ML20038A184
| ML20038A184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/06/2020 |
| From: | NRC/OCM |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19365A119 | List: |
| References | |
| M200206 | |
| Download: ML20038A184 (65) | |
Text
SCHEDULING NOTE
Title:
BRIEFING ON ADVANCED REACTORS AND NEW REACTOR TOPICS (Public)
Purpose:
To provide the Commission with an update on (1) NRCs efforts to modernize and risk-inform regulatory processes to effectively and efficiently license advanced reactors, (2) the NRCs efforts to complete the regulatory readiness activities under the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (3) Vogtle project activities, and (4) stakeholder perspectives on advanced reactor industry initiatives and NRC developmental activities, including potential policy and program challenges.
Scheduled: February 6, 2020 9:00 a.m.
Duration: Approx. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Location: Commissioners Conference Room, 1st fl. OWFN
Participants:
Presentation Panel 1 - External Stakeholders 40 mins.*
Alice Caponiti, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Nuclear Fleet and 10 mins.*
Advanced Reactor Development, U.S. Department of Energy Topic:
- DOE perspectives on advanced reactor development, including Development and application of technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based methodologies Doug True, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, 10 mins.*
Nuclear Energy Institute Topic:
- Nuclear industry initiatives and priorities to support advanced reactor deployment including efforts on micro-reactors
- Status of NEI advanced reactor technology work groups (high temperature gas, fast reactors and molten salt reactors)
Amir Afzali, Policy and Licensing Director - Next Generation Reactors, 10 mins.*
Southern Company Services Topic:
- Licensing Modernization Project efforts to develop technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based guidance for licensing advanced reactors
- Insights and lessons-learned from pilot applications 1
Edwin Lyman, Director of Nuclear Power Safety, Union of Concerned 10 mins.*
Scientists Topic:
- Stakeholder perspectives on advanced reactor regulatory and policy issues Commission Q & A 40 mins.
Break 5 mins.
Panel 2 - NRC Staff 40 mins.*
Margaret Doane, Executive Director for Operations Topic:
- Opening Remarks Robert Taylor, Deputy Director for New Reactors, NRR Topic:
- Vision and direction for regulatory reviews of advanced reactors, key opportunities and challenges, and coordination with federal agencies and external stakeholders Mike King, Director, Voglte Project Office, NRR Topic:
- Vogtle project activities John Segala, Branch Chief, Advanced Reactor Policy Branch, Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities, NRR Topic:
- Licensing Modernization Project o Endorsement of guidance for a technology-neutral, risk-informed, and performance-based approach to licensing, and activities to meet NEIMA requirements Ben Beasley, Branch Chief, Advanced Reactor Licensing Branch, Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities, NRR Topic:
- Overview of readiness to review license applications, status of applications, and development of safety and environmental review regulatory guidance Commission Q & A 40 mins.
Discussion - Wrap-up 5 mins.
- For presentation only and does not include time for Commission Q & As 2
~ lean. Reliable. Nuclear.
Alice Caponiti DOE Perspectives on Advanced Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reactor Development and Reactor Fleet & Advanced Reactor Deployment Licensing Office of Nuclear Energy U.S. Department of Energy
DOE Technology Inclusive Initiatives Can Expedite the Retirement of Regulatory Risk While Modernizing the Regulatory Framework 1 - Ung th - n - ds of innovat1ion by D-v,-loping t - ba is for in reducing *HeJbi1llity in sa isfying the demonstra in1g RC' miss,on is met:
in n o'f regulation by priorit i.zng DOIE"s r1 , rch activi'ties 2 energy.gov/ne
Why is DOE Interested in Assuring a Risk-Informed Performance Based (RIPB) Approach to Advanced Reactor Licensing ?
- Reactor plant event sequence identification, evaluation, and safety system classification are a key source of regulatory uncertainty impeding advanced reactor deployment
- Difficult to consistently and confidently address uncertainty through a purely ad-hoc and expert judgment-based approach due to:
- Wide variation in reactor technologies and safety case approaches
- Financial uncertainty created by late-stage and less structured regulatory decisions
- RIPB approach is technology-inclusive and can be applied to the broad range of advanced reactor designs being supported by DOE
- Assists industry stakeholders and DOE in identifying vulnerabilities and uncertainties and focus research efforts in the most impactful areas 3 energy.gov/ne
DOE Has a History of Promoting Risk-Informed Performance Based (RIPB) Methodologies
- Directly and consistently supported RIPB approaches to the design and licensing of advanced reactor technologies since the 1980s
- General Atomics
- Exelon - Pebble Bed Modular Reactor
- Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)
- Licensing Modernization Project (LMP)
- LMP Pilot Studies on a variety of designs
- Efforts resulted in the approach now being considered by the Commission
- Per the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), RIPB approach reflects the culmination of DOE, NRC and industry insights and good practices
- Strong partnerships and focus on RIPB methodologies continue between the private sector and Government 4 energy.gov/ne
RIPB Approach Going Forward
- Ongoing DOE projects, are implementing the RIPB approach developed through the LMP in support of the DOE authorization process
- Continue DOE cost-shared initiatives addressing licensing (TICAP) and individual awards to industry
- Promote advanced reactor regulatory efficiency by assisting industry in developing NRC application development
- Continue collaborations with the international community on advanced reactor technologies 5 energy.gov/ne
NRC Coordination & Engagement
- Joint advanced reactor deployment activities (LMP, TICAP)
- Nuclear Energy Institute Advanced Reactor Working Group and Technology-Specific Technical Working Groups
- Ongoing NRC-DOE partnerships to evaluate emerging technologies 6 energy.gov/ne
Ongoing and Planned DOE Advanced Reactor Development and Deployment Efforts
- Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Program National Laboratory R&D Activities
- Versatile Test Reactor
- Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program
- National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC)
- Advanced Reactor Demonstrations
- Risk Reduction for Future Demonstrations
- Regulatory Development
- Advanced Reactor Safeguards
- ARC-20 Awards
- Industry Funding Opportunity Announcement Awards 7 energy.gov/ne
Questions?
Clean. Reliable. Nuclear.
8 energy.gov/ne
New & Advanced Reactors Doug True Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President February 6, 2020
©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute
Decarbonization Trajectory of U.S. Utilities 150M AEP Alliant 140M Ameren 130M Berkshire Hathaway Energy 120M Consumers Energy Dominion 110M Emissions (CO2 Metric Tons)
DTE 100M Duke Energy Emera 90M Entergy 80M Evergy 70M FirstEnergy NextEra 60M NIPSCO 50M NRG 40M OGE Pinnacle West (APS) 30M PPL 20M PSEG 10M Southern TVA 0
WEC 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Xcel Year ©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 2
Nuclears Role in a Low Carbon Electricity Future 250 200
~90 GW 33% of Capacity (GW)
New Nuclear Generation 150 100 ~90 GW New Nuclear 20% of Generation 50 Current Fleet SLR 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044 2049 Does not account for decarbonization of other sectors
©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 3
The Time is Actually Now Achievement of Carbon Goals Wont Happen Overnight Renewable Share Will Grow, but is Limited
- Even with storage Firm, Dispatchable Power Still Needed
- Utilities making decisions today about conversions from coal
- Cost competitive nuclear option Basic Timeline:
Nth of Broad a Kind Deployment Demonstrations 2020 2030 2040 2050
©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 4
Regulatory Priorities
- 1. Construction and licensing decisions
- Vogtle 3 and 4
- Design and site applications
- 2. Advanced reactor policy decisions
- Risk-informed regulatory framework
- Technology inclusive
- 3. Streamlining processes
- Significantly shorter reviews
- Efficient Environmental review
©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 5
Southern Company Licensing Modernization Project (LMP)
Amir Afzali Licensing and Policy Director Southern Company
Licensing Modernization Project Why: Reduce regulatory uncertainty to enable accelerated commercialization of advanced non-LWR reactors
- Consistent with the Commissions long-standing effort to transition to risk-informed, performance-based regulations
- Key to achieving modern risk-informed regulation as envisioned in the agencys Transformation Initiative.
How: Develop transparent, systematic, risk-informed, performance-based, and predictable methodology What: NEI 18-04 and four supporting reports are intended to:
- Select and evaluate Licensing Basis Events (LBEs)
- Classify Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) based on their holistic and realistic contribution to risk
- Determine Defense-in-Depth (DiD) adequacy Southern Company 2
LBE Evaluation Chart 1.E+01 I 10 CFR 20 1 lso-Risk 1 "F-C Target" I
ANTICIPATED Line I OPERATIONAL + Xe-100 4x200 Mwt Dose at 500m 0
z 1.E+OO OCCURRENCE AOO) REGION I I I
I
- eVinci 1x14 Mwt Dose at 1m w I aw
' ' *,(j Risk Significant
- PRISM 2x471 Mwt Dose at 500m 1.E-01 0:: -
.._ MHTGR 4x350 Mwt Dose at 500 m LL ~
I I- w z >- 1.E-02 ~ --------------- -
w I-
>z w <(
DESIGN BASIS U) ..J 1.E-03 EVENT (DBE) _ _10CFR50.34
- a.. REGION Dose Limit
~
CQW 0::
a..
C>- 1.E-04 --------------
z Design U) z BEYOND DESIGN Objective w 1.E-05 BASIS EVENT 0
..J (BDBE) REGION 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-04 1.E+OO 1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 30-DAY TOTAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (REM)
AT EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB)
LMP Tabletop Insights RIPB exercises Results of the Tabletop Background confirmed that:
- The LMP process can be effectively executed for a spectrum of different non-LWR concepts
- Design decisions can be optimized through an integrated and realistic analysis of the plants response
- Information obtained through the LMP-based design evaluation can be used for building a strong operational risk management program
Summary
- The LMP methodology, presented in NEI 18-04, is developed based on:
- over 20 years of industry interactions with the NRC staff on risk-informed regulatory approaches, including many public reviews and discussions
- lessons learned from a number of industry tabletop exercises, covering different technologies and designs
- Positive support of Draft Guide-1353 which endorses NEI 18-04:
- ACRS letter of support, following a number of meetings with the industry and NRC staff.
- Next steps:
- Critical- Approval of SECY-19-0117
- Valuable- NRC endorsement of ASME non-LWR PRA standard.
SECY-19-0117 key step in support of Commissions long-standing effort to transition to risk-informed, performance-based regulations and regulatory modernization
- LMP- Licensing Modernization Project
- NEI- Nuclear Energy Institute
- LBE- Licensing Basis Events
- DBE- Design Basis Events
- DBA- Design Basis Accidents
- BDBE- Beyond Design Basis Events
- DiD- Defense-in-Depth
- QHO- Quantitative Health Objective
- PAG- Protection Active Guide
- EAB- Exclusion Area Boundary
- Mwt- Megawatt Thermal
- F-C- Frequency-Consequence
UCS Perspectives on Advanced Reactor Regulatory and Policy Issues February 6, 2020 Dr. Edwin Lyman Director of Nuclear Power Safety Climate and Energy Program Union of Concerned Scientists
What is an advanced reactor?
- NRC has not adopted a consistent definition for the term advanced reactorthis is problematic
- This regulatory basis recognizes that the phrase advanced reactors has different meanings in different documents -- Draft Regulatory Basis, Rulemaking for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors, July 2019
- Physical Security Regulatory Basis: Light-water small modular reactors and non-light-water reactors
- could include large CANDUs
- 2008 Advanced Reactor Policy Statement: any design other than an LWR licensed before 1997
- could include large LWRs (AP1000)
- In any case, these definitions do not include the NRCs enhanced safety and security expectations in the Advanced Reactor Policy Statement 2
NEIMAs definition
- More refined (but also problematic) definition in the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act:
a fission or fusion reactor with significant improvements compared to commercial nuclear reactors under construction as of January 14, 2019 (date of enactment), including improvements such as (A) additional inherent safety features; (B) significantly lower levelized cost of electricity; (C) lower waste yields; (D) greater fuel utilization; (E) enhanced reliability; (F) increased proliferation resistance; (G) increased thermal efficiency; or (H) ability to integrate into electric and nonelectric applications.
3
NRCs NEIMA obligations
- [NRC] shall develop and implement, where appropriate, strategies for the increased use of risk-informed, performance-based licensing evaluation techniques and guidance for commercial advanced nuclear reactors within the existing regulatory framework
- Gives the NRC full discretion to determine where such strategies are appropriate but limits application to reactors with significant improvements compared to the AP1000
- However, NEIMA does not make clear if this definition applies to reactors that have both significant improvements and significant disadvantages compared to current commercial reactors
- Non-LWRs will generally have some improvements and some disadvantages compared to LWRs
- Nor does it specify how the NRC should make such determinations 4
Common-cause failure
- The proposed framework for risk-informing advanced reactors lacks defense-in-depth because the accuracy of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a common-cause failure mode
- PRAs for non-LWR designs are largely academic exercises and lack sufficient data for validation
- The PRA (with mechanistic source term) may be used to justify
- Siting in densely populated urban areas
- Elimination of off-site radiological emergency planning
- Reduction in number of armed responders
- Reduction in number of operators
- No containment structure
- No safety-related electrical power
- Reduction in NRC oversight
- What is the cumulative impact of these regulatory rollbacks?
5
- Staff have proposed that the required content of non-LWR applications and the level of detail of NRCs review themselves be risk-informedthat is, also based on the PRA
- This could lead to circular reasoning: systems, structures and components (SSCs) that the applicant asserts are less risk-significant would receive less review, making it more difficult for staff to determine if the SSCs were properly classified in the first place
- NRC should develop acceptance criteria that new reactor applicants would have to meet to enable independent confirmation that their designs are likely to be significantly safer and more secure before allowing them to use risk-informed licensing processes 6
Changing urban siting policy
- UCS does not support the staffs proposed changes to longstanding NRC policy to allow siting of advanced reactors in densely populated areasand certainly not through a mere change to a regulatory guide
- Changes to siting policy should not be based only on individual risk limits but also technically sound societal risk metrics
- Land contamination/relocation standard
- Population dose limit
- a power plant could be located in Central Park and still meet the Commissions quantitative offsite release standard. - Separate Views of Commissioner Bernthal on Safety Goals Policy, 1986
- Any such changes would be of great consequence and should occur only through rulemaking 7
Example of a less safe advanced reactor: the MSR
- One of the advantages of the molten salt-fueled reactor (MSR) is the flexibility provided by a circulating liquid fuel
- Noble gas fission products are stripped from the fuel by sparging with helium gas
- MSR vendors assert that they will be able to trap and retain noble gas fission products
- few details provided on the specifications, practicality, efficiency, reliability, and cost of off-gas processing systems
- Xenon (Xe) releases from MSRs could pose problems not only for public health and safety, but for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty verification
- 40 to 90 percent of cesium-137 generated would be released from the core into the off-gas system under NORMAL conditions
NOP49 Ci\P15 RUP55 RUP5 CJSP76 1SP34 CAP16 SEP63 RUP56 RUP USP71 RUP59 RUP54 RUP60 OAP14 CAP17 MNP45 RUP58 USP70 USP75 PTP53 USP 4 JPP38
- USP78
- USP79
- MXP44 USP72 CNP2. JPP37 us FRP28 THP65 PHP52 USP80 e e
PAP50 EPT25 e
'> FRP31 MYP42 KIP39 CMP13 e
ECP24' '
PGP51 BRP12 GBP66 AUP08 AUP09 CKP>>FRP27
- GBP67 FRP29 AUP06 ARP02 BRP11 CLP19 AUP10 ARP01 GBP68 ARPO!
NZP46 ZAP62 FRP30 CLP18 AUP07 AUP05 FRP32 0,01 0.05 0.1 0.5 1 GBP69-
- CTBTO Sampling Locations e Global maximum calculated concentration of 133Xe expected emission from current isotope producers, assuming releases of 5x109 Bq/day (T.W. Bowyer et al., Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 115 (2013) 192-200)
Global maximum calculated concentration of 133Xe expected emission from current and future isotope producers, assuming releases of 1x1012 Bq/day (T.W. Bowyer et al., Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 115 (2013) 192-200)
Controlling the xenon background
- Unacceptable IMS interference occurs at Xe emission levels below those needed to meet safety limits
- A seminal study determined that a maximum average Xe-133 emission rate of 5x109 Becquerels/day (0.14 curies/day) per facility would be adequate to control the problem
- 400 MWth Terrestrial Energy molten salt reactor would generate 1x1017 becquerels/day of 133Xe
- Source term is seven orders of magnitude greater than the 5x109 Bq/day level
- The NRC should require MSRs to comply with this limit (or a technically justified alternative)
- Jeopardizing CTBT verification would be inimical to the common defense and security
- MSR: Molten-Salt [Fueled] Reactor
- SSC: Structures, Systems, and Components
- UCS: Union of Concerned Scientists 12
Advanced Reactors and New Reactors Topics Briefing Commission Meeting February 6, 2020 1
Opening Remarks Margaret Doane Executive Director for Operations
Vision and Direction for Regulatory Reviews of New and Advanced Reactors Robert Taylor Deputy Office Director for New Reactors
UNIFIED NRR We Make SAFE Use of Nuclear Technology POSSIBLE ADVANCED REACTORS RESEARCH AND TEST REACTORS NEW REACTORS SUBSEQUENT LICENSE RENEWAL MEDICAL ISOTOPES OPERATING REACTORS 4
SAFE, TIMELY, AND EFFECTIVE LICENSING & OVERSIGHT OF VOGTLE 3&4 Closing ITAAC Photos Courtesy of Southern Nuclear Operating Company Resolving Overseeing Vogtle Construction License Amendment Requests 5
SUSTAINING SMALL MODULAR REACTOR (SMR) PROGRESS Rulemaking ON THE HORIZON Design Certification on Schedule Phase 6 Standard Design Phase 5 Combined License Approval Phase 4 HITACHI Phase 3 BWRX-300 SMR Phase 2 Construction Permit Phase 1 6
ADVANCED REACTORS STAKEHOLDERS NEIMA NEICA PUBLIC 7
ENABLING the SAFE Use of SUCCESS Execution New NUCLEAR Technologies Execution Commitment PREPARATION EXECUTION COMMITMENT 8
Michael King, Director Vogtle Project Office Photo Courtesy of Southern Nuclear Operating Company Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 9
Leveraging technology and innovation to ensure safe oversight of Vogtle project Photos Courtesy of Southern Nuclear Operating Company ITAAC CLOSURE 10
11 Modern Risk-Informed Licensing for Faster Decision-Making 250 60 200 50 40 Number of LARs 150 Days 30 100 20 50 10 0 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Fiscal Year 12
All Vogtle UINs Are Accepted Enabling Efficient ICN Reviews 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
JUN JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT 2019 2020 2021 13 UNIT 3 ICNs UNIT 4 ICNs UINs
Continuously Adapting Inspection to Incorporate Lessons Learned from First Part 52 Construction 14
Initiatives to Modernize Advanced Reactor Licensing John Segala Chief, Advanced Reactor Policy Branch
Executing the Vision 16
Facilitating Innovation with an Integrated Safety Approach Functional Containment Fuel Performance Emergency Holistically Preparedness Considering SSC Consequences &
Classification Safety Margins
& Event Siting Selection Environmental Insurance 17
Developing a Modern Risk-Informed Framework Licensing NEI-18-04 Modernization SECY-19-0117 Project (LMP) 6 LMP Pilots DG-1353 18
Risk-Informing the Content of Applications Application Advanced Safety Classification Reactor Design Safety-Related SSCs Non-Safety-Related SSCs With Special Treatment Non-Safety-Related BDBE SSCs LMP 19
Cooperating Internationally Memorandum of Working Group on the Cooperation Safety of Advanced with Canada Reactors (WGSAR)
Sharing Regulatory Experience Advancing Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Licensing Approaches 20
Implementing NEIMA Provisions
- Issued Reports to Congress Nuclear Energy - Staged Licensing Process Innovation and - Risk-Informed Guidance Modernization Act (NEIMA)
- Developing Guidance within Existing Framework
- Source Term
- Event Selection
- Containment Performance
- Developing a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulatory Framework
- 10 CFR Part 53 21
Readiness to Review Non-LWR Applications Ben Beasley, Chief Advanced Reactor Licensing Branch
Readiness: Staff Preparations Guidance for industry Guidance for NRC Staff Training for NRC Staff 23
Readiness: New Approaches
- Pre-application interaction:
- White paper, audit No SER
- Topical report, Preliminary Safety Write SER Information Document
- Integrated approach to reasonable assurance of adequate protection
- Environmental reviews 24
Readiness: Project Team 25
Potential Applicants Liquid Metal Cooled Fast High-Temperature Gas- Molten Salt Reactors Micro Reactors Cooled Reactors (MSR) Reactors (LMFR) (HTGR)
GE-H PRISM (VTR) X-energy Kairos Westinghouse TerraPower Framatome Liquid Salt Cooled Others ARC StarCore Transportable Sodium-Cooled TRISO Fuel Oklo Terrestrial Westinghouse Others General Atomics TerraPower Columbia Basin Stationary Elysium Hydromine Thorcon Lead-Cooled Muons Flibe Alpha Tech Liquid Salt Fueled Developers that have submitted a RIS response 26
Current and Anticipated Work 27
Oklo Review Status Photo Courtesy of Oklo, Inc Oklo Aurora Powerhouse 28
- BDBE - beyond design basis event
- CFR - Code of Federal Regulations
- COL - combined license
- DBA - design basis accident
- DBE - design basis event
- DG - draft guide
- GE-H - GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
- HTGR - high-temperature gas-cooled reactor 29
- ICN - ITAAC closure notification
- ITAAC - inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria
- LAR - license amendment request
- MSR - molten salt reactor
- NEICA - Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act
- NRR - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- LMP - licensing modernization project 30
- LMFR - liquid metal cooled fast reactor
- LWR - light-water reactor
- NEI - Nuclear Energy Institute
- NRC - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- QA - quality assurance
- PISD - preliminary safety information document
- RIS - regulatory issue summary
- SER - safety evaluation report
- SMR - small modular reactor 31
- SSC - systems, structures and components
- TRISO - tristructural-isotropic
- UIN - uncompleted ITAAC notification
- VPO - Vogtle Project Office
- VRG - Vogtle Readiness Group
- VTR - versatile test reactor
- WGSAR - Working Group on the Safety of Advanced Reactors 32