05000341/FIN-2016001-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Incorporate Operating Experience into Preventive Maintenance Activities Associated with the TBCCW System |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance with an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," was self-revealed when the failure of a tube inside the east turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) heat exchanger caused a trip of the TBCCW pumps and a manual reactor scram due to the loss of all TBCCW. The heat exchanger tube failure occurred, in part, due to the licensees failure to incorporate industry operating experience in order to perform adequate preventive maintenance on the component. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and inspected all tubes in both TBCCW heat exchangers using a rotating pancake coil eddy current test during the Cycle 17 refueling outage. Any tubes identified with indications of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) were either plugged or replaced. The performance deficiency was of more than minor safety significance because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the TBCCW heat exchanger tube failure resulted in a loss of all TBCCW and a reactor scram. In addition, the inspectors found this issue sufficiently similar to Example 7(c) in IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," for not of minor safety significance. The finding was determined to be a performance deficiency of very low safety significance based on a detailed significance determination process review since the delta core damage frequency was determined to be less than 1.0E-6/year. The inspectors concluded this finding affected the cross-cutting aspect of trending in the problem identification and resolution area. Specifically, the licensee failed to analyze operating experiences concerning circumferential SCC information in the corrective action program and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and common cause issues [IMC 0310, P.4]. |
| Site: | Fermi  |
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| Report | IR 05000341/2016001 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Dickson B Kemker J Nance P Smagacz |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65 |
| CCA | P.4, Trending |
| INPO aspect | PI.4 |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
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