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Reactor High Flux Scram - Electrohydraulic Qg trol System Induced EV9tf7 DATE 18, Lgm NuessER (6)
REPORT OATT (7)
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3-87-01, Revision 1 On March 17, 1987 at 0254 hours0.00294 days <br />0.0706 hours <br />4.199735e-4 weeks <br />9.6647e-5 months <br />, Unit 3 scrammed:-from 85% power on high neutron flux signals from the neutron monitoring system.
The unplanned activation of an engineered safety
- feature makes this event reportable.
The high flux resulted from an increase l,
in reactor coolant system pressure caused by turbine control valve fluctuations.
Investigation indicated that circuitry in the Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC) was affected by spurious electrical noise believed to have been caused by malfunctioning cabinet cooling fans.
Philadelphia Electric Company investigations have determined that operators'were inatter.tive to instrumentation indications during the hours preceding the scram.
Five fans were electrically disconnected, 4 fann were replaced, and 4 EHC cards were replaced.
To prevent recurrence, the cooling fans in all 6 EHC electronics bays will be rep 2 aced, as'part of the1 preventive maintenance program, during every other refueling outage.
The operators onEduty during this event received counseling regarding the importance of attentiveness.
The operations staff received a letter from plant management, emphasizing the need to monitor various plant parameters and respond to deviations from normal conditions.
Other than the unit shutdown transient, there were no adverse consequences of this event.
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NLC Pem 3SSA U.$. NUCLEAR RESULATO3Y COMMIS$10N LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Aeaaovfo ous No. siso-oio4 EXPsRES 8/3:46 P ACILITY MAME til DOCKET NURASER (2)
LER NUh4SER ($)
PAGE (3)
"MW TSM Peach Bottom Atomic Power Staticn Unit o 5 jo l0 l0 l l l i8l7 0l0l1 011 0l2 OF 0 14 rEmn N %
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Acronyms Used in this LER:
I APRM - Average Power Range Monitor EHC
- - Electrohydraulic Control System RPS
- - Reactor Protection System Unit Conditions Prior to the Event:
Unit 3 was operating at 85% power.
Description of the Event:
l On March 17, 1987 at 0254 hours0.00294 days <br />0.0706 hours <br />4.199735e-4 weeks <br />9.6647e-5 months <br />, the reactor protection system initiated a full reactor scram due to high flux signals from the neutron monitoring system.
A description of the events which led to the high flux condition follows.
The reactor coolant system experienced pressure spikes for approximately 1-1/2 hours prior to the reactor scram.
Review of main control room instrumentation for this time period indicated that small fluctuations in various plant parameters occurred.
Plant control systems automatically compensated for these small oscillations.
None of these parameters reached alarm or trip setpoints before the scram.
These pressure spikes were caused by the control valves partially cycling due to oscillations in the valve positioning signals from the EHC system.
The increase in pressure introduced positive reactivity to the core by collapsing steam voids, thereby increasing the neutron flux level.
At 0254 hours0.00294 days <br />0.0706 hours <br />4.199735e-4 weeks <br />9.6647e-5 months <br />, the flux signals measured by the neutron monitoring system spiked from 85% to 100% and caused the reactor scram.
The high flux setpoint at 85% power is 100%.
The EIIS code for the EHC system is TG; and for the incore monitoring system (APRM), the code is IG.
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- e IRC Poem as4A U.S NUCLEAR REQULATOAV COMMl5810N LfCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APraoveo ous ao 3 iso-oio4 EXPIRES 8/31/86
, ACILITY NAME Ett DOCKET NUMSER (2)
LER$dWMcER(6)
PAQt (3)
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Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 o ls j o j o j o l 2 l7 l8 8l7 0 l0 l1 0 l1 Ol3 OF 0 l4 TEXT IW more spece a rueuvent, une onwaenet NRC Fome Wet (11)
Consequences of the Event:
Aside from the unit shutdown transient, this event produced no adverse consequences.
The automatic scram led to a safe and j
orderly shutdown.
All cystems functioned properly during the i
transient.
Cause
.,f the Event:
4 Investigation of the event revealed that the control valves had 1
cycled partially opened and closed due to oscillations in the valve positioning signals from the EHC system.
Further investigation indicated that the mest likely.cause of the spiking signals was the ROTRON Type ST, Series 682YS, Spartan
)
fans in the EHC electronics bays.
The fans, designed to run continuously, experienced mechanical failures due to age and normal wear.
The intermittent stopping and restarting of these l
fans is believed to have induced sufficient radio frequency l
electrical noise to affect the electronic cards, resulting in spikes in the signals to the turbine control valves.
The subsequent control valve movement produced the pressure spikes discussed in the " Description of Events" section, thereby causing the reactor scram.
l Corporate and plant management initiated an additional investigation of the events leading to the scram.
This i
investigation revealed that operators were not attentive to p] ant I
parameters during the hours preceding the event.
Corrective Actions
Pour faulty Spartan fans have been replaced with IMC Boxer fans, Model WS2107SL-1000, and five have been electrically disconnected.
As a precautionary measure, the following electronic cards in the EHC system were replaced and calibrated:
Card Nos. 54 and 71, Model No. 114D6005G4,
'A' and
'b' Pressure Amplification; and Card Nos. 42 and 46, Model No. Il8D1302G3,
'A' and
'B' Steam Line Resonance Compensator.
No further pressure spikes have been observed since these corrective measures were l
implemented.
Station technical personnel are continuing with an investigation while Unit 3 remains shutdown, and another revisionto ?)'
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j NIC$mmaeta U.S NUCLEAR RESULATOM COMMISSloN LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION arenovEc oMe No. mo-oio4 expiacs anim
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IL*N Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station nit 3 0 l510 lo lo l 217 l8 81 7 0 l0 ll 011 0 l4 OF 0l4 ran <n
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1 will be submitted if additional information regarding the root cause is identified.
In addressing the issue of operator attentiveness, the individual operators involved received counseling regarding the importance of attentiveness.
The operations' staff received a letter from plant management, emphasizing the need to monitor various plant parameters and respond to deviations from normal conditions.
Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
To prevent recurrence, the " Spartan" f ans in all 6 EllC electronics bays will be replaced during every other refueling outage.
Previous Similar Occurrences:
- None, j
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I PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET i
P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA A PA.19101 (215)841 4000 July 17, 1987 1
Docket No. 50-278 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
Licensee Event Report Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 3
{
I This revised LER concerns a full scram of Unit 3, due to i
high flux, caused by fluctuations in the main turbine electrohydraulic control system signals.
Reference:
Docket No. 50-278 Report Number:
3-87-01 Revision Number:
01 Event Date:
March 17, 1987 Report Date:
July 17, 1987 Facility:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314 This LER was revised to include additional information regarding the cause of the scram and the corrective actions.
The changes are indicated by a vertical bar in the margin.
This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).
Ver truly you,rs, i
/
/$
~f R. H.
Logue l
Assistant to the Manager l
Nuclear Support Department l
cc:
Mr. W.
T.
Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T.
P.
Johnson, NRC Resident Inspector 7
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| 05000278/LER-1987-001, :on 870317,reactor Scrammed from 85% Power on High Neutron Flux Signals from Neutron Monitoring Sys.Caused by Spurious Electrical Noise Due to Malfunctioning Cabinet Cooling Fans.Cooling Fans Replaced |
- on 870317,reactor Scrammed from 85% Power on High Neutron Flux Signals from Neutron Monitoring Sys.Caused by Spurious Electrical Noise Due to Malfunctioning Cabinet Cooling Fans.Cooling Fans Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000278/LER-1987-001-03, :on 880408,actuation of Primary Containment Isolation Sys Occurred During Switching of 4 Kv Emergency Bus Feed.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Training for Operators.Training Bulletin Issued |
- on 880408,actuation of Primary Containment Isolation Sys Occurred During Switching of 4 Kv Emergency Bus Feed.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Training for Operators.Training Bulletin Issued
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-001-01, :on 870311,suppression Pool Water Vol Exceeded Max Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Leaking Check Valve in RHR Loop A.Suppression Pool Water Vol Restored within Tech Spec Limits |
- on 870311,suppression Pool Water Vol Exceeded Max Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Leaking Check Valve in RHR Loop A.Suppression Pool Water Vol Restored within Tech Spec Limits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000278/LER-1987-001-02, :on 870317,unit Scrammed on High Neutron Flux Signals from Neutron Monitoring Sys.Caused by Malfunctioning Cabinet Cooling Fans Re Electrohydraulic Control Sys (EHC) Circuitry.Fans & EHC Cards Replaced |
- on 870317,unit Scrammed on High Neutron Flux Signals from Neutron Monitoring Sys.Caused by Malfunctioning Cabinet Cooling Fans Re Electrohydraulic Control Sys (EHC) Circuitry.Fans & EHC Cards Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000278/LER-1987-002-02, :on 870325,reactor Scram Occurred Due to Low Water Level.Caused by Lifting of Lead Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) During Troubleshooting in Main Turbine EHC Sys Circuitry.Lead Reconnected |
- on 870325,reactor Scram Occurred Due to Low Water Level.Caused by Lifting of Lead Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) During Troubleshooting in Main Turbine EHC Sys Circuitry.Lead Reconnected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000278/LER-1987-003-02, :on 870331,RHR Sys Isolated Due to Inadvertent High Reactor Pressure Signal.Caused by Personnel Incorrectly Assessing Status of Shutdown Cooling Sys Due to Procedural Inadequacies.Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 870331,RHR Sys Isolated Due to Inadvertent High Reactor Pressure Signal.Caused by Personnel Incorrectly Assessing Status of Shutdown Cooling Sys Due to Procedural Inadequacies.Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-003-01, :on 870328,isolation of RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Valves & Head Spray Injection Valves Occurred. Caused by Fuse Removed from RHR Control Circuitry During Safety Block.Personnel Counseled |
- on 870328,isolation of RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Valves & Head Spray Injection Valves Occurred. Caused by Fuse Removed from RHR Control Circuitry During Safety Block.Personnel Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-004-02, :on 870407,primary Containment Isolations Occurred.Caused by Partial Loss of Offsite Power Due to Buildup of Snow on Power Lines & Contact W/Trees.Trees Near 220-kV Lines Trimmed |
- on 870407,primary Containment Isolations Occurred.Caused by Partial Loss of Offsite Power Due to Buildup of Snow on Power Lines & Contact W/Trees.Trees Near 220-kV Lines Trimmed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000277/LER-1987-004, :on 870407,primary Containment Isolation Occurred Due to Partial Loss of Startup Source.Operators Immediately Switched Load to 2 Startup Source |
- on 870407,primary Containment Isolation Occurred Due to Partial Loss of Startup Source.Operators Immediately Switched Load to 2 Startup Source
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000278/LER-1987-004-01, :on 870402,leak Rate of Inboard D MSIV Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Msiv Will Be Inspected to Determine Cause of Leakage.Msiv Will Be Repaired & Retested Prior to Returning to Operable Status |
- on 870402,leak Rate of Inboard D MSIV Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Msiv Will Be Inspected to Determine Cause of Leakage.Msiv Will Be Repaired & Retested Prior to Returning to Operable Status
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000277/LER-1987-005-02, :on 870407,main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valves Had Unsatisfactory Test Results.On 870404,valve Opened When Test Attempted & on 870405,discovered That Motor Control Circuitry Rewired Improperly |
- on 870407,main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valves Had Unsatisfactory Test Results.On 870404,valve Opened When Test Attempted & on 870405,discovered That Motor Control Circuitry Rewired Improperly
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000277/LER-1987-006-01, :on 870423,Group III Outboard Isolation Occurred,Standby Gas Treatment Sys B Fan Started & Half Scram Signal Generated.Cause Not Determined.Reactor Protection Sys Motor Generator Returned to Svc |
- on 870423,Group III Outboard Isolation Occurred,Standby Gas Treatment Sys B Fan Started & Half Scram Signal Generated.Cause Not Determined.Reactor Protection Sys Motor Generator Returned to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000278/LER-1987-006-04, :on 870514,primary Isolation Sys Group 3 Outboard Isolation Occurred.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy & Operator Error.Procedure Revised |
- on 870514,primary Isolation Sys Group 3 Outboard Isolation Occurred.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy & Operator Error.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-007-01, :on 870619,full Scram Signal Generated by Reactor Protection Sys Logic.Caused by Procedural Deficiencies,Combined W/Personnel Error.Procedural Revs Being Made |
- on 870619,full Scram Signal Generated by Reactor Protection Sys Logic.Caused by Procedural Deficiencies,Combined W/Personnel Error.Procedural Revs Being Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-007, :on 870619,full Scram Signal Generated by Reactor Protection Sys Logic.Caused by Procedural Deficiency & Personnel Error.Rev of Intermediate Range Monitors Postponed Due to Administrative Problems |
- on 870619,full Scram Signal Generated by Reactor Protection Sys Logic.Caused by Procedural Deficiency & Personnel Error.Rev of Intermediate Range Monitors Postponed Due to Administrative Problems
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000278/LER-1987-007-02, :on 870829,HPCI Rendered Inoperable Due to Loss of Instrument Power.Caused by Deteriorated Relay Coil.Relay Replaced & Added to Preventive Maint Program to Be Replaced on 6-yr Interval |
- on 870829,HPCI Rendered Inoperable Due to Loss of Instrument Power.Caused by Deteriorated Relay Coil.Relay Replaced & Added to Preventive Maint Program to Be Replaced on 6-yr Interval
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000278/LER-1987-008-02, :on 871005,containment Isolation Valves Automatically Closed.Caused by Personnel Error.Warning Signs for Compartment Doors Ordered & Signs Will Be Installed |
- on 871005,containment Isolation Valves Automatically Closed.Caused by Personnel Error.Warning Signs for Compartment Doors Ordered & Signs Will Be Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-008-01, :on 870529,incorrect Piping Configurations Discovered in Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitoring Sys.Cause Unknown.Sample Lines Realigned in Correct Configuration & Sys Returned to Svc |
- on 870529,incorrect Piping Configurations Discovered in Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitoring Sys.Cause Unknown.Sample Lines Realigned in Correct Configuration & Sys Returned to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000277/LER-1987-008, :on 870529,control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitoring Sys Found Inoperable.Caused by Piping Error Made During Initial Installation.Piping Errors Corrected & Sys Returned to Svc |
- on 870529,control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitoring Sys Found Inoperable.Caused by Piping Error Made During Initial Installation.Piping Errors Corrected & Sys Returned to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000278/LER-1987-009-02, :on 871012,RHR Shutdown Cooling & LPCI Isolation Valve MO-3-10-25B Closed Unexpectedly During Testing.Caused by Deficient Procedure ST 1.3-3.Procedure Will Be Revised Prior to Startup |
- on 871012,RHR Shutdown Cooling & LPCI Isolation Valve MO-3-10-25B Closed Unexpectedly During Testing.Caused by Deficient Procedure ST 1.3-3.Procedure Will Be Revised Prior to Startup
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-009-01, :on 870602,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group III Outboard Valve Isolation & Half Scram of Reactor Sys Occurred.Caused by Loss of Power to Reactor Protection Sys.Breaker 23 Reset & Breaker 52-3691 Closed |
- on 870602,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group III Outboard Valve Isolation & Half Scram of Reactor Sys Occurred.Caused by Loss of Power to Reactor Protection Sys.Breaker 23 Reset & Breaker 52-3691 Closed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-010-01, :on 870630,outboard Containment Isolation Valves Received Isolation Signals While RWCU Sys Isolation Control Relay Being Replaced.Caused by Inadequate Blocking Method.Involved Operators Counseled |
- on 870630,outboard Containment Isolation Valves Received Isolation Signals While RWCU Sys Isolation Control Relay Being Replaced.Caused by Inadequate Blocking Method.Involved Operators Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000278/LER-1987-010, :on 871026,opening of Reactor Vessel Level Instrument Resulted in Group I Isolation.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve Closed,Variable Leg Refilled & Normal Level Indication Restored.Craftsman Disciplined |
- on 871026,opening of Reactor Vessel Level Instrument Resulted in Group I Isolation.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve Closed,Variable Leg Refilled & Normal Level Indication Restored.Craftsman Disciplined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-011-01, :on 870710,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group Iib Isolation Occurred While Operating RHR Sys in Shutdown Cooling Mode.Caused by Blown Fuse.Fuse Replaced |
- on 870710,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group Iib Isolation Occurred While Operating RHR Sys in Shutdown Cooling Mode.Caused by Blown Fuse.Fuse Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-012-01, :on 870710,lightning Strike on 220 Kv Line Caused Unit 3 Startup Feed Breaker to Trip Resulting in Primary Containment Isolation Actuations for Several Unit 2 & 3 Sys.All Isolations Reset |
- on 870710,lightning Strike on 220 Kv Line Caused Unit 3 Startup Feed Breaker to Trip Resulting in Primary Containment Isolation Actuations for Several Unit 2 & 3 Sys.All Isolations Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-013-01, :on 870820,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group Iib Isolation Occurred Causing Loss of Power to RHR Sys a Logic Bus.Caused by Blown Fuse.Logic Cleared.Fuse Replaced & Isolation Signal Reset |
- on 870820,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group Iib Isolation Occurred Causing Loss of Power to RHR Sys a Logic Bus.Caused by Blown Fuse.Logic Cleared.Fuse Replaced & Isolation Signal Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-014-01, :on 870728,containment Isolations Occurred When E-22 4 Kv Emergency Bus Supply Breaker Tripped Open.Cause Undetermined.No Corrective Actions Planned to Prevent Recurrence |
- on 870728,containment Isolations Occurred When E-22 4 Kv Emergency Bus Supply Breaker Tripped Open.Cause Undetermined.No Corrective Actions Planned to Prevent Recurrence
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-015-01, :on 870816,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group II Inboard & Outboard Isolation Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Tree Trimming in Transmission Corridor.Startup Source Restored & Tree Removed |
- on 870816,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group II Inboard & Outboard Isolation Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Tree Trimming in Transmission Corridor.Startup Source Restored & Tree Removed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-016-01, :on 870820,containment Isolations Occurred Due to Startup Source Trip.Caused by Inadequate Concern for Potential Electrical Hazard by Maint Craft Supervision. Supervisors Involved Counseled |
- on 870820,containment Isolations Occurred Due to Startup Source Trip.Caused by Inadequate Concern for Potential Electrical Hazard by Maint Craft Supervision. Supervisors Involved Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-017-01, :on 870916,partial Ventilation Isolation Occurred During Temporary Clearing of Blocked Sys Logic. Caused by Inadequate Review of Blocking Permits.Permit Will Be Revised by 871030 |
- on 870916,partial Ventilation Isolation Occurred During Temporary Clearing of Blocked Sys Logic. Caused by Inadequate Review of Blocking Permits.Permit Will Be Revised by 871030
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-018-01, :on 870828,shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred & RHR Pump Tripped.Caused by Deenergization of RHR a When Safety Block Reapplied.Review of Nuclear Plant Blocking Underway to Identify Specific Improvements |
- on 870828,shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred & RHR Pump Tripped.Caused by Deenergization of RHR a When Safety Block Reapplied.Review of Nuclear Plant Blocking Underway to Identify Specific Improvements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000277/LER-1987-019-01, :on 870904,shutdowm Cooling Isolation & RHR Pump Trip Occurred Whem RHR a Logic Temporarily de- Energized.Caused by Loose Connection at Fuse Terminal.Lead at Fuse Tightened & Isolation Signal Reset |
- on 870904,shutdowm Cooling Isolation & RHR Pump Trip Occurred Whem RHR a Logic Temporarily de- Energized.Caused by Loose Connection at Fuse Terminal.Lead at Fuse Tightened & Isolation Signal Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-020-01, :on 870904,HPCI Sys Determined Inoperable Due to Opening of Resistor in Voltage Dropping Assembly.Exact Cause for Opening of Resistor Unknown.Resistor Replaced on 870914 |
- on 870904,HPCI Sys Determined Inoperable Due to Opening of Resistor in Voltage Dropping Assembly.Exact Cause for Opening of Resistor Unknown.Resistor Replaced on 870914
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000277/LER-1987-021-01, :on 870916,primary Containment Isolation Sys Actuated.Caused by Power Interruption to Distribution Panel. Isolation Reset & Indications Restored |
- on 870916,primary Containment Isolation Sys Actuated.Caused by Power Interruption to Distribution Panel. Isolation Reset & Indications Restored
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-022-01, :on 870929,loss of HPCI Occurred Due to Blown Logic Fuse.Probably Caused by Underrating of Socket for Undervoltage Relay on Battery 2D Charger.Hpci Logic Fuse Replaced & Static Inverter Placed on Ac Feed |
- on 870929,loss of HPCI Occurred Due to Blown Logic Fuse.Probably Caused by Underrating of Socket for Undervoltage Relay on Battery 2D Charger.Hpci Logic Fuse Replaced & Static Inverter Placed on Ac Feed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000277/LER-1987-022, :on 870929,HPCI Disabled Due to Blown Power Fuse in HPCI Logic Panel.Cause Unknown.Fuse Replaced within 35 Minutes,Static Inverter Placed on Ac Feed & Battery Terminal Voltage Monitored Every 4 H |
- on 870929,HPCI Disabled Due to Blown Power Fuse in HPCI Logic Panel.Cause Unknown.Fuse Replaced within 35 Minutes,Static Inverter Placed on Ac Feed & Battery Terminal Voltage Monitored Every 4 H
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000277/LER-1987-023-01, :on 871014,HPCI Sys Disabled Due to Blown Logic Fuse.Cause Unknown.Fuse Replaced within 5 Minutes.No Addl Corrective Actions Planned |
- on 871014,HPCI Sys Disabled Due to Blown Logic Fuse.Cause Unknown.Fuse Replaced within 5 Minutes.No Addl Corrective Actions Planned
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000277/LER-1987-024-01, :on 871112,isolation of RWCU Sys Occurred. Caused by Blowing of Fuse (12A-F-1) Which Supplies Power to Four Temp Switches.Fuse 12A-F1 Replaced & Isolation RWCU Sys Reset. W/8 Ltr |
- on 871112,isolation of RWCU Sys Occurred. Caused by Blowing of Fuse (12A-F-1) Which Supplies Power to Four Temp Switches.Fuse 12A-F1 Replaced & Isolation RWCU Sys Reset. W/8 Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-027-01, :on 870430,primary Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error by Inducing Ground & Blowing Fuse While Applying Blocking Permit.Fuse Replaced & Leads Restored to Original Condition |
- on 870430,primary Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error by Inducing Ground & Blowing Fuse While Applying Blocking Permit.Fuse Replaced & Leads Restored to Original Condition
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-028-01, :on 871217,design Deficiency Discovered Which Could Result in Diesel Generator Trips During Loss of Offsite Power Event.Caused by Deficiency in Original Design. Design Review of Cardox Sys Initiated |
- on 871217,design Deficiency Discovered Which Could Result in Diesel Generator Trips During Loss of Offsite Power Event.Caused by Deficiency in Original Design. Design Review of Cardox Sys Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) | | 05000277/LER-1987-028, :on 871217,design Deficiency That Could Permit Diesel Generator Trips During Seismic Event Discovered. Caused by Deficiency in Original Design.Two Possible Design Mods to Resolve Problem Being Evaluated |
- on 871217,design Deficiency That Could Permit Diesel Generator Trips During Seismic Event Discovered. Caused by Deficiency in Original Design.Two Possible Design Mods to Resolve Problem Being Evaluated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000277/LER-1987-029-01, :on 871221,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group III Isolation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. Isolation Signal Reset within 5 Minutes & Reactor Bldg Ventilation Returned to Normal |
- on 871221,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group III Isolation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. Isolation Signal Reset within 5 Minutes & Reactor Bldg Ventilation Returned to Normal
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-029, :on 871221,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group III Isolation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error While Pulling Fuses to Apply Blocking Permit for Mod Work.Operator Counseled to Be Attentative to Duties |
- on 871221,primary Containment Isolation Sys Group III Isolation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error While Pulling Fuses to Apply Blocking Permit for Mod Work.Operator Counseled to Be Attentative to Duties
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-030, :on 871230,partial Loss of Offsite Power Initiated Actuation of Primary Containment Isolation Sys. Caused by Failure of Time Delay Relay,Agastat Model 7022AD. Relay Replaced |
- on 871230,partial Loss of Offsite Power Initiated Actuation of Primary Containment Isolation Sys. Caused by Failure of Time Delay Relay,Agastat Model 7022AD. Relay Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000277/LER-1987-031, :on 871231,loss of Power to Block Valves Could Result in Loss of Feedwater Heating Event Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Error During Design Process.Plant Mod Prior to Startup of Each Unit Implemented |
- on 871231,loss of Power to Block Valves Could Result in Loss of Feedwater Heating Event Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Error During Design Process.Plant Mod Prior to Startup of Each Unit Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000277/LER-1987-031-01, :on 871231,recognized That Extraction Steam Block Valves Have Common Electrical Feed & Will Fail Closed on Loss of Power.Caused by Error During Design Process. Plant Mod Will Be Implemented, |
- on 871231,recognized That Extraction Steam Block Valves Have Common Electrical Feed & Will Fail Closed on Loss of Power.Caused by Error During Design Process. Plant Mod Will Be Implemented,
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000277/LER-1987-032-01, :on 871110,failure to Comply W/Cable Routing & Separation Criteria Identified.Caused by Engineering Design Personnel Failure to Provide Adequate Design to Const Personnel.All Mod Cables Wrapped |
- on 871110,failure to Comply W/Cable Routing & Separation Criteria Identified.Caused by Engineering Design Personnel Failure to Provide Adequate Design to Const Personnel.All Mod Cables Wrapped
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
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