05000220/LER-1981-036-01, /01T-0:on 810729,during Followup Investigation of Ler,Technician Bypassed Sys 11 & 12 High Radiation & Emergency Condenser High Steam Flow Isolation Function, Violating Tech Spec.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedure

/01T-0:on 810729,during Followup Investigation of Ler,Technician Bypassed Sys 11 & 12 High Radiation & Emergency Condenser High Steam Flow Isolation Function, Violating Tech Spec.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedure

ML20010C733
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	08/12/1981
From:	Neild R NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20010C731	List: 05000220/LER-1981-036, Forwards LER 81-036/01T-0 05000220/LER-1981-036-01, /01T-0:on 810729,during Followup Investigation of Ler,Technician Bypassed Sys 11 & 12 High Radiation & Emergency Condenser High Steam Flow Isolation Function, Violating Tech Spec.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedure
References
LER-81-036-01T, LER-81-36-1T, NUDOCS 8108200359
Download: ML20010C733 (3)

LER-1981-036, /01T-0:on 810729,during Followup Investigation of Ler,Technician Bypassed Sys 11 & 12 High Radiation & Emergency Condenser High Steam Flow Isolation Function, Violating Tech Spec.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedure

Event date:
Report date:
2201981036R01 - NRC Website

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES on 6/30/81 during a routine calibration of the Emergency Condenser Vent Monitors, all four monitors exceeded the upscale trip set point.

This incident was previously reported as LER 81-30.

On 7/29/81, while per-forming a followup investigation of this incident, the technician re-quested permission f rom the Shif t Supervisor to work on Emergency Con-denser Vent Monitor #122. In order to prevent an inadvertent system isolation during the trouble shcoting effort, the #12 Syster. high radiation isolation function was bypassed using a keylock switah.

In addition, as a precaution against a possible personnel error, tae #11 system high radiation isolation function was bypassed in the same manner.

These switches also bypass the Emergency Condenser High Steam flow system isolation function. The isolation functions were bypassed for approxi-mately 30 minutes, at which time #11 Emergency Condenser was returned to normal. The isolation functions of #12 Emergency Condenser remained in bypass for an additional 15 minutes. These actions were in violation of Technical Specification Table 3.6.2c which specifies the minimum number of tripped or operable systems and the minimum number of operable instru-ment channels per operable trip system required for Emergency Cooling System Operability.

The heat removing capability of the Emergency Condenser remained operable throughout the incident. However, the protective system isolation signals of ligh steam flow and high radiation were inoperable.

There was no release of radioactivity, and no effect on the health and safety of the

public or plant personnel.

CAUSE, DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Violation of Technical Specifications during this event was caused by failure to follow station Administrative Procedures.

Present procedures call for maintaining records in the control room of all equipment scatus changes which may render the equipnent or system not capable of performing its intended function in its required manner.

The procedures further require that these status changes or the placement of jumpers or blocks shall include reference to the applicable Technical Specifications.

All operating, tech-nical, and maintenance personnel are instructed on P'ese procedures as they apply to their duties.

An discussed at the Management meeting in the Region I office, that during primary and requalification instruction sessions an increased emphasis will be placed on the importance of the rationale in Technical Specifications.

Also during the meeting, we discussed the fact that the investigation of this event and the two previous occurrences Inspection 80-13 and LER 81-04, was still continuing.

This investigation revealed, from operator feed-back, that previous training has failed to emphasize that both the LCO's for a given system, and the LCO's for instrumentation, which may initiate or isolate a given system, must be referred to whenever component failures cccur or when maintenance or testing is to take place on that system.

Failure to check both sections of the Technical Specifications may be the cause of itadvertant Technical Specification violations. Training will place increasedemphasis on this matter.

Also a component oriented cross-

a August 12, 1981 Page Two reference system will be developed as an aid to readily access all portions of Technical Specifications wh'.ch may directly or indirectly pertain to the operability or ncn-operability of all safety-related components or systems.