ML20209B964

Comments on Proposed Final Rules 10CFR50.72 & 10CFR50.73 Re Immediate Notification & LER Requirements,Respectively. Change That Would Limit Info Loss Between Rule Effective Date & Full phase-in of Immediate Notification Suggested

ML20209B964
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/11/1983
From:	Minners W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rosztoczy Z Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML20209B956	List: ML20209B952 ML20209B960 ML20209B964 ML20209B968 ML20209B974 ML20209C196 ML20209G103 ML20211M231 ML20211M244 ML20211M255 ML20211M278 ML20211M299 ML20211M325 ML20211M339 ML20211M350 ML21314A280 ML21314A281
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Download: ML20209B964 (7)

Text

r UNITED STATES ENCLOSURE 1773 n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.g .,, g =j WASHl';GTON, D. C. 20555

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%, , v...../ January 11, 1983

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• MEMORANDUM FOR: Zoltan R. Roszteczy, Chief .

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Research & Standards Coordina' tion Branch, DST  ;

FROM: Warren Minners, Acting Chief Safety Program Evaluation Branch, DST

SUBJECT:

. COMMENTS ON IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AND LER REQUIREMENTS .

(10 CFR 50.72 AND 50.73)

Reference:

Memorandua for H. Denton et al. from C. Michelson and R. DeYoung "Immediate Notification Requirement for Operating Nuclear Reactors (10 CFR 50.72) and the

' "'? Licensee Event Report (LER) System (10 CFR 50.73),"

December 28, 1982 We attach comments which l'ude the following points:

l'. For the LER rule wesuggest a simple change that would . limit-the information loss between the rule's effective date and full phase-in of the NPRDS.

2. We find the immediate notification rule poorly written and recommend extensive rewrite. "

3. The regulatory analyses are both weak in our opinion, especially the one on immediate notific,ation. We suggest ways to strengthen them with limited work. (We>do not believe that extensive value-impact analysis is warranted in either case.)

It' is no't clear to us from the cover memo what reviews are intended for the draft CRGR package. We requM4tsaT) opportunity to review it.

We are prepared to discuss any of our comments in further detail, We appreciate the invitation to comment.

//

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// m f ih m Warren Minners, Acting Chief

. Safety Program Evaluation Branch Division of Safety Technology cc: M. Ernst . -

R. C1'eveland G. Sege Attac.hment: As stated 1

• 23b56 30739 4 A

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s D

r ATTACHMENT

-COMMENTS ON'LER AND IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

,(Ref. : Memo-for H. Denton from C. Michelson and R..DeYoung, 12/2/82) s .

LER Rul'e (Enclosure 1 of the referenced memo.)

The referenced memo points out (at the bottom of p. 4 of the cover m'emo) that-considerable data loss is likely with the selected approach (Alternative 3) s -:

betkeen the effective date of the new LER rule and the time that NPRDS is fully phased in. Such period of dat'a loss need flot and'should not occur.

It can be avoided quite' diinpTy by allowing a longer-than-usual' time ~ period

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between publication of th dinal rule and its date of effectiveness.

L l~ accWding to present shcedule estimates for publication of the rule (late

) spring or early summer of 1983) and NPRDS readiness to fill the gap (perhaps I January 1984)' some 6 to 8 months of effectiveness delay would be involved,

-instead of'the 3 or 4 months that would be more' usual for rules of this sort.

A' note under the " Effective Date" entry '(Enclosure 1, p. 1) should state the reason for the longer delay.I,The note could be phr'ased along the following lines:

p:ss-

"A longer than usual time period is allowed between publication of this l

~ rule and its effective date in order to enable the industry'as well as

• NRC to gear'up for the new requirements and gain a better understanding of them before changeover from the present requirement's, and to avoid loss of valuable information during the transition."

l Thomas Dorian, ELD, advises that there would be no legal difficulty with

, such an approa,ch.

. . et .

. h e ti.

-Immediate Notification Reauirements (Enclosure 2) ,3 .

e This is poorly written and needs considerable work to improve the write-up's professional quality. Problems include the foll6 wing:

1. The way the adjectives " unusual" and "significant" are used is awkward and confusing. In the rule's usage " unusual event" and "significant event" both mean " hazardous event," and an " unusual" event is treated as more hazardous than a "significart" event.

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2. Partly in view of Comment 1, th'e Summary (Encl. 2, p.1) is inscrutable to a reader not fa'il1&r m ,

with what follows it.

Manyofthepublicc5mmentsaresummarizedinwaysdifficulttounder-5 3.

>$and. Some of the responses are cryptic as to action taken. The technical rationale that has led to the indicated response is seldom

, apparent. The detail given is voluminous but not very specific. We have not been able to discern well what the major points of public comment have been and what changes resulted and why.

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4. (a).The overall justification for changing the present rule, which has

. the benefit of over 2 ye_ars _of experience with it, is not presented fully se == .

and systematically.

(b) There is reference to intent to " reduce the number of inconsequential reports" (p. 11, paragraph 1), but no explanation of how extensive and t oublesome these are with the present rule, and how specific changes will bring about the desired reduction without loss of needed reports.

(c) Speci,fics are lacking about what is meant by "simnil'ar in wording and i~ntent to reporting in the new 50.73 'LER System'." (P. 11, second paragraph.) Are there conflicting requirements that must be reconciled?

.If not, there should be a clearer indication of the safety or admini-strative values of the consistency sought, as part of the justification of the changes and of the rationale for their specifics. ,

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5. The' definitions and requirements of the Emergency Classes should be

- included in the rule published in the' Federal. Register. NUREG-0654, Revision 1 can be referred to f:r further supporting detail (including examples of initiating conditior.s), but should not be relied on for

. th'e requirements themselves or :ne essentials of their ration' ale.

-6. (a) Page'11, line 2: In "little safety significance," the word

" radiological" should be inserted before " safety," to avoid implying

, that " fatality or injury" (p.11, line 3) has no " safety significance."

(b) Page 11, first paragraph an'd p. 34, parigraph '(6): A fatality on site should be required't6'bs reported to NRC regardless of whether there is a news release. NRC.'should not have a policy of waiving a reporting requirement on condition that the information is withheld from the press.

7. The rationale for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as notification deadlines and for distribution of events between the prompt and less urgent categories should be set forth explicitly, if briefly. The general reference to public commjnts is quite in order, but cannot be a substitute for substanti've rati:nale.

8. Encl. 2, Page 33, paraggi4): The distinction between " radioactive release" in sentence (i) and " liquid release" in sentence (ii) is

, confusing. Is the attached mar <.-up (Exhibit A) what is meaht? *

9. Pa,ge 35, paragraph (3): This c.ange would require NRC initiative to establish an open telephone lir.s. The present rule requires the licensee to do it and depends c- NRC action only for closing it (not for opening it). What jus-ification is there for this' change?

10. The write-up has many spelling and typographical errors and .

grammatical inconsistencies. (;:e can provide a partly marked copy of the draft.)

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'11. There are some heading. errors: (a) there is no Section II; , ,

. (b) the rule itself is a subhead under a heading called "VIII. -

Regulatory Analysis;" and (c) public comments are discussed partly under "III. Analysis of Comments" and partly in the long (8 page) section headed "IV. Specific Findings," with no clue to the relation between the two.

Reoulatory Analysis for LER Rule (Enclosure 3) 4  :

We agree that only a limited value-impact analysis is warranted, because the costs are difficult to estimate and the safety value difficult or impossible to quantify. However,ws;t0ggestthatthefollowingcouldstrengthenthe analysis to a worthwhile extent without much effort and without lengthening

.s. '

. the writeup much:

1. Best and bounding estimates should be made of the cost impact. These should be rough NRC-judgment estimates, which may be influenced by the public-comment estimates summarized on pp. 4 and 5. But we should not just say "here are the v,arious public estimates" and be silent as to our own evaluation. I

2. Page 4, item 1: Did the._compenter say what the 100 man years was for?

(1 plant for its lifetime? Total for all plants, per year? All plants, lifetime?)

3. The benefits discussion (p. 5) deserves more emphasis and elaboration.

Il~couldbeplacedbeforethecostdiscussion. -It should comment on the value gained from what will be reported better, the value lost from what will no longer be reported, the net benefit, and the re'lation to the NPRDS and how that affects our estimate of the benefits.

4. It should be made clearer whether the motive for the rule is to enhance

. safety or to limit the burden on the industry or a mixture.

5. The concluding statement fp. 5, last paragraph) is unconvincing: it says only that the reviseo LER system "will not place ari unacceptable burden on the licensees." Benefits as well as cost' burdens should enter the conclusidn. (The conclusion may flow more easily after the additional work suggested by our Comments 1 to 4.)

Reoulatory Analysis'of Immediate Notification Reouirements (Enclosure 4)

1. ,, This analysis does not include even a simple value-impact analysis.

' It should. . With the evident d.ifficulty of quantifying net cost impacts and, especially, safety benefits, only a very limited value-impact arialysis effort is w'ayr'a'nted. It should, however, not be omitted '

altogether. (The sep,tton headed " Benefits and Costs" (pp. 4-6) does not contain such analysis or information.)

2.- The specific benefits noted under " Background" on p. I should be discussed and placed'in some sort of perspective as to significance even if the e elude' quantitative risk appraisal.

3. Page 4, para. 3, second , sentence: What is the basis of the " optimum benefit" assertion?

hex = .

4. For increase or decrease i,n cost impact, some quantitative indication,

. however rough, should be provided. The only cost figures now given *

(p. 5, middle) are for manning the NRC telephones, and even for this ele.

7 ment of total cost there is no indication of how, if at all, it would be affected by the proposed changes in requirements.

5. It would be useful to put some rough numerical.value or range on the "little" additional cost to industry (p. 5, las't sentence).

'6. The conclusory statements (p. 6, secorid paragraph and " Final Decision" section on pp. 7-8) are unsupported.

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. - a . O O

E G .*?. i T h *

[7590-01)

(2) Any event that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any ,

Engineered Safety Featdre (ESF), including the Reactor Protection Systeni.(RPS).

Actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned. sequence dui-ing testing or, reactor operation need not be reported.

'7 .(3), Any event or condition ~ that alone could hEve prevented the fulfill-ment of the safety funct. ion of structures or systems that are needed to: -

(i)

Shut dow'n-the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown.c'ondition; (ii) Remove residual heat; (iii)

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Control the re'. ease of radicactive m,aterial.

Such events may include one or more personnel errors, , equipment failures, .t and/cr dis sien, anzi hlahtica.tien, and/or procedural inadecuacies.

(4)/(ii) Anyp radioactive release that. exceed $ 2 times the applicable N P.

concentrations (see 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Note 1) of 10 CFR Part 20, -

me.==

Appendix B Table II in unrestricted areas', when a~veraged over a $ime ceriod[oj

. r'o d 10 achi Ve Qne hour. (d) Any liquid 3 release that exceeds 2 times the limiting combined Kaximum Permissible Concentration (MFC) see 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix 3, Note 1) at the point of entry into the receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for all rac"ionuclieds except dissolved neble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour. 46., -

(5) Any event requiring the trans' port of a radioactively contaminated

.ndividual to an offsite medical facility for treatment.,

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