05000346/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Maintain Station Blackout Diesel Generator Output Cables in an Environment Consistent with Design |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensees failure to maintain normally energized medium voltage cables BPGD302C, C1, D, and D1 in an environment consistent with the cable design. The cables, which are output cables for the station blackout diesel generator (SBODG), were not designed for long-term water submergence, and were in an electrical manhole that was flooded for a period of several months, perhaps as long as a year or more. Continuous water submergence of energized medium voltage cables not designed for water submergence can accelerate deterioration of such cables and potentially affect the ability of the cables to withstand electrical transients. The licensees procedures and programs for medium voltage cables did recognize the issue and provided a sump pump to address water intrusion into the electrical manhole, but did not provide for any preventative maintenance (PM) or operational checks of the sump pump to ensure its capability to meet its intended function. In response to the finding the licensee increased the frequency of monitoring for water in the manhole. No violation of NRC requirements was identified. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the SBODG was to provide electrical power to emergency core cooling systems in the event of a loss of all alternating current power. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of the SBODG and there was no loss of any system or function due to the flooded conditions of the cables. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control Component, because the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant. Specifically, although the licensees intent was to address potential water submergence of energized medium voltage risk-significant cables to reduce the risk of early cable failure through the installation of a permanent sump pump, the licensee failed to schedule and coordinate the appropriate PM for the pump when it was installed. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
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| Report | IR 05000346/2013002 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble D Reeser E Sanchez J Cameron R Langstaff R Winter S Bell T Briley |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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