05000364/LER-1989-001, :on 890225,Tech Spec Action Statement Requirement Not Met for Inoperable Fire Protection Sys. Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Revised to Include Step Requiring Sys Be Removed from Override

:on 890225,Tech Spec Action Statement Requirement Not Met for Inoperable Fire Protection Sys. Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Revised to Include Step Requiring Sys Be Removed from Override

ML20246P301
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	03/23/1989
From:	Hairston W, Dennis Morey ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-001, LER-89-1, NUDOCS 8903280178
Download: ML20246P301 (4)

LER-1989-001, on 890225,Tech Spec Action Statement Requirement Not Met for Inoperable Fire Protection Sys. Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Revised to Include Step Requiring Sys Be Removed from Override

Event date:
Report date:
3641989001R00 - NRC Website

text

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'e NIC Form 364 U.$. NUCLEAR 7;EQULATO2Y COMMi&SION ATPROVED OMB NO 3160 0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Expire $ s<3vns F ACILITY NAME til DOCKET NUMBER (2l PAGEt3a Joseph M. Farley - linit 2 0istololol316l4 1 lOFl 013 Technical Specification Action Gtatement Requirement Not Met For Inoperaale Fire Protection System Due To Personnel Error EVENT DATE (6)

LER NUM8ER 16)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER F ACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

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NAMg TELEPHONE NUMBER ARE A CODE D. N. Morey, General Manager-Nuclear Plant 2O5 899 5

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ABST R ACT llomst10 1400speces o e, ocoronometeiy torteen tongre speco troewritten Imeri (16) l At 1927 on 2-25-89, with the unit operating in steady state at 100% reactor l

power, a system operator (S0) was making routine rounds and questioned why fire protection sprinkler system (FPS) 2A-59 was in the override position.

The system was removed from override at 1933 and an immediate investigation I

was begun to determine why the switch was in the override position.

Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 requires that continuous fire watches or hourly fire watch patrols (as appropriate) be maintained for the full length of time that the fire protection system is inoperable.

The system had been placed in the override position on 2-24-89 at 0830 in accordance with FNP-0-FSP-28.0 (Smoke Detectors - Clean and Calibrate Procedure).

However, the Shift Foreman - Operating (SFO) secured the required fire watch for FPS 2A-59 at 1500 on 2-24-89 without verifying that the system was operable.

This event was caused by cognitive personnel error. The SF0 who secured the fire watch when the system was still in override has been counseled.

A contributing cause of this event was that FSP-28.0 did not require that the system be taken out of the override position when the maintenance was completed. This procedure vill be revised to include a step that requires that the system be removed from override when maintenance is complete.

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. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ApeRovfo ous No. siso-oion EXPIRES: 8/31/98 -

FA CILITY NAME 11)

DOCKET NUMBER (2).

, LER NUMBER (6)

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Plant and System Identification

Vsstinghouse 1 Pressurized. Vater Reactor Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the. text as [XX].

Summary of Event At 1927 on,2-25-89, with the unit operating in steady state at 100% reactor

- power, a: system operator-(50) was making routine rounds and questioned why fire protection sprinkler. system (FPS) [KP] 2A-59 was in'the override position.- The

. system was removed from. override at 1933 and an immediate investigation'vas-

.bzgun to determine why'the'svitch was in the override position.. Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 ';eauires that continuous fire watches or hourly fire watch patrols (as appropriate) be maintained for the full length of time that j

the fire protection system is inoperable. The system had been placed in the; override position on 2-24-89 in accordance with FNP-0-FSP-20.0 (Smoke Detectors -

Clean and Calibrate Procedure). However, the' Shift Foreman - Operating'(SFO)-

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secured the required fire watch for FPS '2A-59 at:1500 on~ 2-24-89 without verifying that the system was operable.

Description of Event

At 1927 on 2-25-89, while making routine rounds, a system operator (S0) questioned why FPS 2A-59 was in the override position. After ensuring that the switch should not be in that position, the SF0 instructed him to reset it at 1933.

An immediate investigation was begun to determine why the switch was in the override position, The investigation revealed that.on 2-24-89, personnel were psrforming FNP-0-FSP-28.0 (Smoke Detectors - Clean and Calibrate Procedure). In accordance with this procedure, FPS 2A-59 (139 Foot Elevation - Vest Corridor) vss placed in override at 0830. A Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered and the fire watch required by Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 was posted. Vork on FPS 2A-59 continued during the Day' Shift.

During SFO shift turnover, at approximately 1430, the status of FPS 2A-59 was-discussed. It was noted that the work on FPS 2A-59 was complete and the LCO and fire watch could be cleared as soon as FSP-28.0 had been received and functionally accepted. This procedure did not include a requirement.to remove the system from override when the maintenance was complete.

The associated FSP was received and functionally accepted. The Evening Shift SFO cleared the LCO and secured the fire watch associated with the work on 2A-59 at 1500 on 2-24-89 without ensuring that FPS 2A-59 had been returned to service (taken out of override).

FPS 2A-59 remained inoperable from 0830 on 2-24-89 until 1933 on'2-25-89.

However, the Technical Specification action for establishment of the needed fire-watch was not met from 1500 on 2-24-89 until 1933 on 2-25-89 since it was not realized that the switch was in override.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AreRovEo ous wo. sino-oio4

' EXPIRES: 8/31/8B FACILlVY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER 16)

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C:use of Event This event was caused by cognitive personnel error in that the SFO failed to ensure that the svi.:ch was in the correct position.

A contributing cause of this event was that FSP-28.0 did not require that the system be taken out of the ovxride position when the maintenance was completed.

Rzportability Analysis and Sd ety Assessment This event is reportable because the continuous fire vatch required by Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 was not maintained for the full length of time that the

'3 fire protection system was inoperable.- The inoperability of this system had no i

effect on plant operation. Also, an hourly fire watch patrol was in the area coch hour that the system was inoperable. No fire occurred during.the time that i

the system was inoperable. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. This event would not have a en more severe-if'it had occurred under a different operating condition.

Corrective Action

The SFO who secured the fire watch when the system was still in override has' i

bsen counseleo, Also, FSP-28.0 vill be revised to include a step that requires that the system be removed from override when maintenance is complete.

Additional Information

The folla.ng LERs involved personnel errors by the Shift Foreman in the establ'shing and maintaining of fire watchect Unit 1 (Docket 14 umber 05000348):

87-006-00, and 88-004-00 84-013-00, 84-015-00, 84-022-00, 86-013-00, Unit 2 LERs:

84-007-00, 85-007-00, 85-013-00, 88-004-00, and 88-003-00 l

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NRC FORPA 366A

.u,5, GPO 1988-520 5CO M010 19 B3h w

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w Alabama Powar Company 40 inverness Center Parkway Post Ofhce Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Talephone 205 868 5581 W. G. Hairston, Ill L

Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations AlabamaPower the southern electnc systern I

March 23, 1989 i

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I Docket No. 50-364 l

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk j

Vashington, D.C.

20555 J

l Dear Sir 1

l Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report No. LER 89-001-00 l

Joseph H. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Licensee Event Report No. LER 89-001-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted, (Al k, h: ? A C~~

V. G. Hairston, III J

VGH,III/ JAR:pr-8.13 Enclosure cc:

IE, Region II i

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