ML17332A717

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74.Amends Would Modify TS 3.9.4 to Provide Flexibility in Operation of Containment Personnel Airlocks During Core Alterations

ML17332A717
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	03/31/1995
From:	FITZPATRICK E INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17332A718	List: ML17332A717 ML17332A719
References
AEP:NRC:1220, NUDOCS 9504060190
Download: ML17332A717 (16)

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PR.IC)R.I"EV1ACCELERATEDRIDSPROCESSING)REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9504060190,DOC.DATE:95/03/31NOTARIZED:YESDOCKETgFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316,AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITZPATRICK,E.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

ApplicationforamendstolicensesDPR-58&DPR-74.AmendswouldmodifyTS3.9.4toprovideflexibilityinoperationofcontainmentpersonnel.airlocksduringcorealterations.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:.LTRtENCLJSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionNOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1LAHICKMAN,JINTERNAL:LECENTE01NRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DSSA/SRXBOGC/HDS2'XTERNAL:NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111110RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDNMSS/DWM/LLDPNRR/DSSA/SPLBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPI-37(EXT.504-2083)TOELI!vIINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTS'YOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR13ENCL12 R

IndianaMichiganPowerCompany'P.O.Box16631Columbus,OH43216FIMarch31,1995AEP:NRC'1220DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2PROPOSEDAMENDMENTTOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSECTION3/4.9.4FORCONTAINMENTPERSONNELAIRLOCKREQUIREMENTSThisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationfor,amendmenttothetechnicalspecifications(T/Ss)forDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2.Specifically,weareproposingtomodifyT/Ss3.9.4entitledRefuelingOperations,.ContainmentBuildingPenetrations,toprovideflexibilityintheoperationofthecontainmentpersonnelairlocksduringCOREALTERATIONSbyexpandingtheexistinglimitingconditionforoperationtoincludetheestablishmentofcontainmentclosurecapabilityrequirements.ThisproposedamendmentisconsistentwithAmendments194(DPR-53)and171(DPR-69)approvedforuseattheCalvertCliffsNuclearPowerPlantintheNRC'stransmittalofAugust31,1994.TheCalvertCliffsamendmentallowsthepersonnelairlockdoorstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONSprovidedcertainadministrativecontrolsareinplace.Attachment1providesadetaileddescriptionoftheproposedchanges,thejustificationforthechanges,andourdeterminationofnosignificanthazardsconsiderationperformedpursuantto10CFR50.92.Attachment2containstheexistingT/Spagesmarkedtoreflecttheproposedchanges.Attachment3containstheproposedT/Spages.Webelievetheproposedchangeswillnotresultin(1)asignificantchangeinthetypesofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite,or(2)asignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.I.GC03>95040601'PO950331PDRADOCK05000315~,.P'PDR

U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2AEP:NRC'1220TheseproposedchangeshavebeenreviewedbythePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommitteeandtheNuclearSafetyandDesignReviewCommittee.Incompliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(l),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtotheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtotheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.Sincerely,qg'E9r(~E.E.FitzpatrickVicePresidentSWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBEDBEFOREMETHIS8/n/DAYOF~A1995No,aryPubiicMyCommissionExpires:-M-5'5'hAttachmentsCC:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffJ.B.MartinNFEMSectionChiefNRCResidentInspector-BridgmanJ.R.Padgett

'I ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1220DESCRIPTIONANDJUSTIFICATIONOFCHANGES10CFR50.92ANALYSISFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNITS1AND2TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS

~~E, Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1220Page1I.DESCRIPTIONOFCHANGESTheproposedamendmenttotechnicalspecification(T/S)3.9.4makesthefollowingspecificchangestotheCookNuclearPlantUnits1and2T/Ss:S394A.ExpandLimitingConditionForOperation3.9.4,item"b"(page3/49-4)toincludetheabilitytoleavebothpersonnelairlockdoorsinthe"open"positionduringCOREALTERATIONS.Asaresult,closurecapabilityofthecontainmentairlockdoorswillbeassuredinoneoftwoways;1)oneairlockdoorwillbemaintainedclosedduringCOREALTERATIONS,or2)bothairlocksmayremainopenprovidedcertainrestrictionsaresatisfiedincludingthepositioningofdedicatedpersonnelattheairlocktofacilitateclosure.,B.AfootnotehasalsobeenaddedtodefinewhatconstitutesanOPERABLEairlockdoorwhenimplementingthe"bothairlockdoorsopen"optionofthespecification.C.RevisetheBasesforspecification3/4.9.4(pageB3/49-1)toincludetherestrictionsassociatedwiththe"bothairlockdoorsopen"option.II.JUSTIFICATIONFORCHANGESTechnicalspecification3.9.4requiresthataminimumofonepersonnelairlockdoor,aswellasothercontainmentpenetrationsbeclosedduringCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelwithinthecontainment.Althoughthepresenttechnicalspecificationrequiresaminimumofoneairlockdoortobeclosedduringrefueling,theUFSARanalysisofaradioactivereleaseresultingfromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment,takesnocreditforcontainmentisolation.Duringarefuelingoutage,otherworkinthecontainmentdoesnotstopduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.Thisrequiresthatpersonneloperatetheairlockdoorstoenterandexitthecontainment.StudiesofairlockdooroperationandmaintenanceatCookNuclearPlanthaveidentifiedthefollowingtrends.Airlockusage,duringthe1994refuelingoutage,fortheperiodsboundingCOREALTERATIONS(Sept.16th-20thandOct.18th-25th)totalled10,200entriesandexits.Assumingfourtofiveindividualsenteredthecontainmentperairlockcycle,theaveragenumberofairlockcyclesduringCOREALTERATIONSisconservativelyestimatedtobegreaterthan200perday.Suchheavyuseoftheairlockdoorswasnotanticipatedduringitsdesign.Asaresultofthisunexpectedlyheavyuse,failuresofthedoorhavemanifestedthemselvesas Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1220Page2problemsinthegearandinterlockalignmentsofthedoorslockingmechanismandhandwheelfailures.Inadditiontothewearandmaintenanceconcernsdescribedabove,theCalvertCliffssubmittalraisedconcernsregardingworkersafetyandthepracticalrealityoftheairlock'sabilitytopreventthereleaseofradioactivematerialfollowingafuelhandlingaccident.CalvertCliffsprovidedthefollowingargumentwhichwebelievetobeaccurate,realisticandapplicabletoCookNuclearPlant:"Therearealargenumberofpeopleinthecontainmentduringarefuelingoutage,evenduringfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONS.Shouldafuelhandlingaccidentoccur,itwouldtakeanumberofcyclesoftheairlocktoevacuatepersonnelfromcontainment.Witheachairlockcycle,morecontainmentairwouldbereleased.Whilewaitingfortheirturntoexit,the"workerswouldbeexposedtothereleasedactivity."Toaddressthepotentialforworkerexposureandtoincreasetheavailability/maintainabilityofthepersonnelairlockdooratCookNuclearPlant,weproposetoallowbothairlockstobeopenduringCOREALTERATIONSprovidedthefollowingadministrativecontrolsareestablished.Theairlockdoorsshallbecontrolledinthefollowingmanner:1.aminimumofonedoorineachairlockisclosed,or2.bothairlockdoorsmaybeopenprovided:a.onedoorineachairlockisOPERABLE,b.refuelingcavitylevelisgreaterthan23feet,andc.adesignatedindividualisavailableatalltimestoclosetheairlockifrequired.Whenconsideringtheproposedamendment,thedoseconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentwerereviewed.TwocasesarediscussedintheUFSAR,oneforafuelhandlingaccidentintheauxiliarybuilding,theotherforasimilaraccidentinsidecontainment.Thedesignbasisaccidentisthecompleteruptureofthehighestratedspentfuelassembly.Whenconsideringthetwoaccidentanalysesthecontainmenteventwasconsideredtoprovidetheboundingconditions.Thiswasbasedonthefactthatnoreductioninthepotentialthyroiddoeswasassumedsincecharcoalfiltrationwasnotconsideredandnocreditwastakenforcontainmentisolation.Theaccidentinsidecontainment(assuming3588MWTpoweroperation)gave

Attachment1to,AEP:NRC:1220Page3a0-2hoursiteboundarythyroiddoseofapproximately100rem,andawholebodydoseof1.4rem.Bothofthesevaluesremainsignificantlybelowthe300remthyroidand25remwholebodylimitsestablishedin10CFR100.Basedonthesefindings,itwasdeterminedthatallowingbothairlockdoorstoremainopenduringCOREALTERATIONSwouldnotincreasetheanalyzedsiteboundarydoseresultingfromafuelhandlingaccident.Comparedtotheanalyzedcase,thedoseconsequencesofareleasethroughanopenairlockmayevenbereducedbecauseofretentiontimeintheauxiliarybuildingandthepossibilityoffiltrationthroughtheauxiliarybuildingventilationsystem.III.0CFR5092CRITERIAPer10CFR50.92,aproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationifthechangedoesnot:involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,2.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,or3.involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1Thedesignbasisfuelhandlingaccidentistheruptureofthehighestratedfuelassembly.Asdiscussedpreviously,theconsequencesofanaccidentinsidecontainment(i.e.,siteboundarydose),withbothairlockdoorsareboundedbytheexistingfuelhandlingaccidentcurrentlypresentedinourUFSAR.Sincethecontainmentairlockdoorsdonotaffectthefailuremechanismofafuelassemblyduringafuelhandlingaccident,webelievethatthisamendmentrequestdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Additionally,nocreditwastakenforcontainmentclosureintheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,basedontheseconsiderations,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1220Page4Criterion2Asstatedinresponsetocriterionone,thepositionofthecontainmentairlockdoorsinnowayaffectsthemechanismbywhichaspentfuelassemblyisdamagedduringafuelhandlingaccident.Thus,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Criterion3Themarginforsafetyasdefinedin10CFR100hasnotbeenreduced.Asdiscussedpreviously,theexistingfuelhandlingaccidentanalysisforaneventinsidecontainmenttakesnocreditfortheisolationofcontainment.Asaresult,thepositionoftheairlockdoorshasnoimpactontheanalyzedsiteboundarydosesresultingfromsuchanaccident.Basedontheseconsiderations,itisconcludedthatthechangesdonotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.

ATTACHMENT2TOAEP:NRC:1220EXISTINGTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONPAGESMA%MDTOREFLECTPROPOSEDCHANGES e1~~