05000454/FIN-2013007-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Acceptance Criteria for Battery Voltage in TS Surveillance Procedure Failed to Account for Test Equipment Uncertainty |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, when licensee personnel failed to account for test instrument uncertainty in the acceptance criteria for TS Surveillance procedure 2BOSR 8.6.1-2, 125VDC [Volt Direct Current] ESF [Engineered Safety Feature] Battery Bank and Charger 212 Operability Weekly Surveillance. As part of the licensees immediate corrective actions, the voltage of the affected battery charger was adjusted. The licensee also planned to perform a fleet-wide evaluation of the issue. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 0156440, 125 VDC Battery TS Surveillance Values. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the acceptance criteria for the battery voltage did not assure the availability of the safety-related direct current (DC) batteries that would meet the minimum voltage as required by the TSs. This finding screened as having very low safety significance, in accordance with Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings for At- Power, because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the finding was not representative of current performance. Specifically, the decision to not include the instrument uncertainty was made in 2003, as part of an evaluation for a previously identified issue. |
| Site: | Byron  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000454/2013007 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur B Bartlett C Thompson E Duncan M Jones N Shah |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2013007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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