05000445/FIN-2017001-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Use of Non-Design Fouling Factor for Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger in Station Service Water Tornado Missile Calculation |
| Description | Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the failure to use the design fouling factor for the component cooling water heat exchanger in a design basis calculation evaluating a tornado missile strike of station service water system piping. The licensee implemented immediate corrective actions by entering the issues into the corrective action program for resolution and performed an operability determination for the identified degraded conditions. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Issue Report IR-2017-001465. The inspectors determined that the failure to use the design fouling factor for the component cooling water heat exchanger in the tornado missile analysis of the station service water system discharge piping was a performance deficiency. This finding was more-than-minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the use of a non-conservative heat exchanger fouling factor in a design basis accident analysis resulted in a more restrictive temperature limit (i.e., less than the technical specification allowed value) of the safe shutdown impoundment. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that (1) did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and (4) did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The inspectors determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency did not reflect current licensee performance. Specifically, the licensee performed the calculation in 1988, therefore, the performance deficiency occurred outside of the nominal three-year period for present performance. |
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000445/2017001 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Smith E Uribe G Pick J Braisted J Josey M Haire R Kumana S Hedger W Cullum |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2017001 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2017Q1
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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