05000327/LER-1980-047-01, /01T-0:on 800513,two Support Members Found to Be Reversed for Hangers.Caused by Confusion of Side by Side Lines During Installation & Subsequent Reversal.Supports Removed & Reinstalled in Proper Orientation

/01T-0:on 800513,two Support Members Found to Be Reversed for Hangers.Caused by Confusion of Side by Side Lines During Installation & Subsequent Reversal.Supports Removed & Reinstalled in Proper Orientation

ML19312E218
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/27/1980
From:	Swearingen J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19312E216	List: 05000327/LER-1980-047, Forwards LER 80-047/01T-0 05000327/LER-1980-047-01, /01T-0:on 800513,two Support Members Found to Be Reversed for Hangers.Caused by Confusion of Side by Side Lines During Installation & Subsequent Reversal.Supports Removed & Reinstalled in Proper Orientation
References
IEB-79-14, LER-80-047-01T, LER-80-47-1T, NUDOCS 8006030490
Download: ML19312E218 (2)

LER-1980-047, /01T-0:on 800513,two Support Members Found to Be Reversed for Hangers.Caused by Confusion of Side by Side Lines During Installation & Subsequent Reversal.Supports Removed & Reinstalled in Proper Orientation

Event date:
Report date:
3271980047R01 - NRC Website

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Tennessee Valley Authority pequoyah Nuclear Plant LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION SQRO-50-327/ 8047 Technical Specification Involved:

3.5.2 Reported Under Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.1 Date of~ Occurrence: 5/13/80 Time of Occurrence: 1000 EDT Unit 1 Identification and Description of Occurrence Support 1-SIH-86 and 1-SIH-315 were inadvertently reversed during installation.

Seismic analysis indicates that the pipe that runs from safety injection pump B to the hot leg of reactor coolant loop could fail during a seismic event causing a degradation of performance in train B of SIS.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Unit 1 was in mode 3.

Action Specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Met Due to Inoperable Equipment l

The supports were returned to proper orientation within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> per action statement 3.5.2.

Further analysis of the break location indicates that this technical specification (3.5.2) was not violated.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence i

The two lines involved are side-by-side.

When the support was installed, the identity of the two lines was confused, and the support was inadvertently reversed.

Analysis of Occurrence The location of the proposed break was on the 4-inch line that runs from the safety injection pump B to the hot legs (imps 2 and 4) of the reactor coolant system.

This break is just upstream of the 4-inch to 2-inch reducer and is isolable from the reactor coolant system by two check valves. This break is also isolated from train B safety injection pump by normally shut flow control valve FCV 63-157.

Therefore,-both trains of safety injection system can meet 'their primary function of injecting water from the refueling water storage tanks to the four cold loops of the reactor-using both train A and B of safety injection pumps. This brefs will cause a' loss of capability to inject water in j

the hot leg of kops 2 and 4.

This lineup'is used to prevent baron stratification.

t This analysis indicates that this location of the break does not violate Technical Specification 3.5.2.

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Corrective Action

The supports were removed and then reinstalled in the proper orientation.

Failure Data N/A.