Letter Sequence Draft RAI |
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EPID:L-2017-LLE-0029, Package: First Request for Additional Information for Review of Exemption Request for Five Nonconforming Dry Shielded Canisters 11 Through 15 (CAC No. 001028, Docket No. 72-58, EPID L-2017-LLE-0029) (Approved, Closed) |
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MONTHYEARML18100A1882013-04-11011 April 2013
Enclosure 7 - Procedure 12751-MNGP-QP-9.201, Revision 0, Visual Weld Examination
Project stage: Other
ML18100A1852013-04-11011 April 2013
Enclosure 6 - Procedure 12751-MNGP-OPS-01, Revision 0, Spent Fuel Cask Welding: 61BT/BTH NUHOMS Canisters
Project stage: Other
ML18100A1912014-01-30030 January 2014
Enclosure 9 - Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Report 130415.402, Revision 0, Review of Trivis Inc. Welding Procedures Used for Field Welds on the Transnuclear NUHOMS 61BTH Type 1 & 2 Transportable Canister for BWR Fuel
Project stage: Other
ML18100A1902014-05-22022 May 2014
Enclosure 8 - Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Report 130415.403, Revision 2, Assessment of Monticello Spent Fuel Canister Closure Plate Welds Based on Welding Video Records
Project stage: Other
ML18065A5482018-03-0606 March 2018
EnclosuRAI-1 (non-proprietary) (Letter to T. J. Oconnor First Request for Additional Information for Review of Exemption Request for Five Nonconforming Dry Shielded Canisters 11 Through 15)
Project stage: RAI
ML18065A5452018-03-0606 March 2018
Package: First Request for Additional Information for Review of Exemption Request for Five Nonconforming Dry Shielded Canisters 11 Through 15 (CAC No. 001028, Docket No. 72-58, EPID L-2017-LLE-0029)
Project stage: Request
ML18065A5462018-03-0606 March 2018
Letter to T. J. Oconnor First Request for Additional Information for Review of Exemption Request for Five Nonconforming Dry Shielded Canisters 11 Through 15 (CAC No. 001028, Docket No. 72-58, EPID L-2017-LLE-0029)
Project stage: RAI
ML18100A1932018-04-0505 April 2018
Enclosure 13 - Tn Americas LLC Calculation 11042-0207, Revision 1, NUHOMS 61BTH Type 1 DSC Itcp and Otcp Maximum Weld Flaw Evaluation
Project stage: Other
L-MT-18-013, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Exemption Request for Nonconforming Dye Penetrant Examinations of Dry Shielded Canisters (Dscs) 11 Through 152018-04-0505 April 2018
Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Exemption Request for Nonconforming Dye Penetrant Examinations of Dry Shielded Canisters (Dscs) 11 Through 15
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML18121A2502018-05-0101 May 2018
Package: 05/01/2018, E-Mail from C. Jacobs/Dsfm to S. Jurek Monticello Exemption: NRC Clarification Questions on RAI#1 Responses
Project stage: Request
L-MT-18-034, Supplement to Exemption Request for Nonconforming Dye Penetrant Examinations of Dry Shielded Canisters (Dscs) 11 Through 15 (CAC No. 001028, EPID L-2017-LLE-00292018-05-31031 May 2018
Supplement to Exemption Request for Nonconforming Dye Penetrant Examinations of Dry Shielded Canisters (Dscs) 11 Through 15 (CAC No. 001028, EPID L-2017-LLE-0029
Project stage: Supplement
ML18248A1212018-09-13013 September 2018
Federal Register Notice: Exemption; Issuance - Xcel Energy, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Project stage: Other
ML18262A3782018-09-20020 September 2018
Letter to T.Oconnor Exemption from Certain Provisions of 10 CFR 72.212 and 72.214 - Storage Standardized NUHOMS Dry Shielded Canisters 11-15 at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Isfsi(Cac No.001028, Dockets 72-58 and 50-263, EPID L-2017-L
Project stage: Approval
2018-04-05
[Table View] |
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PRA RAI 1. Risk informed implementation of TSTF-563 TSTF-563 is changing the language in the Technical Specification Definitions regarding surveillances for Channel Calibration, Channel Functional Test, Channel Operational Test, and Trip Actuating Device Operational Test. This program will allow revision to the current surveillance requirements by allowing the licensee to adjust surveillances based on any components or group of components within the definition. This appears to change the surveillance requirement and or the process for testing channel components. a) Summarize how component groupings will be selected such that the failure likelihood, and hence the appropriate surveillance interval, is applicable to the selected group (i.e., there are no unreliable components contained within a reliable group). b) How is this change to be included within the NEI 04-10 risk-informed framework? I. Can the effect of the proposed changes be reflected in the current approaches for modelling actuation signals in PRA? If not, how can the PRA models be adopted to measure the effect on risk to provide usable input into risk-informed decision making? II. If the PRA cannot currently, and cannot be modified to, reflect the effect on risk, (1) justify how this proposal is consistent with risk-informed decision making and (2) explain how the acceptable changes to the interval and/or the requirements will be selected.