05000446/FIN-2017003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality |
Description | The inspectors identified a non- cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, associated with the licensees failure to take timely corrective actions for a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to take corrective actions for a leak in the hydraulic snubbers for the Unit 2, loop 3 steam generator, resulting in the level in the hydraulic fluid reservoir going below the minimum level in the sight glass on multiple occasions. This issue does not represent an immediate safety concern because the licensee took action to refill the hydraulic fluid reservoir. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as Condition Report CR -2017- 009071. The licensees failure to take timely and adequate corrective actions to correct a condition adverse to quality was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor , and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the protection against the external events performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences . Specifically, the failure to correct the leak resulted in the hydraulic fluid reservoir level dropping below the minimum sight glass level , and loss of reasonable assurance of adequate oil in the snubbers to support their operation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated October 7, 2016, and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A , Significance Determination Process for Findings At -Power , Exhibit 4 , External Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) the loss of the equipment by itself during the external initiating event it was intended to mitigate would not cause a plant trip or initiating event, would not de grade two or more train s of a multi -train system or function, and would not degrade one or more trains of a system that supports a risk significant system or function, and (2) the finding did not involve the total loss of any safety function that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences. The finding has a human performance cross -cutting aspect associated with work management , in that, the licensee failed to ensure that the process of planning, controlling, and executing work 3 activities was implemented to ensure nuclear safety was the overriding priority [H.5 ] |
Site: | Comanche Peak |
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Report | IR 05000446/2017003 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2017 (2017Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Josey R Kumana M Chambers P Elkmann S Hedger B Correll M Haire |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000446/2017003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2017Q3
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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