ML20211P586
| ML20211P586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1997 |
| From: | SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211P584 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9710210030 | |
| Download: ML20211P586 (18) | |
Text
- '
Enclosure 3 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Charging Pump-Shutdown Technical Specification Changes Unit i Technical Specification Pares 9710210030 971016 "
-PDR ADOCK 05000348 p PDR;
e 1 FNP Unit 1 -
- Technical Specifications Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Charging Pump-Shutdown Technical Specification Changes Chanced Panes 3/4 1-9 Replace B 3/4 1-3 Replace -
B 3/4 1-4 Replace
+.; _
3 ..
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN
. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 s se enarging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE'and capable of'ceing powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus..
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5* and 6.
ACTION:
- a. With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all ops _ _ons l involving CORE ALTERATIONS or' positive reactivity changes,
- b. With more than one charging pump capable of injecting into the ECS, except as allowed-during pump swap operations,-immediately take action to render all but the above required OPERABLE pu p inoperable as specified in 4.1.2.3.2.
t SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS <
4.1.2.3.1 The above-required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE.by-verify!ng,-that on recirculation flow, the pump
= develops a differential pressure # of greater than or equal to 2458 peig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
g4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps,. excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall te demonstrated. inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakars have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.
- A maximum of one charging pump shall be' OPERABLE whenever the temperature of or.9 or more of the RCS cold legs ia less than or equal to 180*F; however, two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non-water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERA 5LE or the RCS is vented via an open'.ng of no less than 5.7 s72are inch 6s in area.
- Differential pressure ir not required to be verified when the Y- RCS is in a water solid' condition.
~
FARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 1-9 AMENDMLNT NO.
PEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 4
BASES BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued) g With the RCS temperature below 100*F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable. "
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugr' arging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify . 2 charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable bslow 180*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the _s
- operation of a single RHR relief valve. Two chargayg pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS for a short time to allow the pumps to be swapped.
This allows seal injection flow to be continually maintained, thus, minimizing the potential for ACP number one seal damage by reducing pressure transients-on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal.
Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surf aces and lost, of
- seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully reseat.when pressure is reapplied. Low temperature overpressure protection is most critical during. shutdown when the RCS is water solid. Mass input transients can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure allowing little time for operator action to mitigate the event. For these reasons, more than one pump should be made capable of injecting into the RCS only when the RCS is in a non water solid condition and when both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an_ opening of at least 5.7 square inches. A 5.7
- square inch opening is equivalent to the throat size area of two RHR relief _
valves.
The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide _a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the COLR after xenon decay and cooldown from 20C'F to 140*F. This condition requires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water-not availabi because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.
4 The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of tha RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 AMENDMENT NO.
REACTIVITY CONTPOL SYSTEMS BASES The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFOELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.
For purposes of determining compliance with Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, any inopecttility of full length control rod (s), due to being immovable, .nvokes ACTION statement "a".
The intent of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 PCTION $
statement "a" is to ensure that before leaving ACTION statement "a" and utilizing ACCION statement "c" thtt the rod urgent failure alarm is illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem is detected in the rod control system by mirimal electrical troubleshooting techniques. Expeditioun action will be taken to determine if rod immovability le d2e to an electrical problem in the rod control system.
The ACTION statements which ;srmit limited variations from 5 the casic requirements are accor3 2nied by additional restrictions which encare that tre original design criteria are met.
Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.
The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the ascumed-rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T avg greater than or equal to 541*F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.
Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are requ'.ad to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.
FARLEY-UNIT 1 E 3/4 1-4 AMENDMENT NO. l
t a .
1 Enclosure 4 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Charging Pump-Shutdown Technical Specification Changes Unit 2 Technical Specification Pares s
1 N
P
- -4 d
FNP 1; nit 2 Technical Specifications Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Charging Pumn - Shutdown Technical Spedncation Changes Chanced Paces 3/4 1-9 Replace I
B 3/4 1 Replace _
~ B 3/4 1-4 Replace _
1
- 1
-REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 4
CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION g
'3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Spezification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and' capable of being powered.
from an OPERABLE emergencyEbus.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5* and 6.
ACTION:
- a. With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations l involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
b.. With more than one charging pump capable of injecting into-the RCS, except as allowed during pump swap
- operations, immediately take action to render all but the above required OPERABLE pump inoperable as specified in 4.1.2.3.2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .
4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a differential: pressure # of greater than or equal to 2458 psig when tested pursuant to specification 4
4.0.5.
4.1.2.3.2 -All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.
a A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or . equal to 180*F; however, two charging purps may be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non water solid condition and both PHR relief valves are
- OPERABLE or the RCS is venced via an opening of no -less than 5.7
' square inches in area.
- -Differential pressure is not required to be verified when the RCS is.in a water solid condition.
FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 1-9 AMENDMENT NO.
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
' BASES
- BORAT',9N SYSTEMS (Continued)
_ MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL fro.a full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 11,336 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 44,826 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.
With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the baeis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 180'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single RHR relief valve. Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS for a short time to allow the pumps to be swapped.
This alluwe seal injection flow to be continually maintained, thus, minimizing the potential for RCP number one seal damage by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal. g Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surfaces and loss of seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully reseat when pressure is reappl .d. Low temperature overpressure protection is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid. Mass input transients can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure allowing little time for operator action to mitigate the event. For these reasons, more than one pump should be made capable of injecting into the RCS only when the RCS is in a non water solid condition and when both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of at least 5.7 square inches. A 5.7 square inch opening is equivalent to the throat size area of two RHR relieg valves.
The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the COLR after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F. This condition requires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water ne:
available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.
FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 AMENDMENT NO.
. s REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES' The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMELIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.
For purposes of determining compliance with Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, any inoperability of full length control rod (s),
due to being immovable, invokes ACTION statement "a".
The intent of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTIOh statement "a" is to ensure that before leaving ACTION statement "a" and utilizing ACTION statement "c" that the rod urgent failure alarm is illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem is detected in the rod control system by minimal electrical troubleshooting techniques. Expeditious action will be taken to determine if rod immovability is due to an electrical problem in the rod control system.
The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provida assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.
The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T avg greater than or equal to 541*F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at ope-ating conditions.
Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adoquate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.
FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-4 AMENDMENT NO. l l
y D
-. Enclosure 5 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Charging Pump - Shutdown i Technical Specification Changes :
Units l&2 Marked-Un Technical Specification Panes -
O e-g
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 Ori charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capaolo of being powered f rom an OPERABLE emergency bus.
APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 5" and 6.
ACTION:
6.. With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operatio's involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. .
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a differential pressure, of greater than or equal to 2458 psig when tested pursuant to Specification b, 4.0.5. ,
4.1.2.3.? All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.
"A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERA 3LE whenever the temperature cf one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 180*F)(-----
- 0ifferential pressure is not required to be verified when the RCS is i
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am sg % f.7) #' D 3/4 1-9 AMENOMENT NO. 26 FARLEY-UNIT 1
(
s v
REAcTTVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS r
BASES 3 ORATION SYSTEMS ' Continued)
With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptab'e .
without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORI ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 180*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressur - sient can be relieved by the operation of a single RHR relief valve. Jgg The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the COLR af ter xenon decay and cooldown f rom 200*F to 140*F. This condition requires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 ppm berated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 ppm bora:ed water from the refueling water storage tank.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.
The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated l ,
within containment after a LOCA. This pC band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this-system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES g The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distri'ution o limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN KARGIN is maintained, tnd (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control. rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the contrw. rod riignment and insertion limits.
t FARLEY-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 AMENDMENT NO. 123 l l
con a .w n i;n L;..in A:s JJC 10, 1997.
Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS
~
/ .
for-a short-time to allow the pumps to be-swapped. This -
-allows seal injection flow to be continually maintained,.
thus, minimizing the po?.ential for RCP number _one seal damage by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by 1 preventing RCS_ water from entering the seal. Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on-the seal surfaces _and loss-of seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully rcseat_when pressure.is reapplied. Low temperature overpressure-protection is most critical-during shutdown when the RCS is water solid. Mass input transients can cause- a v. e ry rapid increase in RCS pressure allowing little time for operator action to mitigate the event. Tor _these reasons, more than one pump should be made capable of- -
. injecting into-the.RCS only when the RCS'is-in a non water solid condition and when both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE
~
or.the RCS is vented via an opening of at least 5.7 square-inches.- A 5.7-square inch opening is equivalent to.the
-throat size area of two RHR relief valves.
l
- d.
~
, I Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Charging Pump-Shutdown Technical Specification Changes
- Unit 2 Marked Up Technical Specification Pm
<~
o REACTIVXTY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1. 2. 3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Speci-fication 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5* :.nd 6.
ACTION:
A..With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERA-TIONS or positive reactivity changes.
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- S SURVEILLAMCE REQUIREMENTS '
4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a differential pressure, of greater than or equal to 2458 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERA 8LE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.
"A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever tne temperature of
- one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 180'F, s Differential pressure is not required to be verified when the RCS is in water solid condition. v 1
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FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 1-9 l
a
~ REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
, BASES-BORATION SYSTEMS /Centinued)
With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting. CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPER4SLE and the surveillance Requirement to verify all-charging pumpe except the required ~ OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 180*F provides. assurance that
-a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation _of a single RHR relief valve.
The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a SHUTOOWN HARGIN as specified in the COLR af ter_ xenon decay and cooldown from
~
200*F to 140*F. This condition requires either.2,000 gallons of 7000 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of d.scharge line location and othat physical characteristics.
The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST l also ensure a pH value o.! between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimises the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
The OPERABILITY of one boron injection ayutom during REFUELING ensures that this - system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1.1 MOVAatt CONTRCL ASSEMBLIES TPs specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential ef fects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and tnereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.
1 FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 m .
.x s . . . ..AMENDME,NT,,NO,.
-.. ~ ~ ~ , -i.3
o
/f Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS for a short time to allow the pumps to be swapped. This allows seal injection flow to be continually maintained, thus, minimizing the potential for RCF number one seal damage by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal. Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surfaces and loss of seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully reseat when pressure is reapplied. Low temperature overpressure protection is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid. Mass input transients can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure allowing little time for operator action to mitigate the event. For these reasons, more than one pump should be made capable of injecting into the RCS only when the RCS is in a non water solid condition and when both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of at least 5.7 square inches. A 5.7 square inch opening is equivalent to the throat size area of two RHR relief valves.
2
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _