ML20151K372

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Discusses Concerns Re Final Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift,In Response to ACRS .Operating Knowledge & Experience of Senior Operator & Shift Technical Advisor Combined Will Allow Safe Functioning of Plants
ML20151K372
Person / Time
Issue date: 08/24/1984
From: Thompson H
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Ebersole J
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Shared Package
ML20151H981 List:
References
FOIA-84-656 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8409040014
Download: ML20151K372 (2)


Text

.

.& l fcsy

+p. ~ ~,,c, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y;

[g.'g'.- (f i ,

vvasnincrou.o.c.2osss gj. .

%,.% / /~

~ ~ /' .

.... AUG 2 41964 R E C ., v ,.,

O .

u Hr. Jesse C. Ebersole, Chairman Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

.',pg q

Washington, DC 205S5 n' M,0 M:l*@*2*g Mi $4

Dear Mr. Ebersole:

In the August 14, 1984, ACRS letter to Chaiman Palladino rega ding the final Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift, you expressed concern 4

with option two of the Policy Statement, f.e., combining th (50/STA) position.

It is our understanding that you believe that the STA would lose his independent " diverse" perspective in the dual-role positionyou Furthennore, and, pose therefore, an would compromise engineering expertise on shift.

analogy between a separate STA in a nuclear power plant and an independe flight engineer in the cockpit of an airplane. lack of the latter as a factor bridge crash.

Following the August 10 meeting of ACRS, the staff undertook background The following research on the issue of a third person in the cockpit.

information was received:

(1) Mr. Rudy Kapustin, in the Bureau of Accident Investigation of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the investigator-in-charge of the Air Floride investigation, stated in a phone conversation that the investigation concluded Safety that a third crew recommendations menber would not have prevented the accident.

made by the NTSB to the FAA following their investigation did notMr. Kapustin sai l

include a recomendation for additional crew members.

there are a few carriers who use a three-member crew as a result of their union agreenent.

On March 5,1981, President Reagan appointed a task force on aircraft (2) crew complement with the objective of making recommendations to President Reagan on whether operation of the "New Generation" ofThe task commercial jet transport aircraft by two-person crews is safe.

force concluded, as stated in " Report of the President's Task Force on Aircraft Crew Complement" (July 2, 1981), that adding a third crew member would not be justified in the interest of safety and safety-related improvements must come from measures other than enlarging the size of the flight crew. The report also states that jet transports operated by two-member crews have been in domestic use since the mid-60's and during that period there has been a decrease in the number of accidents.

5 AUG 2 4 564 Mr. Jesse C. Ebersole Concerning the 50/STA position, the staff believes that although it will be more difficult for the S0/STA to have a " diverse" perspective, there areThese charact other positive counter-balancing characteristics.

operating knowledge and experience combined with engineering and technical expertise, and greater acceptance by the operating crew w power plant in both rcutine and nonroutine circumstances.

I hope the above information satisfies some of your concerns.

.& m., L - te L Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Human Factors Safety Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: H. Denton l

4

,.. /-

r r'

O.

  1. UNITED STATES

/ 'o, t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION P

U I ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGT ON, D. C. 20666 ,

          • August 14, 1984 The Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chainnan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissf ort Washington, DC 20555

Dear Dr. Palladino:

SUBJECT:

ACRS COMMENTS ON THE FINAL POLICY STATEMENT ON ENGIN EXPERTISE ON SHIFT REGARDING THE DUAL-ROLE (50/STA) P 9-11, 1984 During its 291st and 292nd meetings, July 12-14 and August the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards considered The the Committee proposed Final Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift.

haa previously considered a proposed draft policy statement on " Shift Crew Qualifications" and a proposed rule requiring on-shift engineering 14, 1982 expertise and had given its advice in reports dated December and August 9, 1983, respectively.

The final Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift provides

( two alternatives for ensuring that adequate engineering and accident assessment expertise is available to the shif t crew. Licensees and applicants may either (1) continue with the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) position or (2) combine the licensed senior operator (50), often With the referred to as the SRO, and STA functions into one position.

latter option, the person in the dual role must be qualified as both an 50 and an STA. The person in the dual 50/STA role may be either the shift supervisor or the assistant shift supervisor. These positions now require the same 50 license, he have, in our past reports, endorsed proposals to permit licensees an option to combine the functions of 50 and STA in a single member of a shift crew. We continue to endorse that option.

Our intent is to contribute to a long-term upgrading of the quality and educational background of the individuals occupying these critical control room positions. Assuming that the increased qualifications bring higher rewards and status, individuals of higher quality should be attracted td' plant staffs.

' 'l We also endorse this gradual approach to revising requirements for

- personnel qualifications. Changes intended to provide for strengthened operating crews over the 30- to 40-year lifetimes of existing nuclear power plants should be made without creating sudden perturbations in

f. ~1 sting industry practices that cause an undesirable reduction in the sel of operating experience at plants.
flh fm A nnu

[ Q7l UJ fy J 7

l.

I

.z-t l' honorable hunzio J. Palladino August 14, 1984 I ,

be recognize that the bachelor's degree (or an acceptable alternative) '

is to be a necessary but not a sufficient Other requirement parts of for total the both the set STA of and the combined 50/STA position. include specific training in 7

requirements for engineering expertise In accident analysis and diagnosis which has been developed for STAS.

addition, while specified minimum qualifications for an 50, STA, or the combined 50/STA are necessary, they should be evaluated in combination with the additional, important criteria that each licensee uses in i

selecting individuals for shift supervisory positions.

' We believe that the policy statement is useful and appropriate and  !

should be approved.

Additional coments by ACRS Members Jesse C. Ebersole, Harold W. Lewis, and David A. Ward are presented below.

Sincerely, i

David A. Ward  ;

Acting Chairman i Additional Comments by ACRS Member Jesse C. Ebersole I am in disagreement with the option to combine the functions of the 50 l Some of the current crop of new, green ano the STa in one individual.

STAS may well have led to the notion that the combined function would be f better. Such STAS may have been employed who would fully qualify under

' the current paper requirements but whose presence in the control room could be more of a detriment than an asset to operational safety.

lo quickly focus on the end effects possible with the combined arrange-ment

-- even if the SR0s have been given engineering training -- I l invite consideration in detail of the hTSB report on the 14th Street -

bridge aircraf t accident.

It is rather clear that third party diverse perspectives in the cockpit would have prevented that accident, although that aspect of adequate crew response was not mentioned in the report.

Additional Coments by ACRS Member Harold W. Lewis i

14,1982, the Casunit-It should be noted that in the letter of December

! tee supported the proposal to permit the option of combining the func-l tions preferable.

of STA and 50, and went on to suggest that such its earlier position intact, but is letter, the Comittee has leftIt would seem more ingenuous to me to either unwilling to reaffirm it. I support and reaffirm or reverse, rather than to obfuscate by silence.

( reaf finn the preference for the fusing of the two functions.

O Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino August 14,1984 Additional Coments by ACRS Member David A. Ward While I endorse the option for either a separate STA or a combined STA/50, as an interim measure, I believe that in the future, it is l

preferable that the STA position be eliminatedI and that itshift believe supervi-is prefera-sors be required to have engineering degrees.

ble to have engineering and analytical ability combined with the author-ity and leadership exercised by the shift supervisor, rather than to expect another engineer to function as a "back-seat driver" in a plant emergency. In my opinion, in-depth technical :,upport to operating shif ts can be more effectively provided by an on-site engineering organization that is always on call than by an individual engineer.

Reference:

Dircks, Executive braft memc for the ComissionersFinal fromPolicy William J.

Statement on Engineering Director for Operations,

Subject:

Expertise on Shif t, transmitted under a memorandum from H. Denton to V.

5tello dated July 3, 1984 I

9 i

l

(

_- .-_ . .. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .