05000400/FIN-2014007-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Establish Appropriate Procedural Limitations Based on Design Requirements of the Emergency Diesel Generators |
Description | The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements in technical specification surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.2.e. were correctly translated into procedural guidance. Specifically, appropriate jacket water (JW) and lube oil (LO) standby temperature limitations, which ensured emergency diesel generator (EDG) capability to meet TS SR 4.8.1.1.2.e. requirements, were not translated into procedures for determining EDG operability. Following identification by the team, the licensee generated nuclear condition report 698245 and established administrative limits to ensure the EDG JW and LO temperatures were not allowed to drop below technically supportable limits. The licensees failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements in technical specification surveillance requirement SR 4.8.1.1.2.e. were correctly translated into procedural guidance, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because, it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure the capability and reliability of the EDGs to respond to a design basis accident at the JW or LO temperature conditions at which they considered the EDGs operable. The team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability. The team determined that no cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current licensee performance. |
Site: | Harris |
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Report | IR 05000400/2014007 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Ruh C Baron G Ottenberg M Riley R Nease R Patterson S Kobylarz |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Harris - IR 05000400/2014007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Harris) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Harris)
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