05000482/FIN-2014007-01
From kanterella
Revision as of 07:57, 25 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform Operability Determinations on Degraded Boundaries |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to perform operability determinations on degraded boundaries with credited compensatory measures in accordance with Wolf Creek Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment. Specifically, operations staff were stationing boundary watches to shut blocked open doors credited for maintaining operability of safety related components in the event of a high-energy line break in the turbine building. There was no reasonable assurance that an operator would be able to close these doors during a high-energy line break event. This violation is documented in CR-87666. The failure to perform operability determinations on degraded high-energy line break boundaries is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding is a deficiency in the qualification of the mitigating system and a licensee evaluation determined that affected system was maintained operable. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in resources in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to ensure that procedures were adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, Wolf Creek Procedure AP 10 104, Breech Authorization, Revision 30, led operators to believe that operability determinations were not required for degraded boundaries and that a boundary watch was an adequate compensatory measure for a high-energy line break, despite clear guidance to the contrary in Procedure AP 26C-004 [H.1]. |
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2014007 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Willoughby R Stroble S Hedger Z Hollcraft G Miller H Freeman L Brandt |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2014007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||