's access has been permanently denied. This is reportable under 10 CFR26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 52136 | 30 July 2016 03:52:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | Power had been reduced for planned maintenance on the 3B feedwater heater. During isolation of the feedwater heaters, a repeated water hammer was experienced. A normal shutdown of Unit 3 was performed. Unit 4 was not affected by the water hammer. The decay heat is being removed via the condenser and all offsite and onsite electrical power is available. The investigation of the cause is underway. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: At 0352 EDT on July 30, 2016, EN #52136 provided notification of a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation during a normal shutdown of Unit 3 in response to a secondary system equipment issue. Upon further investigation, the unit shutdown and manual RPS actuation were in accordance with general plant operating procedures. The manual RPS actuation was in accordance with the general operating procedure and not required to mitigate the consequences of the secondary system equipment issue. As such, the notification made by EN #52136 for a valid actuation of a specified system is hereby retracted. The NRC Resident lnspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (Rose). |
| ENS 51551 | 19 November 2015 00:56:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | Unit 3 experienced Loss of Offsite Power due to lockout on Unit 3 Startup transformer. The 3B EDG auto started and loaded on the 3B 4KV Bus. The 3A Sequencer was out of service and prevented the 3A EDG from auto starting and supplying 3A 4KV busses. With only 3B 4KV bus powered from an EDG and no offsite power to Unit 3, Unit 3 entered an Unusual Event. Core cooling was restored with 3B RHR pump at 2343 EST. At 2350 EST, 3A 4KV Bus was manually loaded onto 3A EDG and conditions for Unusual Event were terminated. Additionally this is a non-emergency eight hour notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), for a valid automatic actuation of the 3B Emergency Diesel Generator. While core cooling was lost, the core experienced a 3 degree heat up. Spent fuel pit cooling has also been restored. The cause of the transformer lockout is under investigation. Unit 4 was unaffected and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified state and local authorities about this event. The licensee has also notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51547 | 18 November 2015 09:53:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), for an automatic actuation of the 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). On 11/18/15 at approximately 0326 (EST) a loss of power was experienced on the 3A 4KV Bus. The redundant 3B 4KV bus did not experience a loss of power. All systems operated as expected following the loss of power with the 3A EDG automatically sequencing onto the 3A 4KV bus and the load sequencer loading as designed. At the time of the actuation, Unit 3 was in a refueling outage in MODE 5. Investigation into the cause of the loss of power is in progress. There was no impact on Unit 4 operation during this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
The licensee is retracting the original notification of a valid actuation and has re-categorized this as a 60-day optional report based on the following: This 60-day telephone notification is being made under the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the 3A EDG. The 3A EDG start resulted from an unexpected actuation of the 3A load sequencer during setup activities for the 3A Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test (ESIT) loss of offsite power (LOOP) sequence. On November 18, 2015, at approximately 0330 EST with Unit 3 in Mode 5 during a refueling outage, an unexpected LOOP occurred on the 3A 4160 V bus. At the time, an Instrument and Control (I&C) specialist was working in sequencer cabinet 3C23A verifying proper placement of flags in preparation for the installation of a local test switch that would be used to initiate the 3A ESIT LOOP signal. The 3A EDG started and functioned as designed. Initial troubleshooting determined that there were no actual plant conditions or parameters (e.g., undervoltage, degraded voltage, manual initiation) involved in the actuation. The root cause investigation revealed that individuals working in the room near the open cabinet did not have their mobile phones in airplane mode as required and two computer tablets being used adjacent to the sequencer cabinet were not in airplane mode as required prior to entering the 3A sequencer room. The cause of the actuation was determined to be an unintended human interaction in the form of electromagnetic or radio frequency interference at the proximity of the 3C23A cabinet. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (McCoy). |
| ENS 51518 | 6 November 2015 14:08:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This 4-hour Non-Emergency notification to the NRC is being made based on notifications to other government agencies per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). On November 6, 2015, at approximately 1138 EST, notification of a deceased American Crocodile discovered in the Owner Controlled Area was made to state and federal agencies. The crocodile's death was not caused by facility operations. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission were notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51515 | 5 November 2015 00:49:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is a non-emergency, information only notification to the NRCOC. Plant conditions are as follows: Unit 3 is de-fueled and Unit 4 is in Mode 1 (At 100 percent power). The Unit 3 Startup transformer is INOPERABLE due to preplanned maintenance. The 3B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) became INOPERABLE due to loss of all 480V vital AC load centers on Unit 3. With Unit 4 in Mode 1, Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1.c requires a 4-hour report to the NRC due to inoperability of 1 of 3 required EDGs onsite, concurrent with inoperability of a required Startup transformer. This report is for informational purposes only and is not required by 10CFR50.72/73. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling at Unit 3 remains available via 3B SFP Cooling Pump which is powered from Unit 4. The loss of the Unit 3 480V AC load centers is still under investigation. TS 3.8.1.1.c requires Unit 4 to exit the TS action statement in 2 hours or shutdown. To exit this TS, no two battery chargers may be powered from the same motor control center. The 480V vital AC load centers for Unit 3 must be restored since Unit 4 requires at least one train from Unit 3 480V AC load centers. The licensee is in the process of performing those actions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51147 | 11 June 2015 12:10:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). On 6/11/15, at 0822 (EDT), Miami-Dade Fire Department notified the site of an alarming single Emergency Plan siren. Investigation is ongoing for alarming siren. At no time was there an emergency requiring the siren activation. FPL (Florida Power and Light) has not issued a news release. This notification is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The Senior NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified.
The investigation of the reported alarming EP siren did not confirm that it had been activated or had malfunctioned. The notification received from the Miami-Dade Fire Department apparently resulted from an erroneous call from a member of the public. This event notification is retracted based on the fact that no EP siren activation occurred necessitating notifications. The Senior NRC Resident (Inspector) has been updated. Notified R2DO (Guthrie) |
| ENS 51065 | 12 May 2015 05:48:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is an non-emergency notification to the NRC (Headquarters) Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation (eight hour notification) due to auxiliary feedwater (AFW) initiation. On 5/12/15 at 0430 EDT, Unit 4 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Generator Differential Trip. Investigation is underway to determine the cause. Auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated as expected. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. Unit 4 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. All control rods fully inserted. Normal offsite power is available with decay heat is being removed by the atmospheric steam dumps. There is no known primary to secondary reactor coolant system leakage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50921 | 25 March 2015 17:01:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to 'other government agencies.' On March 25, 2015 at approximately 1525 EDT, Florida Power & Light Company notified the State of Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission of an observed increase in the mortality of sheepshead minnows in the cooling canal system; an industrial wastewater facility. No other animal or fish species were affected. The impact is estimated to be a very small fraction of the total minnow population. The condition has had no adverse impact on station operations. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Sheepshead minnows are not an Endangered Species. |
| ENS 50807 | 11 February 2015 01:03:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is a non-emergency 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At 1750 (EST) hours on 2/10/15, Unit 4 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to missing tubing supports identified for two separate high point vent lines. This condition is unanalyzed and potentially rendered the cold leg High Head Safety Injection flow path inoperable. Upon discovery, the vent line root isolation valves were closed and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 1805. Investigation has been initiated to determine cause. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: On 2/11/2015 at 0103 EST, Event Notification 50807 reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center (NRCOC) the potential inoperability of the Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) piping due to missing tubing supports on two separate high point vent lines. Subsequent analysis has determined that the Unit 4 HHSI cold leg injection flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS) remained operable with the missing vent line tubing supports and its safety related function was not affected. The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flow path to the RCS had been operable with the missing vent line tubing supports, Technical Specification (TS) requirements were met, and entry into TS 3.0.3 was not required. The HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4. Therefore, the immediate notification to the NRCOC on 2/11/2015 at 0103 EST in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is hereby retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Walker). |
| ENS 50789 | 5 February 2015 18:34:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At approximately 1130 EST on 2/5/15, the site discovered degradation of the technical support center ventilation air handling unit. Compensatory measures were established during the period that the ventilation system was non-functional. The TSC ventilation system was subsequently restored to functional status. The TSC ventilation system was restored at approximately 1834 EST on 2/5/15. The issue was a failure of the automatic TSC air recirculation function due to a tripped circuit breaker. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50714 | 2 January 2015 16:45:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0925 (EST) on 1/2/2015, Engineering personnel identified a gas void in each of two Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) discharge lines which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg HHSI flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. The voids were vented and Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was exited at 1032. The testing for gas voids conducted on 1/2/2015 was a follow-up to a gas void found in one Unit 4 HHSI line on 12/26/2014. On 12/26/14, TS 3.0.3 was entered at 1020 and exited at 1048 after the gas void was vented. After further review, the 12/26/2014 event was also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Engineering evaluation will be performed for both events to determine the specific impact of the gas voids on HHSI system function. Cause evaluation is being conducted to determine the source of the gas and any needed corrective actions. Unit 3 was verified to not have this voiding issue. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On 1/2/2015 at 1645 (EST), Event Notification 50714 reported to the NRCOC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center) gas voids detected on 12/26/2014 and 1/2/2015 in Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) piping which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria. Subsequent analysis has determined that if a HHSI pump started with the measured gas voids present, the resulting system conditions would not have impacted the integrity of the Unit 4 HHSI discharge flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS) and therefore its safety related function would not be impaired. The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flow path to the RCS had been operable with the voids present, Technical Specification (TS) requirements were met, and entry into TS 3.0.3 was not required. The HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4. Therefore, the immediate notification to the NRCOC on 1/2/2015 at 1645 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is hereby retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer). |
| ENS 50668 | 11 December 2014 07:45:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | Turkey Point will be conducting routine preventative maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The expected start of the preventative maintenance is 12/11/14, 0800 EST. Planned completion is 12/11/14, 1800 EST. This maintenance renders the TSC non-functional. The planned TSC alternative will be the Control Room. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
The TSC was declared operable at 1445 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai). |
| ENS 50645 | 30 November 2014 17:26:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is an non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC (NRC Operations Center) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to preplanned manual actuation of Reactor Protection System and auto-initiation of AFW due to beginning of cycle operating conditions, IAW 4-GOP-103 (General Operating Procedure). On 11/30/14 at 1354 EST, Unit 4 reactor power was reduced to approximately 23% and manually tripped as a pre-planned evolution to facilitate repairs to an unidentified steam leak on Unit 4 High Pressure Turbine. All systems and components operated as designed. Unit 4 is currently stable in Mode 3, AFW has been secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| ENS 50624 | 18 November 2014 19:25:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On November 17, 2014, Miami Dade County notified the site of an alarming single Emergency Plan siren. Following this notification from the County, a courtesy ENS Notification was made to the NRC Operations Center and the State of Florida State Warning Point. The siren has been repaired and returned to service. At no time was there an emergency requiring the siren activation. FPL (Florida Power and Light) did not issue a news release. This notification is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to 'other government agencies.' The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. |
| ENS 50549 | 18 October 2014 15:20:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report (two separate) invalid actuations of the Unit 4 Safety Injection (SI) System in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On October 1, 2014 at approximately 1656 (EDT), Sl was actuated on low pressurizer pressure when the Sl signal block was inadvertently removed during pressure transmitter calibrations. The actuation was invalid because it was not in response to an actual plant condition requiring the need for Sl. Containment and containment ventilation isolation were initiated, and the following equipment automatically started: 4B residual heat removal pump; 3A, 3B and 4B high head safety injection (HHSI) pumps; 3A, 3B and 4B diesel generators (DG). This was a partial Sl actuation because of equipment removed from service or already in service due to unit outage conditions. Actuated equipment started and functioned successfully. Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection did not occur. The DGs started but did not load. On October 7, 2014 at approximately 1607 (EDT while unit was in a defueled status), Sl was actuated on low pressurizer pressure during restoration of power to the Train A instrumentation rack. The Sl actuation occurred when a fuse was inserted reenergizing the logic circuit because an incorrect test switch was manipulated during a prior procedure step. Properly positioning the correct test switch would have blocked the low pressurizer pressure signal. The actuation was invalid because it was not in response to an actual plant condition requiring the need for Sl. Containment isolation, containment ventilation isolation, control room isolation, feedwater isolation, and turbine trip were initiated, and the following equipment automatically started: 3A, 3B and 4A HHSI pumps; 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B DGs: 4A intake cooling water pump with isolation of turbine plant cooling water heat exchangers. This was a partial Sl actuation because of equipment removed from service or already in service due to unit outage conditions. Actuated equipment started and functioned successfully. ECCS injection did not occur. The DGs started but did not load. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. .. |
| ENS 50440 | 10 September 2014 10:24:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) which requires a report when any event or condition at time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. On 9/9/14, FPL discovered the automatic feature associated with the swing 4A emergency containment cooling (ECC) unit was inoperable due to a design change inadequacy. During breaker replacement activities performed on 9/3/14, a one hour shutdown action statement pursuant to TS 3.6.2.2.b was exceeded due to two ECC's being unable to automatically start on an SI (Safety Injection) signal. (This was not known until the 4A was declared inoperable on 9/9/14 at 1936 EDT). The 4A ECC was declared inoperable at 1936 EDT on 9/9/14, and in accordance with TS 3.6.2.2.a, must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from the time of discovery. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50354 | 11 August 2014 14:20:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is an non-emergency notification to the NRCOC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation (eight hour notification) due to auxiliary feedwater (AFW) initiation , safety injection (SI) initiation, and emergency diesel generator (EDG) auto start. On 8/11/14 at 1028 EDT, Unit 3 experienced a manual reactor trip due to a loss of instrument air. Auxiliary feed water automatically initiated as expected. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. Instrument air has been restored. At 1305 a safety injection signal (SI) occurred due to main steamline high differential pressure during a plant cooldown to 470 degrees Fahrenheit. High head safety injection (HHSI) pump, residual heat removal (RHR) pumps, and emergency diesel generators (EDGs) auto started as expected due to the safety injection signal. Based on plant conditions, the HHSI and RHR pumps did not inject into the reactor coolant system. The plant was stabilized after the reactor trip, however, the loss of instrument air resulted in a loss of letdown and PZR level continued to slowly increase to approximately 91%. All rods fully inserted and normal offsite power was maintained. Operators initiated a plant cooldown to stabilize and lower PZR level using the S/G atmospheric steam dumps. Unequal opening of the S/G atmospheric steam dumps caused the SI to occur due to main steamline high differential pressure. No RCS injection occurred and all SI equipment operated as expected and has been subsequently secured. Unit 3 is stable in mode 3 at 490 degrees Fahrenheit and RCS pressure is 1940 psig. There was no effect on Unit 4 which continues to operate at 100% power. The loss of instrument air is being investigated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50306 | 24 July 2014 19:43:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This 4-hour Non-Emergency notification to the NRC is being made based on a notification to another government agency per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). On July 24, 2014 at 16:04 (EDT), the control room was notified of a deceased American Crocodile inside the intake well. Based on visual evidence of no physical injury or trauma, the crocodile's death was not caused by plant operations. The Federal Fish and Wildlife Service and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) were notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50287 | 20 July 2014 20:02:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1454 EDT on 20 July 2014, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F due to a natural event. This report is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. At 1800 EDT the NRC verbally approved a natural event Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) which allows the ultimate heat sink temperature to exceed 100 degrees F up to 103 degrees F. Unit power levels have been maintained at Unit 3 100% and Unit 4 95%. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
At 2046 on 7/20/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 exited the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink, when the ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature decreased below the TS limit of 100 degrees F. At 1604 on 7/26/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for TS 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. Turkey Point is currently complying with NOED No. 14-2-001, which allows a temporary maximum UHS temperature of 103 degrees F. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. At 2058 on 7/26/14 the UHS average temperature was 100.3 degrees F and the peak temperature was 100.5 degrees F. Unit 4 is currently operating at 75% power in anticipation of elevated intake temperature in the next several days. Notified R2DO (Musser)
At 2102 on 7/26/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 exited the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink, when the ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature decreased below the TS limit of 100 degrees F. At 1602 on 7/27/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for TS 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. Turkey Point is currently complying with NOED No. 14-2-001, which allows a temporary maximum UHS temperature of 103 degrees F. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. At 1913 on 7/27/14 the UHS average temperature was 101.1 degrees F and the peak temperature was 101.3 degrees F. Units 3 and 4 are currently operating at 75% power in anticipation of elevated intake temperature in the next several days. Notified R2DO (Musser)
At 2212 on 7/27/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 exited the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink, which was entered at 1602 on 7/27/14, when the ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature decreased below the TS limit of 100 degrees F. At 1445 on 7/28/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for TS 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. Turkey Point is currently complying with NOED No. 14-2-001, which allows a temporary maximum UHS temperature of 103 degrees F. At 1946 on 7/28/14, UHS temperature decreased below the TS limit of 100 degrees F and Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 exited the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. 'The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Peak UHS temperature reached on 7/28/2014 was 101.1 degrees F. Units 3 and 4 are currently operating at 75 percent power in anticipation of continued elevated intake temperatures. Notified R2DO (Musser)
At 1455 on 08/07/14, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for TS 3/4.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. Turkey Point is currently complying with NOED No. 14-2-001, which allows a temporary maximum UHS temperature of 103 degrees F. The NRC Resident lnspector was notified. UHS temperature was at 100.4 F at the time of the notification. Notified R2DO (Nease).
At 1445 EDT on 08/08/14 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered Action for TS 3/4.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F. On 8/08/14 at 1556 EDT Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 received Amendment No. 261 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 and Amendment No. 256 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4 and exited the Action for TS 3/4.7 .4, Ultimate Heat Sink. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. UHS temperature was at 101.24 F at the time of the notification. Notified R2DO (Nease). |
| ENS 50217 | 20 June 2014 08:12:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | Notification for planned, routine, preventative maintenance on Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The expected start of preventative maintenance is 06/20/14 at 0815 EDT. Planned completion is 06/20/14 at 1500 (EDT). Maintenance renders the TSC nonfunctional. The planned TSC alternative will be the Control Room. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Maintenance is complete and the TSC HVAC was restored to service at 1455 EDT on 6/20/14. The TSC is now functional. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Haag). |
| ENS 50140 | 25 May 2014 07:37:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is an non-emergency event notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) (four hour notification). On 05/25/2014 at 0536 EDT, as part of a planned maintenance outage to repair a leaking check valve inside the containment building, Unit 4 power level had been lowered to 19% reactor power for the planned opening of the reactor trip breakers. Unit 4 experienced a loss of condenser vacuum. An automatic turbine trip signal was generated which initiated a reactor trip signal. The reactor tripped as required on the automatic trip signal. Unit 4 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. The loss of vacuum is under investigation at this time. All other plant systems are working as designed. The reactor trip was uncomplicated with no other safety system actuations. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to atmosphere. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The grid is stable and Unit 4 is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 3 was not affected and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |