05000261/LER-1982-017-01, /01L-0:on 821104,w/unit at 80% Power,Operator Discovered Isolation Valve Tank Isolation Valve Closed.Cause Undetermined.Valve Locked Open & Procedures Changed to Ensure That Valve Remains Open

/01L-0:on 821104,w/unit at 80% Power,Operator Discovered Isolation Valve Tank Isolation Valve Closed.Cause Undetermined.Valve Locked Open & Procedures Changed to Ensure That Valve Remains Open

ML20028B069
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	11/17/1982
From:	Cox H CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20028B063	List: 05000261/LER-1982-017, Forwards LER 82-017/01L-0 05000261/LER-1982-017-01, /01L-0:on 821104,w/unit at 80% Power,Operator Discovered Isolation Valve Tank Isolation Valve Closed.Cause Undetermined.Valve Locked Open & Procedures Changed to Ensure That Valve Remains Open
References
LER-82-017-01L, LER-82-17-1L, NUDOCS 8211290421
Download: ML20028B069 (2)

LER-1982-017, /01L-0:on 821104,w/unit at 80% Power,Operator Discovered Isolation Valve Tank Isolation Valve Closed.Cause Undetermined.Valve Locked Open & Procedures Changed to Ensure That Valve Remains Open

Event date:
Report date:
2611982017R01 - NRC Website

text

NRc F07.M 366 U. S. NUCLE AR RECUL ATORY COMMISSION l

(1]!)

e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT a

CONTROL BLOCK: l l

l l

l l lh (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6

lS lc la IB lR l2 Igl 0l 01 -l 010l 010l 01 -l 0 l 0 l@l 4 l 1 l 1 l 1l 1l@l l,jg o i 7

8 9 lirFNSEE CODE 14 16 LICENSE NUMBEH 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO

$7 LAT 58 CON'T 3$RC 1 Lhl0 l5 l0 l0 l0 l2 l6 l1 @l 1l 1l 0 l 4l 8l 2 @l 1l 1l 1l 7l 8 l 2 l@

O 1 7

8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h l On Novenber 4,1982, at approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, with the unit at 80% power, a l

o 2 [og3; l licensed operator discovered the Isolation Valve Seal Water (IVSW) tank isolation l

l valve, IVSW-12, closed.

This event resulted in operation less conservative than the l

o 4

(

l 1 east conservative Limiting Condition for Operation as defined by Tech. Spec. 3.3.6.2 l o 3 l which is reportable pursuant to 6.9.2.a.2.

Since the IVSW system is not considered inl o e jol7j l the FSAR safety analyses, there was no threat to the public health and safety.

l I O IR I I I

C DE CODE SUBC E COMPONENT COOE SUSCODE SU E

[ S l D l@ [Aj@ [Bj@ l V l A l L l V l E l X l@ {@ ] @

O 9 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEOUE NTI AL OCCUR R E NCE REPORT REVISION LE R HO EVENT YE AR REPORT NO.

CODE TYPE O.

O agg:;

18l2l

[__j l 0l 1l 7l g

l0l1l l Ll g

y s

_ 21 22 23 24 26 27 M

73 30 31 32 TAKEN ACT ON ON L PT M T HOURS 22 S8 IT D FOR LEjg[J4Gj g [35Zjg [Zjg l 0l 0l 0l l

QJg g

lSElg l MhUFdCTTl R0lg US.

SUP j

JJ M

3#

40 48 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l 3 j o l lIVSW-12 was immediately opened, and a valve lineup was performed to verify all IVSW l

l sys tem valve positions.

No discrepancies were found.

Ef forts to determine how I

i i l the valve was closed were unsuccessful.

IVSW-12 has been locked open, and l

, 7 l applicable procedures have been changed to ensure the valve remains locked in l

, 3 l the proper position. These actions are considered suf ficient to prevent recurrence.

l 3 4 7

8 9 80 SA S

% POWER oTHE R ST ATUS DISCO Y

DISCOV E RY DESCRIPTION [F_j h l 0] 8l 0l @ l N/A l

W @l OPERATOR OBSERVATION l

i 5

" A TlVITY C TENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY @ I RELEASED OF RELE ASE LOCATION oF RELEASE L_d @ LzJ@l N/A l

N/A l

i o PE nSONNE1 E,POs&S DESCRiPT,0~@

~UMeE n Tm l 01010 l@LzJ@l N/A l

i 2 PEPSO~NiLImunS DESCR,PTiO~@

~UyeER 10 l 0101@l N/A l

i R 7

8 9 11 12 LOSS OF OH DAMAGE TO FACILITY h3 8211Q7Q421 QQ}((7 80

,~,

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

v PDR aDOCK 05000261 LzJ@l N/A s

eda I

i o 1

8 9 10 80 ISSUdE @ DESCRIPTION Li l

N/A i

1111111111illi 2 o 7

8 9 10 68 69 80 &

owa M T. h NAME OF PREPARER PHONE:

e e

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR 4

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 82-017 I.

Cause Description and Analysis On November 4,1982, at approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, with the unit at 80%

power, a licensed operator discovered the Isolation Valve Seal Water l

(IVSW) tank isolation valve closed. This discovery was made during an investigation of potential IVSW system leakage.

Investigation of this event determined that the valve was in an open i

position on October 18, 1982, and that the valve was closed on either J

Octobe r 19, 1982, or October 20, 1982.

Interviews with all involved personnel have been completed, but it could not be determined how the valve was closed.

This event resulted in operation less conservative than the 1er.st conservative Limiting Condition for Operation as defined by Technical Specification 3.3.6.2 which is reportable pursuant to 6.9.2.a.2.

j The IVSW system is a seal system which provides exemption from type "C" testing as defined in 10CFR50 Appendix J and provides assurance that, should an accident occur, the containment leak rate would be lower than that assumed in the FSAR.

However, no credit is taken for the operation j

of this system in the calculation of of f-site accident doses and, thus, there was no threat to the public health and safety.

II.

Corrective Action

i The licensed operator, who discovered the IVSW tank isolation valve to be closed, immediately opened the valve which restored the system to an operable status. A valve lineup was subsequently performed to verify that all IVSW system valves were in the proper position. No dis-crepancies were found.

III. Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence The IVSW tank isolation valve, IVSW-12, has been added to the lock valve list, Standing Order 14, and locked open.

This action will prevent inadve rt ent closing of the valve. The IVSW system valve lineup, OP-45A, has also been revised to require IVSW-12 to be locked open, and to require double verification of valve position for the entire lineup. While these actions are considered suf ficient to prevent recurrence, this incident will be reviewed in detail with appropriate personnel to ensure they fully appreciate the potential seriousness of this event.

This review will be complete by December 1,1982.

l i