05000456/FIN-2016004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Control of Welding During FW System Pipe Replacement |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to assure that thermo couple (TC) attachment welding was controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures and to assure that the post-TC attachment weld removal non-destructive examination (NDE) was incorporated into Work Order (WO) 01836557 that provided instructions to replace a pipe segment in the safety-related portion of the feedwater (FW) system. The licensee corrective actions for this finding included documenting this issue as a potential violation of NRC requirements in Issue Report (IR) 02728742, removal of the unqualified welds, and issuing revisions to WO 01836557 that included licensee-approved weld procedures and surface examinations of FW pipe affected by unqualified TC welds. This finding was determined to be of more than minor significance because it affected the Reactor Safety Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. In particular, if left uncorrected this issue would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern because it increased the likelihood of an operational challenge to the plant caused by a FW system line break induced by cracking initiated from unqualified welds. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At Power, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions. Under Part B, Transient Initiators, of the Exhibit 1 questions, the inspectors answered No because the finding did not result in a reactor trip and/or loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. Therefore, this finding was screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Field Presence in the cross-cutting area of Human Performance since licensee managers failed to provide adequate oversight of site and vendor personnel to assure that the TC attachment welding was controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures and to assure that the post-TC attachment weld removal NDE was incorporated into WO 01836557. (H.2) |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2016004 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Palagi D Betancourt D Kimble D Sargis E Duncan G Edwards M Domke M Garza M Holmberg R Fernandes T Go |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion IX |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2016004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2016Q4
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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