05000266/FIN-2014003-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Age Related Relay Failures Result in Inoperable Inverters |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was self-revealed for the failure to replace safety-related inverter components at the vendor prescribed 10-year frequency. Specifically, after concluding that safety-related inverter relays were required to be replaced at a 10-year frequency, per vendor direction, the licensee failed to promptly replace the remaining relays that were eighteen years old or evaluate if the relays could remain in-service until the next scheduled 10-year inverter overhaul. The licensee entered the issue into their CAP and replaced the remaining K2 relays that were past their 10-year replacement frequency in April and June of 2014 and has plans to replace the remaining K1 relays, which provide alarm only function, in 2015. The inspectors determined finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in three additional K2 relay failures in 2013 and 2014, two of which occurred while the inverters were carry instrument bus loads and caused the inoperability of the associated inverters. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings. Because the finding impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the inspectors screened the finding through IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the inspectors answered No to the Mitigating Systems screening questions. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Resolution (P.3), in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. |
Site: | Point Beach |
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Report | IR 05000266/2014003 Section 4OA2 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Oliver J Cameron K Barclay R Elliott T Bilik V Meyers |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
CCA | P.3, Resolution |
INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2014003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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