05000333/FIN-2013003-01
From kanterella
Revision as of 22:47, 27 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | TS Actions for Inoperable Control Rod Not Performed Within the TS Allowed Completion Time |
| Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of technical specification (TS) 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability, because Entergy operators did not take the required actions within the allowed completion time in response to indication that the scram capability of a control rod was indeterminate. Specifically, when available information concerning the scram solenoid pilot valves (SSPVs) required control rod 30-11 to be declared inoperable, operators did not declare the control rod inoperable, did not fully insert the control rod within three hours, and did not disarm the associated control rod drive within four hours, as required by TS 3.1.3.C. Entergys corrective actions included fully inserting and electrically disarming control rod 30-11, replacing the SSPVs, revising the instructions to operators, briefing operators on this issue, and initiating a condition report. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, operators did not fully insert and electrically disarm control rod 30-11 within the TS allowed completion time when the scram capability of the control rod was indeterminate, and therefore required to be declared inoperable. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect multiple automatic reactor shutdown functions, did not involve an unintentional positive reactivity addition, and did not result in inability to control changes in reactivity during crew operations. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, because, given industry operating experience (OE) that cessation of the SSPV buzzing sound was a possible indication of a condition that would prevent the SSPV from performing its safety function, Entergy staff did not communicate to on-shift Operations Department personnel the need to promptly declare control rod 30-11 inoperable if this condition were to occur. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2013003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Rutenkroger J Laughlin E Knutson B Sienel R Rolph T Hedigan |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.10, Bases for Decisions |
| INPO aspect | CO.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||