05000416/LER-1993-001, :on 930111,discovered That No SRO in CR for Approx 5 Minutes.Caused by Decision of Plant Supervisor to Enter Stairwell.Cr Command Function Will Be Presented as Part of Continuing Training Program for SROs
| ML20128H777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1993 |
| From: | Cottle W, Ruffin R ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GNRO-93-00018, GNRO-93-18, LER-93-001, LER-93-1, NUDOCS 9302170160 | |
| Download: ML20128H777 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
| 4161993001R00 - NRC Website | |
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~U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station F1-137 Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
- - Document Control Desk SU1UECT:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No.-NPF '
No Licensed Senior Reactor Operator in Control: Room.
during Operational-Condition 1 LER 93-001-00 GNRO-93/00018 Gentlemen:
- - Attached-is Licensee Event-Report (LER)93-001 which is-a: Final report.
Yo rs truly, A___ = C/ RR/ at achment cc: Mr. D. C. Hintz (w/a) Mr. R. H..Bernhard -(w/a) Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/a) ?
- - Mr.--N.
S. Reynolds-(w/a): L Mr.'H. L.: Thomas l:(w/o)- ML.' Stewart D. Ebneter.(w/a) Regional: Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission I Region-IIL
- -101 - Marietta St.,.
- N.W., Suite 2900' Atlanta,cGeorgia '30323 Mr.'P./W.HO'Connor-OfficeLof: Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission-Mail-Stop_13H3- '
~ Washington,-D.C..'20555 .,l 1170noni 1 I joS**I DA'
3 Attachment to CNRO-93/00018 d 47.C' Fe* = 364 U 5 atVCLE AR RtGULATO3Y COMM188 SON _j APPR0vl0 oms 40 31660tM LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ' ' *"' 8 ' m' DOCast NvMs4R Q6 FAGE G f A.C6 LIT V N AME 01. Grand Gulf Nuclear Station o151olo101411 % 1 lorl 015 fl1LE 4' No Licensed SRO in Control Room during Operational Condition 1 EVENT DATI (6+ LtANUutta @ Of* ORT DAf f t?$ OTHER F AC6tifitt iNVOLvtD tai MONT w Dav ytan ytan 58,Q eM WONtn Der vtaa FAChefv hawls. DOCD ET Nuwstmill 'A' 0 1610101 0;-; ; 0l1 1l1 9 3 d3 0l0l1
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u.~,> nu o,,,,,,,,, "*'+ 1 a.o i.i n ecsi.i so n nau 3 7:Tu, u nosi.inna w m aini a raiun,i ra m. y 1 .m, .o.mia, o,mion, g =.37,g 1i00 n., n ea. inn.> 3 so rmiano so n iouunAi suo n .in n,.i u n..iaim ,wiau n., 26 ao64aldHvl 50.73mlGHial te nieH2Hal LICENSEE CONTACT FOR YMit LEt H2) Navt TELapMcNG Nuvelm ARE A C004 Riley Ruffin, Licensing Specialist 61011 41 317 I -1 211 16 17 COM*LEf t ONE LINE Fon E ACH CouPONENT P Altunt DE8CR 040 IN TMis atPosti itse $C 'h*p$,,"f[I "($'g,"E R h'o,",*,'NI 0 CAv58 Sv1TIV COM*0NENT Cav54 S Y STtw Cov'ONENT 'l I I l I I I ,I ? I I i i i l l I l I l l I l l i i l l SUMLEVENT AL RfPORY 5**ECTto H4) MONTM Day vtan Svtu tSSION YE5 He es temenere RX*tCTEC $v0MfS3rCM Da tti NO { l l r 8.31T M ACY 4 ra,r to 74X anecer a e, seeroemre r Namen.spe spece eveeentie #,n, nei On January 11, 1993 at approximately 0050 CST, a disturbance was
- - heard outside of the control room. The sounds-of-distress were thought to be a woman celling for help.
Two of_the three licensed reactor operators (RO), along.With_the licensed senior reactor operator' (SRO) went.to-the control. room-door to investigate the. matter. The -- remaining RC. stayed at - the'- reactor controls. The SRO stepped into-the stairwell.to intervene in the disturbance. After the SRO was in the stairwell, the control room operator at the door stepped back into the control room and-- allowed the door to close. The control room was without an SRO for approximately 5 minutes. Plant conditions _ did not change during the time the control' room was without.an SRO.. Therefore, this occurrence did not compromise the health and safety of the public.
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Reportable. Occurrence On January =11, 1993 at approximately 0050 hours, the only licensed SRO in the control room, at that time, left the-control room area. This resulted in no SRO being in the control room area while in Operational Condition 1. This was a violation of 10 CFR 50.54 (m) (2) (iii). Additionally, this was a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) 3 6.2.2.b. The occurrence is being reported pursuant to-10 CFR-50.73 (a) (2) (1) (B). B. Initial Conditions The plant was operating - in Operational Condition 1 at approximately 100 percent thermal power. Reactor pressure was 1027 psig and indicated temperature was 531 degrees ~F. The Shif t Superintendent and Shift Supervisor (both SROs) had turned-over the Control Room Command Function to the Plant Supervisor (also an-SRO) and left the control room area. The-P1 ant supervisor was aware of plant status and understood the responsibilities of the ' command function. C. Description of Occurrence On January 11, 1993 at approximately 0050 CST,_a' disturbance was heard outside of the control room. The sounds of distress seemed to be coming from_the east side of the control room. The sounds were thought to be.a woman calling-for help.
- Twc, of the three licensed -ROs, along with-the Plant-Supervisor, went - to the east door-- of the control room to investigate the matter. The remaining RO stayed at the reactor controls.- Control room personnel-at ' the - east door called twice,-however no verbal response was hearQ.
Outside of the east control room door is a stairwell which is considered a part of_the radiological controlled area. Of the three control room -personnel investigating the disturbance, only the plant supervisor had self-indicating-dosimetry. Therefore, the plant supervisor stepped. into the - stairwell with intentions to --intervene -in the disturbance. Once the plant. supervisor'was in the stairwell, the control._ room operator.at the door' stepped back into the control room-and' allowed the door to - close., The plant supervisor - made - verbal contact with the individuals and confirmed that the. situation was under control. o* . u. -~ < 7
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Pa " LLL "JVJE Grand Gulf Nuclear Station o y0 l0 l0 l4 l 1l6 9[ 3 0l0l1 0l0 0l3 of 0] 5 sw w n, au. m neua. w r on Following confirmation of the situation, the plant supervisor realized that he was outside the control room, inside the radiologically controlled area and the control room operators had returned inside the control room and allowed the door to close. The plant supervisor did not attempt to enter the control room without being processed through the llealth Physics Lab (11P). Therefore, the plant supervisor immediately went to HP, processed through the personnel contamination monitor and returned to the control room. Upon investigating the incident, it was determined that a female security officer was trapped in the room above the control room due to Door OC619 not opening when the palm switch was depressed. This room is directly above the control room and within the control room envelope. The only separation between the room and the control room is a f alse ceiling. Once the officer realized she was trapped, she began to call for help, while pounding on the door. The security of ficer outside the room did not immediately hear the person from within. Ilowever, control room personnel were able to hear the calls of distress through the false ceiling. This immediately alarmed control room personnel. The trapped officer did not attempt to transmit via portable radio due to being within the control room envelope area and transmitting via the radio possibly could have caused erratic instrument behavior in the control room and a possible plant transient. The control room was without an SRO for approximately 5 minutes. This is a violation of Administrative Procedure 01-S-06-02, " Conduct of Operations"; Section 6.2.2.b of GGNS TS, " Unit Staff"; the " Table Notations" for TS Table 6.2.2-1, in addition to 10 CFR 50. 54 (m) (2) (iii). Plant deficiency reports were initiated as a result of these violations. Plant conditions did not change during the time the control I room was without an SRO. D. Apparent cause A subsequent investigation determined that the event was caused by the decision of the plant supervisor to enter the stairwell. =ac n a- => ..us wo w o m su m CAD
~. . Attackhment to' GNRO-93/00018.' p v s evettan maovtatoxy couuission % unc tem assa * ~ 4P,aovto ove so mo-oio4 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION. - (MPiet$. # 31'88 '- Ducast Nvwee n m . ten Nuutta te> PAGE131 PActuiv Naut,tti. 'f'" " U U f' 7MeTU Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 0 l5 l0 l 0 l o l 4 l 1l 6 93 0 l0 0l 4 OF O l5 0l0l1 TEXT fJ awe spese e regido( vse causamsf 44C 7erva 3864 DJ MM The reaction of. tho - plant supervisor resulted from the perceived urgency of the situation. The decision won made by the plant' supervisor to personally aid plant perso.,#1 whose safety he judged to be in danger. The decision to ht another person under the ~ fear of ~ bodily harm was a perss value judgment on the part of the plant supervisor. Two causal factors were also identified during the investigation. The plant supervisor felt he'was still in the control room as long as he was not isolated by a closed door. Additionally, the plant supervisor was the only individual in the control room at the-time of ' occurrence who had self-indicating dosimetry. k i other factors which aided in the decision making process were determined to be: 1) the trapped security officer's behavior gave a false impression of imminent urgency, 2) scenarios of this type have not been addressed by operations Management. E. ' Corrective Action Meetings were held with SROs by Operations. Management to convey their expectations of SRos and the role of the control room command function-including a-review of Management Standards and Administrative procedure " Conduct of Operations" regarding the " Control Room Command Function." Appropriate operations personnel were made aware of the event and-the reculting radiological and administrative deficiencies exhibited. Security personnel reviewed the event: emphasizing professionalism and expectations for future actions that would preclude a similar circumstance. The " Control Room Command Function" will be presented as a. part of the continuing training. program for SRos. The plant supervisor involved was disciplined by Operations-Managemeim. m . essic tonsa assa + 0.$ GPo 1986 o 434 6W$6 - W
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Safety Assessment
During the absence of an SRO in'the control room, there was a full complement of licensed reactor--operators present. There was no change in operating parameters during this time. The SRO was out of the control room approximately five minutes. The SRO designated as the Shif t Superintendent had a portable radio and control room - personnel were aware of this fact. There was an operator at the controls at all times during this event. The occurrence did not compromise the safety of the public at anytime. 5 .u a oro isee+en smess goeam =4 - }}