05000282/FIN-2013002-10
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR Part 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those SSCs to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. These measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled. The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design such as by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above, on January 5, 2013, the licensee identified that regulatory requirements regarding the testing of multiple ASME OM Code, Category A pressure isolation valves had not been correctly translated into procedures. As a result, the verification of each valves design had not been adequately verified or checked by the performance of a suitable testing program since approximately February 25, 1998. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform suitable testing on multiple ASME OM Code, Category A pressure isolation valves was a performance deficiency. The inspectors assessed the significance of this deficiency using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power. The inspectors determined that this issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because each of the questions contained in the Mitigating Systems portion of IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2 could be answered no. The licensee documented this issue in CAP 1365473. Corrective actions for this issue included satisfactorily performing testing on those valves that could be tested with the reactor at power, ensuring that valves that could only be tested during an outage were incorporated into the respective refueling outage schedule, and performing an extent of condition review to ensure that other valves were appropriately classified and tested as required by the ASME OM Code. |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
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| Report | IR 05000282/2013002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop C Moore D Passehl J Bozga K Riemer K Stoedter M Holmberg M Learn M Phalen P Zurawski T Bilik |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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