05000483/FIN-2012002-03
From kanterella
Revision as of 22:14, 29 May 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | LICENSEE-IDENTIFIED Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification 3.9.2, Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves, requires that, in Mode 6, Refueling, each valve used to isolate unborated water sources shall be secured in the closed position. Contrary to the above, on November 7, 2011, Callaway operators entered Mode 6 with an unborated water source isolation valve closed but not secured. Valve BGV0601 had been opened on November 4, 2011, while the plant was in no defined mode to allow filling and venting the volume control tank. Later that night, as part of the tagging restoration of the volume control tank, valve BGV0601 was closed but not secured. The lack of administrative controls to secure the valve was discovered on November 13, 2011. Immediate corrective action, to place a seal on the locking device for the valve, allowed exiting the technical specification limiting condition for operation. The cause was attributed to an inadequate procedure used for controlling unborated sources. The details of this issue are documented in License Event Report 05000483/2011-007-00. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Operational Checklists for Both PWRs and BWRs, Checklist 4, PWR Refueling Operation: RCS level > 23\\\' or PWR Shutdown Operation with Time to Boil > 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and Inventory in the Pressurizer, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This was because the finding did not: 1. increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory 2. include findings that could result in a loss of reactor coolant system level instrumentation 3. degrade the licensees ability to terminate a leak path or add reactor coolant system inventory when needed 4. degrade the licensees ability to recover decay heat removal once it is lost This finding was entered in the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201109689. |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2012002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Dumbacher N O'Keefe Z Hollcraft |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Callaway) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||