05000387/LER-2016-011, Regarding Valve Inoperability for a Period Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications

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Regarding Valve Inoperability for a Period Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications
ML16137A021
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/16/2016
From: Franke J
Susquehanna, Talen Energy
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PLA-7476 LER 16-011-00
Download: ML16137A021 (4)
v • d • e


LER-2016-011, Regarding Valve Inoperability for a Period Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
3872016011R00 - NRC Website
v • d • e

text

MAY 1 6 2016 Jon A. Franke Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC Site Vice President 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.2904 Fax 570.542.1504 Jon.Franke@TalenEnergy.com U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2016-011-00 UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 PLA-7476 TALEN ~

ENERGY 10 CFR 50.73 Docket No. 50-387 Attached is Licensee Event Repmi (LER) 50-3 87/2016-011-00. This LER reports an event involving the inoperability of specific isolation valves for a period longer than allowed by Technical Specifications. This event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition which was prohibited by plant Technical Specifications.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

tains no new regulatory commitments.

Attachment: LER 50-387/2016-011-00 Copy:

NRC Region I Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 1013112018 (11-2015) 1¥:~.

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

r* PAGE Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000387 1 of 3

4. TITLE Valve inoperability for a period longer than allowed by Technical Specifications
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 17 2016 2016

- 011
- 00 05 \\Lo

\\[o

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORTIS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:(Check all that apply)

D 20.2201(b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 2o.2201(d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(5)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

~ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in

CAUSE OF EVENT

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000387 YEAR I

2016

3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER
- 011 REV NO.
- 00 Investigation of the valve internals by maintenance personnel revealed the valves were sticking due to interference between the hinge arm and internal seat ring. The condition was resolved by the removal of the excess hinge arm material causing the interference. A condition report was generated to determine the cause(s) of the event; preliminary results indicate the interference was created during the manufacturing process. The same valves on Unit 2 were examined for this cause (preliminary extent of condition) and were determined to not be affected by this manufacturing defect.

ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

There were no actual safety consequences that occurred as a result of this event.

A review of surveillance test results obtained from the redundant valves each in series with 141 F039A and 141 F039B revealed no issues. The quantified leakage from these redundant valves ( 141818A and 1418188; EllS code ISV) obtained during testing in both 2014 and 2016 was well below administrative limits. Therefore, the safety function of these valves was maintained during the period in question.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Completed corrective actions include reworking the valves and performing post maintenance Leak Rate Testing (which confirms valve closure) to restore operability. Results from the causal analysis will be reviewed and additional corrective actions will be generated as required.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None NRC FORM 366 (11 -2015)

MAY 1 6 2016 Jon A. Franke Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC Site Vice President 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.2904 Fax 570.542.1504 Jon.Franke@TalenEnergy.com U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2016-011-00 UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 PLA-7476 TALEN ~

ENERGY 10 CFR 50.73 Docket No. 50-387 Attached is Licensee Event Repmi (LER) 50-3 87/2016-011-00. This LER reports an event involving the inoperability of specific isolation valves for a period longer than allowed by Technical Specifications. This event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition which was prohibited by plant Technical Specifications.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

tains no new regulatory commitments.

Attachment: LER 50-387/2016-011-00 Copy:

NRC Region I Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 1013112018 (11-2015) 1¥:~.

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

r* PAGE Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000387 1 of 3

4. TITLE Valve inoperability for a period longer than allowed by Technical Specifications
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 17 2016 2016

- 011
- 00 05 \\Lo

\\[o

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORTIS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:(Check all that apply)

D 20.2201(b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 2o.2201(d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(5)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

~ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit 1 - Mode 5, 0 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 - Mode 1, 100 percent Rated Thermal Power

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

2. DOCKET NUMBER
3. LER NUMBER 05000387 YEAR I

SEQUENTIAL I

REV NUMBER NO.

2016

- 011
- 00 Unit 1 was in Mode 5 for a planned 24 month refueling cycle outage.

There were no structures, systems, or components inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event, except as described below.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 17 and 19, 2016, two (2) safety related check valves would not properly close during surveillance testing. The valves subject of this LER (141F039A, 141F039B; EllS code ISV) provide a boundary between water in the Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) and Feedwater (FW) Systems. They are both swing check valves designed to close and isolate the reactor vessel and primary containment from the RWCU system.

Additionally, the 'A' valve functions to prevent diversion of RCIC injection flow away from the reactor vessel; the 'B' valve performs the same function for HPCI.

During the 2016 performance of the surveillance to verify Local Leak Rate Test (Appendix J requirements) values were within required limits, the valves were discovered to be open when expected to be closed.

Despite this, the As-Found Minimum Path Criteria to meet Appendix J requirements were not exceeded.

Correction of this condition was required to meet As-Left test requirements.

These valves were newly installed during the 2014 refueling outage. During initial post installation surveillance testing, the test volume(s) would not pressurize, indicating the valves were not seated. Rapid pressuization and depressurization was used to simulate dynamic flow to close the valves by normal means.

The valves were tested following the exercising and met As-Left criteria.

Investigation of the valve internals by maintenance personnel following testing in 2016 revealed interference between the hinge arm and internal seat ring was causing the valves to stick open.

This Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications based on evidence that the valves were not in the fully closed position prior to discovery of the condition. Specifically, the need for the valves to be closed is a requirement deliniated in TS 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs).

NRC FORM 366 (11-2015)

CAUSE OF EVENT

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000387 YEAR I

2016

3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL I NUMBER
- 011 REV NO.
- 00 Investigation of the valve internals by maintenance personnel revealed the valves were sticking due to interference between the hinge arm and internal seat ring. The condition was resolved by the removal of the excess hinge arm material causing the interference. A condition report was generated to determine the cause(s) of the event; preliminary results indicate the interference was created during the manufacturing process. The same valves on Unit 2 were examined for this cause (preliminary extent of condition) and were determined to not be affected by this manufacturing defect.

ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

There were no actual safety consequences that occurred as a result of this event.

A review of surveillance test results obtained from the redundant valves each in series with 141 F039A and 141 F039B revealed no issues. The quantified leakage from these redundant valves ( 141818A and 1418188; EllS code ISV) obtained during testing in both 2014 and 2016 was well below administrative limits. Therefore, the safety function of these valves was maintained during the period in question.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Completed corrective actions include reworking the valves and performing post maintenance Leak Rate Testing (which confirms valve closure) to restore operability. Results from the causal analysis will be reviewed and additional corrective actions will be generated as required.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None NRC FORM 366 (11 -2015)

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