05000364/LER-1981-034-03, /03L-0:on 810809,train a Boron Injection Tank Heat Tracing Had Been Inoperable Since 810711.Caused by Personnel Error.Supply Breaker Had Been Tagged Out for Replacement of Burned Out Heater on 810711

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/03L-0:on 810809,train a Boron Injection Tank Heat Tracing Had Been Inoperable Since 810711.Caused by Personnel Error.Supply Breaker Had Been Tagged Out for Replacement of Burned Out Heater on 810711
ML20010G639
Person / Time
Site: Farley 
Issue date: 09/09/1981
From: Hairston W
ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20010G635 List:
References
LER-81-034-03L-01, LER-81-34-3L-1, NUDOCS 8109220342
Download: ML20010G639 (2)


LER-1981-034, /03L-0:on 810809,train a Boron Injection Tank Heat Tracing Had Been Inoperable Since 810711.Caused by Personnel Error.Supply Breaker Had Been Tagged Out for Replacement of Burned Out Heater on 810711
Event date:
Report date:
3641981034R03 - NRC Website

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&1 G3 EVEN T DATE 74 A130ATOATE 33 cVENT DESCPIPTICN AND PRCEABLE CcN3E';UENCES jo a0 j l At 0045 on 8-9-81, while performing FNP-2-STP-13.0 (Boron Injection Tank Heat Tracina I

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m ; Operability Test), it was discovered that the "A" Train BIT heat tracing was inoperable, l

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i i o ! IThis event war due to personnel error.

Durino the oerformance of the surveillance test.

I litwasdeterminedthatthe[supplybreakerforthe"A"TrainBITheattracinqforthetank i

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! ii W1) theaters had been tagged out for replacement of burned out heaters on 7-11-81.

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i linvolved in issuing the Tagging Order did not recognize this as an LCO Event. As a resuit, ;

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1l LER #8_l-034/03L-0 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Cont'd) were greater than or equal to 145 F every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> was not met.

However, the surveillance test was performed at 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> intervals and the flow path temperature did not decrease below the Tech. Spec. minimum of 145 F.

Following necessary repairs and the successful completion of FNP-2-STP-13.0, the "A" Train BIT heat tracing was returned to service at 1330 on 8-9-81.

Parsonnel involved in the t g ging out of this BIT heater have been counseled concerning this incident. This incident will also be discussed in licensed operator requalification training.

(NOTE:

Heat tracing for the remaining portion of the "A" train recirculi ion piping was in service during this incident.)