ML17328A953
| ML17328A953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1991 |
| From: | ALEXICH M P INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | MURLEY T E NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328A954 | List: |
| References | |
| AEP:NRC:1036B, NUDOCS 9103060047 | |
| Download: ML17328A953 (12) | |
Text
.ACCELERATEDDIRIBUTIONDEMONSTTIONSYSTEMv~~pREGULATORYINFORMATXONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS).ACCESSIONNBR:9103060047DOC.DATE:91/02/27NOTARIZED:NODOCKETgFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana60500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,Indiana&05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONALEXICH,M.P.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana6MichiganEleRECXP.NAMERECIPXENTAFFILIATIONRMURLEY,T.E.DocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
SUBJECT:
ApplicationforamendstoLicensesDPR-586DPR-74,modifyingTechSpecSection3.6.3.1recontainmentisolationvalvestoprovideexemptionfromrequirementsofTechSpec3.0.4undercertaincircumstances.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRtENCLLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTESIIDARECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1LACOLBURN,T.INTERNAL:NRR/DET/ECMB9HNRR/DOEA/OTSB11NRR/DST/SELB8DNRR/DST/SRXB8EOCGF01EXTERNAL:NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111101111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDNRR/DET/ESGBNRR/DST8E2NRR/DST/SICB7ENUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS2RES/DSIR/EIBNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111101111D1SIDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:DDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR18ENCL16 t
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus,OH43216IIHSMSIHSlPvZCNEGQHPQWMAEP:NRC:1036BDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74TECHNICALSPECIFICATION3'.4EXEMPTIONFORCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Attn:T.E.MurleyFebruary27,199l
DearDr.Murley:
ThisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationforamendmenttotheTechnicalSpecifications(T/Ss)fortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically,weproposeto~modifySection3.6.3.1(ContainmentIsolationValves)toprovideanexemptiontotherequirementsofT/S3.0.4undercertaincircumstances.Ourreasonsfortheproposedchanges,aswellasouranalysesconcerningsignificanthazardsconsiderations,arecontainedinAttachment1tothisletter,TheproposedrevisedT/SspagesarecontainedinAttachment2.ThecurrentT/Ssmarked-uptoreflecttheproposedchangesarecontainedinAttachment3.Webelievethattheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofeffluentsorasignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.ThesechangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandbytheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtoMr.J.R.PadgettoftheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtotheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.9i03060047910227PDRADOCK05000315PPDR Dr.T.E.MurleyAEP:NRC:1036BThisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowingCorporateproceduresthatincorporateareasonablesetofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompletenesspriortosignaturebytheundersigned.Sincerely,M.P.AlexichVicePresidentdfwcc:D.H.Williams,Jr.A,A,Blind-BridgmanJ.R.PadgettG.CharnoffA.B.Davis'-RegionIIINRCResidentInspector-BridgmanNFEMSection'Chief ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1036BREASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1036BPage2WeareproposingtoaddanexemptiontotherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification(T/S)3.0.4forcontainmentisolationvalvesrequiredtobeoperablepursuanttoT/S3/4.6.3.1.TheT/S3.0.4exemptionwillallowmodechangewithinoperablecontainmentisolationvalves(providedtheactionrequirementsoftheT/Ssaremet).TheactionstatementrequirementsofT/S3.6.3.1arethat,within4hours,thevalvemustberestoredtooperablestatusortheaffectedpenetrationisolatedbyatleastonedeactivatedautomaticvalvesecuredintheisolationpositionoratleastoneclosedmanualvalveorblindflange.lfavalveisfoundinoperableinMode1,theaffectedpenetrationcouldsimplybeisolatedandpoweroperationcouldproceed(provided,ofcourse,thattheisolationofthepenetrationdoesnotrequireentryintoanotherT/Ssactionstatementbecauseofimpactonaparticular-system'soperability).However,iftheproblemsurfacesinamodeotherthanMode1,theascenttopoweroperationisprecludedbecauseofthelackofanexemptionoftherequirementsofT/S3.0.4.ThisisaninconsistencyintheT/SswhichiscorrectedbyourproposedadditionoftheT/S3.0.4exemption.Fromasafetyperspective,assurancethatthecontainmentpenetrationisproperlyisolatedisaccomplishedbyfollowingtheactionrequirementsofT/S3.6.3.1.ThisisrecognizedbythepresentT/S,whichallowscontinuedoperationinMode1withanisolatedpenetration.ProblemswithinconsistentapplicationofT/S3.0.4exemptionswererecognizedbytheNRCinGenericLetter87-09.1nthatgenericletter,thestaffstated:Specification3.0.4...precludesenteringamodeorspecifiedconditionifanLCOisnotmet,eveniftheActionRequirementswouldpermitcontinuedoperationofthefacilityforanunlimitedperiodoftime.Generally,theindividualspecificationsthathaveActionRequirementswhichallowcontinuedoperationnotethatSpecification3.0.4doesnotapply.However,exceptionstoSpecification3.0.4havenotbeenconsistentlyappliedandtheirbasesarenotwelldocumented.Forexample,approximatelytwo-thirdsoftheactionswhichpermitcontinuedoperationintheWestinghouseSTSareexemptfromSpecification3.0.4.Althoughthestaff ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1036BPage3encouragesthemaintenanceofallplantsystemsandcomponentsinanoperableconditionasagoodpractice,theT/SsgenerallyhavenotprecludedenteringamodewithinoperableequipmentwhentheActionRequirementsincluderemedialmeasuresthatprovideanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.GenericLetter87-09statesthatnothinginthestaff'spositiondiscussedabove"shouldbeinterpretedasendorsingorencouragingthaaplantstartupwithinoperableequipment.Thestaffbelieevesatgoodpracticeshoulddictatethattheplantstartupshouldnormallybeinitiatedonlywhenallrequiredequipmentisoperableandthatstartupwithinoperableequipmentmustbetheexceptionratherthantherule."ThefollowingdiscussiondescribesthecontrolsestablishedattheCookNuclearPlantthataddresstheNRC'sconcern.ControlofmaintenanceatCookNuclearPlantisaccomplishedviaPlantManagerInstruction(PMI)2290,"JobOrders."Thisinstructionincludesaprioritizedsystemofcontrolwhichdividescorrectivemaintenanceintoprioritizedcategorieswithregardtourgency,anddesignatestheindividualororganizationauthorizedtoassignthejobpriority.Thefollowingsummarizesthehighlightsofthecorrectivemaintenancepriorities:Priorit-10Ajoborderspecifyingworkthatmustbeinitiatedandworkedimmediatelytoeliminatedangerofpersonnelinjury,damagetothefacility,lossofgeneratingcapacity,ortoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.Priorit-20A.Ajoborderwhichspecifiesworkthatmustbeinitiatedpromptlyandwhich,ifdelayedbeyondthetimeoreventindicated,willseriouslyjeopardizeplantoperation.B.Ajoborder,whichdoesnotmeetthecriteriaofpriority10,thatconcernsT/Ss-relatedequipmentthathasbeendeclaredinoperableandisinanactionstatement.
ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1036BPage4C,AjoborderinvolvingT/Ss-relatedequipment,failureofwhichwillcausetheinitiationofan"eventinitiated"T/Sssurveillancerequirement.k~Priorit-30A.AjoborderonT/Ss-relatedorsafety-relatedequipmentthat,bydefinition,doesnotfitintoPriority10or20.B.AjoborderthatdoesnotfitintoPriority10or20butislistedintheControlRoomOpenitemslisting.MaintenancejoborderswrittentorepairinoperableequipmentthatisrequiredbytheT/SstobeoperablewillreceiveaPriority10or20.Priority10isreservedforitemsofanimmediatesafetyorplantavailabilityconcernandrequiresactiontobeginimmediatelyandtocontinueona24-hourbasisuntiltheproblemisundercontrol.Priority10maintenanceordersarerarelwritten.Therefore,Priority20maintenancejobordersaregenerallythehighestprioritytobeworked.ThisensuresthatmaintenanceworktosatisfyanLCOreceiveshighpriority.ThefollowingarethecontrolscurrentlyinplacetoensurethatmodechangesdonotoccurwithanLCOinadegradedmodewithouttherequiredreviewandapproval:Syc>,I4tj~,li1.The"PlantHeatupFromColdShutdowntoHotStandb"anyprocedure(OHP4021.001.001)andthe"ReactorStartupProcedure"(OHP4021.001.002)requiresignoffbytheresponsibledepartmentheadsthatallT/Sssurveillancerequirementsforthemodetobeenteredhavebeencompleted.EntryintoModes4and3requiresanEquipmentChecklisttobecompletedandsignedoffbyasupervisorandentryintoMode3requiresareviewofthefollowinglogswithrespecttoMode3T/Ssandotheradministrativerequirements.
ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1036BPage5oTemporarymodification'logbookoControlroomsurveillancebookoControlroomlogoShiftsupervisor'slogoT/SopenitemslogoClearancepermitlogoCautiontaglogoNonT/Ss-relatedequipmentstatuslog2.PerPMI-4030,"TechnicalSpecificationsReviewandSurveillance,"modechangeswhileinaT/Ssactionstatement,whenpermittedbyT/S3.0.4,canonlybemadeafterreviewandapprovalbytheoperationsdepartmentsuperintendentandtheplantmanager.Effortstoreturntheequipmenttooperabilitywillcontinueunaffectedbythemodechange.Theabove-describedadministrativecontrolstolimittheuseofT/S3.0.4exceptionsarecurrentlyinplace.Ourplantoperatorsareawareofandhavebeeninstructedinthecontrolsestablishedtolimittheuseofthe3.0.4exceptions.10CFR50.92EvaluationPer10CFR50.92,aproposedamendmentwillnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationiftheproposedamendmentdoesnot:1)Involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,2)Createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated,or3)Involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1AdequateisolationofaffectedcontainmentpenetrationsisensuredbyfollowingtherequirementsoftheactionstatementinT/S3.6.3.1.Thisrequiresthepenetrationbeisolatedbyat J'fWPgJl' ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1036BPage6leastonedeactivatedautomaticvalvesecuredintheisolationpositionorbyuseofatleastoneclosedmanualvalveorblindflange.ContinuedpoweroperationispermittedinMode1withaninoperablecontainmentisolationvalveprovided0herequirementsoftheactionstatementarefollowed.TheT/Ssrequirementsareinconsistent,however,inthatmodechangeisprohibitedeventhoughcontinuouspoweroperationispermitted.SincetheT/Ssactionrequirementsspecifyanadequatelevelofprotection,webelievethechangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed.Criterion2ThechangeinvolvesnophysicalmodificationstoCookNuclearPlant,noranychangesinthedesignbasis.Thechangeshouldnot,therefore,createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzedorevaluated.Criterion3AdequateisolationofaffectedcontainmentpenetrationsisensuredbyfollowingtherequirementsoftheT/S3.6.3.1actionstatement.Thisrequiresthepenetrationtobeisolatedbyatleastonedeactivatedautomaticvalvesecuredintheisolationpositionorbyuseofatleastoneclosedmanualvalveorblindflange.ContinuedpoweroperationispermittedinMode1withanofthinoperablecontainmentisolationvalve,providedtherequiremtoeactionstatementarefollowed.TheT/Ssrequirementsareiremensinconsistent,however,inthatmodechangeisprohibitedeventhoughcontinuouspoweroperationispermitted.SincetheT/Ssactionrequirementsspecifyanadequatelevelofprotection,we'believethechangewillnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheCommissionhasprovidedguidanceconcerningthedeterminationofsignificanthazardsbyprovidingexamples(48FR14870)ofamendmentsconsiderednotlikelytoinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.Thefirstexamplereferstochangesthatareadministrativeinnature:forexample,achangetoachieveconsistencythroughoutthetechnicalspecifications.Althoughthischangeisnotpurelyadministrativeinnature,itisrelatedtothisexampleinthatitachievesconsistencywithinT/S3.6.3.1inthatmodechangeisnotprecluded,consistentwiththeallowanceofcontinuouspoweroperationinMode1.Thesixthexamplereferstoachangewhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobabilityorconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentormayreduceinsomewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresults ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1036BPage7ofthechangeareclearlywithinlimitsestablishedasacceptable.ProblemswithinconsistentapplicationofT/S3.0.4exemptionshavebeennotedpreviouslybytheNRCinGenericLetter87-09.Theacceptabilityofcontinuouspoweroperationwithcontainmentpenetrationsisolatedpertheactionstatementrequirementshasalreadybeenestablished.Thischangeonlyextendsthatacceptabilityto'allowmodechange.Thus,weconcludethatthesixthexampleisapplicabletothischange.