ML17335A366

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,adding TS for Distributed Ignition Sys

ML17335A366
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	12/03/1998
From:	POWERS R P INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17335A367	List: ML17335A366 ML17335A368
References
AEP:NRC:1291, NUDOCS 9812080068
Download: ML17335A366 (14)

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CATEGORY1REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIOhSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9812080068DOC.DATE:98/12/03NOTARIZED:YESFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM50-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaMAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONPOWERS,R.P.IndianaMichiganPower,Co.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONRecordsManagementBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

ApplicationforamendstolicensesDPR-58&DPR-74,addingTSfordistributedignitionsys.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:AOOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCL(SIZE:/01TITLE:ORSubmittal:GeneralDistributionDOCKET0500031505000316NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-3LASTANG,JCOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-3PDCOPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL.ECENTER01NRR/DE/EMCBNRR/DSSA/SPLBNUDOCS-ABSTRACT11111111NRR/DE/ECGB/ANRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DSSA/SRXBOGC/HDS3.111.11110EXTERNAL:NOAC11NRCPDR~~.~anyNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTZONLlSTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR13ENCL12 IndianaMichiga~PowerCompany~500CircleDriveBuchanan,Ml491071373INSMNAlMICNI6'AMPWARDecember3,1998AEP:NRC:129110CFR50.92DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskMailStop0-Pl-17Washington,D.C.20555-0001Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONAMENDMENT-DISTRIBUTEDIGNITIONSYSTEMTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONANDASSOCIATEDBASESThisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteanapplicationforamendmenttothetechnicalspecifications(T/Ss)forCookNuclearPlantunits1and2.ThisamendmentwilladdanewT/Sforthedistributed,ignitionsystem(DIS).Asdescribedinattachment1,previoussubmittalsonaproposedT/SfortheDISaresupercededbythissubmittal.BackgroundinformationrelevanttotheT/Sandouranalysesconcerningsignificanthazardsconsiderationsarecontainedinattachment1tothisletter.Attachment2containscurrentT/Spages,markeduptoshowwherethenewT/Swillbeinserted.Attachment3containsthenewproposedT/Spages.Oursupportinganalysis,providedinattachment1,indicatesthattheproposedDIST/Swillnotresultinasignificantchangeinthetypesofeffluentsorasignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite,orasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.Theproposedchangehasbeenreviewedbytheplantnuclearsafetyreviewcommitteeandthenuclearsafetyanddesignreviewcommittee.WerequestthattheapprovedT/Samendmentbeeffectivethirtydaysfromissuance.98i208006898i203""PDRADQCK05000Si5P'DR

'U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2~~AEP:NRC:1291Inaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.91(b)(1),copiesofthisletteranditsattachmentshavebeentransmittedtotheMichiganPublicServiceCommissionandtheMichiganDepartmentofPublicHealth.ggR.P.PowersVicePresidentSWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBEDBEFOREMETHISQ/'JDAYOF1998NotaryPublicMyCommissionExpires//jmcAttachments)P,NtCEM.BICKERSNotaryPub(to,BemenCotrnty,~MyCommissionExpfesFeb.16,2001c:J.A.Abramson,w/attachmentsJ.L.Caldwell,w/attachmentsMDEQDW&RPD,w/attachmentsNRCResidentInspector,w/attachmentsJ.R.Sampson,w/attachments U.STNuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage3AEP:NRC:1291bc:T~P.J.J.FOLIOD.F.M.W.K.R.J.F.Beilman-w/attachmentsEuto-w/attachmentsKunsemiller/J.B.Kingseed/G.P.Arent/M.J.GumnsRencheck/E.R.Eckstein/D.F.Powell/D.R.Hafer/BakerStang,Jr.,NRC-Washington,DC-w/attachments ATTACHMENT1TOAEP:NRC:1291SUPPORTINGANALYSESFORAMENDMENTTOTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSDISTRIBUTEDIGNITIONSYSTEM

~~I Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1291Page1Backcaround10CFR50.44,"StandardsforCombustibleGasControlSysteminLight-Water-CooledPowerReactors",requiresthedesignandinstallationofsystemstocontroltheconcentrationofcombustiblegasinsidecontainmentfollowingdesignbasisloss-of-coolantaccidents(LOCAs).Inaddition,foricecondensercontainments,asystemisrequiredtocontrolanamountofhydrogenassociatedwithdegradedcorescenariosthatgobeyonddesignbasisLOCAs.Inthisscenario,theregulationassumes,fordesignpurposes,thattherequirementsof10CFR50.46,"AcceptanceCriteriaforEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsforLight-WaterNuclearPowerReactors",werenotmetbytheemergencycorecoolingsystem,resultinginadegradedcore.Theregulationfurtherpostulatesthattheextentofcoredamageresultsinhydrogengenerationinanamountequaltothatfromametal-waterreactioninvolving75%ofthefuelcladdingsurroundingtheactivefuelregion(excludingthecladdingintheplenumvolume).Theregulationisconcernedaboutthepotentialforhighconcentrationsofhydrogengasinsidecontainmenttobeignitedbyarandomignitionsourcewithconsequentcontainmentfailure.Anextensiveprogramoftestingandanalysishasdemonstratedthatasystemofstrategicallyplacedigniterscanberelieduponforcontrolledburnsofthehydrogengaspostulatedfordegradedcoresby10CFR50.44.AtCookNuclearPlant,theseignitersarecalledthedistributedignitionsystem(DIS).Thecontrolledburningapproachtomitigationofthehydrogenpostulatedby10CFR50.44,fordegradedcoreLOCAs,wasjointlydevelopedbyAmericanElectricPowerwithotherownersofWestinghousePressurizedWaterReactorsutilizingicecondensercontainments.OtherownersincludedtheDukePowerCompany(CatawbaandMcGuire)andtheTennesseeValleyAuthority(WattsBarandSequoyah).Thiscollaborationresultedinhydrogenignitionsystemsthat~sharedmanycommondesignfeaturesandwerefrequentlybasedontestresultsapplicabletoalloftheowners.Safetyevaluationreports(SERs),foreachofthenuclearplantsinvolved,oftenreferredtoSERsoftheotherplants.By1982virtuallyalloftheownershadcompletedinstallationoftheirsystems,althoughfinalizationofstudiesforequipmentsurvivabilityduringhydrogenburninggenerallyremainedanopenissue.Listsofequipmentrequiredtosurvivehydrogenburningweredevelopedbyeachoftheownersandincludedthehydrogenigniters.Atthistime,10CFR50.49,Environmentalqualificationofelectricequipmentimportanttosafetyfornuclearpowerplants,hadnotbeenissued.IndustryrequirementsforequipmentqualificationweredescribedbytheprovisionsoftwoNRCdocuments-theDivisionofOperatingReactors"GuidelinesforEvaluatingEnvironmentalQualificationofClass1EElectricalEquipmentinOperatingReactors"(DORGuidelines)orNUREG-0588, V1 Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1291Page2"InterimStaffPositionon,EnvironmentalQualificationofSafety-RelatedElectricalEquipment,"December1979.Extensivetestingwasperformedtoensurethehydrogenigniterswouldperformproperlyinanenvironmentofhydrogenburning,howevertheicecondenserownersdidnotincludehydrogenignitionsystemswithintheprogramstomeettheDORGuidelinesorNUREG-0588.ThiswasbestdescribedintheMcGuireSERfortheirfinalDIS(NUREG-0422,Supp.No.7,May1983).ThisSERdiscussedtheDukeequipmentqualificationprogramandnoted"Hydrogenignitersarealsonotincludedinthequalificationprogram.However,thefunctionalcapabilityoftheignitershasbeendemonstratedintestsconductedatFenwalandWhiteshellinanatmosphereofburninghydrogen.Moreover,similarigniterassemblieswererecentlyqualifiedbyGrandGulfin,.accordancewithNUREG-0588CategoryIrequirements.Basedonthesefindingsthestaffconcludesthatthereisadequateassurancethatthehydrogenigniterswillsurvivethehydrogenburn.event."RecentdiscussionwithownersoficecondenserplantshasindicatedthattheabovedescriptionintheMcGuireSERreflectsthecurrentpracticeoftheownersincludingAEP.AEPbelievesthatadequateassuranceofDISoperabilityhasbeenprovidedbytheicecondensercontainmentownerswithoutspecificallyincludingtheDISintheequipmentqualificationprogram.Inaddition,theDIShasbeenprovidedfordegradedcoreeventsthatgobeyondthedesignbasisLOCAandisbeingincludedinthe.T/Ssduetotheapplicabilityofcriterion4of10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii)(D)(SeeJustificationforAmendment).Thiscriterionmayincludestructures,systems,orcomponentsthatarenotrequiredfordesignbasisaccidentsasaddressedbyCriterion2and3oftheregulation.Theprovisionsof10CFR50.49aredirectedtoequipmentinvolvedinmitigatingdesignbasiseventsandare,therefore,notapplicabletotheDIS.NothinginthissubmittalisintendedtoestablishadegradedcoreLOCAasadesignbasisaccidentforCookNuclearPlant.Thedesign,analysis,andtestingoftheCookNuclearPlant'sDISwerethesubjectofnumerousprevioussubmittalstotheNRC,commencingwithAEP:NRC:0500,datedJanuary12,1981,andendingwithAEP:NRC:0500Y,datedFebruary26,1993.TheNRC'sreviewofthesystemwasdocumentedinasafetyevaluationreport(SER)datedDecember17,1981.AnNRCletterdatedSeptember11,1991,indicatedthattheDecember1981SERwasexpectedtobefinalunlesstheNRCreviewofCookNuclearPlant'sindividualplantexamination(IPE)resultsindicatedthattheSERshouldbesupplemented.AEP:NRC:0500YwasafinalsummarydocumentontheDIS,includinganalysisbasedonsignificantaccidentsequencesidentifiedbytheIPE.OursubmittalAEP:NRC:0500YdidnotresultintheissuanceofasupplementtotheDecember1981SER.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1291Page3Proposedtechnicalspecifications(T/Ss)fortheDISwereinitiallydescribedinattachment2toAEP:NRC:0500CdatedMay29,1981.TheproposedT/Swasmodifiedbyattachment8toAEP:NRC:0500G,datedFebruary17,1982.Themodificationwasmadetoreflecttheaddition(attheNRC'srequest)of1igniterpertraininthecontainmentinstrumentrooms.ThiscurrentsubmittalsupercedesallprevioussubmittalsinvolvingaT/SfortheDIS.DescritionofAmendmentReuestThisproposedamendmentaddsaT/Sandassociatedbasesfor,theDIS(nochangesto'anexistingT/Sareinvolved).TheT/SbeingproposedfortheDISincorporatesthetechnicalrequirementsoftheimprovedtechnicalspecifications(NUREG-1431,Revision1,"StandardTechnicalSpecifications,WestinghousePlants",April1995)however,thecurrentformatofourT/Ssisretained.Itshouldalsobenotedthattheimprovedtechnicalspecificationsrefertothissystemasthehydrogenignitionsystem(HIS).ThetermDISwillberetainedforCookNuclearPlant.SstemDescritionTheDISatCookNuclearPlantconsistsoftwoindependenttrainsofresistanceheatingelements(igniters),powersupplytransformers,breakers,switches,interconnectingwiring,andcontrolpowerannunciators.Itismanuallyactuatedwhennecessaryandremainsenergizeduntilnolongerneeded.EachDIStrainhas35igniters,18ignitersinuppercontainmentand17inlowercontainment.Theupperignitersineachtrainarefurtherdividedintothreegroups(orphases)andthelowerignitersineachtrainarealsodividedintothreegroups(orphases).Thesesixgroupspertrainareeachpowered.fromadifferentphaseoftwothree-phasetransformers.Itisthetransformerphasethatuniquelydefinesagroup.Thedesignapproachforlocationoftheigniterswasbasedonwherehydrogen,wasexpectedtobeproducedoraccumulate,andalsotoburnasmuchhydrogenaspossibleinthelowervolumeofcontainmenttopreventhydrogenmigrationtothetopofcontainment.Thelowercompartmentignitersare,ineffect,thefirstlevelofdefenseforcontrolledburningofthehydrogen.Itisanticipatedthatmostunburnedhydrogenescapingthelowervolumewillmigratetotheuppervolumeviatheicecondensers.Theicecondenserupperplenumignitersminimizeescapeofthishydrogentouppercontainment.Finally,hydrogennotburnedinthelowercontainmentoricecondenserplenumscouldbeburnedbytheintermediatelevelignitersoutsidethesteamgeneratorandpressurizercubiclesorintheupperdome.Becauseofthegeneralopennessoftheupperdomeandtheabilityoftheflamefrontfromhydrogenburningtofreelypropagatetoadjacentareas,itis Attachment,ltoAEP:NRC:1291Page4expectedthateachigniterinthedomewouldbeindividuallytheleastcriticalfortheoverallfunctionoftheDIS.Eveninthelowercontainment,hydrogenburningbyflamepropagationisexpectedtooccurbetweenadjacentcompartments/areas.JustificationforAmendmentTheDISisthemethodselectedtomitigatethehydrogengenerationfromdegradedcorescenariospostulatedby10CFR50.44.TheDIShasgenerallybeenshownbyprobalisticriskanalysistobesignificantinlimitingtheseverityofaccidentsequencesthatarecommonlyfoundtodominateriskforunitswithicecondensercontainments.Assuchthesystemisconsideredsignificanttopublichealthandsafetyandmeets10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii)(D),Criterion4,forinclusionintheplantT/Ss.BasisforNoSinificantHazardsDeterminationAnextensiveprogramoftestingandanalysishasdemonstratedthatasystemofstrategicallyplacedigniterscanbeusedforcontrolledburnsofthehydrogengaspostulatedby10CFR50.44.Ithasbeenshownthattheseburnscanbeaccomplishedatcombustiontemperaturesandpressuresthatwillnotchallengetheintegrityofthecontainmentstructureortheoperabilityofcontainmentequipmentnecessarytoshutdown(andmaintainshutdown)thereactor.Dueconsiderationwasgiventothepossibilityofdifferentaccidents(suchasaburninducedtransitiontohydrogendetonation)resultingfromuseofthesystem.Aspreviouslydiscussedaboveunder"Background",thedesign,analysis,andtestingoftheDISwerethesubjectofnumerousprevioussubmittalstotheNRCandtheNRC'sreviewandapprovalofthesystemhasbeenpreviouslydocumentedintheSERdatedDecember17,1981.ThisamendmentrequestistheproposedT/SsforthepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedDISandnodesignbaseschangestotheDISarebeingmadeasaresultofthissubmittal.Inaccordancewith10CFR50.92,thisproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationifitdoesnot:2.3.involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;orinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Criterion1TheT/SbeingproposedfortheDISisconsistentwithitsdesignandoperationaspreviouslyreviewedandapproved,andtherefore,doesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityor Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1291Page5consequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheamendmentsinvolvenewrequirementsfortheT/Ssanddonotdeleteanyexistingrequirements.Criterion2TheT/SbeingproposedfortheDISisconsistentwithitsdesignandoperationaspreviouslyreviewedandapproved,andtherefore,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Criterion3TheT/SbeingproposedfortheDISisconsistentwithitsdesignandoperationaspreviouslyreviewedandapproved,andtherefore,doesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.CompliancewiththeproposedT/Swillprovideadditionalassuranceofsystemavailabilitytomaintainamarginofsafetyforcontainmentintegrityduringdegradedcoreevents.Basedonthepreceding,itisconcludedthattheproposedDIST/Sdoesnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdefinedin10CFR50.92.EnvironmentalAssessmentThislicensingamendmentrequesthasbeenevaluatedagainstthecriteriaforidentificationoflicensingactionsrequiringenvironmentalassessmentinaccordancewith10CFR51.21.Ithasbeendeterminedthatanenvironmentalassessmentisnotrequiredbecausetherequestmeetsthecriteriaforacategoricalexclusi'onasdescribedin10CFR51.22(c)(9)~Thisdeterminationisbasedonthefactthattheproposalisanamendmenttoalicenseforareactorpursuantto10CFR50involvinga"changetoasurveillancerequirementandtheamendmentmeetsthefollowingspecificcriteria:(i)Theamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration.AspreviouslydescribedaboveunderBasisforNoSinificantHazardsDetermination,thisproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolvesignificanthazardsconsideration.(ii)Thereisnosignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentthatmaybereleasedoffsite.ThisproposaldoesnotchangethemannerofDISoperationduringpotentialdegradedcore,scenariosand,therefore,doesnotchangethetypesoramountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite.

Attachment1toAEP:NRC:1291Page6(iii)Thereisnosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.Theproposedchangewillnotresultinchangesintheoperationorconfigurationofthefacility.Theproposedchangewillnotresultinchangestothelevelofcontrolsormethodologyusedforprocessingofradioactiveeffluentsorhandlingofsolidradioactivewaste,norwilltheproposedchangeresultinanychangesinthenormalradiationlevelswithintheplant.Measurementof,ignitertiptemperaturesinaccordancewiththeproposed18-monthsurveillancemayinvolvesomepersonnelexposureforigniterslocatedinradiationareas.However,normalgoodradiologicalworkpracticeswillminimizethisexposure.Therefore,itwasconcludedthattherewillbenosignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposureresultingfromthischange.