ML20151Y873
| ML20151Y873 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1988 |
| From: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Roche M GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8808290071 | |
| Download: ML20151Y873 (2) | |
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=s AUG 2 2 1988 Docket No. 50-219 GPU Nuclear Corporation ATTN: Mr. M. B. Roche Vice-President and Director Quality and Radiological Control 1 Upper Pond Road Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Post Exercise Assessment of the May 12, 1987 Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant Exercise of the Radiological Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and 16 Municipalities Enclosed is the subject assessment dated December 10, 1987 with transmittal memorandum from Richard W. Krinin dated July 11, 1988, in which FEMA considers offiste radiological emergency preparedness adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
If you have any questions concerning the enclosure, please contact Ed Fox of my staff at (215) 337-5044.
Sincerely, Original Si Stewart D.gned By-Ebneter Stewart D. Ebneter. Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl:
E. Fitzpatrick, Vice President and Director M. Laggart, BWR Licensing Manager Licensing Manager, Oyster Creek Public Document Room (PDR) local Public Document Room (LPDR)
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A !i g MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Congel Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FROM:
Ric ar rimm Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs SUBJEC T:
Exercise Report for the May 12, 1987, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Response (RER)
Plans for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Attached is a copy of the Post Exercise Assessment (PEA) for the May 12,1987, full participation joint exercise of the offsite RER plans for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (0CNGS).
The State of New Jersey, Ocean County and sixteen municipalities partici-pated in the exercise.
The PEA, dated December 10, 1987, Revi sion 1, was prepared by Region 11 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and transmitted to FEMA Headquarters on June 27, 1988.
As a result of deficiencies identified during the exercise, two remedial exercises were conducted.
A reaedial exercise was conducted on June 19, 1987, for the Pinelands Congregate Care Center and on July 22,1987, for the South Toms River Municipal Emergency Operations Center.
The results of the remedial exercises are included in the PEA.
The State Of fice of Emergency Management has also been requested to provide FEMA Region II with a statement of actions taken, or a schedule of corrective actions to be taken, to correct the exercise inadequacies identified as areas re-quiring corrective action ( ARCAs).
Based on the results of the remedial exercises, FEMA considers that off-site radiological emergency preparedness is adequate to provide reason-able assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871.
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POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT Revision 1 May 12,1987 Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and Sixteen Municipalities for GPU Nuclear Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station June 10,1987 Remedial Exercise of the Pinelands Congregate Care Center July 22,1987 Remedial Exercise of the South Toms River Municipal Emergency Operations Center December 10,1987 Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, N.Y.10278
s CONTENTS PARTICIPATING GOVERNM ENTS AND ORG ANIZATIONS......................
v A B B R E VI AT I O N S..........................................................
vi
SUMMARY
................................................................ vill 1 I NT R O D U CT I O N........................................................
1 1.1 Ex e rc ise Bac kgro und................................................
1 1.2 Fede ral Evalua to rs.................................................
2 1.3 Ev aluatio n C ri t e ria.................................................
3 1.4 Ex erc ise Obj ec t ives................................................
4 1.4.1 New Jersey State Emergency Operations Center.................
4 1.4.2 Emergency Operations Facility................................
5 1.4.3 Emergency News Center.....................................
5 1.4.4 State Field Ac tivities........................................
6 1.4.5 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center....................
6 1.4.6 Ocean County Field Activities................................
6 1.4.7 Ocean County Municipal Emergency Operations Centers..........
7 1.5 Ex e rc ise Sc e n ario..................................................
7 1.5.1 Sce nario Overvie w..........................................
7 1.5.2 Description of State and County Demonstrations................
9 1.5.3 Emergency Classification and Event Timeline................... 12 1.5.4 Protective Action Tim eline................................... 12 2 E X E R C IS E EVA L U ATIO N................................................ 15 2.1 Ne w Jersey Sta t e Operations........................................ 15 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center........................... 15 2.1.2 Field Implementation of State Action to Protect the Public.....................................................
20 2.1.3 Ernergency Worker Exposure Control........................... 21 2.2 E m erge ncy Operations Facility....................................... 21 2.3 E m ergency Ne ws Ce nter............................................ 23 2.4 Oc e a n C o u n t y..................................................... 25 2.4.1 Emergency Operations Center................................ 25 2.4.2 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public (including Pinelands Congregate Care Center, Re m edial Exerc ise).......................................... 30 2.4.3 Emergency Worker Exposure Control........................... 38 2.4.4 Ocean County Municipal Response Activities (including South Toms River Re medial Exercise).......................... 39 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION...............................................................
54 4 ST AT U S O F O BJ E C TI V ES................................................ 70 5 R: 40 VAL OF COMPLETED ARCAs FROM PREVIOUS POST EXERCISE
> E S S M E N TS.......................................................... 90 LLL
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l TABLES 1.5.3 Emergency Classification and Event Time Line.......................... 13 1.5.4 Protec tive Ac tion Tim e Line.......................................... 14 3.1 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action, May 12,1987, State of N e w J e rs e y......................................................... 55 3.2 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action, May 12,1987, Emergency Ope ra tio n Fa c ili ty................................................... 58 3.3 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Defielencies and Areas Requiring Correc'tive Action, May 12,1987, Bureau of' N uc l e ar En g i n e e r i ng................................................. 60 3.4 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action, May 12,1987, Ocean County....... 61 3.5 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action, May 12,1987, Ocean County M u ni c i pal i t i e s...................................................... 65 4.1 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Status of Objectives, A ugust 19 8 7, Ne w Jersey State........................................ 71 4.2 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Status of Objectives, August 1987, Emergency Operation Facility............................. 75 4.3 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Status of Objectives, August 1987, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering............................ 78 4.4 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Status of Objectives, August 1987, Radiological Field Monitoring Teams....................... 81 4.5 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Status of Objectives, August 1987, Em ergency News Center................................. 82 4.6 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Status of Objectives, Augus t 1 + 17, Oc e an Coun t y........................................... 83 4.7 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Status of Objectives, August 1987, Ocean County Municipalities.............................. 87 i
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4 Participating Governments The State of New Jersey Ocean County Barnegat Township Barnegat Light Borough Beachwood Borough Berkeley Township Dover Township Harvey Cedars Borough Island Heights Borough Lacey Township Long Beach Township Ocean Township Ocean Gate Porough Pine Beach Borough Seaside Park Borough South Toms River Borough Stafford Township Surf City Borcugh e
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ANL Argonne National Laboratory BERC N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Emergency Response Coordination BNE N.J. Department of Environment Protection, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering 1
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory j
DOA N.J. Department of Agriculture DEP N.J. Department of Environmental Protection DOE U.S. Department of Enerr DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOH N.J. Department of Health DOT U.S. Department Transportation DRD Direct Reading Dosimeters EBS Emergency Broadcast System EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMRAD N.J. Emergency Management Radio EMS Emergency Medical System ENC Emergency News Center EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FCP Forward Command Post FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration v1
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FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GPU General Public Utilities HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory K!
Potassium lodide NAWAS National Warning System NJSP New Jersey Division of State Police NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCEOC Ocean County Emergency Operation Center OCNGS Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station OCSCD Ocean County Sheriff's Communication Division OEM NJSP Office of Emergency Management PAG Protective Action Guide P!O Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Servlee RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water RCS Reactor Coolant System RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan i
SOP Standard Operating Procedure TLD Thermoluminescent Dostmeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture vii
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POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT Revision 2
SUMMARY
NEN JERSEY frrATE OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The State EOC had ten objectives to demonstrate during this exercise, all of which were met. The State EOC had no outstanding areas of performance requiring corrective action (ARCAs). However, during the course of the exercise, four ARCAs were identified. Each of these ARCAs were related to Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages, having to do with message content, message transmission in hard copy, and verification of the content of messages as broadcast to the public and as transmitted to the Emergency News Center (ENC).
However, since content and timing of EBS messages were judged by evaluators at the State 'EOC to be adequate to protect the public, no deficiency resulted from those shortcomings associated with the EBS messages.
The New Jersey State Police Headquarters in West Trenton was notifled of an i
Unusual Event at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station at 1547 and the Alert Notification was received at approximately 1613. This message, as well as subsequent updates, was received and verified in a timely manner.
The New Jersey State Police (NJSP) Office of Emergency Management (OEM) demonstrated the ability to mobillze staff and activated their EOC facility in a timely manner. Notification of EOC staff by the NJSP began immediately after notification of the NJSP by the utility, and activation of the State EOC proceeded smoothly. Activation and call out procedures are in place and were followed effectively. As of 1630 the State EOC was listed as partially activated according to the State EOC event log.
Full staffing occurred at approximately 1900, about 21/2 hours after receipt of the call initiating activation.
l The NJSP OEM fully staffed the State EOC and, in addition to demonstrating a capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> continuous staffing of the State EOC by showing a roster, l
demonstrated a shift change by staffing a second shift during the exercise play. A full complement of staff was present. The first and second shift staff displayed adequate training and knowledge of emergency procedures. During the shift change, incoming staff were briefed as to current status and operations.
All decisions were made promptly in reaction to information provided to the State EOC. The State OEM Deputy Director was clearly in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response. He demonstrated effective leadership at the State EOC.
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l It was observed that the State EOC received notification of the prior declarations of Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency at the Oyster Creek NGS at about 1613,1818, and 1955, respectively. The deelslon to shelter at General Emergency was reached at approximately 1957 and Emergency Planning Areas 1,2,3,4,7,8,11,17,and 18 were chosen and directed to shelter. Sirens were simulated as being sounded as of 2005 and EBS broadcasts were simulated at 2009 and 2013. Status reports and staff meetings were held on a regular and timely basis. Detailed and timely status boards were kept in all work areas with staff in constant radio communication with the command personnel. Security at the State EOC was excellent.
The State EOC facility is physically adequate in all respects.
All primary communications systems were demonstrated.
Commercial telephones were used the majority of the time to transmit and receive information between the State EOC and the Ocean County EOC.
Back up communications included the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services Radios (RACES), NJSP Radlo, Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD), and the National Warning System (NAWAS). A dedicated telephone line was available between the SEOC and the Ocean County EOC.
The SEOC transmitted and logged messages in a timely manner.
The EBS broadcast ordering sheltering was simulated at 2009, about 14 minutes after the receipt of notification of General Emergency at the State EOC. All four EBS messages issued, Including the two with PARS were issued within the 15 minute timeframe. The fz.irth EBS message on the status of the release and potential health impact was simulated (with siren sounding) as a precaution even though it was not required. PAR decisions were made by the Deputy Director af ter consultation with BNE staff. Messages were telefaxed to the Emergency News Center (ENC) on a regular basis.
Flaws in EBS message handling and formulation which could have created confusion for a small portion of the population receiving PARS resulted in requirements for corrective action in future exercises. The PIO activated the EBS by calling WADB, the primary EBS station, via a dedicated telephone !!ne. The PIO had a set of prescripted EBS messages loaded on a word processor that included numerically-coded descriptions of evacuation areas within the EPZ. Management of the coordination of stren activation
.and EBS broadcasts was effectively demonstrated.
The EOC received timely confirmation of both the stren sounding and EBS system activation.
The initial exercise EBS message was a test message and the second was a "no action" drill message associated with the Site Area Emergency, was simulated as being broadcast at 1833 and 1837. The third EBS message whleh recommended sheltering within nine EPAs at the General Emergency was simulated as being broadcast at 2009 and 2013. There was a minor error in the message handling procedure of the sheltering message. This error did not, however, impact on the health or safety of the population snd was corrected as soon as it was noted.
In order to disseminate the sheltering par information to the public within 15 minutes after the decision was made, the original message was faxed to the Ocean j
County EOC (OCEOC), the EBS Gateway Station (WADB), and the Emergency News Center (ENC). This faxed :nessage had the correct information including the designation and description of nine EPAs. Copies of this original message were then made to be 1x
routed in the standard operating procedure, i.e., attached with a message form and sent to the State operations, rumor control, and the support room in the State EOC. It was during this procedure that an error was made in that page two of this message (including designation and description of EPAs 17 and 18) was not copied and only the first page was faxed to OCEOC, WADB, and the ENC. Because the PIO at the State EOC had correctly faxed the original message containing designation and description of all appropriate EPAs, the State both telephonically notified the Ocean County EOC, WADB, and the ENC of the omission of the second page (of the second fax) and followed up with a telefax of this page.
The fourth exercise EBS message, which recommended evacuation of the nine EPAs previously requested to shelter, was simulated as being broadcast at 2108 and 2112. This message failed to include detailed description of evacuation routes. The EBS station was reported by the State to have this information, which, according to the state representative would be automatically added to.the EBS message. Reference to this process was not found in the State Plan. Since no evaluator was at the redlo station, and no record of a message describing evacuation routes was provided to evaluators, it was not possible to evaluate the adequacy of this procedure. The critical EBS evacuation message contents were telephoned to the Ocean County EOC. 'However, no hard copy.of this EBS message was eeceived at the Ocean County EOC.
The last EBS message, released by the State at 2205 during 12e time that the first day exercise simulation was ending, was informational, being designed to reassure the public that, although a release had occurred during evacuation, "no one should have received a significant dose of radiation".
l Prompt and appropriate actions were ordered to control all types of access to the l
contaminated area. Rumor control was successfully demonstrated at the State EOC.
l l
State of New Jersey /Fleid Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public i
The ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area was only partially demonstrated by the two troopers who staffed aceess control points during the exercise. Both troopers arrived at their posts in a timely fashion and had barricades and protective clothing in thalt squad cars.
Both troopers were familiar with the appropelate evacuation route.
Both troopers had appropriate dosimetry equipment and were familiar with proper procedures in the use of dosimetry. Both troopers had potassium lodide (KI), but neither was aware of the proper procedures for authorization to administer KI. Orders were lasued from approximately 2107 to 2110 to have emergency workers simulate taking KI. Organizations with emergency workers required to take Et included the BNE, the NJSP Field OPS, the Coast Guard, the NJSP marine police, Ocean County workers and Ocean County municipal workers In the EPZ.
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New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection - Emergency Operations Facility The Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (BNE) of the State of New Jersey was not assigned objectives for this exercise.
However, through the course of the exercise, corrections of four outstanding Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) were demonstrated.
The BNE was activated and staffed in a timely manner. Communications were established as the BNE arrived and sufficient telephones were ayallable to support emergency operations. The ring down telephone functioned as required. Communications were established rapidly and without delay with the BNE representatives at the State EOC over a dedicated telephone !!ne. All status boards were maintained adequately and In a timely fashion. These status boards and staff briefings were adequate to keep the BNE decision maker apprised of the current situation.
A licensee liaison person and appropria'te technical staff were available at the EOF soon after the ALERT was declared and prior to BNE's arrival. The Director of the Environmental Assessment Command Center (EACC) briefed the BNE staff once they had arrived. An on call person from the EOF Technical Support staff was provided to brief the BNE or to answer any questions that might arise.
Because the facsimile machine used to transmit plant information malfunctioned, information was verbally transmitted by telephone to the Technical Support staff at the EOF and to the State BNE representative. Protective actlon recommendation development was not degraded by this communications problem, and another telephone was known to be available for BNE use if it had proven to be necessary to obtain this data more rapidly.
Emergency News Center (ENC)
The GPU' ENC staff arrived at the ENC at approximately 1635. Staff of the NJSP arrived at 1654. The Ocean County P!O arrived at approximately 1725, the time when the ENC was declared operational by the GPU PIO. The ENC was fully staffed.
Aside from the Ocean County PIO position, all ENC staffers adequate *y explained how second shif t staffing would occur.
Only minor difficulties were observed in getting the ENC operational. Some telephone lines did not work initially and the telecopier could not be started because the GPU staff had not brought the proper plug. The correct plug wm promptly delivered from the OCNGS. During the short time while the telecopler was not operational, the ENC and OCNG8 communicated by telephone. Press belefings were held regularly. Medle kits, with appropriate information, were available. The UPU, State, and County P!Os all performed their jobe in an acceptable, and often excellent manner. The team effort at public Information dissemination worked well. Maps and plant graphics were good, but the EPAs to which evacuatlon and sheltering PARS applied were not distinguished by hatching / coloring and the plume was not plotted.
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4 Ocean County The County Emergency Operations Center mobilized their etaff promptly and eft lclently. Following the call frcm the plant which initiated activation, mobilization procedures were begun. The Sheritf's County Communication Division is the designated Count't Warning Point.
Upon receipt of the notification of Alert, the Sheriff's Department notified the appHeable EOC staff.
The EOC adequately demonstrated the ability te fully stW their facility and maintain continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing through actual shift c.hanget, and presentation of a duty roster of second shift personnel. The shif t change was accomplished in a quick and effielent manner, but most of the incoming staff did not receive suffielent briefings on the current status and activities within their respective agencies.
The Director of the Department of Emergency Services effectively coordinated 4
and managed the EOC activities. Decisions were' appropriately made and the EOC staff was kept involved in the emergency activities.
Although periodic briefings were conducted by the EOC Director, tne Individual agencies were not given an opportunity to verbelly r esent their response activities and status. A copy of the plan was available for refe?ence and each agency had written procedures. All incoming and outgoing messages were logged and distributed as necessary. The communications systems at the EOC are sufficient in providing communication capabilities with all the required personnel and locations. There were some minor problems experienced with some of the communleations systems during the early portions of the exercise. These difficulties were probably caused by a severe thunderstorm occurring as the beginning of the exarcise. The EOC staff demonstrated their ability to respond to an emergency and to support emergency operations in an adequate manner.
The demonstration of an on-site evacuation, which was to have been evaluated in the field, was prcperly addressed and responded to by the EOC staff. Activities were l
coordinated and required ecmmunications were mcde to notify support agencies to assist in the evacuation. There was no actual field observation because evacuees left the facility prior to the arrival of the FEMA evaluator.
l The Emergency Worker Decontaminacion Center at ManaP.wkin was activr.ted and set up to demonstrate the decontamination operati,n. The staff followed the pien l
and were aware of prope: limits for decontamination. Volunteer firemen and rescue i
squad personnel were available for vehicle decontamination and first aid funettons. Minor issues were identified with doelmetry and instrumentations used for radiologleal mohitoring.
The Pineland High School Congregate Care Center was activated out of sequence from the scenario for evaluation of corrective actions. The previously identifled issue, concerning 24-hour staffing was corrected. There was excellent volunteer participation by many indviduals. The American Red Cross chapter, the Salvation Army and several fire companies provided personnel to staff the various activities at the center. These volunteers should be commended for their interest and efforts. Several issues were identified in the operation of this facility. The traffic flow, both vehicular and for personnel, was not designated in accordance with the plan. There were no barriers or xLL l
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Indications provided for personnel who had been monitored in the parking lot, to assist t' em in moving into the main building. The equipment used to monitor vehicles and personnel in the parking lot was not that specified in the plan and was not adequate, nor were the monitoring personnel properly trained. Tne equipment used by the Ocean County Department of Health personnel for additional monitoring inside the building and in the decontamination area was not the equipment specified in the plan. While this monitoring equipment is appropriate for the speelfic operation, the personnel were not sufficiently trained in its proper use. A remedial exercise was conducted on June 10, i
1987 to correct the lficiency identified at the Pinelands Congregate Care Center (see Section 2.4.2.2.1).
i There were two County field teams mobilized and dispatched to demonstrate i
appropriate and proper techniques in conducting air sampling.
This procedure was demonstrated in order to correct an issue from a previous exercise. The teams exhibited sufficient knowledge and famillarity with their' operating procedures and equipment to verify the completion to the corrective action.
The supply of dosimeters and protective equipment was adequate and appropriate Instructions (Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Record Forms) were available t.
be lasued along with the dos! meters. Both field teams from Ocean County exhibited the knowledge, equipment, and training needed to protect workers from receiving excess exposure and to control the amount of exposure received.
OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPAL EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTER 8 (OCM)
Federal observers evaluated activities at 16 municipal EOCs
- Barnegat, Barnegat Light, Beachwood, Berkeley, Dover, Harvey Cedars, Island Heights, Lacey, Long Beach, Ocean, Ocean Gate, Pine Beach, Sea Side Park, South Toms Rivar, Stafford, and Surf City. The EOCs received initial and follow-up emergency notificas!ons, Most EOCs mobilized staff and activated the EOCs in a timely manner. Only South Tems River failed to achieve full staffing. A deficiency was identiflod at the South Toms River EOC. South Toms River was unable to demonstrate the ability to protect the public as well as emergency workers.
Neither the EMC nor the deputy EMC was avcIlable and those acting in this capacity were not sufficiently trained in radiological emergency preparedness to adequately perform emergency responsibilities. South Toms River was unable to demonstrate any of the exercise objectives assigned to the municipal EOCs (see pge 7). To retest their response capability a remedial exercise was held on July 2,198Y (see page 48). Most of the EOCs presented rosters indicating that enough staff were available to maintain full staffing on a 24-how basis. Inability to provide 24-hour staffing was observed at the South Toms River and Pine Beach EOCs. However, j
South Toms River corrected this problem at the July 22, 1987 Remedial Exercise. This lasue will be evaluated at P!ne Beach EOC during the next exercise. Under the guidance of adept Emergency Management Coordinators, the staff at most municipal EOCs
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demonstrated the ability to make deelslons and coordinate emergency activities. South Toms River, however, was unable to demonstrate the ability to protect the public and the emergency workers. Neither the Emergency Management Coordinator nor the Deputy Emergency Management Coordinator was available, and those acting in this capacity l
l mili
were not trained sufficiently in radiological emergency preparedness to adequately perform emergency responsibilities. These problems were also corrected at the July 22, 1987 Remedial Exercise. (See Section 2.4.4.8). Pine Beach EOC will be evaluated on this issue during the next exercise.
Most emergency res7me facilities have adequate space, supplies, and equipment to support required emergency operations. However, it is recommended that the Pine Beach EOC be redesigned to enhance emergency operations.
All EOCs successfully communicated with other locations using EMRAD, dedicated telephones, commercial telephones, RACES, and other radios. Adequate security was demonstrated. In most EOCs, status boards were maintained, briefings were held, and internal <aessage handling and distribution were effective. Exceptions were at the Pine Beach EOC (where message logging was not efficient) and at South Toms River (where classification levels and a status board were not posted). South Toms River rectified this at the July 22,1987 Remedial Exercise. (See Section 2.4.4.8).
The staff at most of the EOCs demonstrated the ebility to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personal dosimetry.
However, the location of dostmetry at South Toms River was not known, and, in any event, the acting Emergency Management Coordinator was not aware of the proper use of dosimetry. This, however, was corrected at the July 22,1987 Exercise. Staff at the Barnegat Light EOC were not aware of the maximum dose allowed for emergency workers or what the worker was to do if the exposure was exceeded.
Most municipal EOCs demonstrated the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision had been made to do so.
As with dosimetry, the acting Emergency Management Coordinator at South Toms River did not know where the K! was stored or procedures that would be involved in administering it if requ! red. This was corrected at the Remedial exercise.
However, neither the South Toms River EMC nor the Radiological Officer were aware of the maximum dose albwed for emergency worktes.
The Emergency Management Coordinator and his deputy at the Surf City EOC were not sure about who was responsible for making the decision to administer KI.
e IEV
A I
1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7, 1979, the President directed the 'r'ederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lea.d rolponsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments; Determining whether such plans can be implemented, on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments; and Coon!!nating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities e
In the radiological emergency planning process:
- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC),
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE),
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Annex B to the State of New Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Nuclear Power Plants is the RERP for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). It includes detailed state, county, and municipal plans pertaining to that site. This plan was evaluated, and an exercise of the RERP for OCNGS was then held on March 16,1982.
1 A second exercise was conducted on May 24,1983, to assess the capabilities of the state and local emergency preparedness organizations to (1) Implement their j
radiological emergency plans and procedures and (2) protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the OCNGS.
A third exercise of the RERP for OCNGS was conducted on June 5,1985, between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and midnight.
2 On May 12,1987 a fourth exercise for OCNGS was conducted.
A team of evaluators consisting of personnel from FEMA Region !!, the RAC, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and state agencies evaluated the May 12 exercise.
Seventeen evaluators were assigned to evaluate activities of state and local jurisdictions.
Evaluators were trained in New Jersey radiological emergency planning concepts and given an evaluation kit, which included Information on exercise objectives, tha exercise scenarlo, and other issues relating to the exercise. Teat.. Leaders coordinated the operations of teams observing activities of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and Ocean County municipalities.
Following the exerelse, the federal evaluntors met to compile their evaluations.
Evaluators presented observations specific to their assignments, the taams of evaluators developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction, and team leaders consolidated the evalut.tlons of Individual team members. A public critique of the exercise for exercise participants and the general public was held at 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 14, in the Ocean County EOC.
Two remedial exercises were conducted to retest emerg :ncy response capabilities and correct issues evaluated during the May 12,1987 exere Ise. The fi st remedial exercise was held at the Pinelands Congregate Care Center or June 10, 1987.
The second remedial exercise was, conducted on July 22,1987 to ev'Juste an on-site evacuation and the South Toms River EOC.
The findings presented in this report ne based on evaluations of federal evaluators, which were reviewed by FEMA Region II. FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictic?s submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the Areas Requiring Corrective Action discussed in thic report.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all negative findings observed during the exerelse have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate.
1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Seventeen federal Evaluators evaluated off-site emergency response functions.
These Individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below.
Evaluators Agency Exerelse Location / Function J. Picciano FEMA Team Leader, State EOC A. Davis FEMA Communications, State EOC R. Harnett FEMA Operations /PIO, State EOC E. Fox NRC EOF D. Santini ANL Emergency News Center b
3 halustors Agency Exercise Location / Function S. Googins EPA BNE-FC P '
P. Weberg FEMA Team Leader, County EOC W. Gasper ANL Communications, County EOC R. Walsh FEMA Operations, County EOC S. McIntosh FEMA On-site Evacuation J. Keller INEL Congregate Care; Decontamination B. Vinikour ANL Municipal Team Leader; Stafford EOC; Long Beach Twp.
EOC J. O'Sullivan FEMA Barnegat EOC; Lacey EOC G. Seldenfeld FEMA Surf City EOC; Harvey Cedars EOC; Barnegat Light EOC B. Acerno FEMA Berkeley EOC; Beachwood EOC; Ocean Gate EOC H. Fish DOE Sea Side Park EOC, Island Heights EOC; Dover EOC R. Thomson FEMA S. Toms River EOC; Pine Beach EOC 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Section 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.
1980).
FEMA classifles exercise inadequacles as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action. Defieleneles are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a riuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropelate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions. Areas Requiring Corrective Aetions ""e demonstrated and observed inadequacles of State and local government perfmiance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled blennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
In addition to these inadequacles, FEMA Identifies Areu Recommended for Improvement, which are issues observed during an exercise that are l
not ebnsid;erid to adversely impact public health and safety.
While not required, correctin of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.
4
}
---..---m--_ _.. _. _, - - _ _. _, _ _. _ - -
.=
4 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The licensee (General Public Utilities [GPU]), FEMA, NRC and the State of New Jersey planned a coordinated exercise of their respective emergency plans for both the en-sita and off-site ' support agencies.
The exercise involved activation and I
participation of the staff and response facilities of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) as well as emergency organizations and emergency facilities of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, and the sixteen municipalities.
The exercise was intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the OCNGS capabilities to respond to a wide range of emergency conditions. This scenarlo was designed to activate the radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) for OCNGS and GPU corporate radiolog! cal emergency response plan through their various levels.
Although the scenario accurately simulates operating events, it was not intended to assess all of the operator's diagnostic capabilities, but rather to provide sequences that ultimately demonstrated the operator's ability to respond to events and that resulted in l
exercising both on-site and off-site emergency procedures. The exercise demonstrated a nuriber of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise permitted to interfere with the safe operations of OCNGS, and the plant management at its discretion could have suspended the exercise for any period of time necessary to i
ensure this goal. Free play was encouraged and the referees interfered only if operator or player action would have prematurely terminated the exercise or devlated excessively from the drill schedule.
Federr.1 agencies were notified during the exerelse according to existing emergency response procedures.
Federal agencies with radiological emergency preparedness responsibility did not actively participate in the play of this exercise.
Federal representatives, however, d!d act as exercise evaluators.
To provide a conservativa exercise in terms of off-site doses and areas affected, exercise meteorology was used.
Actual meteorology might have led to projected radiological doses below established protective action guides (PAGs) within the areas of l
Interest.
The following objectives were developed for this exercise and hsve been referenced in the narrative of the exercise evaluation section (Section 2) of thia -* ports (Objectives evaluated during the two remedial exercises are Identifled in the respective I
section) 1.4.1 New Jersey State Emergency Operating Center SEOC1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
SEOC2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
SEOC3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to c%rdinate emergency l
activities.
k
5 SEOC4.
Demonstrate adequacy :( facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
SEOC5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
SEOCO.
Demonstrate ability to alert the public witbin the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial Instructional message, within 15 minutes.
SEOC7.
Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate Instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
Demonstrate that the transmission of the EBS message is properly timad to begin within one minute of the end of, the stren sounding.
SEOC8.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
SEOC9.
Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
SEOC1).
Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to !ssue K! to emergency workers (Communications Only -
Out of Sequence).
1.4.2 Emergency Operations Facility EOF 1.
Demonstrate that licensee engineering personnel mobilize to the EOF at the Alert in order to interface with State Assessment Personnel (ARCA ONLY).
EOF 2. -
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations (AllCA ONLY).
EOF 3.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organlaations, and field personnel (ARCA ONLY).
1.4.3 Emergeoey News Center ENC 1.
Demonstrato ability to mobilize staff and activate fac!!!tles promptly.
ENC 2.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
i i
. _ _ _.. -.... -.. _ _. ~..., _ _. _. -., _
6 1.4.4 State Field Activities SFA1.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
SFA2.
Demonstrate tne ability to continuously monitor ar.d control emergency worker exposure.
1.4.5 Ocean County Emergency Operations Center OCEOC1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
OCEOC2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
OCEOC3. Demonstrate ability to make dectstons and to coordinate emergency activities.
O'.* EOC 4.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
OCEOC5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
OCEOC6. Demonstrate the ability to supply and adialnister KI, once the decision has been made to do so. (Communications Only - Out of Sequence)
OCEOC7. Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of on-site personnel.
(Nuclear Generating Station).
OCEOC8. Demonstrate ability to. provide advance coordination of information released.
OCEOC9 Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial Instructional message, within 15 minutes.
l 1.4.6 Ocean County Field Activities OCFA1.
Demonstrate ability to mobillze staff and activate facilities promptly.
I (Congregate Care and Decontamination Centers)
OCFA2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
t OCFA3.
Demonstrate appropr! ate equipment and procedures for measurement of aleborne radiolodine concertrations as low as 10-7 uCl/CC in the presence of noble gases (ARCA ONLY).
OCFA4.
Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
OCFA5.
Demonstrate adequacy of proce'dures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
OCFA6.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mata care of evacuees.
i i
OCFA7.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.
1.4.7 Ocean County Municipal Emergency Operations Centers OCMI.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
l OCM2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
OCM3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
OCM4.
Demonstrate adequac'y of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
OCMS.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
OCM6.
Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
OCM7.
Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so. (Communications Only - Out of Sequence)
OCM8.
Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of on-site personnel.
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Scenario Overview The exercise was initiated when the Rx Coolant Sample results indicated 8.9 uct/mi lodine. A backup sample was taken to verify results. This level of lodine
A 8
activity in the Coolant (8.5 ucl/ml) required the declaration of an Unusual Event per 6430-!MP-1300.01 - Emergency Classification Category I.
Off-gas system process nionitor indications increased at T=00:40 to greater than 10,000 mrem /hr requiring an ALERT to be declared per Category I.
At approximately 21/2 hours into the exercise a small leak in the RCS suction side of a Rectre Pump upst.eam of V-37-9 caus0d increased Dry Wall pressure and a Rx Scram. The leak was greater than 50 GPM, this caused Core Spray system I & II to initiate. System I was not able to inject due to V-20-12 being shut. The booster pump in System !! tripped also at this time the Control Room received a phone call informing them of a fire in the C.S. booster pump motors for System II. This was initiated by painting of the motor casings and welding overhead, when the pump starts it started the welder and the painter, the welder dropped his torch, it ignited some rags and paint and pump motors are in the midst of the conflagration.
The fire in the booster pumps made the system inoperable although the main pumps are capable of supplying water to the vessel at a reduced capacity. Due to the location of the fire and plant conditions, a Site Area Emergency should have been declared per Category R.
At this point the fire should have been controlled requiring activation of the on-site Fire Brigade. The fire did not impact further plant operations since the leak is small compared to the available systems for makeup.
Since the plant is scrammed a Rx cooldown continued for the next two hours.
Near the end of th0 2-hour plant coolaown,'the leak became worse, followed shortly thereafter by a majoc LOCA.
Due to the limited availability of makeup a General Emergency should have teen declared per one of the following:
Category A Category H Category T Containment integrity was maintained over the next half-hour allowing entry into the Rx Building to effect repairs to Core Spray System II. Following such repairs or the elapse of 1/2 hour, D.W. pressure began to decrease. There was a corresponding increase in Rx Building Rad levels. It was postulated the primary contain.nent falls at one of the plugs installed after samples were taken from the Containment shell during the 11R Outage.
The increased activity was discharged through Standby Gas Treatment System to j
the plant stack.
j At T=03:30 a fire occurred in a trailer near the New Maintenance Building.
Because of the potential to involve other site structures it was expected that the assistance of off-site fire support would be requested by the Fire Brigade Leader.
Forked River Fire Department should respond and assist the on-site fire brigade in combatting the fire.
I
?.
l 9
Eventually Core Spray was returned to service to maintain water on the fuel.
However, significant activity had already been released to secondsry containment and the Reactor was already depressurized, but further fuel damage was precluded.
Recovery was not an cbjective of this exercise and as the Reactor was being simulated as stable but severely damaged, the Exercise was terminated at this point after verifying that all mini scenarios and objectives had been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Drill Controller.
1.5.2 Description of State and County Demonstrations 1.
Initial Notification Initial notification was to be performed in accordance with the procedures of the radiological emerg'ency plans.
2.
Activation of Facilities Activation of State, County, and municipal EOCs and staffing of the EOCs by emergency response personnel was to occur in accordance with the emergency plans.
3.
Activation of the EOF GPU Nuclear personnel were to activate the EOF. Activation and operation of the EOF was to be in accordance with the emergency plan procedures. Normal travel times to the EOF by its staff may have been compressed and staffing was to be permitted, one hour after the notification to activate.
- 4. Public Notification The first request to the Emergency Broadcast System was to be a special test message of the Oyster Creek Radiological Emergency Broadcast System.
All messages during the exercise were to be prepared and forwardeg! to the Emergency Broadcast System gateway station (WADB) in accordance with standard procedures. Except for the test message, all exercise EBS messages were to be prefaced by explicit instructions not to be broadcast, but to log the message content and time of receipt.
The procedures for public alerting were to be demonstrated by activation of the stren system in sequence with the broadcast of the EBS message.
5.
Public Information Press releases to the media were to be made in accordance with the respective emergency plans, via the normal press release methods.
The press releases were to contain all necessary information on the current status of the exercise.
10 6.
Communications Communications between the exercise participants were to occur in accordance with the procedures of the emergency response plan. Should any primary communication path (telephone) become inoperative or prove inadequate, backup means (radlo) of communication were to be ut!!! zed as appropriate.
E.
Mobilization of Emergency Workers It was the responsibility of all emergency response agencies to ensure that their resources were actually deployed in adequate numbers to provide a reasonable test of their notification, mobilization,
- command, coordination, and communications capability.
Except as noted below, all State, County, and municipal agencies were to have total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their resources, consistent with this Intent.
When the use of an agency's resources was to be simulated, it was the responsibility of the agency to ensure that all steps necessary to utilize the resources were demonstrated. For example, for an agency to demonstrate the activation of additional personnel, it would be necessary to locate the required call list and have the calls either completed or simulated. Then a realistic estimate of the mobilization time must have been made and forwarded to the agencies which need to know this time estimate. Use of a resource could be demonstrated only after the estimated mobilization time had elapsed. In addition, when a resource was demonstrated the command and control must also demonstrate. It was desirable to carry out all demonstrations to the greatest extent possible, thus determining the need for additional resources such as those used l
for command, control, dose record maintenance, etc.
Total counts of etaergency workers deployed and those hypothesized to have been deployed were to be maintained.
Information regarding which personnel movements were real and which were hypothesized were to be readily available at all times.
The following provides a minimum list of personnel and resources that were to be deployed by the State and local governments to demonstrate the capabilities of their resources. Also provided are I
speelfic demonstration objectives for hypothesized emergency responses.
1.
Decontamination Center Ocean County waa to set up a decontamination center. During the exercise the center was to be used principally for emergency workers to check out through after they have completed their exercise participation. At the decontamination center, any actions
,0 11 which could damage property were to be avolded. All necessary equipment was to be assembled at the decontamination center and its use demonstrated. Detailed demonstration actions were to be implemented at the center by the decontamination center leader.
l 2.
Congregate Care Shelter One congregate care shelter was to be opened and staffed in accordance with the emergency plans. Supplies required for long term mass care (cots, blankets, food, etc.) need not have been acquired or brought to the shelter.
However, the shelter and registration personnel should have obtained estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the exercise been a real emergency. The shelter and registration personnel should then make the necessary estimates of supplies required for the potential evacuees. Sources for the required supplies should then be located, and the means for transportation of the supplies should be determined.
i l
3.
Monitoring Teams l
Ocean County was to field approximately two teams. All of the i
teams were to be supplied with a referee. The referees were to provide simulated field data which used to determine local dose rate readings. These teams however, were to be equipped with the necessary equipmen' which would enable them to determhe actual area gamma dose rates and alrborne radiolodine concentrations.
Data for the environmental samples and TLDs were to be supplied i
by a referee at the appropriate time.
The monitoring teams were not to be culted up in anticontamination clothing, but to have such equipment at their disposal.
4.
Volunteer Organizations The members of volunteer organizations, e.g., firemen and rescue squads, have responsibilities that take precedence over their participation in an exercise.
Therefore, these volunteer organizations were to have participated in their exercise on an as-available basis.
Because the exercise plume impacted speelfic areas, volunteer personnel in the affected zone were to have advance knowledge of their special role in this exercise, in order to maximize their participation.
j F.
Reentry and Recovery The deelslon-making, planning, and implementation for reentry and recovery were not to be demonstrated or simulated.
I
't la G.
Closeout of the Exercise Closeout of the exercise will be accomplished by the following actions:
1.
Emergency workers were to be secured as soon as possible after they have demonstrated their capabilities. The dectslon to secure them was to be made at their controlling EOC, with concurrence from the State EOC, if app!! cable.
Emergency workers radiological exposure records were to be completed for each emergency worker in accordance with the standard operating procedures. Evacuee radiation dose records were to be completed for 15 random volunteers at each site. The completed dose records forms were to be clearly marked "For Demonstration Only" and be forwarded to the responsible State agency for review.
2.
The emergency workers decontamination centers and the congregate care shelter were to be secured as soon as all emergency workers and volunteers haw checked out through these centers.
1.5.3-1.5.4 Emergency Classification and Event Timeline and Protective Timeline Tables 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 provide detailed timelines of events that were noted during the May 12, 1987 exercise.
Table 1.5.3 details the escalation of Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) and Table 1.5.4 details Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Decisions.
i l
.o 13 TABLE 1.5.3 Emergency Classification and Event Time Line Emergency State EOC Ocean Media Classification Utility West Trenton County Cente-Munici-Notification Declared Received Received Received palities Unusuct 1543 1547 1558 N/A 1610 Event Alert
,1603 1613 1623 N/A 1623 to 1627 Facility 1755 1619 1804 1725 1630 to Declared 1905 Operational Site Ares 1814 1818 1822 1815 1830 Emergency Ceneral 1946 1955 2003 1946 1945 to Emergency 2053 Release 2110 2113 2120 2152 2152 Started Release 2240 2245 2254 N/A N/A Terminated N/A = Not applicable l
TABLE I.5.4 Protective Aetlan 11sne IJae New Jersey State EOC Ocean County EOC AT =
Decision Decision Siren EBS T Nede Received Activation EBS Minus Activation Decision Event Time EPAs Time EPAs Time (State EOC)
Time Siren 1821 N/A 1822 N/A 1829 1833 11 Min.
Activation
+
at Site Area 1837 test Emergency message Protective Sheltering 1957 1,2,3, 2003 1,2,3, 2005 2009 (1) 12 Min.
g Action #1 4,7,8, 4,7,8,
+
8' 11,17,18 11,17,18 2013 (2)
Protective Evacuation 2056 1,2,3, 2100 1,2,3,
'2104 2108 (1) 12 Min.
Action #2 4,7,8, 4,7,8,
+
11,17,18 11,17,18 2112 (2)
Protective Evacuation **
2200 Same PAR 2201 2205 (1)
N/O*
Action f3 N/0*
.1,2,3,4,7,
+
8,11,17,18 2209 (2)
Emergency 2114 N/A 2115 N/A N/A N/A N/A Worker KI Decision
- Times for the utility and EOF recommendations were not recorded because the EOF was not observed or evaluated during this exercise.
- Update on evacuation generated because of release of noble gas.
N/R = not recorded N/A = not applicable N/O* = not observed; State EOC exercise play terminated at 2145.
~
15 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION 1
2.1 NEW JERSEY STATE OPERATIONS i
2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The State EOG had 10 objectives to meet during this exercise, all of which were met. The State EOC had no outstanding areas of performance requiring vorrective action (ARCAs).
However, duringt the course of the exercise, four ARCAs were identified. Each of these ARCAs were related to EBS, messages, having to do with message content, message transmission in hard copy, and verification of the content of messages as broadcast to the public and as transmitted to the ENC. The EBS message content and timing, however, was* judged by. observers at the State EOC to be adequate to protect the public and no finding of deficiency resulted from those shortcomings associated with the EBS messages.
The New Jersey State Police Headquarters in West Trenton was notified of an alert at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) at approximately 1613.
This message, as well as subsequent updates, was received and verified in a timely manner.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly was met at the State EOC (SEOC1). The New Jersey State Police (NJSP)
Office of Emergency Management (OEM) demonstrated the ability to mobilize staff and activated their EOC facility in a timely manner. Notification of EOC staff by the NJSP began immediately after notification of the NJSP by the utility, and activation of the State EOC proceeded smoothly. Activation and call out procedures are in place and were followed effectively. The State EOC was observed to be operational by approximately 1619. According to the 1620 entry in the State EOC event log, the State EOC had, at that time, been notified at 1620 of the Alert declaration which had taken place at the Oyster Creek NGS at 1M3. As of 1830 the State EOC was listed as partlally activated according to the Stata EOC event log. According to thJ State event log, all State agencies requiring notifleation were notified as of 1715.
Full staffing occurred at i
approxima.tely 1900, about 21/2 hours after rece'pt of the call Initiating activation.
Some delays in reaching staff occurred because of the time of day - many people were l
between work and home - but all staff were reached.
)
The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully staff the faellities and maintain l
staffing around the clock was met at the State EOC (SEOC 2). The NJSP OEM fully staffed the State EOC and, in addition to demonstrating a capability for 24-hour continuous staffing of the State EOC by showing a roster, demonstrated a shift change by staffing a second shift during the exercise play. A full complement of staff was present, according to the plan, but elected officials did not participate. Over 20 staffers from 14 agencies / organizations were present on the first shift. The first and second shift staff displayed adequate training and knowledge of emergency procedures. During the shift change, incoming staff were briefed as to current status and operations. This objective j
was performed in a professional and timely manner. Since key staff quickly arrived, the
,t 16 length of time involved in fully staffing the State EOC, which was mostly due to the time of day the incident occurred, did not impact operations at all.
J j
The objective to demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate l
emergency activities was met at the State EOC (SEOC 3). All decisions were made promptly in reaction to information provided the State EOC. The State OEM Deputy
]
Director was clearly in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response. He j
demonstrated effective leadership at the State EOC. It was observed that the State EOC received n.otification of the prior declarations of Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency at the Oyster Creek NGS at about 1613, 1818, and 1955, 1
respectively. The decision to shelter Emergency Planning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 17, and 18 was made at 1957. Message logs were kept, reproduced, and distributed in an y
efficient manner. According to the State EOC event log, strens were simulated as being sounded as of 2005 and EBS broadcasts occurred at 2009 and 2013. It was observed that the initial EBS broadcast was simulated at 2009. Status reports were provided by the i
Deputy Director or an assistant over the EOC public address system on the half hour.
Four separate staff meetings were held by the Deputy Director and on two occasions with BNE officials. Detailed and timely status boards were kept in all work areas with staff in constant radio communication with the command personnel.
The Deputy Director overcame communications problems between the FCP and the EOF prior to l
making a news release at 2205 on the status of the prior NGS radioactive gas release, l
which had started at 2110. Security at the State EOC was excellent.
i I
The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilltles and displays to support j
emergency operations was met at the State EOC (SEOC4). The facility, which is located in West Trenton, NJ had suffielent space, furniture, telephones, and other equipment.
Access to the facility and noise were adequately controlled. The facility, which has bunks and showers allowing extended operations, also has a backup generator which was turned on during the exercise. Maps, charts, and status boards were posted and visible.
l The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met at the State EOC (SEOC 5). All l
primary communleations systems were demonstrated.
The communications area was handled in a very organized fashlon. The facility and equipment were adequate to deal with overall operstlans. Commercial telephones were used the majority of the time to l
transmit and recelu information between the State EOC and the Ocean County EOC.
Back up communications included the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Servlees Radios (RACES), NJSP Radlo, Emergency Management Radio (EMRAD), ar3d the National Warning System (NAWAS). A dedicated telephone line was set up between the SEOC and the Ocean County EOC. Temporary problems delaying the transmission of infortration out to field locations in the counties occurred because the frequencies used on the radio net became overloaded by nonemergency users during the exercise. It is recognized, however, that in a real emergency, the State could order the nonemergency users of the Frequency to stop using the system.
Aside from this one problem, overall communleations operations were performed in an impressive manner.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes was met at the State EOC (SEOC 6). The SEOC transmitted and Icgged messages in a timely manner.
I
17 The State EOC received notification of the prior declaration of General Emergency at the Oyster Creek NGS at about 1955.
The decision to shelter was reached at approximately 1957 and Emergency Planning Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8,11,17, and 18 were chosen and directed for sheltering by 2003. The Initial EBS broadcast was simulated at
)
2009, about 14 minutes after the receipt of notification of General Emergency at the
)
State EOC. All EBS messages requiring prompt notification of the public were issued i
within the required 15 minute timeframe. The fourth EBS message on the status of the release and potential health impact was simulated (with stren sounding) as a precaution j
i even though it was not required. PAR decisions were made by the Deputy Director af ter 1
consultation with BNE staff.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion, was met at the State EOC (SEOC 7). The P!O activated the EBS by calling WADB, the primary EBS station, via a dedicated telephone line.
The P!O had a set of prescripted EBS messages loaded on a word processor that included numerically-coded descriptions of evacuation areas within the EPZ.
Management of the coordination of stren activation and EBS broadcasts was effectively demonstrated. The EOC received timely confirmation of both the stren sounding and EBS system activation. Messages were telefaxed to the Emergency News Center (ENC), at 1730,1758,1805,1816,1836,1845, and 2025 explaining pelor actions taken by the State. The State also kept the NJSP media officer at the ENC well Informed by telephone. Although it was not required for this exercise, the State set up a backup computer link to the ENC and transmitted copies of the State EOC event log to the ENC.
The second part of objective SEOC7, to demonstrate that the transmission of the EBS message is properly timed to begin within one minute of the end of the stren sounding was met at the State EOC. S!ren soundings and EBS broadcasts at and after Site Area Emergency were simulated. According to the State EOC event log, at the Site Area Emergency strens were sounded as of 1829 and EBS broadcasts were at 1833 and 1837. At the General Emergency the strens were sounded at 2005 and EBS broadcasts recommending sheltering occurred at 2009 and 2013.
The General Emergency evacuation EBS message was logged as having occurred at 2108 and 2112, after stren sounding as 2104. The last EBS message was not logged due to the closeout of the first day of the exercise.
Flaws In EBS message handling and formulation whleh could have created confusion for a small portion of the population receiving PARS resulted in requirements i
for corrective action in future exercises, as described below. Five EBS messages were I
released by the State. The first was a test message to be read instead of the drill messages.
The second, a "no setton" drill message associated with the Site Area
{
Emergency, was simulated as being broadcast at 1833 and 1837. State message number three, which was not an EBS message, described the Governor's actions and authority in j
declaring a State of Emergency. This message was transmitted to the ENC. The fourth State message and third EBS message, a message recommending sheltering within nine EPAs at the General Emergency, was simulated as being broadcast at 2009 and 2013.
i There was a minor error in the message handling procedure of the sheltering message.
l This error did not, however, impact on the health or safety of the population and was j
corrected as soon as it was noted.
I
_.=
18 In order to disseminate the sheltering par information to the public within 15 minutes after the decision was made, the original message was faxed to the Ocean County EOC (OCEOC), the EBS Gateway Station (WADB), and the Emergency News Center (ENC). This faxed message had the correct Information including the designation and description of nine EPAs. Coples of this original message were then made to be routed in the standard operating procedcre, i.e., attached with a message form and sent to the State operations, rumor control, and the support room in the State EOC. It was during this procedure that an error was made in that page two of this message (including designation and description of EPAs 17 and 18) was not copied and only the first page was faxed to OCEOC, WADB, and the ENC. Because the PIO at the State EOC had correctly faxed the original message containing designation and description of all appropriate EPAs, the State both telephonically nottfled the Ocean County EOC, WADB, and the ENC of the omission of the second page (of the second fax) and followed up with a telefax of this page.
The fifth State message and fourth EBS message, which recommended evacuation of the nine EPAs previously requested to shelter, was simulated as being broadcast at 2108 and 2112. Although this message stated that "A detailed description of the routes will follow the completion of this message", no such details were transmitted by the State.
While evidence of a complete set of instructions on evacuation routes in conjunction with the EBS broadcast ordering evacuation was not provided in hard copy, it is recommended that the State EOC demonstrate that this information is immediately 4
Identified to the EBS station (s) by th.y EOC's authorized point of contact. The message I
itself therefore did not include "the appropriate aspects... of evacuation"(NUREG-0654,
!!, E.7).
The State informed the FEMA evaluator that the EBS station has this Information.and would automatically add it to this message. Reference to this process was not found in the State Plan. Since no evaluator was at the radio station, and the station did not broadcast or record mesatges as they would have gone on air, it is not possible to evaluate the adequacy of this procedure. No hard copy of the EBS message ordering evacuation was sent to the Ocean County EOC. It is recommended that "oral message communications be supported by written (e.g., telex or telefax) verification" (FEMA-REP-10: F.1.2) The sixth state message and f!f'h EBS message composed at the l
State EOC was apparently not telefaxed out of the EOC because the scenarlo called for l
the termination of the first day's portion of the exercise at this time. This last message, l
released at 2205, was informational, being designed to reassure the public that, although a release had occurred during evacuation, "no one should have received a significant dose of radiation." No changes in PARS were included in this message.
The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to centrol access to an evacuated area was met at the State EOC (SEOC 8). Prompt and appropriate actions were ordered to control all types of access to the contaminated area. Access control points were activated, roads were blocked, air traffic was rerouted, and water traffic was stopped. Traffic / access control points were displayed on a map.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met at the State EOC (SEOC 9).
The supply of dosimeters was adequate and appropriate Instructions (Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Record Forms) were available to be issued along with the dosimeters. The
19 dosimeters of field workers were zeroed and were read and recorded at appropriate intervals. State EOC staff demonstrated knowledge of how field workers were to have used the decontamination equipment which was observed in the field.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue K! to emergency workers and/or the general population was met at the State EOC (SEOC 10). This demonstration was limited only to the communication of a controller injected directive to order KIingestion. According to the State EOC event log record of 2114, orders were issued from approximately 2107 to 2110 to have emergency workers simulate taking KI. Organizations with emergency personnel required to ingest KI, included the BNE, the NJSP Field OPS, the Coast Guard, the NJSP marl.'e police, Ocean County workers and Ocean County municipalities within the EPZ.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed at the State EOC.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
Descriptforu The fifth State message and fourth EBS message, which recommended evacuation, stated that "A
detalled description of the routes will follow the completion of this message."
However, no such details were transmitted by the State.
The message itself therefore did not include "the appropriate aspects... of evacuation" (NUREG-0654, II, E.7). The State Informed the FEMA evaluator that the EBS station has this Information and would automatically add it to this message.
Reference to this process was not found in the State Plan. Since no evaluator was at the radio station, and the station d!d not broadcast or record messages as they would have gone on air, evidence was not provided to evaluators during the exercise to show that a complete set of EBS broadcast instructions on evacuation routes in conjunction with the EBS broadcast ordering evacuation would have been lasued to the public. In view of this shortcoming, it was not possible to favorably evaluate the adequacy of the procedure by which EBS messages are formulated and broadcast. (NUREG-0654, II, E.5, E.7, F)
Recommendatlom It is recommended that the State EOC and the ENC demonstrate, with appropriately recorded messages, that Incompletely transmitted information can be immediately I
identified to the EBS station (s) by the EOC's authorized point of contact. If the radio station is authorized to use any judgment in adding to EBS messages, it is recommended that the broadcaster t
record the message as it would be read in a real emergency, and provide the recording to FEMA evaluators.
i
o 20 l
2.
==
Description:==
No hard copy of the EBS message ordering evacuation was sent to at the Ocean County EOC. (NUREG-0654, II, F)
Recommendation:
It is recommended that oral message communications be supported by written (e.g., telex or telefax) verification.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The PIO at the State EOC faxed the original sheltering message to the EBS station, the Ocean County EOC, and the ENC in order to disseminate this Information to the public within 15 minutes after the dectston was made. However, when this message was dispatched via standard operating procedure, the second page of this message, giving the designation and description of EPAs 17 and 18, was not copied. Only the first page was faxed (for the second time) to the EBS Station, Ocean County EOC, and the ENC.
Recommendation: Although the State EOC realized this error and followed up with both a telephone call and fax to all facilities, it is recommended that procedures be developed to assure that all messages are complete prior to telefax!ng to emergency facilities.
2.1.2 Field Implementation of State Action to Protect the Public The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area was only partially met by the two troopers staffing traffic control points during the exercise (SFA 1). Both troopers arrived at their posts in a timely fashion and had barricades and protective clothing in their squad cars. They were familiar with the appropriate evacuation route, but neither was famillar with the location of reception / care centers. It is recommended that emergency workers directing l
evacuation be made aware of the reception / care location to which citizens should be directed.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action observed.
21 AREAS RELOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
Neither of the two troopers staffing the access control points was famillar with the location of reception / care centers.
(NUREG-0654, !!, J.10.g, 0.4.d).
Recommendation:
It is recommended that emergency workers directing evacuation be made aware of the reception / care location to which citizens should be directed.
2.1.3 Emergency Worker Exposure Control The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met by the' State of New Jersey field activities (SFA 2). Both troopers were familiar with dostmetry and both expected to read and report their dos! meter readings every half hour. Both troopers had 0-200 mR and 0-20 R dostmeters, which are appropriate for use in a nuclear generating station emergency.
One trooper had a 0-200 R dosimeter, which is inappropriate for use in a nuclear generating station emergency. Both troopers had potassium lodide (KI), but neither was aware of the proper procedures for authorization to administer Kl. It is recommended that troopers be bett'er trained in the procedures for authorizing the ingestion of Kl.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed.
AREAS REQUIRINO CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
Both troopers had potassium lodide (KI), but neither was aware of the proper procedures for authorization to administer E!. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.f, K.4, 0.4.d).
Recommendations it 8.s recommended that troopers be better trained in the procedures for authorizing the Ingestion of K!.
I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no Areas Recommended for Improvement observed.
2.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY The Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (BNE) (formerly the Bureau of Radiation Protection) of the State of New Jersey was not assigned objectives for this exercise.
However, since it was constituted for this exercise in a training mode it was possible for
22 I
the BNE to demonstrate, through the course of the exercise, corrections of four outstanding Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs).
The BNE was activated and staffed in a timely manner. Communications were established as the BNE arrived and sufficient phones were available to support emergency operations. Additional telephone lines were available and used during the exercise. The ring down telephone functioned as required. This corrected ARCA number one, which required the use of more telephone lines and resolution of a problem with the ring down telephone. Communications were established rapidly and without delay with l
the BNE representatives at the State EOC over a dedleated telephone line.
This corrected ARCA #3, which required that delays in contacting the BNE representative at the State EOC by commercial telephone be avolded. An actual thunderstorm disrupted this circuit and an alternate telephone line was rapidly established.
I During the conduct of the exercise all sta,tus boards were maintained adequately and in a timely fashion. Although a board was not designated "plant status," the other boards and briefings provided to the lead BNE person were adequate to keep the decision maker and the process current. This corrected ARCA #2, which required that if the plant status display board were to be retained as an aid in deelslon making, it must be kept current so as not to be misleading.
i As BNE representatives arrived at the EOF, a lleensee liaison person was available and provided technical persons to brief the BNE once they were prepared to receive such briefings. This person and appropriate technical staff were available at the EOF soon after the ALERT was declared and prior to BNE's arrival. The Director of the Environmental Assessment Command Center (EACC) briefed the BNE staff once they had arrived. An on-call person from the EOF Technical Support staff was provided to brief the BNE or to answer any questions that might arise. This corrected ARCA #4, l
which required the State to have the utility augment the initial EOF staffing so that the BNE staff would be able to obtain plant status information as soon as the BNE arrives at the EOF. The facsimile machine used to transmit plant Information from the licensee's facilities at Oyster Creek actually malfunctioned.
However, Information was transmitted over a telephone circuit to the Technical Support staff at the EOF and to the State BNE representative.
Transmission of this data was slow over the telephone.
Protective action recommendation development was not degraded by this communica-tiv.J problem, and another telephone was known to be available to the BNE to use if it had proven to be necessary to obtain this data more rapidly.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Defielencies observed.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action observed.
J i
t 33 AREA 5 RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT j
There were no Area Recommended for Improvement observed.
2.3 EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER (ENC)
The Emergency News Center was established at the Toms River Elks Club in l
Toms River. The objective to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate l
faellities promptly was met (ENC 1). At the 1603 Alert declaration by the plant the GPU ENC staff immediately departed to the ENC, arriving at approximately 1635. Staff of l
the NJSP arrived at 1854. The Ocean County P!O arrived at approximately 1725, the time when the ENC was declared operational by the GPU PIO. The ENC was fully staffed. More than a dozen GPU staff were present. The single Ocean County staffer i
present was the PIO. Second shift staffing was discussed with each organization. GPU would call in staff from the Three-Mile taland station to man a second shift. The State 4
provided a !!st of Individuals who would staff a second shift and used two PIOS during the f
exercise. The County PIO Indicated that no back-up County P!O is available. Duty i
offleer systems and multiple notification methods were avalle51e to notify GPU and l
State ENC staffers.
Minor diffleulties were observed in getting the ENC operational. Some telephone lines did not work initially, apparently due to the electrical storm occurring at the time. The telecopter could not be started because the correct plug had not been brought from the Oyster Creek Station by the GPU staff. The problem was identified and remedied by driving the correct plug out from the Station. However, the GPU staff should assure that proper equipment for rapid set-up of the ENC be brought from the station on the first trip. During the short time the telecopter was not operational, the i
ENC and OCNGS communicated by telephone. The time of record on the coples was not set properly. It is recommended that the time of record on the copier be properly set.
1 j
The objective to demonstrate the ability to belef the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner was met at the ENC (ENC 2). Press briefings were held regularly.
j Times varied, according to availability of important Information.
Information was i
generally verified before being given to the press and when uncertainty existed it was so stated. Hard copies of news releases and EBS messages were provided to the press.
Media kits, with appropelate information, were available. Information in the Emergency l
Information booklet was repeatedly and appropriately referred to in belefings by the State Pollee.
The GPU, State, and County PIOS all performed their jobs in an j
acceptable, and often excellent manner. The contributions of the GPU technical expert j
were valuable. The team effort at public Information dissemination worked well. Maps j
and plant graphles were available, but could have been used more effectively. The EPAs I
to which evacuation and sheltering PARS applied were not distinguished by hatching / coloring and the plume was not plotted. Graphies should be better used to j
distinguish locations where plume movement and protective actions are taking place.
1 GPU staff discussed the use of some available diagrams of the plant, but decided their l
use in this particular case was not appropriate. Some revisions of the graphics are under consideration by GPU as a result of the exercise.
I 1
t 84 A member of the news media (WOBM) at one point complained about availability of copies of news releases, drawing attention to the fact that only one copier was available in the ENC. In a real, fast breaking emergency, not enough copies could be made rapidly enough, and the possibility of breakdowm under overload of one copter exists. Althougn two copters are not necessary for an exercise, GPU should be prepared to provide two copters in a real emergency.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed at the ENC.
4 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no Areas Requiring Corrective
- Action observed at the ENC.
ARRAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPAOVEMENT
==
Description:==
The telecopler could not be started because the correct plug had not been brought from the Oyster Creek Station by the GPU staff. The problem was identifled and remedied by driving the correct plug out from the Station.
Recommendation:
The GPU staff should assure that proper equipment for rapid set-up of the ENC be brought from the station on the first trip.
==
Description:==
The time of record was not set properly on the copy machine.
Recommendation: The time of record should be accurately set.
==
Description:==
Maps and plant graphics were available, but could have been used more effectively. The EPAs to which evacuation and sheltering PARS applied were not distinguished by hatching /colcring and the plume was not plotted.
Recommendation Graphles should be better used to distinguish locations where plume movement and protective actions are taking place.
==
Description:==
Only one copter was available in the ENC. In a real, fast breaking emergency, not enough copies could be made rapidly enough, and the possibility of breakdeswm under overload of one copier exists.
-v 7--,
y
-.w
25 Recommendatlom Although two cop} ors are not necessary for an exercise, GPU should be prepared to provide two copiers in a real emergency.
2.4 OCEAN COUNTY i
2.4.1 Emergency Operations Center The ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly was demonstrated at the Ocean County EOC (OCEOC)
'd the objective was met (COEOC 1). At 1558 a courtes/ call was received from the p. ant informing the Cuanty that an Unusual Event had been declared. The County is not required to take any action at this emergency classification level. At 1823 the County Sheriff's Communication Division was notifled that the plant had declared an Alert at 1603. The Sheriff's Communication Division is the County's Warning Point for lultlal notifleations and is operational on a 24-hour basis. When the EOC !s activated, the communication responsibilltles are switched over to the EOC steff.
Notification of the staff was implemented from the Sheriff's Communication Division by the activation of the County's pager system. Th3 pocket pager issued to one of the Sheriff's representatives did not trigger as required, so a follow-up telephone call was placed to notify this Individual. The staff mobilized on a "real time" basis.
The County made the appropriate notifications to the numerot.sl municipalltles within the EPZ and alerted all designated agencies as specified in the!r plan.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully staff the facility anu msintain staffing around the clock was partially met (OCEOC 2). The County P!O at the ENC Indicated that no back-up County P!O is available. The Ocean County EOC was well staffed with a full complement of personnel from tht agencies as identif'ed in the plan.
The agenoles and organizations included:
1 County OEM Sheriff's Department American Red Cross Salvation Army Fire Coordinktor Departroent of Health Education Road Department Civil Alt Patrol Medical Health Schools Freeholders A shift change of selected agencies was initiated following the insertion of a freep!ny message, by the evaluators, which speelfled the conditions of the shift change. The actual shift change of personnel took place rapidly with the following agencies / staff participating: Director of Emergency Operations, RADEF Officer, Sheriffs Drpartment representative, Traffic Coordinator, Fire Department representative, and the Health Department. In addition to the actual shif t chenge for the a%rementlened agencies, a written roster of back-up staff for other agencles was presented.
'Ihe change in l
command for each agency which participated in the shift change occurred in a rapid and effielent manner. However, not all the incoming second shift personnel were sufficiently I
briefed by their first shif t counterparts nor by the EOC director. The Director should provide for all incoming staff a detailed briefing of the current status and the activities
a 26 f
up to the time of the shift change, in addition, the first shift should brief their second shift replacements before stepping down.
The ability to make decisicns and coordinate emergency activities was demonstrated (OCEOC3). The Director of tei Depcrtment of Emergency Services and his deputy demonstrated the ability, in sn ew 'tional manner to make decisions and provide strong appropriata leadership for the i.
AN. P@cic briefings were held to update the staff on the emergency status and 6 ity nivities. It would enhance the overall response and assist in unifying the staff if ariefings included status reports from each agency represented in the EOC. The r-4.s cottid be kept short and concise but should include the current Jtatus of the various agencies and any changes or additions to their actions since the previous briefing. A copy of the County Plan was available for h
reference and each agency had written procedures detailing their standard operating procedures. Incoming and outgoing messages were logged and distrituted as appropriate.
The facilities and displays available for'use at the Ocean County EOC were sufficient to support the emergency response activities (OCOEC 4). The EOC is located in the County's OEM building at the Miller Airport in Berkeley Township. The layou and setup of the facility is well arranged and planned out to provide an excellent working area. The County's communications cenw/ is in a room adjacent to the main EOC operations rooms it is separate but close enough to provide rapid message flow. The central operations room is large enough to provide for the anticipated numbers of response personnel and there are adequate supplies and equipment at the EOC for use by the County team. Status boards were available to track and record many different aspects of the emergency response. Some of the items listed on the main status board included the conditions at the plant, meteorological data and the emergency classification level. There were separate status boards used to identify the responN activities for other agencies and functions at the EOC, among these were: School, Police, Fire, IIealth, First Aid, RADEF, Weather, Hospital / Nursing Homes, and Geaeral information. Several people were assigned to update and maintain the status boards, and gpropriate and timely information was posted throughout the incident. Security was establ!shed upon the activation of the EOC and identification badges were required for all personnel. Emergency back-up electrical power was provided for by standby diesel generators. Tirese were not started up during the exercise.
The ability to comm.micate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was demonstrated by the equipment and personnel at the EOC (OCEOC 5). There are numerous communication systerns a.vailable. These include: the dedicated hotline to the Utility and State, EMR AD radic net, RACES, County 2m FM, State 75m SSB, State 2m FM, EMS radio, Fir a Coordinator radio, Eme gency Management Net, Telefax machine, and numerous commercial telephones. Generally, the communications systems activated during the exercise performed without problems, however, there were some difficulties experienced during the se.rly stages of the exercise.
Initially, the telefax machine was slow in receiving and transmitting messages. The hardcopy of the first EBS message was delayed in getting to the EOC l
over the telefax. As the exercise progressed, delays in hardcopy transmissions were l
reduced. The problem s!'ould be identified and corrected to assure rapid and timely flow l
of vital hardcooy transmissions. The EMRAD radio is used as the primary communbtion l
l l
l
- -. ~ -
- o 27 system with the municipal EOCs. During the early portion et the exercise, some of the municipalities had difficulties in receiving transmission. The m'.nicipal EOCs reported the problems back to the County EOC via their back-up communication systems. The County's communication team was unable to determine the cause of the apparent equipment failure.
Weather was speculated as one of the possible causes of the problem. There was an adequate number of EOC staff members assigned to operate communication systems. Generally, these personnel appeared to be well trained and familiar with their responsibilities. However, several of the municipal EOCs reported that they had difficulties in understanding some of the verbal transmissions from the County EOC. The messages were sometimes garbled and overpowered with background noise. Therc is a high level of ambient noise in the communication area at the County EOC caused by the numerous operating communications systems.
Several of the operators were equipped with head sets and boom microphones to facilitate ease of 1
movement within the communication area. The noise level could be significantly reduced if all the radio opsators were provided with headsets as compatible with their i
equipment. Also, to luprove the quality of the transmissions over the radio ~ systems, the operators should receive additional training in communication protocol and procedures.
The communications systems utilized by the EOC to direct and control the County's emergency personnel assigned to field activities was not adequately tested during the exercise. The exercise objectives did not provide for the activation of communications with all applicable field locations and activities which would be used by the County.
There was an Area Requiring Corrective Action identified during a previous exercise which was verified by the County's demonstration of communication procedures. The issue identified dealt with the transmission of the recommendation to ingest K! to all emergency workers. Previously, the message was not transmitted over all 'he required communications systems and therefore was not received by all emergency workers.
Dur!;;g the exercise, when the recommendation to take K! was rece'ved by the County from the State, the County immediately transmittec Instructions to the field workers and the municipal EOCs over the required communication systems, including EMRAD anc RACES.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI once the decision has been made to do so was met (OCEOC 6). The reco'mmendation from the State directing emergency workers to ingest KI was received by the County at 2115.
Immediate steps were taken to notify all applicable locations and personnel.
The procedures as specified in the plan were followed and all required notification was transmitted (see above paragraph on communication). Emergency workers were issued simulated K! as part of their exposure control kits. There is an ample supply of KI in reserve at the EOC.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to effect an orderiv Jacuation of on-site personnel was not observed, because evacuees left the facil!ty p o the arrival of the FEMA evaluator (OCEOC 7). A freeplay message to start the
" of on-site evacuation was inserted at the County EOC at 1953.
The Con' 3 their procedures which include requesting assistance from the Lacey Townsu.p Department to coordinate tranJportation. The County also called the Plant to coordinate the evacuat8cn but was told that the utility had already implemented an evacuation.
The FEMA evaluator arrived aftc? the utility commenced the evacuation demonstration. Therefore, the objective was not observed.
m
28 1
The objective to demonstrate the ability to provide advaMe coordination of information released was met (OCEOC 8). The PIOS at the County EOC exchanged information with the P!Os at the Emergency News Center and coordinated the information to be released through out the exercise. The Emergency News Center provided information, which had been released to the public, to the County EOC in the form of copies of press releases and EBS messages, so that the EOC staff was aware of what information had been released. The County PIO, at the EOC, was not familiar with the process used to compile, draf t and release the EBS message. He did not know whether the EBS originated at the State EOC or at the Emergency News Center. It is essential that ths P!Os understand the entire process and procedures for the EBS.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate and initial instructional message, within 15 minutes was met (OCEOC 9). The County play: an active role in alerting and notifying the public in the effseted areas.
Upon receipt of the recommendation from the State, the County coordinated the activation of the siren system with the County Sheriffs Department, who I
is responsible for triggering the system.
The State's recommendation contains l
Information and times on when to sound the sirens and when to expect the subsequent l
EBS message transmission (s). The stren system was activated four times during the exercise. The County responded rapidly and as specified in their procedures. Following the activation of the alert / notification system the County notified the municipals in the l
effected areas to implement their route alerting procedures. The County ect'vated the i
j route alerting response as a precautionary measure in case any of the sirens had failed.
l There is no system in place to adequately determine if the Individual sirens have triggered in the field.
l DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed.
(
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
Not all the 'aloming second shift personnel were sufficiently briefed by tv. first shift counterparts nor by the EOC director. (NUREG-0654, II, A.4)
Recommendation:
The Emergency Management Coordinator should provide a detailed briefing of the current status and the activities up to the time of the shift change, for all incoming personnel. In addition, the first shift, should brief their second shif t replacements.
l 2.
==
Description:==
The County PIO at the Emergency News Center indicated there was no County PIO back-up available. (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a, A.4) l l
m.
29 Recommendat!on: The County should identify and trata a back-up for PIO in the ENC.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
One of the pocket pagers used to alert the County e
Sheriff's staff did not trigger upon activation of the pager system.
Recommendation: The cause of the malfunction in the pocket pager should be determined and corrected.
==
Description:==
Periodic briefings were given by the Emergency Director for the overall County response. The briefings did not include status reports from the various agencies represented at the EOC. (NUREG-0654, II, A.1.b, A.2.a)
Recommendation: Briefings should include status reports from each gency rer esented in the EOC. The reports could be kept brief but should include the current status of the various agencies' response and any changes or additions 'to their at.tlons since the previous briefing.
==
Description:==
The telefax machine was slow in receiving and transmitting messages: The hardcopy of the first EBS message was delayed in getting to the EOC over the telefax. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d)
Recommendation:
The delays in message transmission over telefax machine should be identifled and remedied.
Description:
Due to a severe thundersto-m during the early portion of the exercise, some of the municipals had difficulties in receiving messages transmitted over the EMRAD radio. Also, several of the municipal EOCs reported that they had difficulties in understariding some of the verbal radio transmissions from the County EOC. The messages were sometimes garbled and overpowered with background noise. (NUREG-0654, II, F)
Recommendation: The noise level could be significantly reduced if all the radio operators were provided with headsets as compatible with their equipment.
Also, to improve the quality of the transmissions over the radio systems, the operators should receive additional training in communication protocol and procedures.
Descript*on: The County PIO at the EOC was not familiar with the process used to compile, draf t and release the EBS message. He did not know whether the EBS originated at the State EOC or at the Emergency News Center. (NUREG-0654, II, G.4.b, 0.4.j)
t 30
\\
Eecommendation: The PIOS should receive training on the process and procedures used to formulate and release EBS messages.
2.4.2 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public 2.4.2.1 Radiological Field Monitoring The objective to demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne r.:,diolodine concentrations as low as 104 uCI/CC in the presence of noble gases was met (OCFA3).
Two radiological field monitoring teams were mobilized to demonstrate the activities associated -with this objective in order to verify completion of a corrective action which was identified during a previous exercise. The Area Requiring Corrective Action was corrected by the knowledge exhibited by team members from both teams.
Also, silver zeolite cartridges were supplied to the teams.
Both teams' had the required equipment necessary for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations.
H,owever, one of the teams did not check through their equipment prior to deployment into the field. The teams were not required to set up and demonstrate the operation of the equipment due to the inclement weather. Instead, each team was asked to describe the procedures for field monitoring at the various locations that they reported to.
The equipment assigned to the two teams had functioning batteries and appeared to be in good operating condition. The units had been recently calibrated. Team members knew that the sample cartridges should be removed from high background areas before initial field measurements could be taken on them.
Portable gasoline generators were given to the teams to supply the power necessary to operate their sampling equipment. The team members indicated that they would be getting 12 volt direct current (d.c.) power converters, which run off the vehicle batterles.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed in the radiological field monitoring.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
Descriptiom One of the teams did not check through their equipment and supplies prior to deployment into the field.
(NUREG-0654, II,1.8)
Recommendattom Field team personnel should check through their equipment and verify that all required supplies are available.
s 31 AREAS RBCOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There wers no Areas Recommended For Improvement observed in the radio-logical field monitoring.
2.4.2.2 Pinelands Congregate Care Center The objective to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptl'; (Congregate Care Center) was not observed (OCFA 1). A Congregate Care Center (CCC) was opened vp during the exerciso at the Pinelands High School. The CCC was to have been activated out of sequence with the scenario to facilitate the evaluator, however, notifica' tion and arrival of some of Te CCC personnel eccurred prior to the agreed upon out-of-sequence timing and prior to the arrival of the evaluator at 1730.
Full staffing was complete at 1840.
The ab!!!ty to fully staff the CCC facility and maintain staffing around the clock was demonstrated by the first shift personnel and by presentation of a duty rester with names of the second shift (OCFA 2). The organizations represented at the CCC and their functions included:
American Red Cross - registration, first aid, shelter management j
1 Salvation Army
- evacuee feeding Ocean County
- monitoring, decontamination Fire Departments
- monitoring, vehicle decontamination An issue identified during a previous exercise was corrected with the demonstration of the 24-hour capability.
The objective to demonstrate the procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees at the CCC was not met (OCFA 5). The registration of evacuees was adequately demonstrated by the Ocean County Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC), after the evacuees had been monitored and found to be vold of radiological contamination.
Numerous problems were identified with the process of monitoring evacuees. The initial monitoring of arriving vehicles was performed by fire department personnel in the parking lot. The equipment used by the monitoring teams was not that identified in the plan and w'as not adequate for the monitoring activities. This same equipment was also used for the initial monitoring of personnel..There was no designated traffic flow pattern to assist with incoming evacuees and vehicles as required by the plan. There were no barriers or indicators to contain and route the evacuees through the facility. Evacuees arriving at the high school building from the parking lots, after being monitored, did not have any identification provided to them which would indicate whether or not contamination had been detected. The Ocean County Department of Health personnel were available to perform additional monitorlag and decontamination.
They were provided with instruments which were not identified in the plan.
This equipment would have been sufficient for the assigned activity but the monitoring
~
32
,,ersonnal were not adequately trained in its proper use. An issue identified during a 1
previous exercise which was concerned with the lack of experience in the use of radiological monitorlag equipment remains outstanding.
The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees was met (OCFA 6). The Ocean County Chapter of the ARC was responsible for the setting up, running, and maintaining of the mass care portion of the CCC. Sufficient personnel were available and were knowledgeable of their assignments. Representatives of the regional ARC office and the National ARC Office were present to provide added advice and to supply additional assistance if needed. The shelter manager was familiar with the operation of the facility and knew what to do in the event that the shelter were to become filled to capacity. He was not aware what the maximum capacity was.
DEFICIENCIES
)
- Descriptiom There were several inadequacies observed at the Pinelands High School Congregate Care Center which would limit the ability to protect the health and safety of the public. (NUREG-0654, II, J.12):
The equipment used by the monitoring teams for vehicle survey and initial monitoring of personnel was net that identified in the plan and was not adequate for the monitoring activity.
There was no designated traffic flow patte'en to assist with incoming evacuees and vehicles as required by the plan.
Evacuees arriving at the high school building from the parking lots, after being monitored, did not have any identification provided to them which would indicate whether or not contamination had been detected.
The equipment provided to the Ocean County Department of Health for monitoring and decontamination was not that identified in the plan. This equipment would have been sufficient for the assigned l
activities but the monitoring personnel were not adequately trained in its proper use.
Recommendation:
1 1.
Proper equipment and training in its use should be provided to the emergency workers at the CCC. The equipment which is to be used sho. Id be identified.
- Issue corrected at June 10,1987 remedial exercise.
l 1
33 2.
The CCC facility should be set up with routes to direct and contain the evacuees.
l 3.
Identification badges or tags should be issued to each evacuee indicating whether or not they are contaminated.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
The shelter manager was not aware of what the maximum capacity of the CCC was, as specified in the plan.
(NUREG-0654, II, A.I.d)
Recommendation:
The capacity of the CCC shelter should be known by the manager.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no Areas Recommended for Improvement observed.
2.4.2.2.1 Pinelands Congregate Care Center Remedial Exercise A remedial exercise was conducted at the Pinelands Congregate Care Center on June 10,1987, to retest the response capabilities and correct the Deficiency found during the May 12,1987 exercise.
There were three objectives identified to be demonstrated by the Congregate Care Center staff:
1.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
4 2.
Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
3.
Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
One Federal evaluator, Brad Salmonson from Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, was at the Pineland facility during the remedial drill.
l The objective to demonstrate the ability to activate the Congregate Care Center promptly was met.
The nature of the drill precluded the obser'ation of the staff notification procedures. The Ocean County headquarters bus, carrying equipment and supplies to support the Congregate Care Center operations, including:
registration, monitoring and decontamination, of evacuees and vehicles, arrived promptly at 1700, the start time of the drill.
The Tuckerton Fire Department's tanker truck, used for
\\
t 34 decontamination, arrived at 1701. Activation of the facility began immediately upon the arrival of these two vehicles. The vehicle monitoring and decontamination area, set up outside, was ready for use by 1734. Activation of the vehicle monitoring area included:
Setting up barriers at all entrances to the Pinelands School parking lots; Placement of traffic signs and cones within the parking lot to establish traffic flow patterns for separating uncontaminated and contaminated vehicles; Distribution of emergency worker dosimetry to all emergency workers, zeroing dosimeters, and recording initial readings; Preparing the survey equipment and checking for operability (i.e.,
installation of batteries, battery che'ck and checking calibration against a known source.);
Operations test of the tanker truck wash water and detergent spray system.
The portion of the Pineland Congregate Care operat'on which uses the inside of the building was set up and ready to receive evacuees by 1734.
Access control including: a reception tabi:, barrier ropes and direction signs, for routing incoming contaminated and uncontaulnated evacuees to appropriate facility entrances, were established outside the building by 1740.
The objective to demonstrate procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees was met. Upon arrival at the Pineland facility, evacuee vehicles were monitored by fire department personnel in the parking lot. The ve"ic.ie monitoring team was equipped with the appropriate instrumentation as identified in the plan. It took l
approximately 10 minutes to complete the radiological survey of each car. Although this monitoring process was very detailed and comprehensive, the t!'me allotted to check each vehicle could cause c back-up if the expected number of vehicles arrived at the facility.
l Following mo'.itoring, the uncontaminated vehicles were directed to a clean parking area and contaminated vehicles were directed to the vehicle decontamination area. Contaminated vehicles were washed with a soap and water spray from the fire department tank truck and rinsed with clean water. Vehicles were remonitored for contamination and washed again, if necessary. The remonitoring of vehicles took at least 10 minutes apiece; this process could be expedited if ths teams that performed the initial monitoring were to fill out a survey form whlen Indicated the location of the contamination on each vehicle. The teama that remonitored, following decontamination, could concentrate on the area identified.
The emergency worker performing this monitoring was not well versed in the instruments measurement units. Most important, however, the individual did know the proper instrument rangs setting and the appropriate meter scale mark which would Indicate whether or not the vehicle was contaminated.
After decontamination was completed, vehicles were sent to a clean parking area. Upon m
, o 35 arrival at the parking area, the occupants of the vehicles were not given any instructions on where to go to be registered and processed into the facility.
All evacuees arriving from the parking areas were required to complete an evacuee radiation dose record form. This form provided informa:* n about the evacuee; e.g., name, address, contacts with other people, whereabo'its and activities since the time of the release. The form also included a section on contamination levels and the contamination methods used.
After completing registration, each evacuee was monitored for cr.itamination.
Appropriate instrumentation and procedures were used during this process. Evacuees determined to be uncontaminated were directed to the clean entrance of the congregate care center. Contaminated evacuees received a "personnel decontamination chart" form which noted the area of the body where contamination was found. These persons were sent to the personnel decontamination ces, se,t up in the shower / locker room.
Rope barriers and directional signs were used to direct the contaminated individuals into the decontamination area.
A plastic runner was used to protect the floor from contamination and receptacles were provided for contaminated clothing.
The contaminated individual was monitored again and directed into the shower area to wash down, using normal soap and water. Following wash down, the evacuee was remonitored and if still contaminated would take another shower. If the evacuee was completely decontaminated, clean cloths would be issued and he would be directed to the mass care portion of the Congregate Care Center.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met. All emergency workers were provided with the i
appropriate direct reading dosimeters (DRDs) and permanent record thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). The DRD ranges were, 0-200 mR and 0-20 R. The firemen assigned to vehicle monitoring and decontamination did not have enough DRDs within their supply kits, however, the Ocean County headquarters bus was able to provide the additional DRDs, so that each individual had all the required dosimetry equipment. The fire department assigned one individual to the task of obtaining and recording the DRD readings from each of the firemen, at 30 minute intervals. This person is well versed in the use of DRDs. Some of the other firemen were not as familiar with the use and function of the dosimetry equipment. They were, however, aware that if the DRD indicated a certain reading they should report in to the recordkeeper and their supervisor.
The activities demonstrated during the June 10,1987 remedial exercise corrected the Deficiency evaluated during the May 12, 1987 exercise. The procedures, equipment, and facility available at the Pineland Congregate Care Center were in accordance with the plan and adequate to support the emergency operations.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed at the Pineland Congregate Care Center during the Retaedial Exercise.
36 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action observed at the Pineland Congregate Care Center during the Remedial Exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
It took approximately 10 minutes to complete the radiological survey of each car. Although this monitcring process was very detailed and comprehensive, the time allotted to check each vehicle could cause a back-up if the expected number of vehicles arrived at the facility.
Recommendation: Vehicle monitoring. teams survey "key" locations on the incoming vehicles, rather than the entire vehicle surface, in order to speed up the process. ("Key" locations are areas such as wheel wells, air cleaners, radiator, etc.)
==
Description:==
After vehicles received the decontamination process, they were remonitored for contamination. The remonitoring of vehicles took at least 10 minutes apiece.
- Recommendation: This process should be expedited by having the teams that perfoemed the initial monitoring fill out a survey form, which Indicated the location of the contamination on each vehicle.
The teams that remonitored, following decontamination, could concentrate on the area identified.
==
Description:==
The emergency worker performing the remonitoring of vehicles was not well versed in the Instruments measurement units.
- Recommendation:
Additional training should be provided on instrument operation.
Description Upon arrival at the parking are's following decontam-Instion, the occupants of the vehicles were not given any instructions on where to go to be registered and peccessed into the facility.
- Recommendation:
A procedure should be developed whicit will direct the incoming evacuees to the proper locations.
==
Description:==
Some of the firemen performing decontamination were not familiar with the use end function of the dostmetry equipment.
Recommendation: Personnel at the Congregate Care Center should receive training on proper dosimetry use.
s 37 2.4.2.3 Manahawkin Decontamination Center The objective to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the facilities promptly (Decontamination Center) was not observed (OCFA 1).
A Decontamination Center was activated at the Ocean County Municipal Utility Authority in Manahawkin, prior to the arrival of the Federal Evaluator. The activation and set up of the facility was not observed.
The Decontamination Center manager presented a roster of second shift personnel who would be used to maintain operations at the center on a continuing basis.
The objective to demonstrate 24-hour staffing was met (OCFA 2), and an issue from a previous exercise was corrected. The staff present at the center displayed adequate training and knowledge of emergency procedures.
All the required personnel, as identified in the plan, were at the center.
The objective to demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles was met (OCFA 7).
This decontamination center is for emergency workers including personnel from law enforcement, fire departments, radiological monitoring teams, and bus drivers. The facility is available to receive and process both vehicles and people. The facility was well organized, and set up as specified in the plan. The staff were knowledgeable in their emergency response activities and assignments at the center.
The separation of contaminated and uncontaminated persons and vehicles was controlled. A process for traffic flow was established and maintained while the decontamination center was operational. A problem was observed with some of the equipment used for radiological monitoring following the decontamination procedures. The survey meter used was not the type identified in the plan.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
The survey meters used for radiological monitoring following decontamination was not the type specified in the plan.
(NUREG-0854, II, K.5.b)
Recommendation: The equipment identified in the plan and the equipment used by the teams in the field should be the same.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no Areas Recommended For Improvement observed.
t 38 2.4.3 Emergency Worker Exposure Control The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was not met (OCFA 4).
At the Pinelands Congregate Care Center the Ocean County Department of Health personnel had adequate direct reading dosimeters (DRD) but the firemen and police did not. Most of the firemen assigned to the initial monitoring of vehicles had only one DRD and no TLDs. Some firemen had a 200 mR DRD and some had 20 R DRD, none were equipped with both, as required by the plan. TLDs were not available for any emergency workers at the CCC.
However, these problems. were corrected at the June 10,1987 Remedial Exercise.
At the Manahawkin Decontamination Center the personnel did not have TLDs and some of the workers did not have DRDs. TLDs were available but were not issued. The firemen assigned to veh!cle decontamination had no dosimetry.
The rescue squad personnel had a 200 mR DRD but no 20 R DRD as required in the plan. The rescue squad had TLDs, but were not properly trained in their use. All of the TLDs for the squad were brought to the Decontamination Center rather than issuing them to individuals and keeping the remainder at the dispatch point. The TLDs were kept in the vehicle which brought them to the center and were not issued to the staff. The personnel assigned to initial vehicle monitoring had only one set of DRDs for two monitors.
Both field teams from Ocean County exhibited the knowledge and training needed to protect workers from receiving excess exposure and to control the amount of exposure received. Both teams zeroed their dosimeters and recorded readings from their dosimeters on the Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Record forms. Individuals were aware that dosimeters should be read a minimum of every 30 minutes and that authorization was required to receive excess exposure. All Individuals on Team #1 were aware of the limit above which they required authorization. Some individuals in Team #2 were somewhat unsure of the limit and were confused between mR and R.
- However, after further discussion between team members they reached a consensus and identified the proper limit requiring authorization. Both teams had KI, were familiar with its use, function, and who would lnstruct them to take it.
All teams were aware of l
decontamination procedures and Team #2 said that they would monitor themselves prior to entering the vehicle after each field monitoring stop.
Both teams had anticontamination clothing and were aware of its use. All teams had "permanent" record TLD badges. Both teams had Self Contained Breathing Apparatuses (SCBA's) available.
DEFICIENCIES l
There were no Deficiencies observed in emergency worker exposure control at the Manahawkin Decontamination Center.
1
l e
39 AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.*
Description:
At the Pinelands Congregate Care Center the firemen and police did not have adequate direct reading dosimeters and TLDs were not available. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a)
Recommendation:
Emergency workers at the CCC should be provided with the required dosimetry equipment and TLDs as specified in the plan.
2.
==
Description:==
At the Manahawkin Decontamination Center the personnel did not have TLDs and some of the workers did not have DRDs. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a)
Recommeadation:
Emergency workers at the Decontamination Center should be provided with the required dosimetry equipment and TLDs, as specified in the plan.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no Areas Recommended For Improvement in emergency worker expostre control observed at the Manahawkin Decontamination Center.
2.4.4 Ocean County Municipal Response Activities EOCs were activated at the following 16 municipalities: Barnegat, Barnegat Light, Beachwood, Berkeley, Dover, Harvey Cedars, Island Heights, Lacey, Long Beach, Ocean, Ocean Gate, Pine Beach, Sea Side Park, South Toms River, Stafford, and Surf City.
South Toms Rive-was not able to achieve full staffing and was unable to demonstrate any of the exere!se objectives assigned to the municipal EOCs. Neither the Emergency Management Coordinator nor the Deputy Emergency Management Coordinator was available and those acting in this capacity were not trained sufficiently in radiological emergency preparedness to adequately perform emergency responsibilities. Due to the inadequacy of trained staff, South Toms River was not able to demonstrate the following objectives:
The ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
The ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
The ability to make decisions and coordinate emergency activities.
- !ssue corrected at June 10,1987 remedial exercise.
40 The adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
The ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
Because South Toms River was unable to demonstrate these objectives, a deficiency was cited.
To retest their emergency response capabilities, a Remedial Exercise was held on July 23,1987 (see Section 2.4.4.8).
The following sections are formatted by the specific objectives that the municipal EOCs were to meet.
2.4.4.1 Activation The objective to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly were successfully met at most of the municipal EOCs (OCM 1). All municipal EOCs received a call over the Ocean County Sheriff's Communication Division radio to initiate activation. This call was sent out when the emergency status was upgraded to Alert (received at municipal EOCs at approximately 1624).
Staff mobilization procedures were adequately demonstrated for most municipal EOCs by use of written call lists. Staffing of most of the municipal EOCs was completed within 30 minutes.
Notable exceptions were at the Lacey EOC, which took about 2-1/2 hours to become completely staffed, and South Toms River EOC, which never achieved complete staffing. See Section 2.4.4.8 South Toms River Remedial Exercise.
Partial staffing within 30 minutes at the Lacey EOC was considered adequate for conducting emergency operations. Difficulty in contacting emergency workers enroute to their homes from their normal jobs accounted for the delay in completing staffing at Lacey. Limited amount of staff (both primary and back-up) accounted for the inability of South Toms River to achieve full activation, and thus, South Toms River was not able to conduct en ergency operations.
Full garticipation in the exercise by the staff at the Island Heights EOC corrected an issue identified from the previous exercise.
DEFICIENCJES There were no Deficiencies at the Ocean County Municipal EOCs related to their activation.
i I
4
-,s-
,,n,,,--.-
,--m,e-,,,, - - -, -
--,,,-m.-
,,-,,,,-n--,-,
nn,,,,,m_
i 41 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1.*
Description:
Full, prompt activation was not demonstrated at South Toms River. (NUREG-0654, II, E.2)
Recom mendations: Additional back-up staff should be provided for the township in order to ensure prompt and complete activation of the EOC in the event of an emergency.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The need exists at Harvey Cedar for more specific e
call-up lists (e.g., backups).
i Recommendation: The call-up list needs to be improved by having back-up personnel listed for each emergency organization position.
==
Description:==
While call-up lists for activation were used at Serf City, the lists did not list individuals for primary and back-up activation.
Recommendation: A new call list should be formulated which lists emergency organization positions and personnel for each work shift for each organization.
2.4.4.2 Staffing and 24-Hour Operation The objective to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock was successfully met at most of the municipal EOCs (OCM 2).
The ability to maintain staffing on a 24-hour basis was demonstrated by the presentation of duty rosters showing second (and occasionally third) shift personnel and their assignments. Double staffing of various positions were conducted at a number of EOCs. This demonstrated the ability of backup (second shift) personnel to adequately handle emergency operations, as well as their interests in obtaining practical experience. Presentation of 24-hour staffing rosters at the Barnegat and Stafford EOCs corrects the staffing issue identified during the previous exercise.
A number of EOCs have had actual experience with long-term staffing during other emergencies (i.e., hurricanes).
The ability to provide 24-hour coverage was not met at South Toms River, Pine Beach, and Harvey Cedars EOCs. Additionally, full staffing of the first shift was not demonstrated at South Toms River. Due to the inadequacy of staffing, South Toms River was unable to demonstrate the ability to protect the public as well as emergency workers. Because of this deficlocy, a Remedial Exercise was conducted on July 22,
- lssue corrected at July 22,1987 remedial exercise.
~.
42 1
1987 (see Section 2.4.4.8).
Improvements in the organization of duty rosters are suggested for Harvey Cedars and Surf City EOC.
DEFICIENCY 1.*
Description:
South Toms River EOC was not able to achieve full staffing or to provide 24-hour coverige; therefore, was not able to demonstrate the exercise objectives assigned to the Ocean County Municipal EOCs. (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a, A.4, G.4.a)
Recommendation: Ocean County must make an effort to correct the staffing problem at the South Toms River EOC to ensure that key emergency personnel, as well as back-up emergency personnel, are available and trained to, carry out all emergency responsibilities.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1.
==
Description:==
The Pine Beach EOC and Harvey Cedars EOC did not demonstrate 24-hour staffing capabilities.
(NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a A.4)
Recommendation:
Additional emergency workers need to be trained to serve as second shift personnel for key emergency organization positions.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no Areas Recommended for Improvement observed.
l 2.4.4.3 Emergency Operations Management The objective to demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities was met at all but one of the municipal EOCs (OCM 3). Most of the i
local Emergency Management Coordinators (EMCs) were effectively in charge of operations; controlling activities and coordinating the overall emergency responses.
Effective management shown by the EMC and/or deputy EMC at Barnegat and Island Heights corrects an issue identified at these EOCs during the previous exercise.
However, although the required EMC training had not been done et Pine Beach due to difficulties in finding volunteers to train for the EMC position, there were no major problems identified in Emergency Management operations. A positive attitude and team-work were displayed at most EOC.,, as demonstrated through the participation of other emergency workers in the decision-making process.
' Issue corrected at July 22,1987 remedial exercise.
I
l 43 Incoming and outgoing messages were legged at most EOCs. As a result of the close working relationships established at most EOCs, staff were kept updated on the emergency status and activities being undertaken by the municipality, county, and state EOCs. Most EOCs had other written procedures or checklists available. These were effectively utilized during each upgrade in the emergency status. Use of such procedural checklists at Beachwood, Pine Beach, and Ocean Gate corrects an issue from the previous exercise identified for these municipal EOCs. Lists of noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons were presented for Dover, Island Heights, Ocean Gate, and Pine Beach, correcting an issue identified in the previous exercise.
However, the mobility-impaired list was not available at Barnegat, and remains an outstanding issue that needs to be addressed.
DEFICIENCY There were no. Deficiencies observed at the Ocean County Municipal EOC related to Emergency Operation Management.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1.
==
Description:==
A list of noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons was not available at the Barnegat EOC. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.d) This is sin 13 sue also identified at a previous exercise.
Recommendation: The Barnegat EOC should have a list of those individuals.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
Message logs were not fully completed at the Long
+
Beach EOC. For example, the time that messeges were received were not recorded.
Recommendation: Message logs should be Tom fully completed; emphasizing the content, who sent the message, declaration time of l
contents in message, and the time that the message war received at the Long Beach EOC.
==
Description:==
The required EMC training had not been done at Pine Beach EOC.
Recommendation: Training should be provided to the designated coordinator at the Pine Beach EOC.
44 2.4.4.4 Facilities The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations was successfully met at most of the municipal EOCs (OCM 4).
Most EOCs had adequate space, equipment, and supplies.
The issue raised during previous exercises concerning the lack of potable water at the Beachwood EOC has been corrected. EOC operations have been moved to a new facility in a modern building.
Organization of the working area at the Barnegat EOC has improved, and so is no longer an issue of concern.
Noise was a minor inconvenience at several municipal EOCs; but not to the extent that emergency operations could not be effectively conducted.
A better organized EOC at Pine Beach would enhance Emergency operations.
Maps, charts, displays, and status boards were available and utilized at most EOCs. When particular maps w' re not posted (e.g., maps showing reloegtlon centers or traffic / access points),
e l
the necessary information was known or readily available in written form.
l Most EOCs had stationed police officers effectively controlling hecess into the EOC.
The issue raised concerning implementation of procedures to ensure that i
contaminatcd ind!viduals are not allowed access into the EOC has been corrected at l
Barnegat, Beachwood, Dover, Island Heights, Ocean Gate, and Pine Beach. This issue i
was corrected by the security officers conducting radiological screenings of individuals prior to allowing them admittance into the EOC. Radiological screening was not done at Ocean Township, considering the close proximity of the Ocean Township EOC to the plant, it is foreseeable that the EOC would have to relocate before the concern of admittance of potentially contaminated persons into the EOC would arise. Nevertheless, I
it is an issue that was raised during the previous exercise and remains a concern that needs to be resolved.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies at the Ocean County Municipal EOCs related to their facilities.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTWE ACTIONS 1.*
Description:
Space was too cluttered with nonessential equipment at the South Toms River EOC. Also, staadard operating procedure guidellr.es, message forms, and other essential materials were not stored in readily known areas. Classification levels and a status board were not posted. Space was not adequate for emergency workers to sit and work efficiently and comfortably. (NUREG-1 0654, II, A.4, D.3, G.3.a, H.2, H.3, J.10.a, J.10.b) l l
- lssue corrected at July 22,1987 remedial exercise.
l l
m
45 Recommendation:
The South Toms River EOC should be kept partially set-up at all times. The radio should be put in a better part of the EOC (e.g., away from "kitchen" area).
Plans and standard opera'..ng procedural guidelines should be up-to-date and readily accessible. A status board and classification level poster should be permanently posted on the wall.
2.
==
Description:==
No steps were taken to ensure that personnel coming into the Ocean Township EOC were not radiologically contam-inated. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.3.a) This is an issue aise identified at a previous exercise.
Recommendation:
Radiological monitoring should be done for incoming personnel.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
All radios at the Harvey Cedars EOC were located e
next to each other, making it difficult to hear messages broadcast over different radios.
Recommendation:
Radios should be spaced apart. coupled with having radio operators for each radio.
==
Description:==
Content of messages were not written on the message board at the Pine Beach EOC.
Recommendation:
The content of the message, not just the message number, should be written on the message board for the benefit of all staff at the EOC.
==
Description:==
The Pine Beach EOC could be better organized to enhance emergency operations.
Also, message logging was not efficient. (NUREG-0654,11, G.3.a, H.2, H.3)
Recommendation:
The State and County should assist the Pine Beach officials in redesigning the facility to improve emergency operations.
More participation at the EOC is needed so that messages can be properly logged.
2.4.4.5 Ccmmunications The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was successfully met e.t all of the municipal EOCs (OCM 5).
Generally, the municipal EOCs were well prepared for any communications that would be required. Radio (e.g., EMRAD) was the primary system
46 for most communications (especially with the Ocean County EOC), with telephone and/or other radio systems available for back-up. Communications to schools, hospitals, and various support organizations were primarily done by telephone. The issue raised that communication operators missed messages distributed early in the previous exercise at l
Island Heights and Pine Beach was corrected. Operators at these EOCs manned their radios at all times during the exercise.
A severe thunderstorm occurred during the early portion of the exercise and communication problems were experienced between a number of municipal EOCs and the Ocean County EOC.
These problems were due to garbled or broken transmissions resulting from the use of the same radio frequency by most EOCs and by the field monitoring teams. Problems also arose due to the speed and clarity (diction) of messages read from the Ocean County EOC. Complaints regarding delays in receiving messages were also expressed by several municipal EOCs. Again, this delay was due to multiple use of the same radio frequency. These above-mentioned concerns are discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.1.
l DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies at the Ocean County Municipal EOCs related to communications.
l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Actions at the Ocean County Municipal EOCs related to communications.
l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
Some messages received at the Harvey Cedar EOC
+
were confusing, but staff personnel did not request a clarification of the messages.
Recommendation: Additional training of communication staff is necessary to make them aware of the need to request message clarification.
==
Description:==
The acoustics at the Pine Beach EOC were a further detriment in trying to decifer garbled or broken transmissions from the Ocean County EOC.
Recommendation: The acoustics in the Pine Beach EOC should be fixed (e.g., install sound insulation on the walls).
l l
l l
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47 i
2.4.4.6 Emergency Worker Exposure Control l
The objective to demonstrcte the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was successfully met at most of the municipal EOCs (OCM 6). Adequate supplies of dosimeter ! (mostly Icw-and mid-range), TLDs, chargers, and recordkeeping forms were available and properly used. Most Radiological Officers at the EOCs tested and zeroed dosimeters prior to issuing them. Personnel were given instructions for dosimetry use and dose recording at the time of issuance. Issues raised over proper use, distribution, checking, and recording of information from dosimeters were corrected at Ocean Gate and Stafford EOCs. Most Radiological Officers made regular communication every half hour with emergency workers reminding them to read their dosimeters. KI (simulated) was also distributed (when ordered by the New Jersey State EOC via Ocean County EOC) with instructions for its use.
Key staff (i.e.,
Radiological Officer and EMC) at most EOCs were aware of maximum radiological doses allowed, procedures to follow if the dose was exceeded, and under what conditions the dose could be exceeded.
The objective to monitor and control emergency worker exposure was not completely met at the Barnegat Light EOC due to a lack of knowledge on maximum exposures allowed for emergency workers and procedures to follow if the maximum exposure was exceeded.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed in Emergency Worker Exposure Control.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1.
==
Description:==
The EMC at the Barnegat Light EOC stated that emergency workers who have received an exposure of 2.5 R would return to the EOC. This does not agree with the plan which states that the emergency worker would callin to see what decontamina-tion center to report to after having received an exposure of 1.25 R. (NUREG-0654, II, K.5.b)
Recommendation:
Additional training of emergency workers concerning radiological exposure control should be conducted.
Also, information such as maximum exposure doses and procedures to follow when doses are exceeded should be posted in a prominent location.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Descriptiom The radiological officer in charge of distributing
+
dosimeters at the Lacey EOC read all of the emergency workers' dosimeters at one-half hour intervals.
t l
48 Recommendatiom All emergency workers should be trained and given the opportunity to read their own dosimeters.
==
Description:==
The staff at the Stafford EOC did not apparently know l
where to go if a relocation of the EOC was necessary (i.e., alternate EOC location).
Recommendattom The county should inform the Stafford EOC (and probably other municipal EOCs) where to relocate if an evacuation of the facility is required.
This information, coupled with a l
description under which this situation would occur, should be visibly l
posted at all municipal EOCs located within the 10-mile EPZ.
2.4.4.7 Administration of KI The objective to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so, was successfully met at most of the municipal EOCs (OCM 8).
Key staff (e.g., Radiological Officer) were aware that the order for administering KI was to come from the State EOC and that directions for use were on the bottles. The issue related to a lack of familiarity for administering K1 that were evident in the previous exercise was corrected at Barnegat, Lacey, Ocean, Pine Beach, and Stafford EOCs. El supplies at most facilities were fresh or fresh supplies for expired supplies were expected within a few days. Simulated K! was present at the municipal EOCs for use during the exercise.
The objective was partly unmet at the Surf City EOC, as the EMC and his deputy were not sure as to who was to make the decision to administer KI.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Defielencies observed in the administration of KI.
AREAS REQUlRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1.
==
Description:==
The EMC and his deputy at the Surf City EOC were not sure about who makes the decision to administer Kl. They thought it was to be done at the county or municipal!ty level.
(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e)
Recommendation: Provide additional or more frequent training of
(
emergency workers.
Also, a large information card should be placed by the KI supplies that details administration procedures.
49 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l
==
Description:==
Simulated KI was available at the Long Beach EOC, e
but actual supplies had expired and a fresh stock had not yet arrived.
Recommendation: A better system for replacing KI is needed. K!
supplies should be delivered to the EOC prior to the expiration date of existing supplies.
2.4.4.8 South Toms River EOC Remedial Exercise 4
A remedial exercise was conducted at the South Toms River EOC on July 22, 1987 to r9 test the response capabilities and operect the Deficiency found during the May 12,1987 exercise.
There were seven objectives identified to be demonstrated by the EOC staff.
1.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities pror.1ptly.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to fully staff facillt'les and maintain staffing around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4.
Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
One Federal Evaluator, Joanne O'Sullivan from FEMA Region II, was at the South Toms River EOC during the remedial exercise.
The objectives to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly and to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock were met (1 and 2). The initial notification to the South Toms River EOC was transmitted via the pager system. At 1805 the Ocean County EOC called and requested that the South Toms l
River staff advise them when they were fully staffed. Staff mobilization procedures
50 were demonstrated. The Communications Officer promptly notified we staff using a written call list, which had current telephone numbers.
Complete staffing was completed at 1822 ano consisted of the following personnel: Communications Officer, Emergency Management Coordinator, Security
- Officer, Radiological
- Officer, Administrative Officer, Fire Representative, Public Works, Police Officer, and First Aid. The staff present at the EOC demonstrated an adequate knowledge of emergency response procedures. A roster identifying those personnel available for second shift operations was presented. There appears to be a sufficient number of back-up personnel listed on the roster.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities was met (3).
The Emergency Management Coordinator was effectively in charge of the EOC operations. He demonstrated adequate knowledge of the plan and emergency management responsibilities. Periodic briefings were conducted;
. and at each change in emergency, classification level the EOC staff was reminded to verify that all required activities and procedures had been initiated or completed, as specified in their written checklist.
The Emergency Management Coordinator was aware of all messages received and acted on them accordingly. Message logs were kept and all messages requiring a reply were responded to. When the message was received from Ocean County that siren #11 had failed, immediate actions were implemented to dispatch (simulated) emergency vehicles (fire truck and police car) to perform route alerting.
The EOC at South Toms River was notified of the Alert at 1805, the Site Area Emergency at 1930, and the General Emergency at 2015. All notifications were acted on appropriately.
The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of the facilities and displays to support emergency operations was met (4). Appropriate maps and charts were visibly displayed and updated as necessary. The communication equipment (radios) are located in an area sectioned off from the main EOC operations area. This separr.tlon helps to minimize and control the noise. Security was established at the entrance to the EOC and was maintained during the duration of the exercise.
Back-up pow'er generators are available if required; their activation was not demonstrated. The EOC is arranged to support extended operations, with showers and room available to set up cots.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel was met (5). All communication equipment and the procedures demonstrated were sufficient for the EOC operations.
Communications with Ocean County and with emergency workers in the field were maintained throughout the exercise, there were no problem encountered. All messages received from the Ocean County EOC were clearly audible and those requiring a reply I
were quickly responded to.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was partially met (6) and an Area Requiring Corrective Action remains incomplete. Emergency personnel at the Toms River EOC were issued low-and mid-range dosimeters and TLDs. According to the plan, each emergency worker
$1 Is responsible for maintaining their own dosimeters (i.e., checking and recording dosimeter readings). Only the Radiological Officer read and recorded his dosimeter at the 30-minute interval, as required. In addition, neither the Emergency Management Coordinator nor the Radiological Officer were aware of the maximum allowable dose without authorization. They were aware they would notify the County EOC if there was a reading on the dostmeter, but they were not aware of what that reading was.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has bera made to do so was met (7). The E,mergency Management Coordinator r
at the South Toms River EOC was familiar with the procedures for administering
)
potassium lodide. There was a fresh supply available in the EOC (expiration date of November 1989). At 2020 the Ocean County EOC sent a message to simulate taking of KI. The Fmergency Management Coordinator immediately responded by advising all emergency workers to ingest KI as instructed. An Area Requiring Corrective Action from a previotis exercise was corrected.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies evaluated at the South Toms River EOC.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
Descriptions in the South Toms River EOC only the Radiological Officer read and recorded his dosimeter at the 30-minute interval, as required by the plan. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.b)
Recommendation: All emergency workers should be trained in the procedures for reading and recording their dosimeters values.
2.
==
Description:==
Neither the Emergency Management Coordinator nor the Radiological Officer knew that the authorized dose limit was 1.25 Rem. (NUREG-0654, II, K.4)
Recommendation: An emergency workers, particularly decision makers, abould be awce of the maximum dose allowed without authorization.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no Arect Recommended for Improvement evaluated at the South Toms River EOC.
l 52 2.4.4.9 Evacuation of On-site Personnel The objective to demonstrate the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of on-site personnel was not observed during the May 12, 1987 exercise (see Section 2.4.1) because the evacuees left prior to the arrival of the FEMA observer. However, an on-site evacuation was successfully demonstrated during the July 22, 1987 Remedial Exercise.
On July 22,1987 a remedial exercise was conducted to test the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of on-site personnel at the Oyster Creek plant.
Robert L. Acerno from the FEMA Region II office evaluated the on-site evacuation.
t One objective was identified for demonstration during the Remedial Exercise:
Demonstrate the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of on-site personnel. This objective was met.
The on-site evacuation was responded to in a prompt and well organized fashion. The ability and resources necessary to provide access control and monitor traffic flow in the vicinity of the evacuation was adequately demonstrated by two State L
Troopers stationed at traffic control points. Both Troopers arrived at their assigned post s
promptly, were equipped with barricades and protective clothing, had the required
(
dosimetry equipment, and were familiar with dosimetry procedures. They had an ample f
supply of KI (expiration date - November 1989) and were aware of who may authorize its k
use. They were familiar with the evacuation routes to be used and where the remote assembly area was located. Both Troopers had a computerized radio system and back-up radios in their vehicles.
An Individual from the GPU staff who acted as the guard and the evacuee for the demonstration, arrived promptly at the gate and was familiar with the applicable evacuation route. He was provided with a hand-held FM transceiver with a rapeater, which enabled him to communicate with both the plant and the remote assembly area.
The remote assembly area is located approximately 15 miles from the plant, and was sufficient in providing monitoring and decontamination for the plant evacuees. Privately owned vehicles would be used to transport the plant personnel to the remote assembly area.
DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed at the on-Q ; evacuation.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There werc no Areas Requiring Corrective Action observed at the on-site evacuation.
t
53 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no Areas Recommended for Improvement observed at the on-site evacuation.
4
54 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Act'on. The definitions of exercFse inadequacles are as follows:
Deficiencies 0.re demonstrated and observed inadequacles that would cause a finding that offolte emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropelate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility In the event of radiological emergency.
Because of the potential impact of defielencies on emergency preparedness, they are requ! red to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other actions.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacles of State and local government performance, and although their ocerection is required during the next scheduled blenatal exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
Section 2 of this report lists Defielencies or Art:as Requiring Corrective Action based on the findings and recomme.wlations of federal evaluators at the exercise of the radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Oyster Creek Generating Station on May 12,1987. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), and objectives for the remedial exercise agreed upon by the State, FEMA, and the RAC.
i l
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA l
Associato Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Wasnington, D.C., that any Deficiencies or 2reas Requiring Corrective Actions have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.
l FEMA requests that both t:le State and local jurisdictions su' omit a schedule of actions they have taken 7 Intend to take to correct these inadequacles.
FEMA l
rece,nmends that a det-i plan, loclud.)g dates of completion for scheduling and implementing recommenda..ans, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immed 4tely.
l Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action which were observed at the l
May 12,1987, exercise for the Oyster Creek Generating Station, as well as outstat.Lg l
Deficiencies or Areu Requiring Corrective Action from 1
'lous exercises, require that i
a schedule of corrective r.ctions be developed. Table 3 will summarize recommendations l
to correct those Deficiencies or Areas Requirliig Corrective Action. The current status cf ill recommendations will be indicated.
i l
l l
l L--
1.
TABLE 3.1 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENER ATING STATION - SUMRIART OF DF.FICIENCES l'
AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTtvE ACTION bley 12,1987 BTATE OF MEW JERSET Fage 1 of 3 Issue Idencified Wunec-06S4 heecription and FDIA-REP-t Previews Esercica Esercise Pre sent ase.
bece m Corrective Actles Etv.*
Ctees g,,,,g,,,4 6/S/85 S/12/87 Status
- h I.
The fifth State message enes fourth ESS emessage, whleh recom-E.5, ARCA X
1 seended evoemetten, stated that *A seteued description of the routes E.7, will follow the eempletten of thin emessage". However, no seek F
detalle were trenomitted by the Ctete. The smessege itself therefore did not laelude "the ;; m." te es;neeta af eveemetlen"(NUREO-8854, II, E.7). De fitete befermed the FEMA evehsetor that the EDS 1
station has thle Informellen rad wt 14 auteenelleelly odd it to thle meseege. Reference to thle process wee ret foemd in the State Plan.
I Since no evaluetor uras et the redte statloa, and the stellen did not
(
broedeast er record mesonges as they would have gene se air, evidence wee not previded to evalustors durlag the eserelse to show that a ese6pleto set of EM breedeemt lastruettoes en eveeuellen routes in conjunetles with the EDS hmedomet orderleg eveemetlen would have been lemmed to the pebble. le view of thle shorteomleg, it j
wee not possible to feverehty evokeste the 4*y of the pre-I ced.re by whleh EBS messages are formeleted and breedeest. It le w
recomencoded that the State EOC and the ENC dessenstrate, with u
appropriately reeerded messages, tint ineerreetly trenomitted i
i leformetlen een be lemedetely Identifled to the EBS stellen(e) by like EOC's autherleeJ point of eenteet. If time redte eteties le i
authertsed to use any Mment la adding to ERS messages, it le recommended that the Wer record the aseconge as it weesid be reed in a real emergency, and prevlde the reeerding to FEMA evoluetore.
~
2.
No hard espy of the EBS message orderlag eveemeties wee sent to the F
ARCA X
I i
i Deeen County EOC.
It is reesessmended that eral mesange l
communications be supported by wrhten (e.g., teles or telefen) i veriftentles.
I
a TABLAt 3.1 OY5rER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - RIMMARY OF DEFICitapCES AND AREAS REQUORIBIG CORRECTt12 AM1088 May II,1999 WTATE OF NLW JEEMY Page 2 of 3 i
tease Identitled altmac-0654 Bosemiption end FSSA-REP-1 Previene Esercise Estreise Present t
g,,,,g,,,4 6/5/85 5412/87 statee' th.
secommended corrective Action Bew.*
Close 3.
Both troepare had ra** Redido (Elk but molther was evere of J.t e.f.
ARCA X
I i,
the prayer preeedures for eer.herleetlea to adulateter KI. ti is K.4
.ecommended that troepers he better trained in the proceeseos for i
euthortalg the lagoettee of E!.
4.
The State RERF eentales two esaftletleg eriterle for eteerist M.1 X
C eve :veted areas for reentry this L_
^ zi deleyed reestry 'w e (Plan i
short perled. The pies should be reviewed and reelsed to resolve ebenge) i this ceaftlet.
I 5.
The rumor eentrol telepheme number wee met ine:udr5 le oil of the G.3A X
N/Obl C
l E8S mesonges. Determlae whether the rumor eentrol telephose (Plan number is to be laeluded as part of EDS masonges and fauc.e ebenge) conelstent procedures with regard to *his poHey for ejl EM soessages. ~ Aloe W Ineludlag reference to pubile Erformetles brochures in ESS anemonges.
e i
i t
l w
e TART 2 3.3 OYSTER CREEK NUCIAAR GENERAT1100 $7ATIOtf -
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIEE AND AREAS REQUISIIOG CORRECTtVE ACTIOtt asey as, test NFATE OF NEW JERSEY Page 3 of 3 Issue Identiftad istmec-4454 Dneeri*ptioe and FEMA-REP-1 Prevleue Kaercise Esercise Pre sent b
g,,,,g,,,4 6/5/05 5/12/87 Status' me.
Recommended Corrective Acties Bew.*
Ctese l
l 8.
Despite the publie edeontles efforte underteben by the state and G.I.
X X
N/Obj C
utllity, t%e peMie awareneen eenseenleg redelegical emerge =ey G.2 (Per procedures appears to be low. The Stue werting jeletly with the letter utility ab.'d emplere edeltier!al e7setsee to hte the pubMe about froan OEM the eerseleg of the sire. fgnet, Emergesey Plannlag Arees, and dated proteelt e actlen setions. *hle could be seeompilohed try pleeing en 7/19/05) edvertleement la telephone 3rveterlos, laeludsg the inforsaation be calendere, posting read al ne, and making rede and TV -
j t
mente 15ee. 2.1.5, p. 31(96)l. A pr:blie informetlen program eheeld be initleted in the 30-ml> EPL Pneted nettees should be pleeed in hotelo, motele, and ottas.' pleses frettsted by trenelent persons 14.1.5.e(82): Table I.V,7(83)l. PiMie Informellon penphlete givlag Informetlen and lastreetion for use curlag en Emergency should be
~
prleted and distr %ted to all mesters of the publie l4.1.5.b(82):
Table 1,V,6fS3)].
um eNUP EG-9454 FEMA REP-1, key.1. Criterle for tien and Evaluetten of
'C Restedlel Action Complete-l Radiolegleel Emergene' Respenas Plane and.. __ _ in Support of Nuclear Is Remedlet Aetlen leeo aplete.
Power Plante, Part R.
M/Obj.: Not en obleetive.
j N/Obs.: Not otmerved.
N/Rs No NUREG-4654 referenee.
- Def.: Defielency.
3/16/02.
ARCAs Area Requirhg Carrective Aetion.
j These eleselfleetions were added to the table beglaning wit'. the May 12, 1987 escreise and are not given for lemmes identified et prevloes esereisee.
i k
i
TABLE 3.2 OYSTER CRESE NUCl. EAR GENERAT1110 STATIOst - ERIMARY OF DEFICISMCIES AND AREAS REQUBRING CORRECTIVE ACHOli May 12, lue?
EMERcENCY OPERATIOtt FACCJTY Pg e l of 2 Issue Ident! fled IM2 H:-6656 boost!"~1m and FDtA-REP-1 Previous Esercise L ercise Present h
d t
Iso.
Recommended active Accles Rev.*
Clase Esercisee 615/85 5i12/e7 states 3.
Emepy resposee feellity ed not have enmugh telephone lines to F.A X
C support emergency operations. Utillae the meditlenal telephone line whlete was apparently evelleMe during drills. Identify and resolve the proldeun with the rig (.-men telephone.
2.
One display board on plant states whleh le en old in deelegen smkig H.3 X
C was inttlelly used Imt was not kept ey to date. If the plant statue display beerd le to be retained, it mest be k.pt earrent so es not to be misleading. Additlenelly, thle heard should be reworded to simpilly le.terpretellen of the status of the plant.
3.
The designated offletal et the EOF was not clearly in charge of A.2.s X
C comsmaelesting PARS to OEM fee lamplementation. The BRP SR AO Corrected at at the EOF should be clearly la ehmege of coSam.unleeting PARS to the 11-12-86 OEM for implementellen.
Artificial Estead g.,
Encercise m
4.
On several eeenslens there was eensiderette deley in centeeting the F.1 X
C BRP representative et the State EOC by eemaneretel phone.
Identify the emme of the delay in eenteeting the BRP representative et the state EOC by comunerelet telephone and implement a method to swold repeat securrenees of delays la meklag these contacts.
S.
Derlag the early stages of the esereise, there were delays in C.?
C obteleing plant status informellen ahoe to the feet that the utMity Plan has uses not fully activate the EOF with a nuclear engineer wollt the been cheated Site Ares Emnergency eleasifleotten. The State shid a.iraqa with to fa,21y the utility tc, have the utility aestaneel the lolth! EOF stofflag by staff et addlag one nuclear engineer se innt the BRP staff will be able to Alert obtain plant status informellen as asen as BRP errives et the EOF.
y e
- e 6.
<e TABLE 3.2 OTSTER CREER NUCLEAR GENERATit00 frATIOtt - SUteIIARY OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIR8tIG CORRECTIVE ACTION May it. 3907 Ea8ERGE80CY OPERATIOtt FACIEJTY Page 2 et 2 Issue identified puREC-06S4 Beecriptlee and FDtA-REP-1 Previews Esercise Esercise Present b
No.
Receh Correstive Actlos Bew.*
Cleas g,,,gg,,,4 6/5/85 S/12/87 States
- 4.
Fleid teams were not used offsetively to endeln Informatis needed I.8 K
N/Obj C
te veriff dose peeleetleas for en entended perled of time. The field Corrected at teems soust be effectivelj emed to deflee the plume with respoet to the 31/12/84 both eine med streagth. Several measurements of the plume stromgth Artificial should be made et er near plume eenterline, as determined by Islead measurements, se that the pregeetleas een be verlfled or modified as Emercise n(v essary. By this verificellen process, PARS een be ed usted l
accordengly.
- NUREC4454, FEMA AEP-1, Rev.1. Criterne for Preparation and Evaluation of
'Cs Remedtel Aetten Complete.
Redlological Emergency Resposee Flems and 7.. -r r In Support of Nueleer la Remedlet Aetion Incomplete.
Power Plants, Part II.
N/Obj.s Not en objective.
N/Obs. Not observed.
N/Rs No NUREG-0454 referenee.
dPrevleus esereises were held on 5/24/83 and b
u Def.: Defieleney.
3/84/02.
e ARCAs Area Requirlag Corrective Action.
These eleestfleetions esere added to the table beginning with the May II,1987 emereise end are not given for issues identified at previous esereises.
TANLE 3.3 OYSTER CRBEE NUCLEAR GENERA'FBIBG EfAT3ON - SUMBBARY OF DEF9CIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRat0G CORRECTTVE ACTION Stey it.ISSF SUREAU OF NUCLEAR R30GetEERB00G Pese 1 of I Iseue Identifled IfuREC-0654 beocripcios and FEMA-SEP-1 Previene Eserclee Esercise Present h
C ase.
Secommended Corrective Accles sev.*
Close g,,,,g,,,4 6/S/03 S/12/07 ss.%e 1.
Some essergeoey workers ad elst have TLD teges.
Regulae XJ.e I
N/Obj i
briefings should be gives to emergenty flew werkers to ensure that proper use of deelmetere and reserJ keeping of doses are appiled.
2.
Some emergency wortese were unfomuler with sne mesimum E.1 X
N/Obj I
espesure allowed without pnger authorisellen. Emergency workers should be tralned to know the mesimum espesure levelt, et wheek they will be required to notify their megervleet and be authertsed to receive additiesel espeesee if necessary.
l 3.
A radio frequency sheeW be set melde for the escluolue use of flew F.1.d X
N/Obj C
monitoring teams.
'NU AEG-0454. FEnf A REP-1. Rev.1. Critorie for Preparation and Evaluellen of
'Cs Remedlel Aetlen Complete.
Radielegical Emergency Response Pieme and Prepareeness la Support of Nuclear is Ressedlet Aetlen ineemplete.
Power Plante. Part II.
N/Obj.: Not en eblective.
O N/Obea Not ebeerved.
N/Rs No MbREG-0454 reference.
dPrevleus enereises were hew en S/24/83 and bDef.: Deficioney.
3/14/02.
I ARCAs Area Requirleg Correettve Aetlen.
t These elese19eetlees were added to the teWe beginning with the May 12.1987 exerclee and are not given for leones identified at prevleue emerelsea.
l i
g 8
e
TAat2 3.4 OYSTER CREER NUCl2AR GENERATM00 WFAT904 -
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIE80Cl33 AND AREAS RBQ4NRa800 CORRECTtvE ACTION May II,1987 OCEAbi COUttTY Page 1 of 4 l
Issue Identitled l
soumEC-0654 4
Specription and PDIA-BEP-1 Previews Esercise Esercles Present h
g,,,,g,,,4 6/S/85 S/12/87 statue
- ass.
Recensended Corrective Action Bew.*
Close l.
Not all the lasemiss seesad shift permannel were suffielently briefed A.4 ARCA X
I by their first stdft seenterparts mer by the EOC director. The Emergemey Management Coordneter should provide e detailed briefing of the current states and the settelties op to the llane of the shif t ehenge, for ou ineemleg b _ _
- d. In additlen, the first stdft, sheadd brief their eseead stdtt 7. '- --- -z ts.
2.
The County PSO at the E-4 _, News Center ladleeted that there A.2.e, ARCA X
1 wee no County PSO boek-up evellable. The Ceemity should identify A.4 and trela a beek-up for PSO la the ENC.
3.
One of the teems did not edneet threco[te their equipment and supplies' LS ARCA X
I prior to ". -,
__.t late the fleid. Field lesen personnel should check threegh their _..
-M and worify that all regadred sopplies
~
are ovelleble.
4.
There were severet landegseeles sheerved at the Plaeloads High J.11 Def.
X C'
Scheel ceagregate Core Center whleh weiJd limit the ability to protect the hesith and eefety af the publie. Tine ; O-nt used by 1-monitoring teams for veldele survey and Baltlet maattering of personnel we.s not that identifled la the plea and wee act adequate for the seeniterleg setivity. There wee me deelganted traffic flew pottern to oeslot with lesenlag eveemees and weldeles as reepstred by the plan. Eveemees arriolag at the high setteel buildlag frees the parking lots, efter helag steeltered, did not have any ideettfleetlen provided to them wi&h tuould laneese whether er not contemias-ties had been detected. The egulpanent provided to the Ocean County Department of Health for mealterlag med decenteselmellen was not tiet idratified la the plan. This egelpment would have Ineen suff6ekat for the assigned selleltles but the sneeltering personnel i
l TAmos 3.4 OTerER CREEK NHCLEAR GENERATING BrATION -
SUMMARY
OF DEFSCIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIR8800 CORRECTIVE ACTION asey 13.1987 OCEAlf COUIfTY Page 2 of 4 l
Issue Identified l
IfUREC-0656 teocriptlee end FEMA-REP-1 Previene Esercise Ese rci se Present b
g,,,,g,,,4 6/5/85 5/12/a7 statue" I
see.
aseemesmead Corrective Action Rev.*
Ctese l
l were not adequately treteed in its proper ime. proper ognipment end I
trelaing la its use senauld be provided to the esmergemey werkere et the CCC. The :.. nt wheeb Is to be used should be identified The CCC feelNty should be est up with routes to deoet med contain the eveesees. lesettfleetlen Men er tage should be lessed to each j
eveewee ladleetleg whether er met they are eestamineted.
5.
The shelter scenager wee not swore of what the seeminum espeelty A.I.d ARCA X
I of the CCC see, en speelflod Ir. t% plea. The espeelty of the CCC shelter sheaW be known by the umger.
8.
The survey snetere used for redlelegleet meelterleg followlsig E.S.b AltCA X
I decentaminellen wee not the type speelfled la the plan.
De esp.lpment identified in the plan and the espelpment used by the teoarg in the field hM be the same.
X C'
7.
At the pleelande Ceegregate Care Cent'er the firemen and yellee dW KJ.e ARCA not have adequate erset reedisig deelsnetere and TLDe were not eyeliable. Emergemey werkere et the CCC should be provided with j
the resguired dealmetry esysipmes
- d TLDs as speelflod in the plan.
~
S.
At the ashutin Desseeminetlen Center the pereennel dW met K.3.e ARCA X
I have TLDs and sosne of the workere ed not have DRDs. Emergency workers et the Decentominellen Center should be provided with the reepstred doelmetry agulpment and TLDs as speelfled in the plan.
4 9.
It sheeW be verified that eu seheels under the jurle<5etten of the E.5 X
X N/Obj I
superintendent at the Stefferd Elementary Scheel have received E.8 tone elert redes.
i s'
G..
o.
TABLE 3.4 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GE80ERATtse0 sfATION - SusaaIARY OF DEFICM80CIM AND AREAS REQUIEftuG CORRECTIVE ACTION EBey 13. ISST OCEAN COUNTY Pese 3 et 4 Issue Identified WIREC-0654 i
neocri g los and FDe4-REP-1 Prevleue Esercise Esercise Present h
os.
Secommanded Corrective Action Bew.*
Close g,,,gg,,,4 615/05 5/12/87 statue
- 10.
A esempreheenive pukile edueetlen program should he e*ted.
J.10.e X
N/Obj C
espeeleily la light of the losgo transient populeller-Emergency procedures should be posted le motel rooms and in public feeMitles.
A program should be bestituted to Nore that both feu-time and transient reeldente receive emergene-3ferenetten.
i i
)
II.
Althougte Oceen Cemety is not reepsired td have a empobility to moniter red 6eledene, it la eleets to de so the feueing should be 1
addressed 1
e) The eoesity fellowed the state air seampilmg precedere for I.9 K
C redleledine.
Heerever, the state tweeedure asede to be corrected with respect to ele flow re;e and the, celeutellen of eetivity. 38ew puseps to esereet the ear flew probleen have been ordered their reeelpt should be verified.
b) Sempileg hits sheedd eseeele aliver meelite omrtristes.
l.9 K
C i
12.
There was no ladleetles that a written rester was ovellable et the A.4 X
C Pinelands and Brick High Behools Congregate Core Daters er et the Mensheesthe decenteentanties senter to ensure tM etafflag could he m-
," ' -f en a 34-hour heels. A rester sceuld be eveHehle et these feelHiles le ensure 24-hour stafflag eepobility.
l 13.
A enemange te notify e5 Emergoney tferbers wittele the le-mile EPZ.
J.9 K
C to atmealete taking KI esos seet relayed by the eeunty to all F.14 l
Esmergene r Warhere and sees treammitted only en the Fire Band and the Emergency RSedical Servlee rede freagesencies. The message should go to all Emergency Workers and should be transmitted on EMR AD and the RACES.
l 1
TABLE 3.4 OTWFER CREEK NUCtAAR GENE 2A*T10 $FAThMt -
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIER AND AREAS RSQUIR2IIG CGERECTfvR ACTION Mey it. ISST i
OCEAN COUltTY Fase 4 ef 4 l
1 feeue I h lflee f
InmEC-4654 l
Soestlpties and FEMA-SEF-1 Frevleue Eserclee Esercise Present b
g,,,,g,,,4 6/5185 5/12is7 statue
- us.
e=eh Correct L** Acties Sev.*
Clees I
14.
Radletlea meelterleg p et the Pinelands High Seheel E.S.h I
C' Congregate Care Mter 43 set have adequate.. * :: la the 0.5 use of redetlen smenteerise hustrument operstle and p6eper precedwee for determining redeelen eentealeetlee levele of Individuo's. Radletion mentter --
" shem44 receive adellenal treinlag en the operation of redletten :=enitsc~:rg lentramente and proper proceenres for radiettom eesteminellen omrveA i
l
'NUREO-0454. FEMA REP-1, Kev.1, Criterle for Properetles and Evoluellen of
'Cs Remedal Actlen Complete.
RadleWgical Emergeney Respamme Pleas and A ; -' r in Support of Ne;elear is Remedel netlen losesoplete.
Poaver F1ents. Part 5.
M/Obj.s Not en ohjeettve.
4 h/Obs.: Not etmerved.
As No NUREG-9064 mf-dPreef aus esereless were held on 1/24/03 and "Def.: Defielemey.
3/16/01.
[
ARCA: Area RegmMsg Carreettve Aetles.
' Issue corrected during the Jane 10.15s7 j
These ele.htless were added to the it*1e beglanhtg with the May 1*,,1987 Remedel Esercise.
emerelse aN are not given for lesmes identitled at pre-less enerrisee.
i l
1 D
s
~
q s.
TABLE 3.5 OTSTER CREEE NUC1. EAR GENERATIIh3 STATION - SUS $ MARY OF DEFICIENCIER AND AREAS REQUIR8tIG CORRECTIVE ACTION May II,1987 OCEAN COUNTT ;AUNiCIPAIJt1ES rage I of S Issue Identified 1
IsuetC-06S4 toestipales and FDEk-REP-1 Previous Esercise Ese rcise Present me.
Recommmedad terrective Action Sev.*
Close g,,,,g,,,4 6/S/83 S/12/87 Statue
- h 1.
FmB, preempt setive*Isa was met demonstrated at South Tome River.
E.1 ARCA X
C' Additlemal hock-ey staff should be provided for the toweekly in order to eenere prompt and eempletc cettvetlea of the EOC In the event of an emergemey.
2.
South Tome River EOC was met ehle to achieve feu staffisq er to A.2.e, Def.
X C'
provide 24-heer seg therefore, was not able to drmenstrate A.4, the eserelse ob)oettwee eenignes' to the Ocean Cowy Munleipal G.4.e EOCs. Oeeen County senseld usets en effort to eermt the staffing l
praedem et the Emoth Tome 'llver EOC, to meeere *het key I
emergency pereennel, as weM en beek-up emergency personnel, are awellsble end treined to earty out aJi emergemey ey.mnities.
3.
Speee wee too elettered with noneemoettet ogsipment et the South A.4, ARCA X
C' Tome River EOC. Aloe, etendsed operating preeedere guidelines, D.3, l
message forms, and other eenential meterials were not stored in G.3.e.
readily known areas. Classifleotten levels sad e status boord were 3.2, vi not yested. Speee was met edegnete for emergemey workers to ett H.3, l
end work effielently and esafertehty (NUREG-4854, II, A.4. D.3, J.18.e.
G.3.e. H.1, H.3, J.18.e J.38hk The South Tome R!ver EOC should J.18h j
be kept partially est-up at all tissee. The radio should be put in e i
better part of the EOC (e.g. owey freen kitchen" aree). Plane and standard operating preeJewel guidelines should be ip-to-date and q
readily acceseR>le. A statene heard and eteestfleetlea level poster l
ehould be permanently yested on the wett.
I 1
I l
l
TABLE 3.5 OYSTER CREEE NUCLEAR GENERATW80 ETATIOtt -SUMetARY OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRIIeG CORRBCTfYE ACTION Bley IS. 198f OCEAN COUIITY B0UeSICFALfnes l
Pese 2 of S Isome Identified i
InmEC-4654 l
Beectlpties and FEBEA-REP-t Previene Esercise Esercise Present h
d ass.
Recomesmeed Corrective Action Bew.*
Ctees Esercisee 6/5/85 5/12/s7 status" i
4.
Neither the Emeegeery blemagement Ceeseenter nor the E.4 ARCA
'X i
Redlelegleel Offleer leew that the so.herleed deee Malt wee 1.25 Rem. All esseegemey werkere, partloolerty declaien makers, should be owere of the mesieseos does euewed tithout outhertsettee.
4 I
Seeth Tome Elver C
Bernaget IJght X
I j
5.
Feu partleipatlee he the esereise le aseeemory to devoley and N.I.e ARCA l
demonstrate emeegener operetiene menegoseent skille.
Fett 4
partlelpatlee la enggested fers l
intend Heighte X
X C
I l
S.
Emergemey Operettese Centere et Beechweed and South Tosse River H.3 ARCA i
Beresses and Berkeley. Oooen and Stafford Townships need lonprovemente. The Beeehwood and Stafford EOCs both leek potable water and soweste eeneeetites and both have erosaped workisq I
ereas. The Ocean Temeshly l'CC le witide the two mile EFZ and there is me ehermale feettity for the toweehty estelde the two mile eree.
Boesenseed X
X C
Seeth Tome River X
C 1
Berkeley X
C Stefferd X
C i
Ocean Towsebly X
C i
4 1
i 1
1
s.
TAat2 3.5 OYSTt!R CREEK NUCl2AR GENERATN00 STATIOef - SUMBIA!!Y OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRIIeO CORRECTIVE ACTION tasy if.1987 OCEAN COUNTY RIUNICIPAIJ71ES Page 3 of 5 1 esse Identified IsunEC-0656 9seeription and FEM A-REP-1 Previous Esercise Esercise Present b
me.
secommended *:errective Actles Rev.*
Class g,,,,;,,,4 6/5/05 S/12/87 statue
- 7.
Resnicipal EOCs udtede preteettwo setten areas should implement K.5.s ARCA X
precedwee to ensure that eentemlasted ladlwidsels are not allowed seeese late the EOCs.
Oeenn Township X
X I
Bernatet Touraship X
C Oceen Gate X
C Pine Beech X
C Beechweed X
C island Nights X
C Dewec li C
8.
35matelpel peseedures should be developed, inclumag a checklist for D.4 ARCA each eenoegency classifleetle Benetweed X
C Pine Beech X
C Oceen Gate X
C ew S.
IJets of meninstitutlemeNsed mobility-Isepelred perarnas should be J.18.4 ARCA evellable et each seen4elpel EOC Bernaget Tomassdy X
X I
Pine Beech X
C Island Heights X
C s
Oceen Goto X
C Devec X
C
TABLE 3.S OYWTER CREEE NUCl.EA R OENERAT9000 ffATION - SUWM ARY OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS RSQUIRileG CORRECTIVR ACTION 8 Bey it,ISST OCEAN COUNTY 38UNICIPAIJflEB Page 4 of S I
I sew Identified WUsec-0654 Douriptlen and FD64-REP-1 Previeve Esercise Esercise Present h
- ano, aseemmended Corrective Acties new.*
Claes g,,,,g,,,4 6/S/85 S/12/8F statue C 10.
Treinleg of emeegemey werkers in the proper use, distributloa.
KJ.b ARCA checklag and ;u ^^ ; ef informetlee from deelheters is needed Stafford X
C South Tome River X
I Ocean Gate X
C 11.
Twenty-four hour stafflog by rester ehemld be evelletde et each A.2.s A R C.*.
menleepeHty A.4 Bernaget Towsoldp X
C Stefferd X
C i
Pine Beseh X
i Harvey Cedere X
X 12.
The wertig eroe et Bernage Tourasedy showld be better ergentred to H.3 C
feellitate emergency operellene.
~
A.2.e cp o
l 13.
Some of the early messages were miseed when the eomsaunicatione operatore were swey from the redle.
Pine Beech X
C letand Heighte X
C 14.
Trotning is needed for newly emelgned Deputy Coordinators.
O.4.e taland HelgtQ X
C Pine 9emeh X
C sernaget Townshly X
C i
l 1
a e
6 g
-e-
TAREA 1.5 OTFFER CREEE NUCLEAR GENERATIIOC BFATION - SUMelARY OF DEFICIENCIER AND AREAS RSQUIElleG CORRECTIVE ACTION asey it. 3947 OCEAN COUlfTY MUNICWAlJTIES Page $ of S l
Issue Identified puREC-0654 i
heer h loe and FEMA-REP-1 Prevleue Esercise Esercise 0' resent me.
Seee m ded corrective Actice Rev.*
Cl ose g,,,gg,,,4 6/S/85
$/12/87 Status' b
15.
The mumleepel EOCs ehemed to familiar with the precedures for J.IS.f edeleleterlag EL lacey TownsMy X
C Oceen ToweeMp X
C Bernaget Tawashly X
C Stefferd X
C Pine Beech X
0 i
South Tome River X
X C'
Surf City X
l
- NUREG-Stte, FEM A REP-1, Rev.1. Criteria for Preserellen and Evoluellen of
'C:
easeeel Aetlen Complete.
Redlelogleel Emergency Response Plean and L - ;^---- In Support of Nuclear Is Remedle! Action leeemplete.
Power Pleets, Part N.
N/Obj.: Not en oldoetive.
N/Obs.: Not ebeerved.
N/R No NUREG-4454 referenee.
d m
Previous esereless were held en 5/24/03 and bDef.: Deflelency.
3/18/82.
ARCAs Area Regstring Cavsellwe A4.tlen.
These eleselfleetions were addoel to the tehle beglanlag with the May 12, 1987 Remedlet Esercise esercise and are not given for leemse identified at prevleue esereisee.
Ilseue evaluated dcrig the July 22,1987 Remedial emercise.
h i
k
m 70 4 STATUS OF OBJECTIVES The objectives for radiological emergency preparedness exercises are developed to correspond to the observable elements of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. FEMA had defined thirty-six (36) core objectives to test major portions of emergency response capabilities.
FEMA Region !! and the State of New Jersey have defined additional objectives. Table 4 will ilst the status of the.9e latter objectives for the State, the EOF, the ENC, and the local jurisdictions by exercise date.
Where applicable, the corresponding core objective will be referenced.
t e
9 I
e
l TABLE 4.1 OYMER CREEE NUCLEAR GENERATING MATION - STATUS OF OBJECTIVES j
August 1987 NEW JEESEY RATE Page 1 of 4 i
I Core Esercise Exercise Exercise Exercise h
Objective" Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/i3 6/5/85 5/12/37 1
Demonstrate ability to mobilise staff and A
A A
A activate facilities promptly.
l 2
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and A
N/0 A
A maintain staffing around the clock.
~
3 Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to A
A A
A R
coordinate emergency activities.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays A
A N/0 A
to support emergency operations.
i 5
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all A
A A
A appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public within I
A A
A l
the 10-mile
- EPZ, and disseminate an. initial
]
anstructional message, within 15 minutes.
I
?
j 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute I
A A
A appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
1 I
Demonstrate that the transmission of Eg5 message A
A i
is properly timed to begin within one minute of the end of the airen sounding.
e
TABLE 4.1 OYIfrER CREEE NUCLEAR GENERATING trrATION - trrATUS OF OBJEC11VES August 1987 NEW JERSEY STATE Page 2 of 4 i
Core Exerci:s Exercise Exercise Exercise h
Ob',ective*
Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 1
17 Demonstrate the organizational ability and A
A N/0 A
i resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and A
A N/E A
i control emergency worker exposure.
22 Demonstrate the ability to aske the decision, A
A A
A based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue (communi-n KI to emergency workers.
cation only) l 5
Demonstrate the ability to receive and verify A
A N/0 initial and follow up emergency notifications j
form the licensee.
t
}
3,5 Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an A
A A
N/O
)
accurate and timely menner, that messages are l
properly logged, that status boards are accur-l ately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel 4
are briefed.
3 Demonstrate that the designated official is in A
A A
N/O charge and in control of an overall coordinated response.
32 Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for A
N/0 A
N/O and request Federal assister ce.
TABLE 4.1 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING frrATION - firATUS OF OBJECTIVES August 1987 NEW JER8EY STATE Page 3 of 4 -
Core Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise h
Objective" Exercise Objective 3/16/32 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/M 10 Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate A
A A
N/0 protective action recommendations to the public utility recommendations, independent based on recommendations from the accident assessment group, and off-site factors such as evacuation time estimates and traffic conditions.
20 Demonstrate the means to implement a decision to A
A N/E N/0 authorize exposure for emergency workers in m
excess of the general public FACs once the decision has been made by DON.
20,21,22 Demonstrate the coordination between the Depart-A A
A N/O ment of Health (DON) and the BRP for establishing the authorization of dosages for emergency workers, in excesa of general public standards.
Also demonstrate the decision process for issuence of potassium iodide (ER).
20,21 Demonstrate the decision process to establish A
A N/E N/0 authorizstion for emergency workers to receive exposures in excess of the public FACs.
10 Demonstrate overalt knowledge of the PAR, which A
A N/E N/0 has been explained by the BRP at the EOF, and comununicate the information to the OEM at the EOC.
Oa e
O
~
TABLE 4.1 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING RATION - STATUS OF OhJECTIVES Aequot 1987 NEW JERSEY RATE Page 4 of 4 Core Esercise Exercise Exercise Exercise b
Objective" Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 35 Demonstrate the recovery and reentry procedures N/E A
N/0 N/0 at the state; these procedures are to include decision
- ensking, dose comunitment,
area anonitoring, decontamination, and public information.
15 Demonstrate the resources necessary to manage an N/0 A
A N/0 orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPI.
es 15 Demonstrate that the permanent population has N/0 N/0 A
N/O received information on how they will be notified and what their actions should be in the event of a
radiological emergency and that this information is updated on an annual basis.
15 Desmonstrate that information on emergency actions N/0 N/0 A
N/O has been provided to resident and transient populations.
CFEMA Cuidance Memorandum 17, Revision 1, Feb. 16, 1984.
b A: Adequately Demonstrated I: Inadequately Demonstrated N/0: Not an Objective N/E: Not Evaluated e
1 TABLE 4.2 OYRER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NATUS OF OBJECTIVES Aignet 1987 EMERGENCY OPERATION FAC11JTY Page 1 of 3 Core Exercise Exercise Esercise Exercise i
h i
Objective
- Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 1
1 l
1,5 Demonstrate the ability to activate the BaF-NQ N/0 N/O A
N/0 4
l and cosusonicate with BEF staff in transit to both the EOF and. Forward Command Post (FCP).
l 10 Desenst rate that the BRF-HQ is in charge and N/0 N/0 A
N/0 responsible fo'r accident assessment decision making processes until the EOF /NJBEF is activated.
E 1
Demonstrate the abillty to mobilize staff and A
A A
N/0
{
activate State functions at the EOF in a timely manner.
l 2
Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of I
A A
N/O State functions at the EOF in a timely manner.
1 l
4 Demonstrate that the emergency response A
A A
N/0 j
facilities have g adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
3 Demonstrate that messages are accurately logged, A
A A
A status boards are maintained and updated, appro-i priate briefings are held, incoming personnel are briefed, and messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely mennu.
i e
0 0
e 4
e
O.
9 TABLE 4.2 OY!rrER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING IFTATION - STATUS OF ODJECTIVES August 1987 EMERGENCY OFERATION FACILITY Page 2 of 3 Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Core b
Objective
- Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 I
3 Demonstrate that the designated official is in A
A I
N/O (Cor-l charge and in control of the overall response of rected at l
Artificial Island En) f 5
Demonstrar.e the ability *to c-icate with all A
A I
A 1
l appropriate locations,. organizations, and field f
personnel.
l 10 Demonstrate the' ability to make appropriate A
A I
N/O protective action recommendations to OEM for the public based on independent in plant engineering and effluent release analysis and comparing those results with the Utility and HRC to obtain a unified FAR.
23.
Demonstrate the decision process for issuance of A
N/O A
A l
potassium iodide (KI) with OEM and State Nealth.
t l
1 T
i i
TAB 1,E 4.2 OYSTER CREEK MUCLEAR GENERATING 8TATION -IrrATUS OF OBJECTIVES Aequst 1987 EMERGENCY OPERATION FACliJTY Page 3 of 3 i
Exercise Exercise Esercise Exercise Core h
Objective
- Esercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 10 Demonstrate the capability of the BRP liaison at N/0 N/0 A
N/0 the State EOC to understand FAC recosamendations and to report such actions to the Director of OEM i
or his designee.
i
)
- FEMA Guidance Memorandum 17, Revision 1, Feb. 16, 1984.
.i b
g A: Adequately Demonstrated 1
1:
Inadequately Demonstrated N/O: Not an Objective N/E: Not Evaluated i
l 4
l l
1 i
I I
1 i
4
4 TABLE 4.3 OYttrER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING IrrATION - firATUS OF OBJECTIVES August 1987 BUREAU OF NUCLEAst ENGINEERING (Forward Cossonand Post)
Page 1 of 3 Exercise Exercise Exercise Esercise Core Objective" Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 h
1 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and A
A A
N/0 timely activate the Forward Command Post in a menner.
6 Demonstrate the ability of the FCP to mobilize A
A A
N/0 timely l
and deploy field monitoring :aame in a menner.
l e,
4 Demonstrate that the emergency response A
I A
N/O i
facilities have adequate space, equipment and supplies to support emergency operations.
2 Maintain staffing at FCP on 24-hour basis A
A A
N/0 including staf fing of Field Monitoring Teams,. by roster.
5 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all A
A A
N/0 appropriat.e locations, organizations, and field personnel.
5 Demonstrate the ability to communicate to both N/O N/0 A
N/0 BRP-HQ when that station is in commend and to the l
BRPs representative at the EOF when it activates.
1 l
TABLE 4.3 OYMER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - RATUS OF OBJECTIVES 1
August 1957
)
HUREAU OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (Forward Connasand Post) 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise I
Core Objective" Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 b
,i 20 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor A
A I
N/0 and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry in conjunction with the Health Department field representatives.
[
i l
7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and I
A A
N/0 i
procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
i R
{
22 Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer A
A A
N/0 i
KI, once the decision has been u de to do so.
s i
1 3
Demonstrate that the designated officia.1 is in A
A A
N/O j
charge and in control of an overall response of
)
the BRP function at the FCP.
i i
3 Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an A
I A
N/0 securate and timely manner, that messages are i
properly
- logged, that*
status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appro-1 priate briefings are held, and that incocing personnel are briefed.
~
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1 1
1
TABLE 4.3 OYSTER CREEK' NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - STATUS OF OHJECTIVES Augiant 1987 HUREAU OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (Forward Comnenand Post)
Page 3 of 3 Core Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise b
Objective" Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 1
8 Evaluate the effectiveness of new radiological N/O A
N/O N/O training programs for decontamination, I
monitoring, dose reporting and record keeping, I
and personnel protection.
CFEMA Cuidance Memorandum 17, Revision 1, Feb. 16, 1994.
i, o
c b
A: Adequately I)emonstrated I:
Inadequately Demonstrated,.
N/O: Not an Objective N/E: Not Evaluated 1
1 l
e d
TABLE 4.4 OTirTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - STATUS OF OILIECTIVES August 1987 RADIOLOGICAL FIELD MONITORING TEAMS Page1ofI l
Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise l
Core Objective" Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 b
8 Demonstrate the appropriate squipment and A
N/0 A
N/O procedures for measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as.
0.1 l
picocuries/cc in the presence of noble gases.
8 Demonstrate the ability to use proper field N/O N/0 A
N/0 practices and the proper radiation detection equipment, i.e., SAN-II (scintillators), CM tubes y
to determine Noble gas and iodine concentrations within the plume.
7 Demonstrate the proper field methods of knowing N/O N/0 A
N/O when you are immersed in a radioactive plume or measuring deposition of a plume that has already passed.
5 Demonstrate adequate"communications between field A
A A
N/O teams and cosamond locations.
- FEMA Guidance Mesaoras.4um 17, Revision I, Feb. 16, 1984.
b 4: Adequately Desmonstrated It Inadequately Demonstrated N/O: Not an Objective N/E: Not Evaluated
- 9 e
b g
^
TABLE 4.5 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - STATUS OF OBJECTIVES August 1987 EMERGENCY MEWS CENTER i
Page 1of1 Core Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise h
Objective
- Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 1
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and A
A A
A activate facilities promptly.
24 Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a A
I A
A clear, accurate and timely manner.
2 Demonstrate the abilitf to maintain staffing of A
A A
N/O State functions in the ENC on a 24-hour basis by
,E roster.
25 Deconstrate the ability to provide advance A
I A
N/O coordination of information released.
26 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate 1
I A
N/O rumor control in a coordinated menner.
"FEMA Guidance Nemorandum 17, Revision 1, Feb. 16, 1984.
b A: Adequately Demonstrated I: Inadequately Demonstrated N/0: Not an Objective N/E: Not Evaluated
TABLE 4.6 OYSTER CREEK MUCLEAR GENERATING trrATION - trrATUS OF OBJECTIVE 3 August 1987 OCEAN COUNTY Page 1 of 4 Remedial Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Core Objzetive" Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 6/10/87 b
1 Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and A
A A
A A
N/0 (Pine-l activate facilities promptly.
(Pine-lands) l
- lands, Mana-hawkin) 2 Demonstr.ste ability to fully staff facilities and A
A A.
A N/0 m
maintain staffing around the clock.
(except Pine-
- lands, Mana-hawkin) 3 Demonstaste ability to make decisions and to A
A A
A N/O coordinate emergency activities.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays A
A A
A N/0 to support emergency operations.
5 Demonstrate ability to cosamunicate with all A
A A
A N/0 appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
22 Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer N/0 A
I A
N/0 KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
(Comsmuni-cations only) e M 4 9
g g
s.
TABLE 4.4 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING IrrATION - STATUS OF OBJECTIVES August 1987 OCEAN COUNTY Page 2 of 4 Remedial Care Exercise Exercise Esercise Exercise Esercise h
Obj2ctive*
Esercise 0%ective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 6/10/87 23 Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly N/0 N/0 N/E N/E F/0*
evacuation of on-site personnel.
(Nuclearr A at Generating Station) 7/22/87 Exercise 25 Demonstrate ability to
- provide advanc<a N/D N/0 A
A N/0 coordination of information released.
I 13 Demonstrate ability to alert the public withlis I
A A
A N/O the 10-mile
- EPZ, and disseminate an irait ia'!
instructional message, within 15 minutes.
8 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures I
I N/0 A
N/O sigborne radioiodine concen-for measurement of
- uci/cc in the presence of trations as low as 10 noble gases.
20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and I
A A
I A
control emergency worker exposure.
(Pine-(Pine-lands) land) 27 Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for I
A I
I A
registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
28 Demonstrate adequacy of facili*'.as for mass care I
A A
A N/0 of evacuees.
TABLE 4.8 OYffrER CREEkt NUCLEAlt GENERATING firATION - STATUS OF OBJECTIVES August 1987 OCEAN COUNTY f
Page 3 of 4 Remedial l
Core Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercise Excrcise b
j Obj:ctive" Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 6/10/87
)
29 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for I
A A
A N/0 decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.
5 Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and A
A A
N/G N/0 follow up emergency notifications.
m 3
Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an A
A A
N/0 N/0 accurate and timely usaner, messages are property
- logged, that status boards are accurately maintair.ed and
- updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
3 Demonstrate the ability.of the dealsnated N/0 N/0 A
N/0 N/O official to determine the need for and the ability to obtain State assistance.
15 Demonstrate the organizational ability to manage A
A A
N/0 N/O-an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ.
16 bemonstrate the organizational ability and A
N/0 A
N/0 N/0 resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
19 Demonstrate that organizational ability
.and N/0 A
A N/0 N/0 orde:rly (Communi-resources, necessary to effect an evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EFZ.
cations only) 9
i.,..
t TABLE 4.8 OYMER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING NTATION - STATUS OF OBJECTIVES August 1987 OCEAN COUNTY Page 4 of 4 1
Remedist Cero Exercise Exercise Exercise Exercice Exercise h
Objective
- Esercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 6/10/87 13 Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public N/O N/O A
A N/O alerting procedures, if necessary, in the event of partial siren system failure.
18 Demonstrate the resources necessary to effect an A
A A
NO N/O i
orderly evacuation of the mobility-impaired andividuals within the 10-mile EFZ Jg
.i
.l l8 FEMA Guidance Memorandum 17, Revision 1, Feb. 16, 1984.
b At Adequately Demonstrated l
Is Inadequately Demonstrated l
D/03 Not an Objective C/Es Not Evaluated e
TABLE 4.7 OY!rrER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING firATION - STATUS OF OBJECTIVES Angust 1987 OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES Page 1 of 3 Remedial Core Exercise Emercise Exercise Exercise Exercise b
Obj;ctive" Esercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 7/22/87 1
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff
.and A
I A
A A
activate facilities promptly.
(Except STR) 2 Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities,and A
A I
I A
maintain staffing around the. clock.
~
~e 3
Demonstrate ability to mke decisions and-to A
N/O I
A A
coordinate emergency activities.
(except South Toms River) 4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays I
I I
A A
to support energency operations.
5 Demonstrate ability to communicate with all A
I A
A A
appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
20 Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and N/0 N/0 I
I I
control emergency werker exposure.
22 Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer N/0 N/0 I
A A
KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
orderly N/O N/O N/0 N/E N/0 23 Demonstrate ability to effect an evacuation of on-site persannel.
e *.
=4 4
it TABLE 4.7 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING IrrATION - NATUS OF OBJECTIVES AugJet 1987
~
OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES Page 2 of 3 Remedist Exercise Exercise Exercise Esercise Exercise objective
- Esercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87 7/22/87
)
Coro b
s ility to receive initial innd A
N/O A
N/O N/0 5
Demonstrate the k
followup emergency notifications.
l 4
Demonstrate that the emergee,cy response A
N/O I
I N/0 facilities have adequate access control and that security can be maintained.
~
-E 3
Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an 1
A A
N/O N/0 accurate and timely menner, messages are property logged, that status boards are accurately ' main-tained and updated, that appropriate briefings are
- held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
5 Demonstrate the ability to casumunicate with all A
I A
N/0 N/O l
appropriate locations, organizations, and field l
perronnel.
1 32 Demonstrate, the ability of the designateJ N/O N/0 A
N/O N/O l
official to determine the need for and the l
ability to obtain county or State assistance.
14 Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public A
A A
N/O N/O alerting procedure, if,necessary, in the event of partial siren system failure.
_ _ _ = _ _
1 ABLE 4.7 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - STATUS OF OBJECTIVES l August 1987 OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES Page 3 of 3 Remedial Cora Exercise Esercise Emercise Exercise Exercise Objective
- Exercise Objective 3/16/82 5/24/83 6/5/85 5/12/87
'/22/87 b
18 Demonstrate resources necessary to effect an N/0 A
A N/0 N/0 orderly evacuation of mobility impaired individuals within the 10 mile EFZ.
16 Demonstrate the resources necessary to daal with N/0 A
A N/0 N/0 impediments to evacuation,.such as inclement weather or traffic conditions.
E 17 Demonstrate that traffic control points can be N/0 N/0
-A N/O N/0 established in a timely manner.
CFEMA Guidance Memorandum 17, Revision 1, Feb. 16, 1984.
b As Adequately Demonstrated It Inadequately Demonstrated 13 / 0 3 Not an Objective C/E Not Evaluated It chould be noted that there are 16 municipalities within the EPZ and an "Inadequacy Demonstrated" rating might l
rcticct only one (or more) municipalities not meeting that objective.
l l
1 e,
i l
90 5 REMOVAL OF COMPLETED ARCAs FROM PREVIOUS POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENTS The following list summarizes those Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) in the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Exercise Assessment dated August 22,1985 which have been corrected and verified in previous exercises and are being removed from the chart provided in Section 3:
State of New Jersey EOC numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
Emergency Operations Fac!!!ty numben 7, and 8.
BNE Forward Command Post numbers 3,5,6, and 7.
Radlological Field Monitoring Teams numbers 1,2, and 3.
Emergency New Center numbers 1,2,3,4,5, and 6.
Ocean County EOC numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11,12, and 13.
Ocean County Field numbers 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,10,11, and 12.
Ocean County Municipalltles numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
The only ARCAs which appear in Section 3, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action, are those previous ARCAs which remain incomplete, have been completed as a result of the May 12,1987 exercise or are rew ARCAs.
t l
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