05000416/LER-2018-005, Secondary Containment Door Misaligned, Due to 1nadequate Criteria, Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
| ML18145A292 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/2018 |
| From: | Emily Larson Entergy Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GNRO-2018/00026 LER 2018-005-00 | |
| Download: ML18145A292 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
| 4162018005R00 - NRC Website | |
text
~~Entergy GNR0-2018/00026 May 25, 2018 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Operations, Inc.
P. 0. Box756 Port Gibson, MS 39150 Eric A. Larson Site Vice President Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
Tel. (601) 437-7500 10CFR50.73
SUBJECT:
Licensee Event Report 2018-005-00, Secondary Containment Door Misaligned, Due to Inadequate Criteria, Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
Dear Sir or Madam:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29 Attached is Licensee Event Report 2018-005-00. This report is being submitted in accordance with 1 OCFR50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
This letter contains no new commitments. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Douglas Neve at 601-437-2103.
Sincerely, Eric A. Larson Site Vice President Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
- - EAL/jw
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Attachment:
Licensee Event Report 2018-005-00 cc: see next page
GNR0-2018/00026 Page 2 of 2 cc:
NRC Senior Resident Inspector Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Port Gibson, MS 39150 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Lisa M. Regner Mail Stop OWFN 8 81 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Kriss Kennedy, NRR/DORL (w2)
Regional Administrator, Region IV 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511
GNR0-2018/00026 Attachment
- Licensee Event Report 2018-005-00
NRC FORM366 (02-2018)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 o'-"f\\ll~Q"(,f i~
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- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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- - 1.-Facmty-Name Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1
- 4. Title
, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not reouired to respond to the information collection.
Secondary Containment Door Misaligned, Due to 1nadequate Criteria, Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
- 5. Event Date
- 6. LER Number
- 7. Report Date
- 8. Other Facilities Involved Sequential Rev Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Month Day Year N/A Number
_No.
- - OSOOON/A 03 30 2018 2018
- - 005
- - 00 05 25 2018 Facility Name Docket Number N/A OSOOON/A
, 9. Operating Mode
- 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requiremen1s of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D s'0.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1 >
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D so.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2) i D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71(a)(5) 100
_J 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(~)(3)(ii)
[81 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a){1)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) o 50.73<a><2><A>
D,50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 0 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) q 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 0 73. 77(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2){i)(C)
O Other {Specify in Abstract below or in 2018
- - 005 Auxiliary Rail Bay Door alignment was restored, and the Secondary Containment Drawdown Surveillance was satisfactorily performed.
Planned actions included in the corrective action program which may be changed in accordance with the program:
Match marks or alignment aids will be added to the door, and referenced in the relevant procedures.
F. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
REV NO.
- - 00 No radiological event occurred during the potential loss of Secondary Containment; therefore, no actual consequences existed.
In addition, a Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) specific wind tunnel test (Colorado wind tl.. ~nnel tests) has demonstrated that a pressure in Secondary Containment greater than three times the result of the UNSAT Secondary Containment Drawdown Surveillance would still be sufficient to prevent leakage of Secondary Containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere. Thus,
. during.a radiological event in this condition, exfiltration would not have occurred, The GGNS Dose Analysis would have been preserved, and the Secondary Containment safety function would have been met. Therefore, no actual or potential safety consequences existed during this event.
Entergy has evaluated this event/condition and determined that it did not result in an actual loss of safety function.
Therefore, in accordance with the guidance provided in NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Section 2.2, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Sub-Section, Safety System Functional Failures, Page 30, Lines 27 through 30; this condition will not be counted as a safety system functional failure against Performance Indicator MS05, Safety System Functional Failures.
G. PREVIOUS SIMILAR OCCURRENCES Over the past three years, there have been two instances where air flow around the Auxiliary Rail Bay Door was identified, one on December 12, 2017, and one on February 5, 2018. On December 12, 2017, the door was subsequently found slightly misaligned, and on February 5, 2018, no cause was identified. Neither of these instances resulted in a failed Surveillance or Inoperable Secondary Containment.
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NRC FORM 3668 (02-2018)