05000341/FIN-2015003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Establish Correct Classification and Preventive Maintenance for Reactor Recirculation Pump Flow Switches |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance with an associated Non-Cited Violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," was self-revealed on March 19, 2015, when the reactor recirculation pump A seal cooling water flow switch failed, resulting in a leak of Reactor Building closed cooling water and emergency equipment cooling water into the drywell and a subsequent reactor recirculation pump trip. The reactor recirculation pump seal cooling water flow switch was incorrectly classified in the licensees preventive maintenance program and did not have appropriate preventive maintenance tasks assigned to prevent its failure. The licensee replaced the failed flow switch prior to plant start up from the forced outage. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence for this event include replacing the recirculation pump seal cooling water flow switches with a more robust design that do not have glass tubes, thus eliminating the failure mechanism. The finding was of more than minor safety significance because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the reactor recirculation pump seal cooling water flow switch failure caused a loss of cooling water flow to a reactor recirculation pump that subsequently resulted in loss of the pump and single loop operation. In addition, the finding was sufficiently similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," Example 7(d), in that this violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) had a consequence such that "[a]n actual failure had occurred with the non-scoped component causing a transient/scram." The finding was determined to be a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance during a quantitative Significance Determination Process review since the delta core damage frequency was determined to be less than 1.0E-6/year. The inspectors concluded this finding affected the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution and the cross-cutting aspect of identification (IMC 0310, P.1). Specifically, licensee personnel had opportunities through execution and analysis of its preventive maintenance program to ascertain the effect the recirculation pump seal flow switch failure would have on the closed cooling water systems that connect to the component. |
| Site: | Fermi  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000341/2015003 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Shaikh B Kemker G Hansen J Wojewoda M Kunowski P Smagacz R Walton S Bell T Briley |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.65 |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2015003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2015Q3
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
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