05000327/LER-1981-059-01, /01T-0:on 810428,auxiliary Bldg Gas Treatment Sys Inoperable.Caused by Railroad Door to Cask Loading Area Being Open W/O Personnel Present,Due to Misinterpretation of Procedural Control.Door Closed.Personnel Reinstructed

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/01T-0:on 810428,auxiliary Bldg Gas Treatment Sys Inoperable.Caused by Railroad Door to Cask Loading Area Being Open W/O Personnel Present,Due to Misinterpretation of Procedural Control.Door Closed.Personnel Reinstructed
ML20004F022
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1981
From: Kirk G
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20004F018 List:
References
LER-81-059-01T, LER-81-59-1T, NUDOCS 8106160404
Download: ML20004F022 (2)


LER-1981-059, /01T-0:on 810428,auxiliary Bldg Gas Treatment Sys Inoperable.Caused by Railroad Door to Cask Loading Area Being Open W/O Personnel Present,Due to Misinterpretation of Procedural Control.Door Closed.Personnel Reinstructed
Event date:
Report date:
3271981059R01 - NRC Website

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The anyti-0 ToTTI l Unit 1 in modu 4 with RCS tannerature and oranance at f"5Ti'l I isrv buildina nas trestment system was inonerable due to the railroad door to the c'a I

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lhiTi'l I necessary to do so.' This event is reportable under 6.9.1.12.b.

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'ER SUPPLEMENTAL WFORMATION l

SQRO-50-327/81059 Technical Specification Involved:

3.7.8.1 Reported Under Technical Specification:

6.9.1.12.b Date of Cccurrence: 4/28/81 Time of Occurrence: 1200 CDT Identification and Description of Occurrence:

The auxiliary building gas treatment system was inoperable due to the rail-road door to the cask loading area being open without personnel present to close the door if it became necessary to do so.

This event was originally evaluated as nonreportable, but subsequent reevaluation by plant management on June 2, 1981, determined the event reportable under 6.9.1.12.b.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in node 4 with RCS temperature and pressure at 3400F and 1100 psig.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

l The procedural control which required personnel to be present at the door when it is open was misinterpreted. The interpretation was based on a NRR special exception allowing the auxiliary building to containment

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equipment access door to be opened' during unit 2 construction provided the door could be closed within 10 minutes if required. This was unappropriately applied to the auxiliary building railroad door.

Analysis of Occurrence:

SQRO-50-327/80184 indicated that with the auxiliary building railroad door open, the 4-inch H O vacuum required for ABGTS operability could 2

not be maintained. Following this first event, a caution tag was placed on the door to require r.n operator to be present when the door was opened.

Corrective Action

The door was closed upon discovery. Personnel have been reinstructed to remain at the door while it is open. Modifications, repair work, and testing are being performed to ensure the k-inch H O vacuum can be maintained when the 2

railroad door is opened. This work will be completed prior to Unit 2 fuel load which is currently scheduled for June 21, 1981.