ML17325B255

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Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,modifying Tech Spec 3/4.7.5.1, Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys, to Address NUREG-0737,Item III.D.3.4
ML17325B255
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 06/29/1989
From: ALEXICH M P
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To: MURLEY T E
NRC
Shared Package
ML17325B256 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM AEP:NRC:0398R, AEP:NRC:398R, NUDOCS 8907050406
Download: ML17325B255 (41)
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Text

CCp~RATEDDlSTR1BUTION DEMO.iSTRATlONSYSTEM,REGULATOR NFORi4ATION DISTRIBUTION TEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR'.89'07050406 DOC;DATE:

89/06/29NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaS0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,Indianaa05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION ALEXICH,M.P.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana6MichiganEleRECIP.NAME

=RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E.

NRC-NoDetailedAffiliation Given

SUBJECT:

Application foramendstoLicensesDPR-586DPR-74,modifying "ControlRoomEmergency Ventilation Sys"6associated bases.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A046DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR lENCLiSIZE:36+5TITLE:ORSubmittal:

TMIActionPlanRgmtNUREG-0737 6NUREG-0660 NOTES:RIRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LASTANG,JINTERNAL:

AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/MEB 9HNRR/DREP/RPB 10gCJEE~IZG~RSDSRDEPYEXTERNAL:

LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1'111111111011111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDNRR/DEST/ADS 7ENRR/DREP/EPB loNUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS1RES/DSIR/EIB NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL551011'111011=11DSRIShNOTE'IOALLRIDS"REKXPIEÃIS'IZASE HELPUSIOREDUCE%ASTE.'ÃIACI.'IHE DOCUMEPI'DÃHKL DESK,RDCNPl-37(EÃZ.20079)%0EIZMZlQZE V3URNAMEFKHDZSTRZBUTZQN LZSTBPDRDOCUMENIS YOUDONPTNEED(DSTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR21ENCL17r rJQ+IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus, OH43216AEP:NRC:0398R DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74CONTROLROOMVENTILATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:T.EDMurleyWashington, D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyJune29,1989

DearDr.Murley:

Thisletteranditsattachments constitute anapplication foramendment totheTechnical Specifications (T/Ss)fortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically, weproposetomodifyT/S3/4.7.5.1

("ControlRoomEmergency Ventilation System")anditsassociated Basessection.Thechangesaredesignedtoaddresscontrolroomhabitability concernsrelatedtoNUREG-0737 ItemIII.D.3.4.

Thereasonsfortheproposedchangesandouranalysesconcerning significant hazardsconsiderations arecontained inAttachment 1tothisletter.TheproposedrevisedT/Spagesarecontained inAttachment 2.Webelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificant changeinthetypesofeffluents orasignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.

ThesechangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee andwillbereviewedbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee attheirnextregularly scheduled meeting.Incompliance withtherequirements of10CFR50.91(b)(l),

copiesofthisletteranditsattachments havebeentransmitted toMr.R.C.CallenoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommission andtotheMichiganDepartment ofPublicHealth.8S'07050406 Pf(05000315PDRADOC5PblU XQl'l Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page2Thisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowing Corporate procedures thatincorporate areasonable setofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompleteness priortosignature bytheundersigned.

Sincerely, M.P.AlexichVicePresident ldpAttachments cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.WEG.Smith,Jr.-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffA.B.DavisNRCResidentInspector

-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief g~~p>Q'4)A

~~4ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:0398R REASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSESFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITNOS.1AND2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page1I.INTRODUCTION ANDBACKGROUND Thislicenseamendment requestproposestomodifyT/S3/4.7.5.1 (controlroomemergency ventilation system)andtheaccompanying Basessection.Theproposedchangesareintendedtoaddresscontrolroomhabitability issuesrelatedtoNUREG-0737 ItemIII.D.3.4 andGenericLetter83-37.Additionally, thechangesclarifyseveralaspectsofcontrolroomventilation systemoperability requirements.

Apreviousversionofthisamendment requestwassubmitted inaletterdatedJuly10,1986(ref.AEP:NRC:08560).

Subsequent tothesubmittal, theCookNuclearPlantcontrolroomventilation systemwasreviewedbyaninspection teamfromtheofficeofNuclearReactorRegulation (NRR)andbyRegionIIIstaff.Theinspectors foundproblemswithourTechnical Specification (T/S)submittal, andwiththecontrolroomhabitability analysesthatsupported thechanges.Asaresult,wewithdrewourproposedT/SchangesbyletterdatedApril29,1988(ref.AEP:NRC:0398P).

ByletterdatedOctober11,1988(ref.AEP:NRC:03980),

weprovidedrevisedcontrolroomhabitability

analyses, andcommitted toproviding T/SchangesbyJune30,1989.Thecontrolroomhabitability analyseswerelaterrevisedtocorrectanerrormadeintheprevioussubmittal andtoincorporate enhancements totheanalytical technique thatwasusedforcontrolroomthyroiddosecalculations (ref.AEP:NRC:0914E datedDecember29,1988).II.DESCRIPTION OFCONTROLROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMThecontrolroomventilation systemisdesignedtomaintainthecontrolroomhabitable following designbasisaccidentconditions.

Figure1isasimplified flowdiagramofthecontrolroomventilation system.Figure1alsoshowsthelayoutofthevariousroomsthatareservedbythecontrolroomventilation systems.Theseroomsincludethecontrolroomitself,theHVACmachineroom,(which housesthevariousventilation equipment),

andtheP-250computerroom.1.Normal0erationDuringnormaloperation ofthecontrolroomHVACsystem,outdoorairisdrawnintothesystemthroughthenormalintakedamper.TheHVACsystemsuppliesairtotheP-250computerroomandtothecontrolroom.Airfromthe Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page2computerroomflowstothemachineroomthroughatransfergrill.AirreturnstotheHVACsystemfromthecontrolroomandthemachineroom.Theemergency intakedamperandthetoiletroomexhaustdamperarenormallyopen.Therecirculation damperwillbemaintained openinthefuturetoprovideprotection againstitsfailingtoopenifitshouldbeclosed.,2.RadioloicalModeIntheeventofasafetyinjection signalfromeitherunitorahighradiation signalfromthecontrolroom'sarearadiation monitor,thesystemwoul'dautomatically berealigned intherecirculation/cleanup mode.Inthismode,thenormalintakedamperandthetoiletexhaustdamperwouldautomatically closetopreventunfiltered airfrombeingdrawnintothesystem.Therecirculation damperwouldautomatically open(ifclosed)toproviderecirculation capability, andbothpressurization fanswouldautomatically start,drawingairthroughthefilterunit.Theoperatorwouldthenturnoffoneoftheredundant fanstoensurethatairvelocitythroughthefilterunitwillprovideaminimumiodineresidence timeofapproximately 0.25seconds.Thefilterunitincludesroughingfilters,highefficiency particulate air(HEPA)filtersandcharcoalabsorbers enclosedinafilterhousing.Intheradiological mode,thesystemisdesignedtoprovideaflowratethroughthefilterunitof6000cfm+10%.Thisflowrateisacombination ofairrecirculated throughtherecirculation damperanddrawnfromtheoutsidethroughtheemergency intakedamper.Pressurization ofthecontrolroomenvelopeisprovidedbythisoutdoorairdrawnbythepressurization fans.Thedesignofthesystemissuchthataminimum1/16-inch watergauge(W.G.)pressurewouldbemaintained inthecontrolroom.Sincethecomputerroomandequipment roomswouldseelittleornopersonnel ingressandegressunderaccidentconditions, theyaredesignedtoprovideapressuregreaterthanambient,butpotentially lowerthan,thecontrolroomitself.3.ToxicGasModeAchlorinegasdetectorislocatedinthenormalairinletduct.Intheeventthatchlorineisdetected, theventilation systemwouldbemanuallyrealigned fromthe,controlroomintheisolation modeofoperation.

Thisisaccomplished byclosingthenormalintakeandthetoiletexhaustdampers.Thecontrolroompressurization fansarenotrun,therebylimitingtheamountofcontaminated Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page3outdoorairthatcanenterthecontrolroom.Theemergency intakedampercannotbeclosedfromthecontrolroombeyondthesettingfortherecirculation/cleanup mode.Withoutthepressurization fansrunning,airenteringthroughtheemergency intakedamperislimitedtothatamountdrivenbythesmalldifferential pressurethatmayexistbetweenthecontrolroomandadjoining areasandtheoutsideatmosphere.

III.CONTROLROOMHABITABILITY ANALYSESThecontrolroomhabitability analysessubmitted inourlettersAEP:NRC:03980 andAEP:NRC:0914E involvedatoxicgasstudyandcontrolroomdosecalculations.

Forthetoxicgasportion,aprobabilistic studywasperformed thatdemonstrated thepotential foratoxicgasreleasehavingthepotential forcausinganaccidentleadingtothereleaseofsignificant quagtities ofradioactive fissionproductswaslessthanthe10/yearguideline ofStandardReviewPlan2.2.3entitled, "Evaluation ofPotential Accidents."

Forthisreason,noT/Schangesregarding toxicgasareproposedinthissubmittal.

Withregardtocontrolroomdoseconsequences, theanalysesaccounted fortheeffectsofsinglefailuresinthecontrolroomventilation system,andworst-case meteorology conditions pertheMurphy-Campe reportcitedbyNUREG-0737 andtheStandardReviewPlan.RelevanttotheproposedT/Schanges,iodineremovalefficiencies of95%forcharcoaland99%fortheHEPAfilterswereassumedintheanalyses.

AppendixAto10CFR50,GeneralDesignCriteria19,requiresthatdosestocontrolroomoperators belimitedto5remwholebody,oritsequivalent to.otherpartsofthebody.Thewholebodydoseresultsdemonstrated compliance withthe5remlimitforallconceivable amountsofairinleakage intothecontrolroom.Forskindose,theresultswerewithinthe50remlimitrecommendation ofICRPPublications 26and-30forallconceivable inleakage rates.Forthyroiddose,adherence tothe50remdoselimitofICRP26and30isestablished asafunctionofthecombination offilteredandunfiltered inleakage intothecontrolroom.Forexample,afilteredintakerateof1000cfmcoupledwithanunfiltered inleakage rateof20cfmresultsinadoseof43.8rem,whichiswithinthe50remlimit.IV.TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESTheproposedchangestoT/S3/4.7.5.1 andtheassociated Basesaredescribed inthefollowing section.Tofacilitate review,thechangesareorganized intotencategories.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page41)Adotionofthe1980versionofANSIN510Theproposedchangeconsistsofreplacing reference tothe1975versionoftheANSIN510Standardwithreference tothe1980version,inT/S4.7.5.1.AttheCookNuclearPlant,ourcontrolroomventilation systemsarenotofANSIN509-1976 design.Additionally, theunitswereoperational beforetheissuanceofANSIN510-1975.

Thus,literalcompliance withallrequirements ofANSIN510-1975 cannotbeachieved.

The1980versionofANSIN510-1975 recognizes thatallventilation systemsarenotofANSIN509-1976 design.Section1.2ofANSIN510-1980 states:Itistheintentofthisstandardthatitberigorously appliedonlytosystemsdesignedandbuilttoANSIN509;however,sectionsofthisstandardmaybeusedfortechnical guidancefortestingofnon-N509systems.ANSIN510(1975and1980)requiresthatanair-aerosol mixinguniformity testbeperformed uponcompletion ofinitialsysteminstallation.

ANSIN510specifies theuniformity testasaprerequisite toT/Srequiredin-placeleaktestingofcharcoalandHEPAfilters.Thepurposeofthetestistoverifythattracerinjection andsampleports.arelocatedsoastoprovidepropermixingofthetracerintheairapproaching thecomponent stagetobetested.Althoughair-aerosol mixinguniformity testingwasperformed atthetimeofinstallation, thedocumentation wasnotdetailedenoughtopermitrepetition ofthetest,orverification thatthesamplepointscurrently usedarethesamepointsqualified bythepre-operational tests.Thus,inearly1985wedecidedtorepeatthetestingsinceitisrequiredforliteralcompliance withANSIN510-1975.

Aprogramwasinstituted beginning inJuly1985toperformthetesting.Thetestingisdescribed inourletterAEP:NRC:0959, datedMay28,1987,whichproposedadoptionofthe1980versionofANSIN510fortheESFandspentfuelpoolventilation units.Thetestingshowedthatthecontrolroomunitsdidnotmeettheacceptance criteriaofANSIN510-1975 or1980.Forthisreason,wehavebeenapplyingastatistical correction factortoourmeasuredin-placecharcoalandHEPAleaktestresults.Forthecontrolroomunits,themeasuredin-placeleaktestresultsarebeingmultiplied by1.9forUnit1,and1.5forUnit2.(Thedevelopment ofthecorrection factorswasdiscussed inAEP:NRC:0959.)

Weareproposing elsewhere, inthislettertodecreasetheallowable penetration to0.2%forthecharcoal, and0.1$fortheHEPAs,versusthepresentrequirement of1%.Thischangeisintheconservative direction, andwebelieve Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page5boundsanyerrorintroduced bynotcorrecting themeasuredpenetrations bythestatistical correction factors.Itistherefore ourintenttodiscontinue useofthecorrection factorsuponimplementation ofthe"morestringent penetration requirements.

Toaddresstheissueofliteralcompliance withtheT/Ssdescribed above,weproposetoadoptthe1980versionofANSIN510andtomodifytheBasestostatethat,sincetheunitspre-dateANSIN509,literalcompliance withANSIN510cannotbeachieved.

Ourcomparison ofthe1975tothe1980versionofANSIN510hasdetermined thatthedifferences discussed aboveweretheonlyonesofmajorsignificance, withtheexception ofrequirements relatedtothemethyliodidelabtestingstandardwhichisdiscussed below.Severalminorchangesrelatedtopenetrometer sensitivity, adsorberresidence timecalculations andbackground dusttestingwerealsomadeinthe1980edition,butour'review determined thesetobeeithermorerestrictive ortohaveminimalimpactonsafety.Laborator TestinofAdsorbent Otherissuesrelatedto,the1980versionofANSIN510involvesthetemperature usedduringthelaboratory testofcharcoalsamplesrequiredbyT/Ssandtheminimumefficiency requiredbytheT/Ss(T/S4.7.5.1.c.3 and4.7.5.1.d.2).

Thesetestsverifycharcoaladsorberremovalefficiency formethyliodides.Wepresently testtotheRDTM16-1T-1973

standard, whichisreferenced byANSIN510-1975.

Thistestspecified testconditions of130Cand95%relativehumidity, whichhavebeenincludedinourpresentT/Ss.The1980versionofANSIN510,whichweareproposing toadopt,specifies ASTMD3803-1979 asthetestingstandard, andstatesthattestconditions shallbeinaccordance withplantT/Ss.TheNRRinspection team'sreportrecommended thattheT/Ssexplicitly statethattestingwouldbetotheASTMD-3803standard.

Thereportalsorecommended thatthetesttemgerature be30Cversusthepresentrequirement of130C,sincethe130Ctestwasnotrepresentative ofplant0conditions andmayactuallyregenerate thecharcoalbeingtestedbyboilingoffvolatiles inthesample.Weacceptbothoftheserecommendations, andhaveincorporated themintoourproposedT/Schange.Wewillbeproposing similarchangesfortheESFandspentfuelpoolventilation systemT/Ssinafuturesubmittal.

IEInformation Notice87-32referenced alabtestingprotocoldeveloped byEG&GIdaho,Inc.Itisourunderstanding thattheASTMStandards Boardisconsidering J1 Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page6theprotocolforinclusion inarevisedversionofASTMD-3803.InarecentNRCRegionIIIinspection, wewererequested toconsiderincorporation oftheEG&Gprotocolforinclusion inthissubmittal.

Wehavereviewedthisrequest,andbelieveitispremature toincorporate itintoourT/Ssatthistime.Weareproposing toincorporate theASTMD3803-1979

standard, whichisthepresentindustrystandard.

WedonotfeelourT/Srequirements shouldbebasedonatestingprotocolwhichhasnotbeenrecognized asacceptable bytheappropriate standards committee.

Theprotocolisverystringent, andwouldbedifficult forallbutnewcharcoaltomeetforefficiencies requiredbythecontrolroomhabitability analyses.

Thereasonforthisisthatonlynewcharcoalcanwithstand themoistureofthe20-hourpresoakwhichtheprotocolrequires.

WebelievetheASTMD-3803-1979 testisadequatefortheCookNuclearPlant.Thehumiditythecharcoalisexposedtowillbelessthan70%,sincethecharcoaladsorbers arelocatedinaroomservedbytheSeismicClassIcontrolroomairconditioning unitsandduetothehighpercentage ofheatinthecontrolroomareasthatissensibleheat~Thetestismadesomewhatconservative bytheT/Srequirement totestat95%relativehumidity.

SincetheEG&GprotocolmaybeincludedinafutureversionofASTMD-3803,weplantoconducttestingtoassessitsadequacyandimpactontheCookNuclearPlant.Weareplanningtoconductparalleltesting,whenpossible, tocomparetheASTMD-3803testresultstotheEG&Gprotocolresults.Weareplanningtoconsidertestingwiththeprotocolatarelativehumidityof95%and70%.However,filtertrainoperability determinations willbebasedontheT/Srequirements inplacewhenthetestingisperformed.

Withregardstotheacceptance criteriaforthelaboratory test,weareproposing toincreasetherequiredefficiency fromitspresentvalueof95%to97%.Theincreaseisintheconservative direction.

Thecontrolroomdoseanalysessubmitted inAEP:NRC:03980 assumed95%efficiency forthecharcoalfilters.AlthoughthepresentT/Svalueisconsistent withthisassumption, theT/Sdoesnotallowanyroomfordegradation ofthecharcoalfromtheT/Svalue.Webelieveourproposedacceptance criteriaof97%willprovideadequatemargin.Intheeventthatsurveillance testingdemonstrates thatthecharcoalthathasbeeninservicedoesnotcomplywiththe97%efficiency requirement, wewillnotconsiderthecondition asaT/Sviolation forreportability purposesunlesstheefficiency isbelowthe95%analysisvalue.IntheNRRinspection repor't,itwasrecommended thatanacceptance criteriaof99.3%efficiency bespecified inthe Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page7T/Ssinordertoclaim95%efficiency inthedoseanalyses.

Webelievethisrecommendation tobeexcessive andhavechosennottoincorporate itintoourproposedT/Schanges.ANSIN509-1980 specifies thatnewcharcoalcanallowapenetration of3%,whentestedat30Cand95%relative0humidity.

Wecurrently buycharcoalwhichmeets99%efficiency atthoseconditions, whichisalreadysignificantly abovetheANSIN509requirements.

Asdiscussed above,ourcontrolroomhumidityiscontrolled tohumiditylevelsof70%orless,yetwetestthecharcoalat95%relativehumidity.

Thisisanextrameasureofconservatism alreadyimposeduponthecharcoal.

Wenotealsothatthelaboratory testisonlyformethyliodines.Thecharcoalfiltersareexpectedtobemuchmoreefficient forelemental iodinethanfororganicvarieties ofiodine.Despitethis,theaccidentanalysesconservatively assumed95%efficiency forbothelemental andorganicformsofiodine.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobabil'ity orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

(2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpieviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thechangetothe1980versionoftheANSIN510testingstandardwillupdateourT/Sstocurrently acceptable testingstandards.

Sincethe1980versioncorresponds morecloselytotheCookNuclearPlantventilation systemdesignandsincethechanges0tothe30Clabtesttemperature andthe97%filterefficiency areclearlyintheconservative direction, webelievethechangesdonotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident.

Criterion 2Thechangeonlyinvolvesourtestingmethodstoverifyventilation systemoperability.

Asthischangedoesnotinvolvemodifications totheplantorchangesinoperation ofthesystemsinvolved, webelieveitwillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page8Criterion 3Veareproposing totestourventilation systemsinamannerwhichcorresponds morecloselytothesystemdesign.Sincethe1980versionofthecodeisthecurrentindustrystandard, andsincethechangestothe30Clabtesttemperature andthe97%0filterefficiency areclearlyintheconservative direction, webelievethatnoreduction inamarginofsafetywilloccur.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding examples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichconstitute additional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedintheT/Ss.Thisexampleisapplicable tothechangestothe30Ctesttemperature andthe97%filterefficiency sincethesechangeswillmakeitmoredifficult tomeettheT/Srequirements.

Thesixthexamplereferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentbuttheresultsofwhicharewithinlimitsestablished asacceptable.

Sincethe1980versionofANSIN510involvescertainrelaxations ofrequirements contained inthe1975version,thischangemaybeperceived asinvolving anincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentorareduction inamarginofsafety.The1980version,however,represents theversionconsidered currentby,theindustryandcorresponds morecloselytotheCookNuclearPlantventilation systemdesign.Forthesereasons,webelievetheexamplescitedarerelevantandconcludethatthechangesshouldnotrequiresignificant hazardsconsideration.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page92)ControlRoomPressureBoundaT/S4.7.5.1.e requiresthecontrolroomemergency ventilation systemtobecapableofmaintaining thecontrolroomatapositivepressureofatleast1/16-inch W.G.relativetotheoutsideatmosphere.

Theactionstatements ofT/S3.7.5.1addresstheheatingandcoolingsystems,thepressurization fans,andthefiltertrain.Theydonot,however,specifically addressthepressureboundary.

ThepurposeofthisproposedchangeistoclarifytheT/Spressurization requirements, sincethe1/16-inch W.G.requirement islimitedtothecontrolroom,anddoesnotincludethemachineroomandP-250computerroom,asdescribed intheintroduction tothisattachment below.Ourinterpretation ofourpresentT/S3/4.7.5.1 isthatthepressureboundaryisapartofthefiltertrain,andthusfallsundertheactionstatements associated withit.Wedonotinterpret thepressurization fanactionstatement asapplicable, becauseitaddresses inoperability ofoneofthetworedundant fans,whereasthepressureboundary, likethefiltertrain,isnotredundant.

Ourinterpretation hasbeendiscussed withtheNRRinspection teamleaderduringtheApril1986visittotheCookNuclearplantandhasbeendocumented inourletterAEP:NRC:0975B datedApril8,1986.Becausethepressureboundaryisanintegralpartofthecontrolroomemergency ventilation system,necessary tolimitamountsofunfiltered inleakage towithinanalyzedlimits,weproposetodefineitasasubsystem ofthecontrolroomventilation system.Wehaveaddedanactionstatement (d)whichallowsthesameinoperability timeasforthefiltertraininModes1through4,consistent withtheinterpretation described previously.

Wehavealsoincludedpressureboundaryrequirements inactionstatement (e),whichweareproposing toaddtoaddresscontrolroomhabitability requirements inModes5and6.Requirements forthisactionstatement weremadeconsistent withwiththoseproposedforthefiltertraininModes5and6~FurtherdetailsontheadditionofMode5and6requirements willbeprovidedlater.Wehavealsoaddedasurveillance requirement forthepressureintheHVACmachineroomandP-250computerroom.Underaccidentconditions, theseroomswouldbeatpressures aboveambient,butmostlikelylessthan Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page10the1/16-inches W.G.requiredforthecontrolroomproper.TheHVACmachineroomandtheP-250roomwouldnotbeexpectedtobeenteredorexitedveryfrequently intheeventofanaccident, aswouldbeexpectedforthecontrolroomitself.Wearetherefore proposing apressurerequirement fortheseroomsof1/25-inches W.G.WenotethatairissupplieddirectlytotheP-250computerroom,andthentransfers tothemachineroomviatransfergrillslocatedinthewallbetweentherooms.PressureintheP-250computerroomwouldalwaysbeslightlyhigherthanthemachineroombecauseofthesmallpressuredropassociated withairpassagethroughthetransferopenings.

Therefore, measurements neednotbetakenintheP-250roomiftheyaretakeninthemachine'oom.

Wehavealsoclarified thecontrolroompressurization testrequirement toindicatethatthetestmustbeperformed withtheventilation systemintherecirculation/cleanup modeofoperation.

Thischangeisadministrative innature.IntheNRRreport,itwasrecommended thatthepressurerequirement forthecontrolroom,machineroom,andP-250roombe1/8-inches W.G.,asspecified intheStandardReviewPlan.Wehavenotadoptedthisrecommendation sinceitisinconsistent withtheCookNuclearPlantdesignbasis,andcannotreliablybemetwithourventilation system.Achieving apressurethathighisespecially difficult inthemachineroomsandP-250computerrooms,sincetheyweredesignedtobeatpressures onlyslightlyaboveambient.Higherpressurization ofthoseareascouldbeachievedthroughbalancing oftheairflows, butwouldbeattheexpenseofreducedpressureinthecontrolroomortheneedtobringingreateramountsofcontaminated outsideair.TheStandardReviewPlanspecifies thatthecontrolroomhabitability analysesshouldaccountforanominal10CFMofunfiltered inleakage forplantswhichpressurize to1/8-inches W.G.Thenominalinleakage valueaccountsforlossofpressurization duetoingresstoandegressfromthecontrolroompressureboundary.

Sincewecannot.meetthe1/8-inches W.G.,weareproposing toaccountforanominal15,cfmunfiltered inleakage, aswellasaccounting fortheamountofinleakage measuredtoleakbytheclosedisolation damperHV-ACRDA-1.

(Limitsoninleakage willbediscussed laterinthisattachment.)

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolvea

~Il\ll Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page11significant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involvedasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thepurposeofthisgroupofchangesistoformalize inourT/Ssourinterpretation oftherelationofthecontrolroompressureboundarytothecontrolroomemergency ventilation system.Thisinterpretation haspreviously beendiscussed withtheNRCandhasbeendocumented inourletterAEP:NRC:0975B.

Therefore, thisportionofthechangeisadministrative innature.Thechangealsocreatesadditional surveillance requirements, andtherefore wouldnotbeexpectedtoresultinasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.

Criterion 2Thechangewillnotresultinanyphysicalmodifications totheplant.Theadditional testingrequirements willusestandardequipment andstandardtestingprocedures.

Thus,itisnotanticipated thatthesechangeswillcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Thesechangesdonotdeleteorreduceinanywaypreviousrequirements forsafety.Thus,theyshouldnotreducepreviousmarginsofsafety.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding examples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsider'ation.

Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhicharepurelyadministrative innature.Thisexampleisapplicable totheinterpretation ofthecontrolroompressureboundaryasapartofthefiltertrain,withequivalent actionrequirements.

Thesecondexamplereferstochangeswhichconstitute additional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotincludedintheT/Ss.Thisexampleisapplicable totheadditional pressureboundaryrequirements wehaveproposed.

Wetherefore concludethatthe,examples citedarerelevant, andthatthechangesdonotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

r~~Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page123)In-PlaceLeakTestforHEPAandCharcoalAdsorbers T/Ss4.7.5.1.c and4.7.5.1.d requirelaboratory testingofcharcoalsamplestodemonstrate adequateremovalefficiencies formethyliodides.Thesamplesmaybeobtainedfromtestcanisters orfromsamplesremovedfromthecharcoalbed.Toobtainasamplefromthecharcoalbedrequirestheremovalofanadsorbertray.Prudencedictatesthatafterthetrayisreplacedinthehousing,aleaktestshouldbeperformed onthecharcoaladsorberunittoensurethatthegasketsremainintactandthatexcessive bypassleakagewillnotoccur.Leaktestingofthecharcoaladsorberbankafteradsorbertrayreinstallation isrequiredbyourT/S4.7.5.1.d.2, andaftercompleteorpartialreplacement ofacharcoaladsorberbankbyT/S4.7.5.1.g.

Itisnot,however,specifically requiredbyT/s4.7.5.1.c.3, eventhoughthisT/Salsoallowsremovalofacharcoaltraytoobtainasample.Toachieveconsistency throughout theT/S,weareproposing toaddtheleaktestingrequirement toT/S4.7.5.1.c.3.

Inadditiontoleaktestingofthecharcoaladsorbers, T/S4.7.5.l.d.2 requiresleaktestingoftheHEPAfiltersfollowing reinstallation ofthecharcoaltrayusedtoobtainacarbonsample.CharcoaltraysandHEPAfiltersarelocatedindifferent sectionsofthefilterhousing;reinstallation ofacharcoaltraywouldnotbeexpectedtoimpacttheleakagecharacteristics oftheHEPAunits.LeaktestingoftheHEPAunitsfollowing charcoaltrayinstallation isnotarecommended testperTable1ofANSIN510-1980, norisitrecommended byRegulatory PositionC.5ofRegulatory guide1.52,Revision2,March1978.Itistherefore ourbeliefthatthistestrequirement isanerrorinourpresentT/Ss.Wehavedeletedtherequirement inourproposedversionofT/S4.7'.d.2.Wearealsoproposing toconservatively decreaseourallowable filterpenetration asmeasuredbyleaktestsrequiredbyT/S4.7'.lee.l,c.2,d.2,fandg.Thepresently allowedpenetration is1%forboththecharcoalandHEPAfilters.Weareproposing todecreasetheallowable penetration to0.1%fortheHEPAs,and0.2%forthecharcoal.

Thedecreaseinallowable penetration providesatenfolddecreaseintheamountofflowwhichmaybypasstheHEPAfilters,andafivefolddecreaseinflowwhichmaybypassthecharcoalfilters.Weareproposing thechangetoprovideadditional protection forthecharcoalandHEPAefficiencies assumedinthedoseanalyses.

(TheT/S-required charcoalefficiency waschangedfrom90%to97%,asdiscussed previously.)

The I~~tlI Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page13lowervalueforallowedpenetration (0.1%)isproposedfortheHEPAssincetheaccidentanalysisassumesarelatively highremovalefficiency of99%.Theproposedallowedpenetration forcharcoal, 0.2%,isslightlylowersincetheaccidentanalysisonlyassumes95%filterefficiency.

Thechangealsoeliminates theneedtoapplyacorrection factortothemeasuredpenetration, toaccountforourinability tomeettheair-aerosol distribution testacceptance criteriaofANSI-N510 (seediscussion inSection1).Wearepresently applyingaconservatively derivedmultiplication factorashighas1.9tothemeasuredHEPAandcharcoalpenetration tocompensate fortheair-aerosol distribution testdeficiency.

Thisfactoriseasilyboundedbythedecreaseinallowable penetration weareproposing.

IntheNRRinspection report,itwasrecommended thatpenetration belimitedtoamaximumof0.05%forboththecharcoalandHEPAfilters,basedontherecommendations inRegulatory Guide1.52.Webelievethispenetration limitisexcessive forplantsoftheCookNuclearPlant'svintage,andtherefore havenotproposedthelimitforinclusion inourproposedT/Ss.TheRegulatory Guide1.52recommendations werebasedonplantswhichweredesignedinaccordance withANSIN509.Asdiscussed inPart1ofthisattachment, theCookNuclearPlantventilation unitswereinstalled priortoissuanceofANSIN509.CriticalelementsofANSIN509suchasstructural requirements forfilterholdingframes,gasketclampingpressure, housingleaktightness, andair-aerosol mixinguniformity werenotpartofourfiltration systemdesign.Wedonotbelieveourventilation units,whicharenotofANSIN509design,arecapableofreliablymeetingtheRegulatory Guide1.52penetration limitandforthisreasonhaveproposedthealternative penetration limitsdiscussed above.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)(3)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Theadditionoftestingrequirements toT/S4.7.5.1.c ismadetoachieveconsistency throughout theT/Ss.ThedeletionofHEPA Attachment 1toAEP:NRC;0398R Page14testingrequirements fromT/S4.7.5.1.d isintended.

tocorrectanerrorinourpresentT/Ss.Sincetestingrequirements arebeingdeleted,thischangemaybeperceived toinvolveanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accidentorareduction inamarginofsafety.However,forreasonsdescribed previously, itisourbeliefthatthesewouldbeinsignificant.

Thechangetotheallowable charcoalandHEPApenetration isintheconservative direction, andwouldbeexpectedtoincrease, ratherthandecreasesafety.Criterion 2Theaccidents ofconcernforcontrolroomventilation systemsaregenerally considered tobefires,radiological

releases, ortoxicgasreleases.

Causesofthesearenotafunctionoftestingrequirements forthecontrolroomventilation system.Therefore, weconcludethatthesechangeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3SeeCriterion 1,above.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page154)AdditionofModes5and6Alicabilit andActionsGenericLetter83-37,whichconcerned NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications, statedthatT/Ssshouldrequirethat"twoindependent controlroomemergency aircleanupsystemsshouldbeoperablecontinuously duringallmodesofplantoperation andcapableofmeetingdesignrequirements."

Becauseofthis,weareproposing thatT/S3.7.5.1forthecontrolroomemergency ventilation systemberevisedtoincludetherequirement tha'tthissystembeoperableinallmodesratherthanjustModes1through4.Forinoperability ofthefiltertrainorthepressureboundary, orforthecaseofinoperability ofbothtrainsofredundant components, weproposesuspension ofalloperations involving corealterations orpositivereactivity changes.Thesechangesrepresent additional restrictions requiredbyNUREG-0737 andGenericLetter83-37,andinnowayreduceprevioussafetyrequirements.

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thesechangesconstitute additional restrictions ontheplantintermsofT/Smodeapplicability andactionstatement requirements.

Sincenoneofthesechangesreduceinanywayprevious, safetyrequirements, theywouldnotbeexpectedtoresultinanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.

Criterion 2Nophysicalchangeswillbenecessary totheplantasaresultofthisgroupofchanges.Additionally, nonewtypesofplantoperation willbeintroduced; rather,presentoperating requirements willbeextendedtoincludeadditional modes.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page16Therefore, thesechangesshouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Thesechangesaddadditional safetyrequirements andinnowayreduceanyexistingrequirements.

Thus,noreduction inmargin,ofsafetyshouldoccurbecauseofthesechanges.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding examples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesecondexamplereferstochangesthatconstitute additional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedintheT/Ss.Sincethischangeinvolvesadditionofrequirements formodesofoperation thatpreviously hadnorequirements, weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangeshouldnotinvolvesignificant hazardsc'onsideration.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page175)LimitsonOutdoorAirIntakeInordertoensurethatthecontrolroomismaintained habitable duringaradiological-type

accident, itisnecessary tolimittheamountofoutdoorairthatisbroughtintothecontrolroomfor.pressurization purposesorduetoinleakage.

Also,duetosinglefailureconsiderations, itisnecessary tolimittheoutdoorairintakeforthenormalairconditioning system.Aspresently written,T/S3/4.7.5.1 doesnotestablish limitsontheseairflows.

Thelimitson"airflowarenecessary toprotecttheassumptions ofthecontrolroomhabitability analyseswhichweresubmitted inourlettersAEP:NRC:03980 andAEP:NRC:0914E, andthedoselimitsof10CFR50AppendixACriterion 19.InordertoaddressthisproblemwiththepresentT/Ss,weareproposing toaddsurveillance, requirements associated withthevariousflows.Thenewsurveillances willrequiremeasuring thecombination offilteredintake(throughdamperHV-ACRDA-2) andunfiltered inleakage (throughdamperHV-ACRDA-1).

Thetestingistobeperformed inconjunction withtestingtoensuretheabilitytopressurize thecontrolroom,machineroom,andP-250computerroom.Thecombination oftheflowratesmustbesuchthatadherence totheacceptance criteriaof5remwholebody,50remskinand50remthyroidisassuredevenwhenfailureofthenormalintakedamperisconsidered.

Wearealsoproposing toaddasurveillance requirement toverifythattheflowthroughHV-ACRDA-1, whileopen,islessthanthevalueassumedforsinglefailureconsiderations inthecontrolroomhabitability analysis.

(However, wehaveaddedafootnotetothisrequirement whichnotesthatthesurveillance neednotbeperformed ifthenormalintakeisprovidedwitharedundant isolation damper.Thisgivesustheflexibility toaddaredundant damperwithoutneedingaT/Schangetorealizeitsbenefits.)

Thetestingdescribed abovewillberequiredatleastonceper18months'he NRRreportrecommended thattestingofthevariousflowratesshouldbedoneperiodically, aswellaswhenworkisperformed onthenormaloremergency ventilation systemsthatcouldaffecttheintegrity ofthesystemorflowrates.Wehaveproposedan18monthschedulefortheflowtests,buthavenotincorporated thesuggestion forwork-initiated surveillances.

Thetypeofworkthatcouldbeexpectedtohavethepotential"to degradethesystemorflowratesisnormallyassociated withrefueling outages,andtherefore wouldbecoveredbythe18monthrequirement.

Routinemaintenance suchasreplacement offireordoor Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page18seals,whichmayoccurduringplantoperation, iscontrolled sothatthepressuresealingcapability isnotdegraded.

Wedonotbelieve,therefore, thataddingrequirements totheT/Sassociated withmaintenance activities isofpractical value,andsinceitmayaddconfusion totheT/S,wehavechosennottoincorporate it.TheT/Ssurveillances weareaddingdonotprovideabsolutenumbersorrangesofnumbersforthevariousflowrates.Rather,theT/SreferstotheUpdatedFSARfordetermination ofthelimits.Thisgivesustheflexibility tomakechangestotheanalysisundertheprovisions of10CFR50.59,whenapplicable, withoutneedingaT/Schange.Forexample,changesinfuelenrichment couldcauseanincrease(ordecrease) intheradiological sourceterm.ByhavingtheT/SrefertotheUpdatedFSAR,weeliminate theneedtoreceiveaT/Samendment onthecontrolroomventilation systeminordertoaccommodate thechange.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criter'ion 1SincethepresentT/Ssdonotrequiretestingforairinleakage, thischangerepresents additional restrictions totheT/Ssthatshouldenhancesafety.Wetherefore believethatthechangewillnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accidentorasignificant reduction inthemarginofsafety.Criterion 2Thechangedoesnotinvolveanynewmodesofplantoperation orphysicalplantmodifications.

Therefore, wedonotbelievethatthechangeswillcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page19Criterion 3SeeCriterion 1above.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding examples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesecondexamplereferstochangesthatconstitute additional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedintheT/Ss.Sincethischangeinvolvesadditionofrequirements formeasurement offlows,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangeshouldnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page206)Clarification ofSstem0erationDescritionThepurposeofthesechangesistoclarifydescriptions ofcontrolroomventilation systemoperation whichareincludedintheT/Ss.Aspresently written,T/S4.7.5.l.e.2 instructs ustoverifyevery18monthsthat:Onasafetyinjection signalfromeitherUnit1orUnit2,oronacontainment phaseAisolation signal,thesystemautomatically divertsitsinletflowthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberbankandthateitherfancanthenbemanuallystartedintherecirculation mode.Thisdoesnotadequately describetheCookNuclearPlantsystemforthefollowing reasons:(1)Automatic systemactuation occursonasafetyinjection signalfromeitherunit.Thesafetyinjection signalwillalsoinitiatetherespective unit'sphaseAcontainment isolation.

However,thecontainment phaseAisolation signalwillnotitselfinitiateventilation systemactuation.

(2)Intheeventofasafetyinjection signalfromeitherunit,bothpressurization fanswouldautomatically start.Onewouldthenbeturnedoffbytheoperators toensureadequateiodineresidence times.TheT/Sascurrently writtenimpliesthatthefansmustbeturnedonmanually.

(3)OurunitsdonothaveHEPAorcharcoalbypasses.

AirisdrawnthroughtheHEPAsandcharcoalwheneverthepressurization fansarerunning.Therefore, airisnot"diverted" throughtheHEPA,andcharcoal, asstatedinthepresentT/S.TomaketheT/Smoreaccurately reflecttheCookNuclearPlantsystem,weproposetoreviseittorequireverification that:a)Onasafetyinjection signalfromUnit1,thesystemautomatically initiates operation intherecirculation/cleanup mode.b)Onasafetyinjection signalfromUnit2,thesystemautomatically initiates operation intherecirculation/cleanup mode.

I*lC,>>

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page21Weh'aveseparated thetestingrequirements fortheUnit1andUnit2signalstoemphasize thatthesignalfrombothunitsmustbetested,i.e.,thateither/or isnotsufficient.

WealsoproposetomodifyT/Ss4.7'.1.cd4and4.7.5.l.e.3.

TheseT/Ssweremodifiedtoreflectthefactthatthedesignrequirements of6000cfm+10%and1/16-inch W.G.areforoperation intheradiological, orrecirculation/cleanup modeofoperation.

TheNRRinspection reporthadtworecommendations regarding specification ofequipment intheT/Ss.First,itwasrecommended thattheradiation monitorwhichprovidesforactuation oftheemergency aircleanupsystembeincludedinT/Ss.Second,itwasrecommended thattheT/Ssspecifytheindividual pieceswhichmakeupthenormalandemergency portionsoftheventilation systems.Wehavechosennottoincorporate theserecommendations.

Withregardstotheformer,theradiation monitorisnotsafetygradeequipment, norisitassumedtofunctioninthedoseanalysiswhichsupportsthisT/Schangesubmittal.

Wetherefore donotbelieveitisappropriate toincludethemonitorintheT/Ss.Regarding thesecondrecommendation, inclusion ofalistofequipment comprising systemsisnottypically includedintheT/Sandistherefore inconsistent withtheT/Sformat.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thesechangesareadministrative innature,intendedprimarily tocorrecterrorsintheT/Sdescription ofcontrolroomventilation systemoperation.

Sincenochangesinplantoperations orphysical-changes totheplantwilloccurduetothesechanges,theydonotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page22Criterion 23Sincenochangestothephysicalplantorplantoperations willoccurbecauseofthesechanges,theyshouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated.

Criterion 3Thesechangesareadministrative innature,intendedprimarily tocorrecterrorsinthepresentT/Sswithregardtosystemoperation descriptions.

Thus,theyshouldinvolvenoreduction inmarginsofsafety.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhicharepurelyadministrative innature;forexample,changestoachieveconsistency throughout theT/Ss,correction oferrors,orchangesinnomenclature.

Asdiscussed above,thesechangesareintendedtocorrecterrorsintheT/Sdescription ofthecontrolroomventilation systemoperation.

Therefore, weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangesshouldnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page237)ChanestoPressurization FanRunTimeReuirements Aspresently written,T/S4.7.5.l.b requiresthatthecontrolroompressurization fansberunatleast15minutesevery31daysonastaggered testbasis.TheNRRreportrecommended thattheruntime.beincreased toonehourtoensurethatthesystemcanfunctionwithoutanearlytrip.Weconcurwiththisrecommendation andhaveincludeditinourproposedT/Ss.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedchangewillnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3).involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Weareproposing toincreasethesurveillance requirements onthecontrolroompressurization fansbyincreasing theirrequiredrun-times.

Thisshouldprovideadditional protection againstanearlytrip.Wetherefore expectthechangetoenhance,ratherthandecrease, plantsafety.Criterion 2Thechangedoesnotinvolvemodifications totheplantorchangesinoperation configuration ofthesystemsinvolved.

Therefore, webelievethechangewillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3SeeCriterion 1above.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding examples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesecondexamplereferstochangesthatconstitute additional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedintheT/Ss.Sincethischangeincreases the'required run-timeofthefans, Attachment ltoAEP:NRC:0398R Page24withoutreducinganyotherrequirements, weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangedoesnotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page258)ChanestotheControlRoomVentilation SstemBasesWealsoproposetomodifytheBasessectionforT/S3/4.7.5.1.

Ourproposedchangesincludediscussions ofthefollowing:

a.Theuseofthe1980versionoftheANSIN510standard.

b.Analysislimitsonairin-leakage.

c.Definition ofthepressureboundary.

d.Reportability considerations fordegradedcharcoal.

Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page269)Editorial ChanesInadditiontothechangesdescribed previously, severaleditorial changesweremade.Thesewerechangestocorrecttypographical errorsinourpresentT/Ss,orchangesthatwerenecessary asaresultofthosechangesdescribed previously.

Thesechangesaredescribed inTable1below.Becausethesechangesarepurelyeditorial,-

theydonotreduceamarginofsafety,donotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, anddonotintroduce the'possibility ofanewaccident.

Therefore, webelievethesechangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdefinedby10CFR50.92.Table1ListinofEditorial ChanesUnit3/4.7.5.b, c"and"movedfromT/S3.7.5.1.b toT/S3.7.5.1.c 3.7.5.1Applicability changedto"AllMODES"becauseoftheadditionofactionforModes5and63.7.5.1-Action "MODES1,2,3,and4"addedafter"ACTION"becauseoftheadditionofactionforModes5and64.7.5.1.d.2 4.7.5.1.e.l LCOforT/S3.7.5.1"s"addedto"demonstrate"

"(W.G.)",

addedafter"WaterGauge""whall"changedto"shall"3.7.5.1Applicability changedto"AllMODES"becauseoftheadditionofactionforModes5and6 Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page27Unit~TSDescrition3.7.5.1-Action "MODES1,2,3,and4"addedafter"ACTION"becauseoftheadditionofactionforModes5and64.7.5.1.d.2 4.7.5.1.e.l "s"addedto"demonstrate"

"(W.G.)"addedafter"WaterGauge"Basesfor3/4.7.5"EMERGENCY" changedtolowercaseletters Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0398R Page2810)OtherTSIssuesRaisedinNRRReortTheNRRinspection reportraisedaconcernregarding thecontrolroomtemperature limitof120F,specified inT/S4.7.5.1.a.

Theconcernwasthatthetemperature specified maynottakeintoaccountactualequipment qualification temperature forcontrolroominstrumentation.

Wearecurrently researching thisconcern,toensurethatthe0120Ftemperature isadequate.

WeexpecttocompletethisstudybyJune1990.Ifadditional T/Schangesarenecessary duetotheresultsofthestudy,wewillproposethechangesbySeptember 1990.Conclusion Inconclusion, webelievethattheproposedchangesdescribed inthefirstninecategories notedabovedonotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations because,asdemonstrated inthepreviousdiscussion, operation oftheCookNuclearPlantinaccordance withthechangeswouldnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

analyzed, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.

Figure1CONTROLROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMPI250ROOMPAIACOHDITIOHINO SYSTEMFPxEMEROEHCY MEASURINO AIRFLOWCLEANUPSYSTEMSTATIONCNPRECIRCULATION DAMPERMHV-ACROA-8 NOAMAI.IHTAKEDAMPERHVACROAICLTOILETEXHAUSTDAMPERHV-ACRDA-4 EMENENCYINTAKEDAMPERHV-ACROA-2 MACHINEROOMZQlZO~0I-4ZOZ0'CI4ZSl~0isaOZIIIZZQl0OE4ZI4ggOc0~0poLEOENOCONTROLROOMTOILET(UNITe2ONLY)SACKORAFT DAMPERfDAMPERVORTEXDAMPERMMOTOR-OPERATEO'ARALLEL SLAOEDAMPERCIILORDlE DETERSENTRIFUSAL MOTOR-FAH'OPERATEOSUTTERFLY DAMPERCHARCOALAOSOASERHEPAfILTERPREFILTER COILIH4COILSMEDIUMFEFFICIENCY FILTERITRANSFEROPENING ll~I ATTACHMENT 2TOAEP:NRC:0398R PROPOSEDCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1AND2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

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